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ABSTRACT
Japan's military policies, particularly its air power policies,
have not been closely related to contemporary national security require-
ments. The military organization which has evolved in post-war Japan has
reflected to a degree Japan's perception of its milieu, but its
orientation and posture has often been affected by special groups or
factions with distinct interests. Those internal pressures have
resulted in a military organization which has sacrificed operational
capacity for the establishment of an organizational core from which a
broader range of military options could be undertaken in the future.
This study examines the evolution of the Japanese Air Self-Defense
Force and those related organizations responsible for the use of air
power in the defense of Japan. Historical, political, strategic, social
and institutional factors have affected this evolution over the first
twenty years of Japan's independence after World War II; they have been
discussed in order to clarify Japan's air power goals. The study is
based on the assumption that detailed examination of a force structure
can test related policies and permit assessment of any presumptions
concerning the basis of the policies. Moreover, it has been further
hypothesized that close assessment of one aspect of national security
policy can provide a different perspective and new insights to the whole
of that policy.
In order to test the noted assumptions and reach the stated
conclusions the Air Self-Defense Force has been studied from a somewhat
different perspective. Its characteristics and capabilities have been
evaluated in terms of stated government policies, and thesis organization
reflects the assumption that a nation's security policies can be tested




some discussion of the theoretical parameters of national security
policy and a general review of Japan's post-war attitudes toward the
security problem. After examining the Japanese perceptions of threat and
the variables which condition and limit policy, the process whereby
policy is formulated has been traced in detail in order to identify those
groups which participate in it.
The bureaucratic nature of the process and its institutionalization
during the post-war era have increased its significance. The relative
influence of the parties in the relatively inflexible evolution has also
affected interpretation of the policy.
Finally, the air power structure as it existed in 1972 has been
examined in detail in order to delineate the policy choices which, in
fact, have been undertaken. In addition, the actual capabilities of the
force structure condition, the perceptions of Japanese policy-makers, and
aid in assessing the probability that specific defense options might be
exercised in the future.
Previous studies in the general area of Japanese defense policy
have not examined institutional details of the force structure or its
operational capability. They have arrived at widely varying conclusions
regarding Japanese policy, and have cited the Self-Defense Forces as
example of their deductions. Academic efforts in this area have often
utilized a general approach to security policy rather than the specific,
functional method used here.
The conventional body of knowledge concerning Japanese security
policy has contained certain assumptions. Those include:
Japanese defense policy was developed early in the occupation and
did not change for the first twenty years of independence. It proposed
reliance on the United States for external defense and emphasized
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autonomous capability for internal stability;
Japanese political leadership has taken an active and informed role
in defense policy formulation. Therefore, the first assumption may be
considered a cohesive policy reflecting the views of various interest
groups and implemented throughout the national government
;
Strategic thought in Japan has been definitive and cohesive, and
groups reflecting this body of thought have had access to the political
leadership and have supported the previously mentioned defense policy;
The rearmament steps which have been taken have been contrary to
the basic policy and have been the result of United States pressure,
particularly during the first ten years after the Korean War began;
The Japanese military forces which have resulted from the above
policy have remained small, but become quite effective. They were built
to complement the U.S. force structure in Asia, but have achieved a
certain autonomous capability to defend the home islands;
Japanese national security policy has continued to be uniquely
limited by the strong currents of pacifism and anti-militarism in the
society;
On the other hand, there have been indications, for example in
defense spending, that the military has achieved a larger role in Japanese
decision-making. Some danger of resurgent Japanese militarism has arisen.
These conventional wisdoms regarding Japanese national security
policy are challenged in this study and an alternative series of deductions
have been proposed:
Defense policy has not remained constant since 1947. The evolution




The evolution of defense policy has reflected both external and
internal pressures. While the United States played a significant role
in the birth of the Air Self-Defense Force, the impetus for its develop-
ment and the emphasis it was accorded were not the result of American
pressures. Initiative for the policy evolution came primarily from
defense-oriented groups within the Japanese policy-making structure;
The political leadership has not been active in policy formulation
and has acted only reluctantly, when the press of events or consensus
below has forced recognition of policy evolution. This has reflected
the historical sensitivity to military policy in Japan, but also reflected
Japan's belief that it has faced a very limited threat in Asia;
Strategy has not been discussed thoroughly in post-war Japan. No
cohesive body of thought has developed, and strategic theories have not
had a great deal of influence within the Japanese decision-making process;
Military policies have been limited by social and political factors,
however the nature and severity of those restrictions have not been so
extreme as to constrain policy-makers unnaturally. The receding memory
of World War II and a growing Japanese national awareness have contributed
to Japan's acceptance of its military establishment;
The resultant force structure was not an American invention, nor
has its role been determined by political pressures or social factors.
The air power structure has not contributed to the maintenance of internal
security; it has not emphasized operational coordination with the United
States forces; it has had an extremely limited operational capacity,
whether autonomously or otherwise; and the policies which have guided the
Air Self-Defense Force have not aspired to those objectives;
Recent increases in the defense budget and the selection of military
equipment have not reflected increased military influence. The direction

and pace of Japanese military development has been primarily the result
of political-economic pressures. Military options in policy implementation
have continued to receive relatively little discussion or consideration
by the Japanese government.
The isolation and disregard of the military has created a
situation where it has been allowed to control its own evolution
within strict economic limitations. Budgetary allocation stressing
operational capacity has been eschewed by the military planners, and the
Air Self-Defense Force has developed into the nucleus of a larger air
force rather than a combat ready organization. It has stressed an




A study such as this which attempts to investigate a contemporary
social subject must rely heavily on information directly provided by
participants and current observers. This thesis is no exception and
regretably, it is impossible to recognize all those who helped within
this short preface. Before acknowledging the efforts of a few of the
many upon whom I relied during the past eighteen months, I wish to
recognize the United States Navy which released me from normal duties
thereby making it possible for me to pursue the study. Without its
financial and administrative support, the necessary research would have
been incalculably more difficult.
The topic which I selected was directly related to one of the most
immediate concerns of government. Consequently, its sensitivity could
have made information difficult to obtain. In this regard, I am greatly
indebted to Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, who took
a personal interest in this project and wrote to General Ishikawa
Kanshi, Chief of Staff, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, explaining
my study and requesting General Ishikawa's assistance.
I conducted the majority of my research in Japan during a five-
month period in 1971 and 1972, and was warmly and courteously received.
The Air Self-Defense Force cooperated with me in every way possible and
went far beyond the bonds of normal hospitality to make me welcome in
their midst. I am grateful to the officers and men of the Air Self-
Defense Force; another volume would be required to thank all who helped
me during my stay. General Ishikawa was the pre-eminent example of
the spirit in which I was received and the pride and professionalism
of the military organization he leads. The personal prestige of this




I also wish to note the invaluable assistance which I received from
those special people who went beyond simply responding to my requests
and gave of themselves, each in his own way:
Mr. Taoka Shunji, defense affairs correspondent of Asahi Shimbun
,
seemed constantly by my side during my stay in Japan. His professional
knowledge, his tireless enthusiasm, and his innovative and cogent mind
were a source of great inspiration to me. Moreover, he opened his home
to me and taught me far more of his nation then the subject I studied;
Mr. Ogawa Raita, Vice President and Managing editor of Koku Shimbun
and a highly respected expert on Japanese military aviation, was incredibly
generous with his time and effort;
Lieutenant Commander James E. Auer, United States Navy, dear friend
and student of Japanese naval affairs, provided information, encouragement,
criticism and other instances of aid to numerable to mention. He was
a source of strength to me, in ways that defy description;
Mr. Raymond Y. Aka of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo, an American official who has been associated with the
Self"Defense Forces from their inception, who arranged meetings with
Japanese officials and leaders which would have been impossible without
his aid. In addition, he himself was an important source of historical
data;
General Sanagi Sadamu, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, retired, the
second Chief of Staff and ex-Imperial Japanese Navy officer, gave me the
benefit of his vast knowledge of the history of Japanese military
aviation and his personal experiences in the post-war era. The integrity,
the dedication, the ability and the stature of this man were, in
themselves an invaluable experience;
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Mr. Sonoyama Noriya, Foreign Liaison Section, Air Staff Office,
Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, who was assigned the unenviable task of
dealing with my daily problems, was always available and tireless in his
efforts in my behalf. His concern for my study and my success will
remain a warm memory of my stay in Japan.
Officers from the other branches of the Self-Defense Forces such as
Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, Chief of Staff, JMSDF, Vice-Admiral Samejima
Hiroshi, JIISDF, and Major General Muraoka Hideo, JGSDF, provided valuable
information and opinion. Japanese government officials, including
Director-General Masuhara Keikichi, Japan Defense Agency, Secretary-
General Kaihara Osamu of the National Defense Council, Defense Councillor
Yasuda Hiroshi, Security Division Head Matsuda Yoshifumi of the Foreign
Ministry, and Mr. Masuoka Ichiro, Secretary to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the National Diet, provided first-hand
information on the subject.
American officers and officials were also quick to assist me and
provide data vital to this thesis. They included: General Eugene B.
LeBailly, United States Air Force; Rear-Admiral Julian T. Eurke, Commander,
Naval Forces Japan; Dr. Dean C. Allard, archivist of the U.S. Naval
History Division of the Chief of Naval Operations; Mr. Jack W. Davis,
Chief, Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force, Japan; Lieutenant
Colonel Edmund K. llartenberger , USAF, Mutual Defense Assistance Office,
American Embassy; and Major Claude C. Blanch, USAF, Defense Objectives
Branch, Commander, United States Forces, Japan.
Retired officials from both Japan and the United States provided
first-hand data regarding the evolution of the Air Self-Defense Force.
They included: Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; Generals Otto P. Weyland
,




Vice-Admirals Kuwabara Torao, IJN; Terai Yoshimori, JMSDF; Lieutenant-
Generals Okumiya Masatake, JASDF; and Arinuma Genshiro, JASDF.
Outside the public sphere, representatives of acadeniia, the media,
and private institutions were most cooperative in giving me the benefit
of their views and criticisms. I am particularly indebted to:
Professor Tsunoda Jun, Professor of Diplomatic History, Kokugakuin
University; Professor Royama Michio, Institute of International Relations,
Sophia University; Mr. Aoki Hideo, Managing Editor, Kokuj oho ; Professor
Momoi Makoto, National Defense College; Mr. Arimori Mitsuo, Executive
Director, the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors; and Mr. Mabuchi
Ryoitsu, Defense Production Committee, Keidanren. Professor Geoffrey
Kemp, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, was the second reader
of my thesis and was helpful in developing its organization of this
thesis.
Professor Allan B. Cole, Professor of East Asian Affairs, the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, directed my thesis and was
unstinting in his efforts. Professor Cole must accept a responsibility
beyond that of thesis director, however; he has guided my study of Asian
affairs and advised me throughout my post-graduate education.
I relied on the services of several excellent translators and
interpreters, however, it is appropriate to single out Mr. Nakagawa
Nozumo, who ably assisted me in many difficult situations.
Beyond those who provided assistance directly related to the
substance of the thesis, there were many, including some already mentioned,
who through their kindness, hospitality and generosity made the trip to
Japan far more than an educational experience. The list of all those who
opened their homes to me and my family would exceed the bounds of this
short note, but they made our visit a unique and. total experience which

we shall long remember.
Lastly, I wish to thank my wife, Shirley Marie Hughes. She has long
provided trust, encouragement and criticism over the course of the
challenges I have faced, but on this particular challenge she went far
beyond the traditional role of support with which a wife is often
credited. She left the comfort and security of American suburbia, and
with my son, accompanied me to a small apartment in Tokyo. Not only did
she come, but through her optimism and enthusiasm she made a great
adventure from what could have been a sacrifice or a separation. Wife,
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AIR POWER AND THE SCOPE OF DEFENSE POLICY

This study focuses on the evolution of air power and air power
doctrine in Japan in the era since World War II. Air power is a complex
concept, difficult to define and delimit. An air force is a bureaucracy
and an institution; aerospace is an environment; an aircraft is a unit
within a weapons system; air defense is a functionally oriented mission.
An air force, or any military organization, may be treated through
diverse academic orientations. It may be studied internally, either
from a historical perspective or through institutional assessment. An
air force may be compared to the society to which it belongs. The
conclusions of a treatise of this nature might be drawn in terms of the
institution's compatibility with society or the degree to which societal
characteristics are reflected in the organization. A military organiza-
tion may also be evaluated solely in terms of functional performance.
The present study examines the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force from
a different perspective. This force will be evaluated as a reflection
of past Japanese policy towards the use of air power for national
security, and as an indication of the directions of Japanese policy
toward the future use of air power. Such an approach only has value if
air power policies are essential to military policy and In turn,
relevant to national security policy.
In an international system comprised of states capable of exercising
force in their external relations, the survival of the social unit is
related to its capability to respond to acts of force directed against
it. There are varied methods of dealing with the actual or potential
threat of force, and the sum of all these measures might be called the
state's national security policy.
A state must concern itself with different levels and types of
threats. Classical military threats include direct assaults against

the national territory or other essential extensions of the state. The
threat may also be indirect: a state may face internal disruption, or
it may be denied access to natural resources or the use of international
seas and airspace.
National security policy, or the response to these various contingencies,
may include political, legal, economic or counter-force measures designed
to deter such potential or actual threats. Within the international
system as it has evolved in the post-war era to 1972, foreign policy and
defense policy are interrelated; they defy separation. * Raymond Aron
includes all related policies and actions in the general title, "diplomatic-
strategic behavior", indicating that defense and foreign policy are two
aspects of a continuum which should not be separated. The balance
between the means of effecting national security policy depends on the
state's national experience and in part on the nature of the international
system to which the state belongs.
When Japan regained its status as a sovereign nation-state on
April 28, 1952, the relative importance of military alternatives had been
deemphasized by its historical experience. The disastrous result of
World War II had thoroughly discredited their efficacy. Japan's leaders
were aware of the latent hostility which could be excited through emphasis
on its military capability. A legacy of mistrust existed among the
nations which Japan had dominated during the war. The Soviet Union and
The systemic interpretation included here relies on Raymond Aron,
Peace and War , A Theory of International Relations (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1968) and Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles; or the Setting
of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1968).
I have relied on Aron for his concept of political-strategic interraction
and his concept of power in international relations. Hoffman's views of
the recent evolution of the international system are also integral to






the Chinese People's Republic were among the states who refused to sign
a peace treaty with Japan; instead they had signed a treaty specifically
hostile to Japan.
The Japanese homeland had been devasted in the war and Japan devoted
itself to recovery. Japanese initiatives were limited and the government
dealt with its many problems through an extensively revised form of
government as a result of a new Constitution, drafted and adopted during
the Occupation. The resultant pragmatic policies were focused inward
and external policies were primarily reactive. There has been little
or no attempt to project Japan's power or ideals outside its national
boundary; economic advancement and more recently, social and public
welfare have been emphasized.
Japan's focus on domestic concerns did not relieve it of attention
to national survival problems as long as a theoretical possibility
existed that another state or states could take action inimical to it.
The nature of the problem was quite different for Japan because the
international system which it faced in 1952 differed greatly from the
pre-war one. The basic systemic structure had changed and a bi-polar
system dramatically divided the world into two hostile camps.
Normal international intercourse between the two spheres was largely
suspended. States theoretically faced three choices: they could become
members of either sphere, or opt for a non-aligned neutralist position.
In reality, Japan did not have a full range of options because it
bordered a division of the bi-polar system where sphere boundaries were
sharply defined. The United States had occupied Japan after the war and
led one of the juxtaposed sets of coalitions. The Japanese government
negotiated the Peace Treaty almost exclusively through the United States.
The U.S. envoy, John Foster Dulles, represented the Japanese to the other

signatories. The United States intended that Japan join the "free-world".
The neutralist option was not viable in light of the geo-political and
other realities.
'Free World 1 membership was not an inimical prospect to the Japanese
conservative leadership. The basic political orientation of the
bureaucrats who were in power was similar to that of the United States
leadership in that they supported the status-quo and felt considerable
antipathy towards internal or external communist movements. Japan
continued to choose membership in the same camp of the bi-polar system
after it achieved independence. Options offered by opposition parties
have included armed or unarmed neutrality, strict or leaning neutrality,
or a socialist orientation; all have been rejected by the electorate.
The bi-polar system which has dominated the 1950' s and 1960's has
been an important consideration in the Japanese security problem.
Although states may deal with each other in various types and levels of
intercourse, military interractions are discouraged within spheres by
the dominant state. On the other hand, inter-bloc transactions have
carried some presumption of hostility which has suggested emphasis on
military means of exercising power in these relations.
National military policy has not been historically important in
post-war Japan for two reasons. Military action relevant to inter-bloc
confrontation would rarely be undertaken on a national basis without
approval, coordination and support from the super-power. In addition,
certain system boundaries are high-risk, sensitive points of confrontation
where military acts could escalate rapidly. The superpowers discourage
military action in these areas, such as Central Europe and Northern Asia.
As a result of these national and international factors, Japan has
established a hierarchy of Interests and potentialities which emphasize

its economic strength. It has become a global giant in economics,
literally trading around the world. In contrast, the Japanese government
has played a limited diplomatic and political role, concentrating on the
United Nations and regional activities. This has been dramatized by a
total commitment to forego military actions beyond the defense of its
territory.
The government's emphasis on diplomatic cooperation is one method
of effecting national security although Japan has recognized United
Nations ineffectiveness, and implicitly the limits of diplomatic action:
"thus it must be said that there is a long way to go before achieving
international society and the establishment of peace (through the United
o
Nations).' The government's emphasis on the improvement of domestic
economic conditions, and recent increases in economic aid programs and
international development financing also may be considered relevant to
national security.
Systemic reinforcement of the deemphasis on military means in
international relationships began to disentegrate in the latter half of
the 1960's. An evolving military balance between the super-powers and
a growing independence of national units within the spheres have
contributed to deemphasis of the bi-polar system. The Sino-Soviet
dispute, the policies of the Nixon administration in Asia, the United
States-Chinese detente and limited disharmony in the United States-
Japanese relationship have signalled increasing political diversification
in Asia. The growth of Soviet naval forces in Asian waters, preoccupation
of the United States Seventh Fleet, reduction of U.S. forces, and Chinese
Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan , October 1970, official
translation, p. 9. This was the first defense white paper which the
Japanese government has published since World War II.

nuclear capacity indicate that the forementioned policies have been
implemented at the strategic level.
Military measures remain a possible means of exercising influence
in the international system, and the increasing multi-centrism of the
international system increases the possibility that force might be used
in bilateral conflicts as well as inter-bloc confrontations. A multi-
centric system increases the possibility that applications of force
would not generate a multilateral response in that such a system more
closely corresponds to a theoretical group of independent units capable
of exercising military force in any relationship. The previous assumptions
concerning military response relevant to the bi-polar era may no longer
be valid in all future situations. Some minimum level of autonomous
counterforce capacity, to include thwarting an attack and limiting
damage, would then be likely to become an integral part of national
security policy. Therefore, the evolving multi-centric system which
Japan faces generates a new and complex series of questions. Japan
must decide if its previous deemphasis of military measures in national
security policy can continue to provide most efficiently for its security.
In addition to systemic modifications, Japan's growing economic
infrastructure, a source of power and vulnerability, has increased the
4
likelihood that its perceptions of threat may change. Increased
probability that unilateral military action may be required also has
increased the probability that Japan is evaluating individual power
relationships between itself and its potential adversaries. Those
relationships consist of comparisons of all elements of national power.
Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and
Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Frcntice Hall Inc., 1970) described
the tremendous growth of Japan in the 1950' s and 1960's and projected
continued expansion of the economic base.

Military elements constitute a basic ingredient of the power relationship
and resultant policy.
If military measures have some likelihood of becoming a more
important aspect of Japanese national security policy, there remains the
problem of defining the specific parameters of these measures and their
affect on Japan's basic orientation. Before Japan's current policy or
future policy towards military methods of effecting security may be
determined, its past attitudes and the basis of those attitudes are
relevant
.
Over the past two decades, Japanese defense policy, or the lack of
it, has not been the subject of significant academic discussion outside
Japan. In the bi-polar world of 1952, Japanese military policy would
have had little meaning. The United States' concern for Japanese
security increased as the confrontation with the Soviet Union evolved
although it demonstrated some interest early in the Occupation. Its
decision to deny occupation rights in Hokkaido to the Soviet Union may
have been the first post-war measure taken to preserve Japanese cohesion.
As the Occupation evolved, and the negotiations for independence began,
the leaders of the United States and Japan did not openly disagree on
national security policy. The Japanese attitude has been the subject of
speculation, primarily because the United States government displayed
a rather inflexible attitude. Japan, it felt, must deal with the
security problem in a manner satisfactory to the United States before
independence. John Foster Dulles testified before Congress that the
Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty could not be separated: "yes, they
5See Herbert Feis, Contest Over Japan (New York: W. W. Norton
Company, 1967) where he described the lengthy, bitter dispute over
control of Japan as the war ended.

are very definitely interdependent; they interlock."^ As a result, the
Peace Treaty and the U.S. -Japanese Security Treaty went into effect
simultaneously. The terms and implementation of the Security Treaty
left the newly independent Japan with a national defense policy which
included foreign military bases on Japanese soil. From that day forward,
national defense policy has been one of the most controversial subjects
in Japan.
There are at least three diverse theories which purport to explain
the basis of Japanese policies regarding the employment of its military
forces in the post-war era. The first explanation has described Japanese
policy as only a derivative of United States' Asian security policy.
Japan functioned as the acquiescent partner who planned and executed
only what she was bid. This view was held by both opponents and
supporters of the policy. The Japanese Socialist Party recently
reiterated its opinion concerning the matter:
"U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Japanese
Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific
,
82nd Congress, 2nd Session Hearings January 21, 22, 23 and 25, 1952
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 62. Even the
title of the hearings suggests the interdependence Mr. Dulles referred
to. For an excellent discussion of the various aspects of these early
negotiations, see John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power , The Japanese
Dilemma (New York: Dunellen, 1971), Chapter 3, and Martin E. Weinstein,
Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971) also Michael B. Hughes, "Guardianship to Partnership: The
Evolution of the United States Base Structure in Japan, 1952-1970,"
April 20, 1971, unpublished (MALD Thesis), Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, chapter II, where I discuss the various
U.S. attitudes toward the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty.
'I am not suggesting the Security Treaty was signed under duress or
contrary to the basic goals and beliefs of the Japanese leaders. How-
ever, the timing of the Treaty, the secrecy of negotiations, Constitutional
aspects and the implementing U.S. forces illustrate and explain the
uncertainty and controversy surrounding the subject, whatever the
positions of the leaders on both sides, or the rational advantage to
either state.

(The time has come to end).... the period of the Japan-
U.S. Security Treaty - an era of Japan's subordination
to and dependence on the United States... and in which
Japan has been forced to cooperate with the Asian strategy
of the United States. 8
This acquiescence is not necessarily viewed as a positive or willing
attitude on the part of the Japanese government. It has been characterized
as "essentially passive - an effort to hold in balance" American demands
and the pacifist feelings of the Japanese people. At one level of
abstraction such an explanation is a truism. The defense of Japan was
an integral part of American security policy, and as Hoffman observed,
"everyone's heart misses a beat while the superpowers 'confront' one
another. No one else much matters then." Japan, like any other
nation-state within the sphere of a superpower, had limited options.
Perhaps the key to this first theory is that it sees the Japanese
government acting without autonomous goals and acquiescing to United
States policy except where limited by internal factors such as politics,
social attitude, economics and the Constitution.
The other major theories do not disagree with the above concept of
the international system. They do, however, believe that the Japanese
government operated with positive objectives. The first of these
theories became popular during the establishment of the National Police
Sugiyama Shozo, ed., Japan Socialist Review , November 15, 1969,
p. 3, organ of the Socialist Party of Japan. This view has also been
evident in non-hostile sources such as George F. Kennan, "Japanese
Security and American Policy", Foreign Affairs , Volume 43, No. 1,
October 1964, 14-28; James H. Buck, "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces,"
Asian Survey
,
(September 1967), VII, No. 9, 597-613, Major Gilbert M.
Billings Jr., "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force," Air University Review ,
Vol. XVI, No. 5/July/August 1965), 71.
a









Reserve and it foresaw the "resurgence of Japanese militarism." It is
a conspiracy theory which postulates that the Japanese government is
planning the rearmament of Japan eventually leading to military dominance
and the expansionist policies of the 1930' s. Accusations to that
effect were quite common in early 1952 while the Status of Forces
Agreement was being reached, and from January to June in 1954 when the
Defense Agency was organized. * The viewpoint received less attention
afterward, although each new defense build-up plan or defense budget has
elicited charges of a similar nature.
The past three years have seen a revival of this explanation of
Japan's defense programs, and accusations have been heard from two rather
disparate sources;' The Chinese People's Republic and the United States
12Congress. The tremendous Japanese economic growth, and the popularization
of jishu boei , autonomous defense, in Japan have appeared to rekindle
the theory. During a recent Diet controversy over the Fourth Defense
Build-up Plan, the opposition parties repeatedly assailed the "dangerous
13
trend toward unlimited militarism and failure of civilian control."
Although these charges are often polemic attacks, the basis of the charge
is that Japan again plans to project its power primarily through
Japanese newspapers during this period were filled with such
charges, see particularly Tokyo Shimbun , April 21, 22, 1952, Japanese
Press Summary
,
February 12, 29, 1952, Yomuiri Shimbun , March 26, 27, 1953.
For a current, and academic source supporting this view see Myung-kin Yiu,
"The Prospect of Japanese Rearmament," Current History , Vol. 60, No. 356
(April 1971), 193 ff.
12
Premier Chou En-Lai began his criticism in 1968 and has continued
to charge that Japanese militarism is "being revived." The United
States-Chinese Joint Statement, February, 1972, is an indication of the
emphasis placed on this issue by the Chinese. U.S. House of Representatives
Foreign Affairs Committee, Survey Report, 1970, "warned against Japanese
militarism."
13




Although this theory and others will be criticized throughout this
volume, it is important to note some of the assumptions relevant to
such an explanation of Japanese military policy. Japan would have to
maintain secrecy regarding its final goals and implementation; those
wishing military dominance (presumably including the uniformed establish-
ment) would require access to the political decision-making process; and
if such an evolution has been and is occurring, the military budget and
inventory would reflect weaponry associated with the projection of power.
A third theory which seeks to explain the rationale behind the
development of the Japan Self-Defense Forces has been expoused by Martin
Weinstein. He also concluded that Japan has not been passive regarding
the military aspects of national security policy; it instead took the
initiative in 1947 and developed a policy based on its own assessment
of the evolving situation in Asia.
It concluded that the only viable defense to the major threat,
which was the Soviet Union, lay in dependence on the United States. The
resultant policy has been actively and continuously pursued since first
proposed and, in essence, consists of two major pillars:
(1) A mutual defense agreement with the United States
which would include a guarantee against direct attack
(2) Japanese forces capable of maintaining internal security.
Japan's Postwar Defense Policy is Weinstein 's principle work on
the subject. Also see a recent edited volume, James William Morley, ed .
,
Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1972), for a less theoretical, and current series of
studies which generally reach conclusions similar to Weinstein; Japanese
defense policy has been reached autonomously and has deemphasized
military options.





The Japanese government has not always been successful in implementing
these goals, and American demands have led to some rearmament steps
outside the policy framework. Nevertheless, Weinstein has contended that
the two forementioned goals have shaped the government's approach to the
security treaties with the United States, and to the allotment of
resources to the Self-Defense Forces.
This explanation of Japanese defense policy also contains assumptions
which deserve a fuller discussion. If the Japanese force structure has
been oriented toward internal security, its organization and equipment
should reflect such emphasis. Weinstein capsulized the decision-making
process by contending that "Prime Ministers Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi,
Ikeda and Sato have made defense policy." If the decision-making
process is not that simple, it becomes necessary to explain the goals of
groups which have an interest in security and to ascertain their access
to the process whereby policy is formulated.
A basic difficulty with these explanations of Japanese defense
policy is that each one has concluded by contending that the Self-Defense
Forces illustrate the validity of their evaluation. This contradiction
is possible because in each case the force structure has not been
evaluated definitively.
A closer examination of the Japanese force structure would appear
to clarify analysis of Japanese defense policy in two respects. Neither
policy nor strategy operates in a vacuum. The means of implementation
of military policy lies, at least partially, in the force structure. The
roles, capabilities and priorities within that structure should help to
define previous policies.





An American military strategist has concluded that "wars are won on
sound strategy implemented by well trained forces which are adequately
and effectively equipped." Therefore, one sure means of delimiting
future policy orientations and strategic options is to determine the
character of the force structure, its training and equipment.
The allotment of resources within the force structure, the training
and operational capacity of the structure, and the command network which
direct it not only define and clarify policy and strategy, but will act,
over time, to modify those policies with which they conflict. Therefore,
it would appear that any definitive discussion of defense policy should
base itself, in part, on close evaluation of the force structure.
The task of analyzing the entire Self-Defense Force in detail and
relating that analysis to the framework of national security policy
would be an unmanageable task. In an effort to limit the study, yet
reflect the relationship between policy and force structure, the Air
Self-Defense Force and air power policy will be used to illustrate the
relationship which has been postulated.
Air power and the air force functionally limit the scope of the
study, but should accurately define the force structure-policy relation-
ship. Upon the establishment of the Japan Defense Agency, air power
was emphasized by the first Director General, Mr. Kimura Tokutaro, who
announced the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) would be the
18
principal weapon used in the defense of Japan. Commentators have
regularly referred to the JASDF as the "frontline force," the force most
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S. Army, Wedcmcyer Reports (New
York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958), p. 74.




operationally ready within the Japanese defense forces.
Air power may play a great variety of roles and be used in different
strategies, but the combination of a particular weapons system and its
associated training and tactics is of limited flexibility. Therefore,
data in this area will be relatively reliable in reinforcing or disposing
of certain assumptions about the air power aspect of defense policy.
Air power is a very significant element in the projection of military
power; and while it is conceivable, it is unlikely that any industrial,
modern nation-state would attempt to project its power without the use
of aviation. Therefore, study of the structure built to implement air
power should aid in reaching definitive conclusions about that aspect
of national defense policy. Such an approach must have limitations, and
it should be noted that any conclusions reached regarding defense policy
beyond the immediate aspect of air power may be reached only through
20inference or association.
Aviation may be employed in several functional military roles.
Aircraft and missiles may be used to attack other aircraft or missiles
on an intercept mission, as in defense against a bomber force. This
same air to air role may be used to achieve air superiority over any
given space or territory. Aircraft may attack targets on the land or
sea to achieve tactical or strategic goals. Aircraft weapon systems
19 See Buck, loc . cit
. ,
p. 605-610; Aoki Hideo, "Jishu Boei to
Nippon no Boei no Ryoku," (Autonomous Defense and Japan's Air Defense
Capabilities), Gunji Kenkyu , July 1971, pp. 160-162; and Martin E.
Weinstein, "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force, Restrained But Powerful,"
Air Force and Space Digest , Volume 50, No. 12, December 1967.
20The lack of substantive reinforcement to conclusions about defense
policy is endemic to anyone who studies the subject horizontally; in
other words, those who emphasize only the making of the policy, or only





may be used in close air support at the battle front; they may be used
in interdiction, or interruption of the supply lines between the source
and the front; and they may be used in strategic bombing or attack at
the source of the adversary's supply. Air power may be used to attack
naval targets on the surface or beneath it. It also may be used to
obtain intelligence or to carry out reconnaissance. Avaiation may serve
to supply a military force and to give it mobility.
The portion of the thesis dedicated to analysis of the force
structure will focus on the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) . All
aviation activities are not administered and operated by the JASDF; the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Ground-Self Defense
Force (JGSDF) have a Naval Air Force and Aviation Section, respectively.
The roles of these two branches will be considered and all aspects of
air power will be examined through discussions of milieu, policy,
strategy and command capacity. However, in relation to manpower, training
and operations, cohesion of the study is preserved by focusing on the
JASDF. All of the above-noted air power functions will be discussed in
some degree, although capacity in some areas is nonexistent and the
responsibility for execution of others is rather vague.
The organization of the study depends on the presumption that force
structure does reflect the perceptions and the resultant security
policies of the policy-makers. It therefore begins where the policy-
makers begin, with an assessment of the power balance in Northern Asia.
The respective national strengths and relevant force structures in Asia
will be discussed primarily in terms of Japanese perceptions.
The decision-maker must consider another series of factors relevant
to his own state before he begins constructing policy. The following
section of the study will pursue these internal parameters which include
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geo-political characteristics, natural resources, social indices and
national traits. Institutional and historical factors peculiar to the
Air Self-Defense Force are particularly relevant to the formulation of
air power policy. The policy-maker must understand these national
self-limitations as well as the potential adversary's capabilities.
The next step is the process through which the policy is formulated.
It may include a formalized bureaucratic evolution or a more simple
personal or elitist group decision. Decision-making can be complicated
in the most totalitarian societies, and in Japan it has become a complex,
highly bureaucratic process. Japan's political leadership has
demonstrated little interest or expertise; as a result, the process
Itself has determined the access of various interest groups and clarified
their goal orientation.
Uniformed planners, civilian defense bureaucrats, politicians,
industrialists and others have demonstrated interest in Japanese
defense policies. While the policy formulation process contributes to
understanding the relative influence of these groups, two subsequent
sections analyze the existing and potential aspects of the force
structure and thereby demonstrate functional areas in which policy has
been dominated by particular groups. The force structure in Japan
previously has received little academic attention, and that which it
21
has received has been superficial and uncritical.
21The JASDF has been called a "sizable and very efficient force,"
and there are many who have expressed this opinion. See Edwin 0.
Reishchauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttlc,
1970) p. 297; or Weinstein, "Restrained But Powerful," loc. cit . , p. 65;
or Buck, loc . cit
.
,
p. 610. Emmerson, Arms and Power , pp. 127-151,
discusses the SDF in slightly more critical terms, but again, passes
over its operational status in a few paragraphs. Or Under Secretary
U. Alexis Johnson in Senate testimony: "Japan has the capability (to
defend) against a major conventional attack." U.S. Congress, Subcommittee
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The failure to examine the force structure rigorously has led to
misinterpretations of the basis of Japan's attitude toward military
means of effecting national security policy. I intend to demonstrate
that Japan's leaders have not perceived any threat, and therefore, the
bureaucracy has not been required to reach a consensus on military
policies. The social and institutional parameters have not severely
constrained policy-makers; as a result, the process by which policy was
formulated has become extremely important. The force structure illustrates
the isolation in which the uniformed planners work; it also indicates the
industrial influence and economic motivation in defense development.
The irreconciled, and in some cases contradictory policy proposals, have
resulted in a force structure capable of exercising a variety of future
options, but having limited operational capacity. These perspectives
will present a less rational and cohesive, but more realistic interpre-
tation of Japanese national security policy, its past and its future.
on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on
Foreign Relations , United States Security Agreements and Committments
Abroad, Japan and Committments Abroad, Japan and Okinawa , 91st Congress,
2nd Session, Hearings (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1970), p. 1167.

II.
THE NEED FOR MILITARY FORCE

A military force structure is presumed to be a means of effecting
military policy, which is, in turn, one method of effecting national
security. National security policy describes those measures and
positions taken by a state to contend with the threats which it perceives.
Any proposal or action which was viewed as inimical to a state's
interest could be considered a threat. However, few states act in the
interest of other states, and such an unlimited definition of threat
would equate national security policy to all of a state's external
policies. The concept may be limited to deal with those hostile measures
or actions which directly or potentially endanger the survival of the
state.
There are at least three distinct areas in which a state's survival
may be challenged. One, of course, is direct attack against the
territory of the state. Secondly, a state can be subjected to indirect
attack, as when it is deprived of essential rights of passage or access
to resources and markets upon which it depends. The state's existence
may also be threatened by internal dissension initiated or exacerbated
through external influence.
The possible use of military forces in response to the first type
of threat is obvious; such forces also have application in the second
situation, particularly if the required access or resources were denied
through use of force. A military organization could be required to
maintain martial order or curtail external influences in the event of
indirect aggression.
It is possible to agree that such threats exist conceptually, but
to disagree as to their reality. Moreover, throat exists as perceived
by the state threatened; whatever the balance, that perception is the




The two chapters in this section therefore will emphasize the
Japanese perception of their international environment. The first
chapter deals with the geo-political balance in Asia, and discusses
Japanese policies which condition and limit the government's evaluation
of threat. The second chapter focuses on the nature of the threat as
suggested by Japanese strategic thought. Strategic theories are at
least partially generated by threat or the projected anticipation of
threat. The resultant strategies provide additional evidence of Japanese
perceptions regarding the probable levels and forms of violence with




Certain of Japan's geo-political and social characteristics may be
identified in terms of strategic strengths and weaknesses. Although
these elements are internal, and independent of the states surrounding
Japan, they directly pertain to Japan's interpretation of threat.
Direct attack on Japan is complicated by its insular status. The
four major islands which constitute the bulk of Japanese territory are
separated from mainland Asia by 125 miles at their closest point of
approach. However, the nation stretches more than 1300 miles along the
Asian littoral, presenting a long, exposed coast to the continental
nations.
Moreover, it is heavily populated, having 106,000,000 inhabitants
in 1970; and even within the limited territory there is a pronounced
concentration of population and industrial resources. Such a concentration
presents a vulnerable target and urbanization continues; more than 75
percent of the population was classified urban in 1970. The population
is principally located along what has become a super megalopolis,
stretching around the Keihin industrial area and extending west through
Nagoya, Osaka and Hiroshima to the northern coast of Kyushu. This
area, illustrated in Figure 1-1, is approximately 500 nautical miles (N>I)
long and 100 NM wide at its widest point; it produced more than 75 percent
Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan (Tokyo: Japan













of the total industrial output of Japan in 1969.
The rapidly expanding economic infrastructure also leaves Japan
more vulnerable to indirect attack. The Japanese gross national product
(GNP) , which was the equivalent of 3.6 billion dollars in 1947, will
3increase to 276 billion dollars in 1972. Japan is heavily dependent on
importation to fuel its industrial complex; it has the largest merchant
fleet in the world and became the world's third largest trader in 1970,
exchanging almost 20 billion dollars per year. The oceans surrounding
Japan, barriers to direct attack, also make Japan potentially vulnerable
to indirect pressures.
The ocean does limit the potential for massive infiltration aimed
at creating internal dissension. Social and economic factors make the
possibility of indirect aggression even more remote. The Japanese are
a remarkably homogeneous population, in race, language, ethos and social
customs. Minority groups are too small to constitute problems. Per
capita income has risen from the equivalent of 34 dollars per year in
1947 to more than 2090 dollars per year in 197 2. 5 Japan has appeared
to be capable of dealing with the rising expectations of its people.
2See Teikoku's Complete Atlas of Japan (Tokyo: Teikoku-Shoin
Company, Ltd., 1969), p. 16. Some estimates made in Japan during 1971
suggested that an even greater percentage of industrial output was
concentrated in the megalopolis. Suffice to say that the heart of
industrial Japan lies within the relatively small rectangle.
Economic Planning Agency, op_. cit .
,
pp. 152-153, the 1972 estimate
is my own, interpellated from the 1970 GNP at official growth figures
(8%) for 1971 and estimate for 1972 (5.5%), and converting at current
exchange rates.
Ibid., p. 83. I did not consider flags of convenience in classifying
the Japanese merchant fleet largest.
5Ibid
. ,
p. 152-153, calculated in the same manner described in FN3.
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Japan, from this base, has chosen to deemphasize military methods
of national security during the 1950 's and 1960's despite the large
military structures present in the People's Republic of China, North
Korea and the Soviet Union. Some of the factors which have determined
Japan's national security policy have been mentioned already, however,
the factors and in some cases, the policies themselves contribute to
Japan's perception of threat. To the extent that the policies reinforce
or alter perceptions, they contribute to future policy and therefore
pertain to the current discussion.
Japan has no official enemy. Government statements scrupulously
avoid any reference to a possible adversary. A secret military planning
document which was written within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was
leaked in 1965, and a significant portion of the resultant furor arose
because China and North Korea had been used as enemies in this mock
operations plan. Prime Minister Sato was forced to testify in the
Diet that the government did not "look upon any country as its potential
enemy." More recently, General Uemura, a recently retired JASDF Chief
of Staff, testified at a trial in Hokkaido involving the ASDF in which
he indirectly acknowledged that the Soviet Union was a probable enemy.
g
The revelation made news throughout the country.
This incident known as the "Mitsuya Kenkyu" or "Three Arrows Plan"
had been prepared as a joint operation study two years before in the
Joint Staff Office of the JDA. A paper drill or operational analysis
type plan, it of course had no direct connection to Japanese policy, nor
was it an expression of same.
Malnlchl Daily News , February 11, 1965, background information




January 28, 1972. As explained when I discuss this matter
in an interview with Major Torino on February 5, 1972, General Uemura
simply did not deny an allegation made by a defense attorney.
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Japan has refused to consider using military force outside its
territory. It has repeatedly asserted that troops will not be dispatched
overseas, that no interests outside the national territory will be
defended by the Self-Defense Forces. The Constitution forbids resorting
to armed means to settle international disputes, and in October 1971,
Director General (DG) Nishimura declared that the principle would be
"applied to the protection of our overseas economic interests and
t .,10assets
.
Japanese nuclear policy, as commonly expressed during the 1970 's,
has consisted of the three no's: it will make no, allow no and have no
nuclear weapons in Japan. 11 The very existence of the adamant non-
nuclear policy has had an effect. Japan's lack of military nuclear
capability has been equated with lack of capacity to deal with a nuclear
threat. An adversary's nuclear force structure has been disregarded
except for the "nuclear umbrella" which normally has been presumed to be
provided by the United States. The effect of the Security Treaty on
Japan's non-nuclear policy may be subject to question. In October 1971,
Director General Nishimura remarked that: "even if the nuclear umbrella
of the United States should be removed from Japan the situation will
12
not change." It might be argued that this attitude toward nuclear
9Defense of Japan
, pp. 38-39, The New Defense Build-up
, pp. 3-5.
UNishimura Naomi, Director General of JDA, Philosophy of Self-
Defense - Strategy of Limited Response , October 11, 1971, text of speech
delivered to the Foreign Correspondent's Club of Japan, p. 8.
See Chapter 2 for a discussion of Japanese non-nuclear policy.
-^Nishimura, Philosophy
,
p. 38, there was a very Freudian slip in
the printed text of the speech which actually read, "the unclear umbrella
of the United States." This quotation is drawn from a response to a
question rather than from the actual text.
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armaments is the norm of national behavior; all nations, with the
exception of France, China and perhaps India, have continued to be willing
to rely on the nuclear deterrent of the superpowers. The Japanese case
is peculiar in that Japan has a technical capability to develop nuclear
weapons and is surrounded by neighboring states who do have nuclear
arsenals.
The policies which have been mentioned have reflected the disparity
between the military forces capable of exerting influence on Japan and
its autonomous capacity to respond to the threat with force. Any
apparent incongruities between its national force structure and national
interests may represent an unconventional emphasis on defensive methodologies,
but have primarily been explained in terms of the U.S. -Japan Security
Treaty.
It has in fact been argued that the national defense structure is
tasked only with the maintenance of internal order while all other
aspects of national defense are to be effected through implementation of
the Security Treaty:
These forces were to maintain internal security, and by
doing so were to contribute to the creation of a mutual
defense relationship with the United States, which was to
include a guarantee of Japan's external security."
Regardless of the validity of this assessment, the Security Treaty
has served as a substitute for various aspects of a conventional national
defense structure. Thus the Security Treaty has been relied on to
provide a counter-force response to various modes and levels of external
threat. Such a policy tends to assume a bi-polar world, or at least a






It is in such a situation that any threat to Japan would prove an
identical threat to the United States; the U.S. method of dealing with
the threat could be assumed to correspond to the best interests of
Japan.
If the Security Treaty ever represented such identity of threats
and interests, it no longer did in 1972. If United States security
interests were global and all-encompassing, they were not in 1972.
Despite changes in the perceived national interests of the parties and
modifications of the international system, Japan and the United States
have continued to place great emphasis on the Security Treaty. In the




This explanation tends to be absolute and perhaps not completely
accurate, but is used to emphasize the issue. I shall not attempt to
treat the historical evolution of the Security Treaty. It is, of
course, an essential facet of Japanese national security, and I shall
discuss and refer to the security relationship throughout this study.
However, the history and development of the U.S. -Japanese security
relationship has been covered in detail elsewhere. Refer to Weinstein,
Postwar Defense Policy
,
for a detailed review in english; and Emmerson,
Arms
,
part 2, for interesting aspects of early U.S. -Japanese negotiation.
Also see "The U.S. -Japan Security Treaty," Boei Nenkan (Defense Yearbook)
(Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko Kai, 1972 ed.), pp. 101-113. The official
Japanese view may be found in Defense of Japan, "The Development of
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements" (section 4-1). For opposition views
of development refer to "DSP Views Toward the Government-LDP Decision
for Automatic Extension of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty," Democratic
Socialist Party Statement, (U.S. Embassy Translation) and "Indictment
Against Automatic Extension of Security Treaty; Arms of 1970 Treaty and
our Attitude," Shakai Shimpo (organ of the JSP), June 17, 1970 (U.S.
Embassy Translation). A detailed, newspaper outlook on the treaty is
provided by "Japan's Peace and Security: Part III: The Security Treaty,"
31 parts, The Mainlchi Daily News , November-December, 1968. See also
Hughes, op_. cit . especially Chapters II and IV, William J. Jorden,
"Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West," Borton, e_t al_. , eds. Japan
Between East and West (New York: Harper and Brother, 1957); and Fred
Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1968) . What I shall attempt to do is focus on the changing complexion
of the treaty due to the change in policies and capabilities in Asia.

27
We intend that Japan shall remain our most important
Asian ally. We expect that the future will be an even
greater degree of interdependence between us. We believe
the vitality of our friendship and our cooperation in
international matters is essential to the stable Asia
we both require—and to the peaceful world we both
seek. 15
On January 29, 1972, in his annual policy speech to the Diet, Prime
Minister Sato also reiterated the importance of the relationship:
For Japan, our relations with the United States are more
important than those we have with any other country.
Today, no matter to what extent international relations have
become multipolarized, this fact has not changed in the
slightest degree. Xo
There has been, however, a shift in the nature of the relationship.
Even in the reaffirmations cited above, Prime Minister Sato noted the
multipolarization of the international system and President Nixon did
not talk about the defense of Japan but of common interests shared in
Asia. Three months before, then Director-General Nishimura gave a major
defense policy address, and did not specifically mention the Security
Treaty. He mentioned the confidence provided by "Japan's security
relationship with the U.S.," however, he then declared:
This does not mean, however, that Japan will forever, and
in every field of national security, depend on the U.S.
Nor will Japan take every U.S. protection for granted.
We are doing and will try to do more by ourselves. Never-
theless the security relations with the U.S. are a basic
15President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's:
The Emerging Structure of Peace , A Report to the Congress, February 9,
1972 (Washington, D.C. , U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 58.
^Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, text of administrative speech




element for which we have not yet found any effective
alternative.
There were several interesting aspects to the statement. The Director
General indicated that the relationship was changing, and that there
was a difference between U.S. interests and Japanese interests. Perhaps
most significantly, in terms of the threat to Japan, Mr. Nishimura
acknowledged that the probability of U.S. action differs with the nature
of the threat involved.
Japan will not take " every protection for granted." The Director
General was rather explicitly acknowledging that there were situations
in which the United States might not act, situations in which Japan
previously may have expected the United States to act.
The Nixon Doctrine included a reaffirmation of the nuclear umbrella,
but warned that local conflicts must be dealt with by the parties
concerned. President Nixon said Japanese-American cooperation was
essential to a stable Asia. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi put it another
way in 1969; American forces were necessary "to keep the peace in the
1 ft
region." The United States will not become directly involved in
local conflicts, but will participate in regional stabilization. A
security relationship tempered by the Nixon Doctrine forces Japan to
assess the limits of the U.S. commitment before it can determine the
value of the relationship. What will be the nature of the stable Asia
to which the President referred? May a regional subsystem be defined
and how may it be made stable? What level and type of cooperation in
this endeavor has been offered? Japan has disassociated itself from any




October 1969, p. 31
1 ft
, "Japan's Legacy of Change," Foreign Affairs ,
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role in a global military balance. However, within the increasing
multi-centrism in Asia, there exists the possibility that regional
threats might arise which could demand new responses from the Japanese.
Raymond Aron asserted that the first characteristic of a system :'is
19
the configuration of the relation of forces." This, he said, involved
several questions; "What are the limits of the system? What is the
distribution of forces among the various actors? How are the actors
situated on the map? "2"
The primary purpose of defining such a system is to determine
possible threats to Japan, therefore, it is permissible to begin by
designating it a political-military sub-system. The actors may be
defined by their capability to project their influence on Japan by the
r r 21use of force.
Figure 1-2 is a world polar projection centered on Tokyo and it
graphically presents the problem of distance for participants in an
Asian political-military sub-system. The continental states of
Southeast Asia may be eliminated, both by virtue of their distance and
lack of seagoing navy. Australia is over 3000 miles away; its defense
budget is only two-thirds of the Japanese defense budget, its GNP






, Professor Tsunoda Jun, October 21, 1972, Interview, was
very helpful in clarifying my concepts regarding Japan's international
milieu particularly on a regional basis.
21
The reverse (Japanese threat) need not be considered for two
reasons; the threat to Japan has been established as the major criterion
and Japan's policy and force structure provide a low capability for
Japanese force projection. Section V discusses air power capacity in
detail. It should be noted that the issue of the U.S. role in
conditioning Japanese perception of threat. has been suspended in order
to establish the system in which it will operate. I shall return to
the U.S. role in the Japanese view of their system.
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FIGURE 1-2. World Polar Projection Centered on Tokyo, Japan

















one-sixth that of Japan. ' The Philippines is closer but having one-
tenth of the Japanese defense budget and one-thirtieth of the Japanese
GNP eliminate it as a threat.
Indonesia must be considered more carefully because of its position.
It guards the Straits of Malacca, Japan's gateway to the Mideast. It
also claims control of Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait, two deepwater
straits between the Malacca Strait and Australia. Japan is dependent on
trade and particularly dependent on the supply of oil from the Mideast. 2 -*
Japan imported 99.4 percent of its crude oil in 1968 and 91 percent of
that came from the Mideast. Therefore, the Malacca Straits provide
an ideal geographic checkpoint to apply pressure to Japan. It should
be remembered that the point here is to assess the strategic possibility
of sea-lane interdiction, not to assess the probability of Japanese
reaction although proposals for sea-lane protection are outside of the
mainstream of defense theory in Japan."
22Approximate figures taken from International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London; International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1971) pp. 44-47.
^Commander Sekino Hideo, I.J.N, (ret.), defense author and advisor
to the Foreign Ministry stressed this vulnerability in discussions on
December 2, 1971 and February 28, 1972. Also, see Auer, James E.,
"The Postwar Sea Forces of Maritime Japan, 1945-1971." (Ph.D. Thesis),
July 1971, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
pp. 276-300 for a detailed account of the Sekino Theory asserting the
need, and possibility for protection of the sea lanes. Another thorough
discussion of the problems of the maritime defense is Sekino Hideo,
l.J.N. (ret.), "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
.
May 1971, pp. 98-121.
24




Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, when Director General, declared that Japan
had "neither the capability nor the intention to go on the high seas" to
protect its tankers, Proposals on Mutual Security Between Japan and the
United States
,
text of speech delivered at the Washington Press Club,
September 10, 1970. Professor Royama Michio of Sophia University told
me that such theories "were pre-nuclear and archaic; they are not
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The Indonesia archipelago is a geographic checkpoint, however, it
is not an insurmountable obstacle. Japan operates twenty-five-knot
supertankers which, by 1971, began to bypass Malacca; and shipping could
go around Australia. In political terms, there appears little advantage
for the present Indonesian government; Japanese economic reprisals
could outweigh the advantage of attempting blackmail at Malacca. The
only probable use of Malacca Straits as a geo-political checkpoint would
occur when a state with probable benefit used that location to apply
pressure in collusion or alliance x^ith Indonesia.
With the Southern Asian nations eliminated, the regional subsystem
narrows to Japan's five immediate neighbors and the United States.
Figure 1-3 provides a rough summary of the size and ready force structure
of these states. The United States is far from the center of the
regional system; this special discrepancy will be discussed in more
detail later. The Asian deployment of United States' military forces
does make it capable of acting in the political-military sub-system.
One obvious fact is revealed by Figure 1-3. There are four large, or
potentially large, members, and there are three relatively small actors.
Although North and South Korea and Taiwan have the technical capacity
to reach Japan with the weapons they possessed in 1971, such a venture
seems highly unlikely. Aside from political realities, they could
feasible technically, economically or politically," Interview, February 5,
1972. Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary General of the National Defense
Council and others were also very critical. Commander Sekino recognized
the improbability that Japan would (could) extend such protection, he is
therefore interested in much closer maritime coordination between Japan
and the U.S. Seventh Fleet; Interview, December 2, 1971.
26Taiwan has both the air and naval capacity to reach Okinawa (approx.
300 NM.) with F-100's, F-5's, Airborne Brigades, Destroyers and Landing
Ships, North Korea could drop bombs on Honshu with IL-28's, Mig-17's, and
MiG-21's (400 NM to Hiroshima); See Military Balance, 1971-1972 , for
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not carry out any rational act of violence without support from another
state. All three states are former Japanese colonies and battlegrounds
of the cold war. They provide a problem for Japan that might be
characterized more accurately as areas of instability rather than
autonomous threats. These instabilities are aggravated by the large
force structures existing in the three states, and the uncertainty likely
27during a readjustment period among the major powers.
Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 as a result of the Sino-Japanese
War, and it reverted to China in conformity with the terms of surrender
of World War II. It became the refuge of Chiang Kai-shek and the
government of the Republic of China in 1949. Japan subsequently signed
a separate peace treaty with the Nationalist government. Japan's
previous occupation and the separate peace treaty have been a great
irritant to the Chinese People's Government in Peking. Professor
Fairbank. compared the Communists to the Ch'ing Dynasty which conquered
Peking in 1644, but "could not rest content" until Taiwan was taken in
1683. Japan has limited options regarding Taiwan: to support
Nationalist China, to support an independent Taiwan, to avoid the issue,
or to support the Chinese People's Republic. Japanese internal pressures
make it increasingly difficult to avoid a decision. There has been in
Japan a strong emotional pull toward the Taiwanese Independence Movement,
27Major General Takeda Akio, JASDF, Interview, February 21, 197 2,
a military theoretician on the staff of the National Defense College.
I am in his debt for his comprehensive and novel ideas on the Asian
balance of power and Japan's security problems. Specifically, he
emphasized the instability of these two areas and the need for Japan to
take a positive role in a solution. I am afraid, however, that he will
not agree with my conclusions regarding the best solution from Japan's
viewpoint.
28John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. Reischauer, Albert M. Craig, East Asia:




which bases itself in Tokyo. However, Taipei and Peking both would
oppose that position and such a Japanese policy would only exacerhate
the dilemma. The United States already has acquiesced to the one-China
philosophy of the two contending governments. There are voices who
argue that Taiwan is a vital Japanese interest and Peking must be
29
opposed on the issue; they are, however, in a minority. Japan's
essential interest is balance and stability in the region. While it is
valid to urge a peaceful solution of the imbroglio, Japan eventually
will accept the probability that Peking will dominate Taiwan.
If Taiwan is an important issue to Japan, Korea is a critical one.
The Korean peninsula lies between Japan, China and the Soviet Union.
It has been the scene of three wars in the past eighty years. None of
those wars were fought with the primary intent of conquest, but were
results of attempts to change the balance between larger powers in the
system. .Japan has believed and publicly acknowledged that Korea is an
important issue in Japanese national security. In 1969, Prime Minister
Sato stated in Washington, D.C.: "if an armed attack against the
Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be
on
seriously affected. u Mitsuya Kenkyu , the secret defense study planned
by the Defense Agency in 1963, envisioned a hypothetical invasion of
South Korea.
Again, there have been limited options for Japanese policy. It
has been natural for Japan to oppose forceful re-unification by North
29
Joseph Z. Redau "Japan's Taiwan Dilemma," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, March 1972, pp. 49-53.
ori
Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, Speech to National Press Club,
Washington, D.C., November 4, 1969, text, New York Times .
3 1Japan Times , February 10, 11, 12, 1965,
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Korea, for that would mean Korea's dominance by either the Soviet Union
or China. A quick glance at the map reveals the difference in Japan's
strategic posture. The entire Japanese megalopolis is within five hundred
nautical miles of Korea's southern tip. Japan could support either
peaceful reunification or the status quo. Peaceful reunification and
neutralization are often considered ideal solutions to the problem.
In an ideal world that solution would work; however, in a less than
ideal world there remains a high probability that competition for
influence in Korea would resume after reunification. Japan would have
historical and geographical disadvantages in such competition. It
would appear that this will continue to be a Pandora's Box better left
unopened; although there remain instabilities possible in the Korean
situation, no probable alternative has promised greater benefit to
•JO
Japan.
If the smaller states in Asia may be judged incapable of seriously
threatening Japan, it is possible to conclude that in the absence of the
Soviet Union, China and the United States, Japan would have no security
problem, would need no security treaty, and would require a minimal defense
structure. Such a statement may appear inane, but it can be helpful in
understanding the chimeric aspect of Japan's defense requirements: A
non-nuclear nation with a defense-only force structure potentially facing
the three largest nations in the world, all equipped with nuclear
weapons.
32General Takeda, Interview, February 21, 1972. The general believed
that Korean reunification and neutralization could remove the common
threat to all three nations (China, USSR, and Japan), and enable an Asian
Security Treaty, including arms control and military deployment control,
which uould stabilize the Asian subsystem. The J SP proposes essentially
the same solution when they advocate a 4-power security treaty which
effectively would neutralize Korea and eliminate 'competition.
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An important aspect of this assessment is that Japanese theorists
and political leaders have perceived Japan as a full-fledged member of
this subsystem. General Takeda, already cited, believed that Japan
should advocate a four-pillared security arrangement, including the
United States, Soviet Union, and China with Japan. 33 Professor Royaraa
also predicted that the new balance in Asia will be a quadra-centric
one; he believed that the four nations will deal with each other from
equidistant positions. Prime Minister Sato acknowledged that Japan
must work for closer relations with its Communist neighbors in his major
foreign policy address for 1972. 35 Director-General Nishimura was
more explicit on October 11, 1971, in a major address on the "Philosophy
of Self-Defense:"
Japan's belief is that it is both necessary and possible,
first, for Japan, the U.S., the Soviet Union and China -
whatever their differences might be - to cooperate and
work together for ultimate peace and stability in the
Asian-Pacific region. 36
Figures 2 and 3 reveal some obvious flaws in this vision of a
quadra-centric balance in Asia. First, the nations are not equidistant
in space.
• The United States is significantly displaced and, although
it has an evident global interest, a specific interest and involvement
33
Interview, February 21, 1972.
34
Interview, February 5, 1972.
35The Japan Times
, text, January 30, 1972.
Nishimura, o£. cit
. , p. 40.

38
in the regional balance must be demonstrated.
It is also evident that no military balance exists between the
four powers. Disregard of this imbalance is what Professor Aron called
"military indifference - taking armament potential for actual power,
imagining that diplomatic notes have the same force of conviction
whether they are supported by statistics of steel production or by
op
fleets of battleships, aircraft carriers and planes."
Japan is not co-equal to the other three states in military power
in 1972; even were it decided to achieve parity, Japan faces geographic
difficulties. Continental states, with their great territorial expanse,
are more able to absorb the destruction of war. This is especially
important in an age when offensive technology dominates at both strategic
and tactical levels of warfare. Japan also faces an imbalance of space.
The respective concentrations of industrial capacity of the U.S., the
U.S.S.R. and China are a greater distance from Japan than the Japanese
megalopolis is from the national boundaries of those three countries.
On May 28, 1971, Mr. llakasone Yasuhiro, the Director General of the
Self-Defense Forces, also expressed a belief that the stability of Asia
was dependent on the four nations discussed. He went on, however, to
enunciate four principles which must guide Japanese diplomacy and one of
OT
'The future might prove the United States less of an Asian power
than in 1940. The U.S. interest in Taiwan and South Korea will continue
to decline, other than their effect on Japan, and the line of U.S.
"free-use" bases now extends only to Guam. In 1940 the U.S. involvement
in China stemmed partly from U.S. possession of the Philippines. At
that time the U.S. was an Asian territorial power.
oo
Aron, £p_. cit . , p. 40.
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39those was to have a reliable ally." If Japan must have an ally -
and strategic data supports such a theory - the only possible balance
is tri-centric. As long as the U.S. -Japan security relationship continues
to exist in some form, the actual balance now in the process of evolving
is tri-centric. If that situation remains stable, the probable threats
to Japan may be discussed in terms of three bilateral relationships:
Japan-China, Japan-U.S.S.R.
,
and Japan-U. s/° Possible multilateral
combinations and the possibility of Japan playing a balancer role may
be considered in terms of these relationships.
The French military theorist, Pierre Gallois, declared that Chinese
nuclear capacity had forced Japan into one of three courses: absolute
dependence on the U.S.; neutrality, dependence on China; or indigenous
development of a nuclear weapons capacity. Such a pronouncement
naturally gained significant public attention in Japan, and the Defense
39
Mr. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Perspective of the Defense of Japan
,
text of speech delivered at the America-Japan Society, May 28, 1971
(Japan Defense Agency), p. 10. The four principles were: 1) to do
nothing beyond our national strength, 2) to take no gambler's risks, 3)
to have a reliable ally, 4) not to be isolated from world currents.
Mr. Nakasone had expanded on this view in a discussion in Yomiuri
,
July 18, 19, 1970.
40
Professor Royama Michio, "Again on the China Problem", Chuo Koron
,
November 1971, (U.S. Embassy Translation), discussed the Chinese problem
and suggested that there will be a tripolar detente, but he saw it as a
nuclear, global balance which operates above Japan's level of participation
and actually makes the Japanese position more flexible. The tri-centric
concept I suggest here is a regional system which directly involves
Japanese policy, and in which Japan plays a part In the balance. The
possibility of alliances against Japan will not be discussed in detail.
Hopefully, the following discussion on the bilateral relationships will
show that cooperation between two or more great powers against Japan is
unlikely and even the use of a third state by one of the great powers
would not be tolerated by the others.
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Agency announced a "full-scale study of the China question."^ 1 The
results of that study have not been announced, but understanding of the
Sino-Japanese power relationship lies deeper than Chinese nuclear
capacity.
The relationship has been deeply involved in the common history the
two nations share. The Japanese openly feel that their relationship
with China has been a very special one. They believe that cultural,
social and linguistic similarities give them a unique ability to under-
stand and deal with China. Lieutenant General Okumiya Masatake, JASDF
(ret.), is a military historian and has authored works in both English
and Japanese. In discussing the China issue, General Okumiya declared
that "Japan became an independent country when China jointed the United
Nations.
"
4Z Japanese feeling for the special relationship has been
increased by their sense of guilt resulting from aggression in the 1930 's
and 1940's. As a result of the special relationship, Japan has felt
little fear or hostility toward China. There also has been a certain
sensitivity in Japan to the Chinese relationship with other states.
Perhaps this sensitivity results from the common Confucian background
because the Japanese have seen themselves balanced against China.
China's status as permanent member of the Security Council also has
41See Sankei, February 1, 1971 (U.S. Embassy Translation) for
detailed quotes on the Gallois theory and JDA announcements concerning
their forthcoming study of China. See also Tokyo Shimbun
,
February 1,
1971 and Nihon Keizai
, January 10, 1971.
42
Interview, November 18, 1971, see the bibliography for some of
General Okumiya 's works, he also is the co-author of Midway The Battle
that Doomed Japan . A former member of the UN as well as the JASDF,
General Okumiya was an advisor to the International Editorial OCfice of
the PHD Institute for World Peace in Tokyo in 1971.
Weinstein, "Japan and the Continental Giants," Current History
,




worried the status-conscious Japanese. Improvement of U.S. -Chinese
relations has therefore been interpreted in Japan as a deterioration of
U.S. -Japanese relations. While the timing and method of effecting a
U.S. -Chinese rapprochement obviously could exacerbate Japanese concern,
the basic sensitivity has existed regardless.
There have been areas of friction between China and Japan. One
analysis, made in Japan during the Nixon visit to China, argued that the
Chinese attitude toward Japanese militarism had shifted in 1969. ^ In
the spring, Chinese and Soviet troops were clashing along the Amur
River; President Nixon announced a new Asian policy in the summer; and
then the U.S. -Japan Joint Communique concerning Taiwan and Korea
instigated Chinese fears that Japan was replacing the U.S. "vacuum" in
Asia.
Regardless of the timing of the shift in Chinese attitude, it has
been clear that the resurgence of a military structure and the increase
of Japanese political-military influence have been prime concerns of
Chou En-lai. He has repeatedly warned of the dangers of Japanese
militarism over the past three years; most recently the subject was
broached in the U.S. -Chinese Joint Statement issued February 14, 1972.
The Nixon visit to China was a great sbock to the Japanese and
it perhaps is unwise to use it as an example, however during Nixon's
visit I was approached many times by Japanese to discuss the subject and
this basic assumption repeatedly manifest itself.
^"Security Issue Plays Role in China-U.S. Talks," Yomiuri
,
February 21, 1972.
For a convenient and detailed statement of Chou's views see James
Reston's interview, "Chou alarmed Over Japan's Growing 'Militarism' in
Asia," The Mow York Times , August 10, 1971. For a detailed analysis of
China's concern with Japan's nuclear capacity, see Alice Langley Usieh,
Communist China's Evolving Military Strategy and Doctri ne ( Ar 1 i n g t o n
,
Va. : Institute for Defense Analysis, June 1970), pp. 38-43.
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Although there is little doubt that Chou's concern was real, it is
doubtful that he believed 'militarism' was dominating Japanese life.
The Chinese statements on Japanese militarism could be considered a form
of preventative diplomacy.
The Chinese attitude on Japanese militarism has been essentially a
defensive one, and assessments of Chinese strategy reinforce that
viewpoint. The rough figures cited in Figure 1-3 show a great disparity
between the force structures of the two states, but that picture does not
fully describe the balance. The Chinese naval forces have been equipped
and deployed in such a manner as to suggest coastal defense was the
primary strategy. ' The Air Force has had the technical capability to
reach Japan, but with only a small percentage of its bombers and they
48have been outmoded. Its MiG-17's and MiG-19's could reach Kyushu
but would be operating at their maximum combat radius. Recent reports
suggested that the Chinese were placing more emphasis on the flexibility





p. 42. For more detail on the
general "low-risk, cautions" military strategy employed by the Chinese






1971-1972, reports the total Air Force in
China at 2800 aircraft, approx. 200 of those being bombers. Air
Actualities
,
the official review of the French Air Force, has recently
reported the Chinese Air Force at 3,740 aircraft, including 440 bomber
aircraft, (as reported in Yomiuri , January 28, 1972, and Mainichi Daily
News
, January 29, 1972).
49
The MiG-19 is supersonic and the Chinese fleet totalled over 800
in 1971 with a production rate approaching 16 per month, Air Actualities
,




, as reported in Mainichi Dnilv News , January 29,
1972 and the Daily Yomiuri
,
January 28, 1972. The aircraft is reportedly
called the F-9 and weighs ten tons with a maximum airspeed of Mach 2.
The Chinese are reported to have 80 built and production underway at the
rate of 10 aircraft per month.
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The Japanese have been aware of the growing Chinese nuclear capacity
which further imbalanced their military relationship with China. Japan
has viewed the Chinese nuclear capability as the major source of any
future Chinese threat potential. ' The official Japanese position on
the issue reflected a broader nuclear attitude: at present, "China
does not pose a substantial threat;" and if the threat grew, Japan
must "rely on the security provided by the United States nuclear
52deterrent." Therefore, it has not been concerned with Chinese military
capability and has not viewed it as a significant threat to Japanese
security. There remains the possibility that continued Chinese
rearmament, particularly attack capability, and a destabilized Asia
could escalate Japanese estimates.
Although the Japanese have avoided any public designation of enemies,
they have believed that the Soviet Union has presented their principal
military threat during the post-war era and will continue to do so, at
least in the 1970's. 53
The threat, although tied to Soviet global interests, has also
been regional. The Soviet Union is Japan's closest neighbor. It occupies
more Asian land than any pure Asian power, and its dependence on the
Pacific has increased: for commerce, for food supply and for access
to an environment in which it may project its influence in Asia and
protect its security interests vis-a-vis China. It has become "inextricably
Nakasone, Proposals on Mutual Security , September 10, 1970, p. 24.
Hsieh, op_. cit .
, pp. 48-54, discussed China's nuclear mix and possible
strategies.
CO




See Weinstein, Japan's Defense Policy , and "Japan and the Continental
Giants," loc . cit .
,
p. 197, for comment concerning Japanese perceptions.
Also Emmerson, Arms
, pp. 243-250, for a discussion of Soviet policies
regarding security in Asia and the Japanese position.
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involved" in Asia, as either a global or regional actor.
The Soviet Union is not only "inextricably Involved" in Asia, it
also has become unavoidably involved with Japan in both its regional and
global role. Japan is a potential enemy to the Soviet Union. The
Japanese islands limit Soviet access to the sea. If the Japanese take
purely regional defense measures such as establishing control over their
peripheral sea and air areas, the acts assume global proportions to the
Soviet Union because they limit the Soviet fleet's access to the Pacific
Ocean. Japan may find that any Pacific conflict involving the Soviet
Union would be unavoidable because of this geographic relationship.
Siberian resources and Japanese technology are two elements which
could lead to improved relations. Those relations have proven dynamic
in recent years with the Soviet Union initiating the betterment and
broadening of its relations with Japan. The Soviet Union did not
normalize relations with Japan until 1956, and they have not signed a
Peace Treaty concluding World War II. There have been frictions between
the two states, primarily over the "Northern Territories," and the
treatment of Japanese fishermen by Soviet authorities. Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko visited Tokyo in January 1972, and in an apparent shift
5/,George Thompson, "The New World of Asia," Foreign Affairs ,
October 1969, p. 137, discussed the Soviet involvement from the Indian
Ocean to the Artie and makes the point that the USSR is "inextricably
involved."
Emmerson, Arms
, pp. 227-243, contains a good account of USSR-
Japan relations including the territorial problem, and Weinstein, "The
Continental Giants," loc . cit .
, pp. 198-199, discussed the fishing
issue. For a summary of Japanese viewpoints on the issue see Watanabe
Takechi, "Territorial Issue Key to Peace Treaty," Mainichi Uailv News ,
January 29, 1972, which includes Japanese views on other Japanese-
Soviet problems. It also could be noted that there was a continuing
dispute over the repatriation of Japanese POW's after World War II
which has left some Japanese disenchantment with Soviet negotiations.
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of Soviet attitude, agreed to open negotiations for a Peace Treaty
including discussion of the Northern Territories. Prime Minister
Sato, addressing the Diet after Grorayko's visit, stressed "the strengthen-
ing of amicable and friendly relations between our two countries.'
At first glance, the Soviet military power vis a_ vis Japan has
appeared to be overwhelming. However, it is not without limitation.
First, the force structure actually deployed to Asia has been only a
small portion of the Soviet military. Figure 1-3 provides general data
on the approximate size of forces actually stationed in Asia. Although
Soviet forces obviously could be redeployed at any time, the distance
between Leningrad and Vladivostok makes redeployment a major undertaking.
It would appear probable that the Soviet Union will continue to be
heavily committed in Europe during the 1970' s and would withdraw forces
there with great reluctance.
The Soviet Forces deployed in Asia have had varied missions. The
Soviet Pacific Naval Fleet has been increased significantly over the
past few years, however the submarine fleet and surface task groups
have operated in a global strategic and political role. Director
General Nakasone expressed such an opinion when asked about the Soviet
Navy: "this global deployment of Soviet naval power is less a military
58
threat than a political demonstration." The Soviet force structure
also must consider a regional mission in Asia which has outweighed any
Japanese focus. The thirty-three divisions in Asia have been deployed
along the Chinese frontier; that sensitive border has limited Soviet
^"Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, press conference,
January 28, 1972, Mainichi Daily News
, January 29, 1972.
57Japan Times
, January 30, 1972.





options with regard to Japan.
Finally, in the event of hostilities with Japan or China, the Soviet
Union would face a serious logistics problem, particularly if amphibious
operations were planned. If seaborne supply was interdicted, the Trans-
Siberian Railway is a limited vehicle, as it still is reduced to single
track in some areas. Over 4000 rail miles connect Moscow and Vladivostok;
the distance and supplies needed to support an amphibious invasion would
pose a serious logistics problem. -*9
Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense
Council (NDC) , was correct when he argued that the only Japanese hope
against the Soviet Union was delay; there was no real probability that
Japan alone could resist attack.
The factors mentioned above do help to explain, however, the lack
of Japanese concern and their optimism concerning the probability of
attack, either direct or indirect.
The lowering tensions in Asia and the "era of negotiation" have
popularized the belief that there does exist very little chance of
attack. The Security Treaty and the entire concept of a U.S. -Japan
security relationship has been questioned. Opponents argue that, with
the lessening of U.S. -Soviet and U.S. -Chinese tensions, the treaty has
lost its raison de'etre and should be abrogated or phased out.
59Mr. Taoka Shunji, Interview, December 1, 1971.
Interview, February 29, 1972, and see Kaihara Osamu "Boeiryoku to
wa Nanika Gutaitekini Kangaeyo" (Let's Consider Defense Capability
Realistically), Niju-Seiki (The 20th Century Magazine), January 1971.
^Shimizu Minoru, "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty: Improving Int'l
Climate Brings Demands for Abrogation," The Japan Times , March 9, 1972,
or see U.S. Embassy, Press Translations , June 15-30, 1970, for a series
of opposition statements made on the tenth anniversary of the treaty.
Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, former Director General of the Defense Agency,
and member of the House of Councillors, National Diet, pointed out that
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Professor Royama has argued that nuclear deterrence exists with or without
a treaty or relationship; it existed because of a tri-centric nuclear
balance between China, the Soviet Union and the United States. He
proposed that Japan phase out the security arrangement, retaining
ft
1
?deterrence value and gaining flexibility.
The security arrangement was established in a world dominated by
the United States and the Soviet Union. If a transition to a more
multi-centric international system is occurring, and evidence portraying
that transistion has been discussed, some of the common rationales
given for the existence of the Security Treaty are no longer valid.
The United States unconditionally guaranteed the defense of Japan, and
terms such as the J'spear and the shield" were applicable to the U.S.
and Japanese defense responsibilities in Japan. The Nixon Doctrine
qualified the unconditional guarantee, and the U.S. force structure in
Japan in 1972 was no longer the spear that it once was. U.S. Forces
were no longer in Japan for the defense of Japan. Earlier U.S. posture
which directly defended Japanese territory has fundamentally changed.
Lieutenant General Caraway, a former high commissioner of the Ryukyus
,
there was growing pressure within the Diet for treaty revision/abrogation,
stemming from the relaxation of tensions, Interview, February 19, 1972.
62
Royama, Interview, February 5, 1972, see FN 43, this chapter, for
discussion of Professor Royama's views.
Emmerson, Arms
,
p. 143, uses this term to describe the collective
U.S. and Japanese defense responsibilities.
6AThe last USAF F-4 squadron left Japan in July 1971. A Marine
Air Wing is stationed at Iwakuni, Japan, and elements of the 7th Fleet
provide strike capability.
U.S. Congress Senate, Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Japan and Okinawa , 91st Congress,
2nd Session, Hearings (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1970), testimony by




was correct when he alleged that U.S. bases in Okinawa would be less
useful to the United States after reversion. ° He was correct in a
bipolar world where the United States required unlimited use of its
bases in order to carry out global defense commitments wherever and
whatever conflict arose.
In a changing Asia the previous reasons for the security arrangement
are suspect. It would not be correct, however, to assume that the
emerging situation has not provided a new basis for a security arrangement-
Professor Wakaizumi Kei, a distinguished Japanese political analyst,
has contended that a fundamental review of the Security Treaty will be
mandatory by the mid-1970fe. He concluded that there are three likely
options available to Japan:
1) Renunciation of the Treaty and Japanese Nuclear
Rearmament
.
2) Revision of the Treaty to include U.S. nuclear
protection in return for base rights, but with minimum
contact.
3) Renegotiation of the Treaty leading to a closer
security relationship on the bases of equality and mutual
interest. '
If only the general security relationship is considered, it would appear
that the choices could be narrowed to two: either continue to operate
in the context of a U.S. -Japanese security relationship or not.
If the security relationship is ended, the United States and Japan
separate; but what happens to the United States? The American interest
"°Lt. General Paul W. Caraway, ret., comments in United States-
Japanese Political Relations
,
Special Report Series it 7 (Washington, D.C,
Georgetown University, Center for Strategic Studies, May 1968), p. 25.




in participation is different in a multi-centric situation although
the size of the states involved and ocean between make it likely that
instability in Asia could eventually involve the United States. There-
fore, as President Nixon said, stability in Asia is a U.S. interest.
It would remain an interest even in the event the Japanese security
relationship was terminated. However, the United States would discover
that there existed no method to apply its force structure on a regional
basis. Alliance with either of the other two powers would serve only
to exacerbate a then bipolar region. The United States' contribution to
Japan's political-military posture has become focused on the availability
of its military forces and this contribution would not be applicable
elsewhere in the subsystem. The United States would cease to participate
effectively in the regional subsystem. Whatever the status of global
nuclear deterrence, the regional, tri-centric balance would have failed.
Japan, after discarding the security relationship with the United
States, would not be capable of maintaining a tri-centric regional balance.
Two options would be open. As Professor Wakaizumi suggests, Japan could
arm, including nuclear armaments, and attempt to play an autonomous
role in the sub-system. Such a plan would be expensive and uncertain,
facing all the strategic difficulties of an insular nation facing one,
or possibly two, continental adversaries. The alternative would be to
seek alliance with either, or submit to dependence on either. Either
alternative is equally unattractive, for in view of the relationships
described above, the Soviet Union or China would oppose Japan's alliance
with its continental adversary.
68
This is not to suggest that the day the treaty ends, there would
be either a war or a great shift of alignments. The process would be a
slow one perhaps not noticeable at first, but instability in the system
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It appears probable that a continuing U.S. -Japanese security
relationship would be profitable, even in a regional, multi-centric
context. Such an arrangement would provide Japan greater flexibility and
system stability than any other choice. The 1970 decision to extend
the Security Treaty indicated that Japan and the United States have
elected that choice.
While the U.S. posture in Asia makes it Japan's ally rather than
adversary, the U.S. -Japanese security relationship and the system within
which it operates are vital ingredients to understanding the Japanese
perception of threat, both direct and indirect. There are those in Japan
who argue that the threat to Japan has increased despite the Treaty.
Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense Council,
has repeatedly urged that more attention be payed to Soviet and Chinese
policy statements as well as their physical capabilities in an effort to
draw more attention to the possible threat to Japan. °^
Mr. Kaihara, however, has been in the minority. There has been an
attitude in Japan that might be summed up: "We are at peace, not at
war." 70 This belief that the probability of attack is extremely low was
would lead to incidents. These could manifest themselves as infringe-
ments on Japanese international rights, its shipping, air routes,
fishing, etc.
^Interviews, November 10, 1971, and February 29, 1972, See
Kaihara Osamu, "Anzen Hosho no Tadashii Kangaekata" (The Correct Way to
Consider National Security), Jij i , April 1969, for a comprehensive and
thorough exposition of Mr. Kaihara's view in this area. This article
includes discussion of the threats facing Japan, the viability of various
alternatives such as neutrality pacts and security agreements, and
criticism of some viewpoints in Japan. The article is particularly
significant in view of Mr. Kaihara's substantial influence as Secretary
General of the National Defense Council.
This was the comment of Mr. Aoki Hideo, Executive Director and




repeated to me by senior officials in the Defense Agency, by generals
in the Air Self-Defense Force, by middle-grade officers teaching at the
Air Staff College and by cadets at the Officer's Candidate School at
Nara. Hedley Bull's assessment in Foreign Affairs was correct: "Japan
71does not now perceive any direct threat to her security." The first
goal of the new Fourth Defense Build-up Plan formalized the position
"(We are) building up gradually our autonomous defense setup, on the
72
assumption that no threat is impending on Japan for the moment."
The threat of indirect attack has not received thorough analysis
in Japan's assessment of its defense needs. Several factors have contributed
to the depreciation of this danger: stability in Asia which may have
always been the primary benefit of the United States presence and certainly
is in the 1970' s; Japanese policies toward the use of their military
organization which prohibit its application to such situations; and a
widespread belief in Japan that sea-lane protection, for example, is an
anachronism of the pre-nuclear age and not technically possible in the
future.' Therefore, official policy has disregarded the threat of
indirect attack, despite its strategic feasibility.
As has been discussed, the relationship of the Security Treaty to
Japanese security has become more complex and its effect has tended to
be disassociated from the direct defense of Japanese territory. The
simple argument that Japan feels no threat because of the Security Treaty
may, in the final analysis, be accurate, but it is also pointless in
"The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," Foreign
Affairs
, July 1971, p. 676.
72
Japan Defense Agency, The New Defense Build-up Plan (JDA Draft)
,
April 27, 1971, official translation, letter of transmittal. The Foreign
Ministry generally concurs with this assessment.
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terms of Japanese perceptions. The statement may not be qualified.
Japan has felt no threat, direct or indirect, to its national security.

Chapter 2
STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN JAPAN
Strategy, because it prescribes tactics against the use of force
or postulates methods of dealing with threats of force, can assist in
further clarifying the Japanese perception of threats to its national
security. This chapter is not dedicated to the definition of an official
Japanese strategy; it is, instead, a survey of the prevalent strategic
discussions in Japan. There are those in Japan who either believe that
a threat does exist, or believe there exists the probability of a future
threat. The various views serve better to delineate the threat perceived
in Japan, particularly with regard to its nature. A derivative of this
survey is a portrayal of the defense intellectual community. Knowledge
of the character of the community provides some insight into their
impact on the policy-making process.
Clausewitz said that "war is an act of violence intended to compel
our opponent to fulfill our will."-'- Strategy concerns itself with the
methodology of such an act; "the theory of the use of combats for the
object of war. "^ These military aspects of strategy are of primary concern
in this discussion; however, war is an act in the strategic-diplomatic
continuum. Clausewitz also called war "a continuation of political
commerce." Therefore, strategic thought as discussed here is not limited
solely to pure military application. Non-military strategies, particularly
those designed to contend with possible threats of force, are significant
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War , ed. Anotol Rapoport (London, Penguin




, Book II, Chapter 1, p. 173.
3 Ibid
. ,





As might be suspected, the absence of perceived threats has a
significant effect on strategic thought in Japan. Any definable community
of defense intellectuals is very small. Defense research has not been
a significant area of academic endeavor, whether in terms of accomplish-
ment, prestige or funding. The lack of money also has discouraged the
institutionalization of strategic thought.
Those few institutions that do consider defense problems usually
include military matters among varied social and economic aspects of
national security. There has been, therefore, very little focus on
strategy among those who do consider national security. The Nomura
A specific number of "defense intellectuals" is difficult to
determine if only because of the problem of definition. However, even
including a broad range of subject from technical expert to political
generalist, there are less than twenty well-known students of national
security. This comment and the substance of the discussion of the
defense community relies on interviews with Professor Momoi Makoto,
December 3, 1971; Commander Sekino Hideo, December 2, 1971; Professor
Kosaka Masataka, January 1, 1972; Professor Iwashima Hisao, February 4,
1972; M. Gen. Yaraada Ryoichi, Chief Defense Section, Defense Division,
Air Staff Office, December 13, 1971. Professors Momoi and Kosaka are
among the most highly regarded "defense intellectuals" in Japan.
Professor Iwashima is a young professor at the National Defense College
who is emphasizing modern international communications (political and
social aspects). Professor Iwashima pointed out that despite the
pacifism in Japan, there is almost no peace research occurring.
^Institutions include the International Relations Institute at
Sophia University and Kokusai Mondai Kenkyucho (Defense Problems Institute),
which consider strategic matters at the policy level and include
foreign policy emphasis. The Nomura Research Institute is economically
oriented. The Historical Research Institute, KDK Institute and Tairiku
Mondai Kenkyucho are all very small, limited budget operations. Within
the Defense Agency, Boei Kenshusho , or the National Defense College, is
the center of academically oriented study. Computer programmed
operational analysis studies are programmed by the Air Staff Office and
conducted by computer think tanks such as Mitsubushi Research Institute,
IBM in Japan and the Computer Research Center.

55
Research Institute, for example, was headed by Mr. Saeki Kiichi, a
respected name in defense analysis and former president of the National
Defense College. However, the institute itself has been oriented toward
economic matters and has not focused on strategy or even been limited
to national security studies. Other institutions are quite small,
such as the Historical Research Institute which was concerned with naval
war history and has begun to pursue current strategic affairs. It is
mainly a one-man operation with a director, one or two research associates
and secretaries. Institutions such as the International Relations
Institute at Sophia University focus on broad national policy studies
and, moreover, disassociate themselves from the Defense Agency or any
Q
military oriented studies.
The small size of the community concerned with defense and its
diffusion among varied institutions and groups have combined with the
lack of threat to eliminate any cohesion or focus among those who do
discuss strategy. The "community" has consisted of individuals, reliant
on diverse organizations not primarily concerned with strategy. There-
fore, there has been a tendency toward academic isolation among these
scholars and critics, and they often become concerned primarily with
one aspect of strategy.
Professor Momoi and Commander Sekino, Interviews.
7 Cdr. Sekino is the Director of the Institute, Interview,
December 2, 1971.
8This is true on the institutional level but not necessarily so at
the individual level. Professor Royama Michio, Sophia University does,
for example, accept invitations for conferences or lectures at the
National Defense College as does Professor Kosaka Masataka of Kyoto
University. Interviews Kosaka, January 1, 1972; Royama, February 4, 197 2,
These two highly regarded international affairs experts are among the
few examples of academic integration of policy and strategy.
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In order to put the various strategies available in perspective,
Figure 2-1 outlines the possible strategic alternatives open to Japan.
Japanese policy and posture in 1972 superficially indicates a strategy
corresponding to category B, with a limited conventional capability
for territorial defense. Weinstein would postulate that category B.2.a.
best describes Japanese post-war strategy. Others have suggested that
current, covert Japanese goals include implementation of one or more
of the last three strategies listed in Figure 2-1.
There are as many opinions regarding the proper Japanese defense
posture as there are categories in Figure 2-1. David K. Willis, for
example, argued in 1970 that Japan must consider "some wider tasks of
area defense, as veil as self-defense.
"
y There was some indication that
Japan might be moving in that direction in November 1969, when Prime
Minister Sato expressed Japan's special interest in Korea and Taiwan.
However, it seems more likely that Prime Minister Sato was speaking in
terms of the consultative clause of the Security Treaty. While Japan
might allow the United States to defend Korea using Japanese bases, it
presently does not contemplate participation.
Some have speculated on the level of military forces necessary to
participate in regional defense. Mr. Taoka Shunji recently drew up a
plan relying on the resources which would be available to Japan were
it to dedicate five per cent of its GNP to defense spending over the
ensuing ten years. Such a policy would provide ten billion dollars
9David K. Willis, "Japan in Asia: Rabbit, Porcupine or Tiger?",
Pacific Community
,
July 1970, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 103. Mr. Willis' argument,
however, seems implicitly based on the assumption that the alternative
to limited external defense would be a more substantial rearmament.
Manuscript of article written by Mr. Taoka who showed it to me
and discussed his ideas on December 2, 1971. Mr. Taoka was not advocating




Figure 2-1. Japanese Strategic Options.
A. Unilateral Disarmament.
1. Non-aligned. Rely on United Nations and non-aggression treaties.
2. Aligned. Rely on United States (or other military power) for
all aspects of physical defense.
B. Limited Conventional Capability for Territorial Defense.
1. Non-aligned.
a. Concentrate on maintaining internal security against an
indirect aggression. Use geographical advantages and
national unity (large reserves also) to fight guerrilla
war against invader.
b. Concentrate on conventional forces.
2. Aligned.
a. Concentrate on internal security. Rely on other state for
external defense.
b. Coordinate forces and tactics to complement those available
from ally. Either by mission or level of conflict.
C. Unlimited Conventional Capacity for Territorial Defense.
1. Non-aligned. Develop force structure capable of defeating any
attack including large invasion. Rely on nuclear stalemate.
2. Aligned. Same force structure, but rely on 'nuclear umbrella'
of United States or other nuclear power.
D. Conventional Capacity for Defense of Territorial and External Interests.
1. Non-aligned. Could include C. 1. above plus several levels of
capacity including:
a. Defense of South Korea and /or Taiwan, and
b. Protect sea lanes, and
2. Aligned. Any of the strategies suggested in D. 1. could be
undertaken in concert with another state. This could include
only a limited Japanese defensive capability with reliance on
an ally to implement the capacities listed above. Or the
Japanese could emphasize manpower while an ally provided equipment.
E. Nuclear Capacity for Territorial Defense.
1. Non-aligned. Defensive nuclear capacity including anti-aircraft
and anti-ship weapons, and a second-strike nuclear deterrence
capability.
2. Aligned. Nuclear armaments complementing ally, relying on nuclear
deterrence of ally for support against all (or some) states.
Concentration on tactical and/or defensive nuclear armaments.
Nuclear sites in either or both countries.
F. Nuclear Capacity for Defense of Territorial and External Interests.
1. Non-aligned. Development of all aspects of nuclear weaponry.
Mobile strike forces, tactical and strategic weapons included.
Attainment of great power military status.
2. Aligned. Development of F. 1. above in concert or alliance with
other state(s). In this case, comprehensive mutuality of
interests would be required among the allies.
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per year, or one hundred billion available for a ten-year program of
defense construction. The budget base would equal six times the 1970
budget and would enable naval and air power construction which not only
could establish a credible defense posture, but allow the projection of
Japanese military force within the region. The research and development
portion of Mr. Taoka's budget was increased by a factor of 700, enabling
the development of nuclear armaments. ^
That policy is technically possible today, but it is advocated by
very few people. Few discuss the allocation of that amount of resources
because such a policy option is assigned a very low probability.
Therefore, the strategic application is of limited interest although the
nuclear policy option does receive attention.
Three major areas or arguments receive primary strategic focus in
Japan. The newly popular concept of "autonomous defense" has been
discussed in terms of the degree of cooperation desirable with the United
States. This has been the middle ground of strategic choice and it has
normally been discussed assuming that the autonomous force structure
would be similar in size to the current Defense Forces. This area has
received the great majority of detailed strategic analysis.
Negotiated security has become another favorite topic and usually
has included discussions of arms limitations, ratios of armament or
disarmament. At the other pole, the nuclear weapon option has received
increasing attention. The great disparity between the force levels
envisioned by these three arguments can be partially explained by the
Using a 1970 base, Mr. Taoka programmed the following increases
per year: GSDF - 600 billion yen (2.4 x 1970); MSDF - 1200 billion
yen (8.6 x 1970); ASDF - 600 billion (A. 8 x 1970); Research and
Development - 700 billion yen (700 x 1970), including nuclear development,
equals a total 3500 billion yen or 10 billion dollars (before revaluation)
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lack of manifest threat which would focus strategy;
While most Japanese agree that the threat of international violence
is very low, they differ in their view of the type of violence which
could be employed. Commander Sekino has contended that Japan's great
reliance on imports makes the sea lanes the most vulnerable target.
Mr. Ogawa of Koku Shimbun agreed with that concept, and argued that the
first visible results of independent security policies would be a
growing harassment of Japanese international rights. General Genda
Minoru, former Chief of Staff, JASDF, and now a member of the House of
Councillors, also argued that interdiction of Japan's supply lines
was the "most important point in Japan's defense."-1-^
Another theory has found wider acceptance; it has emphasized
another form of indirect attack. M. Yasuda asserted that no "rational
aggressor" would destroy "his war trophies" through a massive attack
aimed at Japan's industrial potential. If the aggressor wished to
impose his will on Japan he must resort to a small scale invasion or
to an indirect approach. The choice:
Indirect approaches will do and can do better. No risk
of inviting a third party intervention. ...gone in fact
is the classic possibility of an outbreak of a contingency
12
Interview, December 2, 1971, also see "Japan and Her Maritime
Defense," pp. 100-105.
Ogawa Raita, Interview, December 27, 1971.
Genda Minoru "Boeicho ni Namiyon Nozumaku" (What I Expect of
the Defense Agency), Koku Shimbun , July 21, 1971, p. 9.
15
Mr. Yasuda, "No Drastic About-Face in Security Policy," The
Daily Yomiuri
,
January 6, 1971 (part of 3-part series). M. Yasuda is
reported to be a pseudonym for a prominent defense analyst in Japan.
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with an armed open attack.
Then Director General Nakasone reflected this attitude in interpellations
before the Diet in 1970. He testified that he believed direct attack
would be accompanied by indirect attack; "irregular political measures
smacking of military intention or launch military actions with political
factors." The Director General expressed the same belief on
December 1, 1970 in a speech to the Foreign Correspondent's Club in Tokyo:
A nuclear or an all out conventional warfare is least likely
to occur. But the contingencies we must most likely deal
with will be (one) an indirect aggression or an externally
supported city guerrilla operation and (two) a limited
infiltration and its escalated form, a local open
invasion.-'-"
The diverse concepts of the nature of the threat tend to aggravate
the fragmentation of strategic thought. A direct external threat has
been largely disregarded and indirect aggression is very difficult to
deal with in conventional strategic terms. The fragmentation and lack
of pressure for focus in Japanese strategy have been reflected by the
threats envisioned by the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces.
The GSDF has supported the view that limited invasion of Hokkaido
was most likely; the MSDF has believed the primary threat to Japan was
the submarine menace; while the ASDF planners have contended a large
16
M. Yasuda, "No Drastic About-Face in Security Policy," The
Daily Yomiuri , January 6, 1971 (part of 3-part series).
17Japan, Japan National Diet, House of Councillors, Budget Committee,
Interpellations Regarding Defense Matters , May 12, 19 70, p. 13, (Japan
Defense Agency).
18




scale air attack will precede any other use of force. The base of
strategic thought is quicksand, and discussions range all the way from
nuclear armament to disarmament.
The Nuclear Option
The decision, whether or not to attain a nuclear weapons capability,
has been made. The government of Japan repeatedly has disclaimed any
intention of attempting nuclear armament. Yet, it remains an open issue,
discussed on the assumption that no decision has been made. Professor
Wakaizumi argued in Foreign Affairs in 1969, that there was no small
probability that "the road to nuclear armament might be selected"
between 1975 and 1980. He then declared that it is an unlikely choice,
21
"at least within the 1970' s." The choice Professor Wakaizumi, and
many Japanese, refer to is not an "either-or" choice, but the positive
one. There is an implicit assumption that if_ the decision is made, or
when it will be made, it will be a positive one.
A positive decision to develop nuclear weapons contains many
complications. The type of fission material to go in the weapon must be
19
This was pointed out to me by Taoka Shunji during my first month
in Japan and was not disputed by the many persons with whom 1 raised the
issue. Nor was a substantive explanation of the difference offered.
This problem will be raised again in the discussion in Section IV
regarding the construction of policy and in Chapter 10 when command
relationships are discussed. Perhaps the underlying reason for this
disparity is that the uniformed services agree that the most likely
threat is indirect.
20





22This is the general focus of Japanese informed discussion. Those
opposing nuclear rearmament argue as though they were slowly bcin^
defeated. I am not suggesting that, therefore, nuclear rearmament is




chosen; the inventory may be offensively or defensively orientated;
strategic weapons, tactical weapons, or both may be selected; the type
of delivery system has to be considered; and the issue of unilateral
versus bilateral or multilateral development must be considered.
Such a decision is shaped by many factors, including social,
economic, technical, political and strategic elements. While the primary
concern here is with the strategic variables, it should be noted that
social opposition in Japan, the 'nuclear allergy,' has been considered
a primary reason for political attitudes to date. There are indications
that this viewpoint is slowly changing, or perhaps that the potential
for change is increasing. In August 1969, 72% of the Japanese hoped
that Japan would not have nuclear weapons, but only 36% believed that
Japan would be non-nuclear in ten years. Two years later 73% of the
people still believed nuclear weapons were undesirable, however, only
30% still believed that Japan would not possess such weapons." In
1968, a young Liberal-Democratic candidate for the House of Councillors
of the Diet advocated "re-thinking" of the Japanese nuclear policy and
24
campaigned with a national flag sewn on his jacket. He received more
votes than all the Communist candidates combined, indicating some
decline in the "nuclear allergy." While this gradual shift in attitude
does not necessarily support political advocacy of nuclear rearmament,
it has generated wider discussion of the various aspects of nuclear
weaponry
.
23Results from Yomluri , August 7, 1969, and Sankei, August 4, 1971.
Yomiuri : 1) Do you hope Japan will have nuclear weapons? Hope - 16.1%,
Do not hope - 71.8%, Do Not know - 12.1%; 2) Do you think Japan wil]
possess nuclear weapons (If U.S. nuclear umbrella withdrawn)? Yes - 43%,
Ho - 30%, do not know (or can not say) - 27%.
24Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," loc. c_it. , p. 511.
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The Japanese nuclear policy to 1972 has consisted of three no's;
make no, have no and allow no nuclear weapons in Japan. That policy
has been based, in part, on the United States nuclear deterrence. In
December 1970, then Director General Nakasone said, "we will not possess
nuclear arms as long as the U.S. nuclear deterrent effectively functions." 25
One year later another Director General declared that "even if the
nuclear umbrella of the United States were removed," Japan's nuclear
attitude would not change. Perhaps not, but the Japanese nuclear
option is most often discussed in terms of the existence of a nuclear
deterrent.
Some argue that nuclear deterrence is increasing despite the
validity of the U..S. nuclear umbrella. Professor P.oyama was among
those who argued that a nuclear balance or stalemate provided everyone
27
with a nuclear umbrella. Kishida Junnosuke, editor of Asahi Shimbun
,
wrote in 1968 that nuclear weapons were a deterrent and the "security
of a nation in the nuclear age is not complete without nuclear weapons." 2 ^
He argued that the reliability of U.S. nuclear deterrence was decreasing,
in fact the increasing global power balance, the dispersal of nuclear
technology, and the anti-ballistic missile had lowered the nuclear
umbrella for any one country. However, Kishida postulated a four-level
nuclear structure which included superpowers, other nuclear states,
25Nakasone, Defense of Japan
,
p. 30. Prime Minister Sato has also
noted the relationship between the non-nuclear policy and U.S. deterrence.




Professor Royama, Interview, February 4, 1972; Mr. Nakasone also
has expressed a similar view, see Defense in the Future
, pp. 2-3.
28
Kishida Junnosuke, "Nippon no Kaku-Seisaku to Hikauku Sengen no
i Mi," (Japanese Nuclear Policies and the Significance of the Non-
Nuclear Weapons Declaration), Ushlo Nippon No Shorai , (Ushio Magazine,
special issue, the Future of Japan), Spring 1968, p. 42.
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semi-nuclear states and underdeveloped states. Achievements of more
complex nuclear capacities by the lower levels continue to force the
superpowers to advance in order to maintain a "nuclear Pax Russo -
29Americana." Because of the pressure from below, the superpower
competition could result in a balance which applied to all the countries
of the world. "Country-unit nuclear deterrence is based on treaty and
a price must be payed. However, under global deterrence there is no
price to be payed, so it is doubly unwise to pay for a deterrence which
30
is decreasing." Mr. Kishida's argument has been especially appealing
to opponents of nuclear rearmament in a period of uncertainty over the
validity of the U.S. commitment.
Others have questioned the credibility of the U.S. deterrent; the
headline of an August 1971, article by M. Yasuda read "U.S. Nuclear
31
Umbrella No Longer Credible." General Holloway, Commander of the
Strategic Air Command, testified before Congress that he did not believe
the President would launch the U.S. nuclear force in support of NATO.
Mr. Yasuda concluded the U.S. would be even less likely to take a
nuclear risk in Asia. General Genda added another perspective to the
question as he argued that whatever the validity of nuclear deterrence,
it is a global tool. Nuclear weapons might be employed on a regional
32
basis, and there is no regional nuclear umbrella for Japan. General Genda
29Kishida Junnosuke, "Nippon no Kaku-Seisaku to Hikauku Sengen no
i Mi," (Japanese Nuclear Policies and the Significance of the Non-
Nuclear Weapons Declaration), Ushio Nippon No Shorai , (Ushio Magazine,




31 In The Daily Yorniuri , August 19, 1971.
32General Genda Minoru, ASDF ret., former Chief of Staff, now member




called the three non-nuclear principles "the magic of not getting wet
without umbrella. "33 General Takeda Akio made a similar assessment
when he argued that a nuclear-conventional distinction was no longer
valid for Japan. Japan, he felt, must consider defense in the future
Asia in terms of all weapons; autonomous focus on limited war capability
was no longer relevant. * These men would disagree with Mr. Kishida's
theory on the basis that it is not applicable to the regional threats
to Japan. Therefore, Japan must take positive steps to avoid the
regional nuclear threat.
One obvious answer would be to obtain an autonomous deterrent
capacity. It could be argued that the French deterrent in Europe is not
a global, but a regional, deterrent. The Japanese, by obtaining a
nuclear capacity, would in fact support the goals of the Nixon Doctrine
and share in the deterrence of "theater nuclear war—by virtue of their
35
own nuclear capabilities." The growing nuclear capacity of China
threatens further to erode the credibility of the U.S. deterrence,
particularly if the Chinese continue to emphasize regional interests.
Alice Hsieh concluded that the "Chinese are more sensitive to (nuclear)
weapons systems developed in the region." A Japanese nuclear
capacity would "make the Chinese even more cautious," and the nuclear
balance of power "might be further complicated to China's disadvantage;




Interviexj, February 21, 1972.
-"Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before House
Armed Services Committee, U.S. Congress, F4 1972-1976 Defense Program
and 1972 Defense Budget
, March 9, 1971, (Washington, U.D. CPO, 1971)
p. 22. Laird was speaking of those nations which possess weapons and
was not advocating Japanese nuclear arms.




a Japanese regional nuclear capacity.
. .may well have the effect of
limiting China's use of its emerging nuclear capacity. "^7 This theory
sees the Japanese autonomous nuclear deterrence operating in the frame-
work of a continued U.S. -Japan security relationship.
Professor Uakaizumi illustrated the contrary assumption when he
equated nuclear rearmament and renunciation of the Security Treaty.^
An autonomous nuclear stance exacerbates many of Japan's geo-political,
strategic weaknesses, and such a stance has been the target of vociferous
criticism. If Japan's possible adversaries were China, the Soviet
Union and the United States; the distance to major industrial centers
would dictate inter-continental weapons and/or a submarine-based force.
The continental expanse of the adversaries and dispersed industrial and
strategic structures would force Japan to build a numerically large
force as well as a sophisticated one, in order to be able to inflict
a level of damage that could make the potential adversary susceptible
and therefore deter it. These nations already are developing nuclear
weapons, and all have some air defense; therefore, the Japanese nuclear
deterrent force would require a missile delivery capacity. The limited
dispersal possible in Japan would make a second-strike capability
available only through substantial hardening measures or a submarine-
based force. The concentrated industrial sector in Japan makes it an
ideal nuclear target. Its insular geography limits the acquisition
distance of land-based warning systems, and therefore, increases the
37
Hsieh, op_. cit .
, pp. 9-10.




complexity of defending against missile-borne nuclear attack.
The issue is undecided, but it is evident that there are strategic
liabilities to nuclear rearmament. The possibility that U.S. nuclear
deterrence has failed, or is failing, has caused some to look for other
solutions outside nuclear rearmament. One of those is negotiation.
Negotiated Security
The alternative to armament competition is disarmament or arms
control, which is normally advocated in a multilateral context in the
40hope that it will provide some lower balance of forces. The Japanese
Socialist Party has advocated unilateral disarmament throughout the post-
war era, however, they qualify their stand by declaring an intent to
negotiate "separate or collective treaties of non-aggression with the
United States, China, the Soviet Union and other countries in order to
guarantee neutrality.' This proposal is vague as to concept, and
-^General Takeda, Interview, February 21, 1972; Professor Momoi Makoto,
Interview, December 3, 1972, the geographic limitations were pointed to
by several uniformed officers with whom I discussed the issue. Also
see Y. Suenaga, "Nixon Shocks, Muckracking Preempt Japan's Manuever,"
The Daily Yomiuri
,
January 28, 1972 (Suenaga purportedly a pseudonym for
a prominent Japanese defense analyst), and Momoi Makoto, "Limit to Self-
Defense Power and its Strategy," Mainichi, June 23, 1970. Before a pro-
nuclear arms policy could be adopted, the technical and economic capacity
of the state must be capable of supporting the venture. This will be
discussed in Chapter 12.
This paragraph is a summation of the strategic arguments presented
against nuclear armament. An official reflection of this strategic
argument is evident in Nishimura, Philosophy on Self-Def cnr.e , p. 33.
40
Security obtained through bilateral or multilateral alliances is
not the major focus of this subsection. The various factors applicable
to security relationships of that nature were discussed in Chapter 1.
The primary concern here is with security negotiated with the potential
enemy in order to arrive at some contrived balance of power which modifies
a pure power relationship.
41
"SPJ's Policy on National Security," Japan ; Socialist Review ,
November 15, 1969, Socialist Party of Japan, p. 18.
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totally imprecise with regard to the types of guarantees or the method
of implementation envisioned although a nuclear-free area is mentioned.
General Takeda also has concluded that there is no viable alternative
to negotiation, although he arrived at this conclusion somewhat differently
42
and is more precise with his proposals. He contended that the U.S.
deterrent has failed in the 1970" s, and that Japan may no longer
distinguish between nuclear and conventional threats. Japan's neighbors
are nuclear powers, and Japan therefore has two options: either strengthen
the treaty and increase armaments, both conventional and nuclear; or,
take a non-military solution. The strategic difficulties of rearmament
facing Japan mandate the non-military solution.
The first step would be the elimination of two great instabilities
in Asia; Taiwan and Korea. Taiwan could be reunited with China, and
the Koreas could be united and neutralized. Korea must be neutralized
because it is a threat to all other neighbors if under the influence of
any one. In conjunction with these steps, Japan would negotiate an
Asian security pact with China, the Soviet Union and the United States.
The treaty would include arms control provisions leading to regional
disarmament. Finally, the nations mentioned would regulate the
international sea and airspace in Asia, and military vehicles of any
type would not be allowed thereon.
A similar proposal, although less inclusive, was advocated by v.
Suenaga in January 1972, in an eight-part article on U.S. -Japan relations
in The Daily Yomiuri /43 He denied the threat of nuclear attack because
/ 1
The following discussion is based on an interview with General
Takeda, February 21, 1972.
Suengaga, "Wanted: Disarm Conference to Freeze Navies in Pacific,"
January 28, 1972, and "Japan Wants a Voice in Pacific Naval Balance"
January 31, 1972, loc . cit
.




of 'war prize' destruction and went on to say that it was "useless
and meaningless to worry about an all-out strategic nuclear war.'
A nuclear stalemate may exist, but it does not eliminate the danger of
local wars.
Limited conflicts are likely to take the form of naval engagements
in this section of Northern Asia. The U.S. Seventh Fleet no longer
dominates the western Pacific which heightens this possibility. This
regional issue is a particularly sensitive one to Japan. Suenaga
declared that Japanese strategists believe it is not a "nuclear umbrella
but the Seventh Fleet and its carrier-based air strike power that
actually deters potential aggression against Japan." Balance must be
maintained, but there remains an increasing probability of an "excessive
naval rivalry;" such a rivalry could be avoided by freezing "part if not
all, naval armaments at an agreed stable level."
The Japanese Socialist Party, General Takeda and Mr. Suenaga may
have little in common, but their proposals do. That similarity is
negotiation to achieve a contrived balance of power. Negotiation of
arms control agreements are rarely successful unless the accord can
prove mutually beneficial. Japan has little to offer in this regard
other than its potential armament capacity. Even if an accord could be
reached, two difficulties remain: preciseness and guarantee. In
General Takeda's proposal one may multiply the difficulties of the
current Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) by two factors: the
Japan Wants a Voice," loc . cit ,
45 Ibid.
46
"Wanted: Disarm Conference," loc . c_:U . , Suenaga goes on to
propose a tonnage balance of USSR - 6: U.S. - 5: China - 3: Japan - 2,




need to control all classes of weaponry, and the problem of regional
application. As Suenaga admitted, the prospect of limiting all the
technological details of naval armament is slim. Even the limitation
of major surface vessels, which Suenaga eventually proposed, would be
complicated by the complexity of weaponry and the press of technology.
Next comes the question of guarantee. How does a state determine
that the agreement which it ratified is being adhered to? How fully may
it rely on a state whose possible interests and potential threat
generated the need for an agreement? Perhaps the answer lies in the
national interests of the parties. The treaty will be violated if it
is in the national interest of the violator, which is not to say such
a treaty is non-negotiable; it only illustrates the temporary and tenuous
nature of such security.
Autonomous Defense Versus Treaty Defense
Perhaps the most immediate strategic argument in Japan in 1972
concerns the concept of Jishu Boei
, or autonomous defense. This argument
focuses on the center of the spectrum presented in Figure 2-1, and is
particularly relevant because it concerns defense policy and defense
procurement decisions being considered in the Fourth Defense Build-up
Plan, 1972-1976.
There are some who believe that Japan already has the capability
to defend itself against attack. Director-General Nakasone, speaking
on May 28, 1971, declared that "Japan assumes full responsibility for
Mr. Kaihara, "Anzen Ho6ho," loc. clt.
, pp. 5-7, criticized
Japanese willingness to rely on such treaties, particularly in view of
their 1941 Treaty of Neutrality with the Soviet Union.
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defending her home islands with conventional weapons. "^^ This was
apparently not news to the United States, for sixteen months earlier,
on January 26, 1970, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson testified that
"Japan has the capability of defending, now defending, Japan proper
49
against a major conventional attack." Such views have been vehemently
criticized by men such as Secretary-General Kaihara of the National
Defense Council, who characterized such views as pure nonsense. The
defense standards necessary for such a claim are presently unattained;
proponents of such a belief "do not know the enemy or themselves."
Perhaps the claim of autonomous defense capability is explained in
the JDA introduction to the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan: We gradually
will build "our autonomous defense setup, on the assumption that no threat
is impending on Japan for the moment." Professor Edwin Reischauer
suggested that there was little difference between autonomous defense
and treaty defense. He compared it to "going into the same room
through a different door," and argued that the theory reflects and
52
appeases growing Japanese self-confidence.
The question is not black and white, and one may see arguments for
53
autonomous defense and reliance on the treaty within the same article.
Nakasone, Perspective of the Defense of Japan
,
p. 4.
49 Hearings, U.S. Commitments
,
p. 1167.
50Kaihara, "Boei Ryoku", pp. 4-5. See Sections V and VI for an
evaluation of Japanese air power. See James E. Aucr, "The Postwar Sea
Forces of Maritime Japan, 1945-1971," (Ph.D. Thesis), July 1971,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, for a definitive
analysis of Japanese naval strength.
51The New Defense Buildup, Letter of transmittal.
Professor Edwin 0. Reischauer, Interview, March 29, 1971.




Degree of cooperation is one distinction that may be made, but it is
not very helpful in distinguishing between the two conepts. There has,
in fact, been little operational cooperation between the two military
forces during an era of great Japanese dependence. Mr. Aoki, editor of
Koku Joho
,
made the point that more cooperation may be required with
less reliance.
The argument may be stated in terms of area: where should the U.S.
and Japan cooperate, and where should Japan have an autonomous capability?
While Japan may participate in regional stability, cooperation to
1972 has manifested itself only passively. The area of active Japanese
participation is limited to its territory in either an autonomous or
cooperative policy. Within the Japanese territory, autonomy may be
discussed in terms of the direction of Japanese strategy and avoid for
the moment the controversy over capability. Although direction or
intent of development provides no definitive comparison, intent may be
expressed in terms of the desired method of cooperation; and here some
strategic distinction may be made.
International cooperation may be required if, one, the national
force is limited functionally, or, two, if its size is limited. V.'ars
may be limited by the methods employed or by the level of combat, however
certain tactics or functions of military force are necessary for any
degree of autonomy. If a military force emphasizes one functional
expertise to the exclusion of a balance of essential capabilities,
generally it has opted for dependence. Emphasis on a smaller, balanced
force provides a limited military independence.
j/,
Aoki Hideo, "Kyokuto Bei Kugun to Nippon no Boku" (Far East
U.S. Air Force and Japanese Air Defense), Gun] i Kenkyu , April 1971,




This difference may be specifically illustrated in terras of air
power in Japan. Official policy in Japan has continued to emphasize the
air defense mission, with no plans for counter-attack capability.-^
That policy has depended on the spear and the shield concept, and has
been basically a dependent posture. Wars are fought with both the sword
and the shield. Any military action would require assistance and no
operational plan may be written without contemplating the use of another
state's forces.
Those advocating such a strategy are more concerned with the
probability of threat today; they postulate that the country likely to
attack, the Soviet Union, could not be defeated alone. The functional
division of labor is more efficient, and concentrating on air defense
while leaving attack to the U.S. requires a less complex command structure.
Changes in this policy would require a significant change of concept
within the force structure and a diversification of allocated resources.
In the Japanese case, political and social controversy also could be
expected. '
Those advocating a more balanced force are less concerned about
threats today, but more concerned about the intent of the United States.
The Nixon Doctrine has raised doubts about U.S. assistance in the event
of low-level, conventional applications of force. Although the U.S.
reaffirmed its intent to keep commitments and to continue to protect
against nuclear powers, withdrawals and further policy statements have
eroded Japanese confidence in the U.S. strategic posture in Asia. One
55Major General Yamada Kiyoichi, Chief Defense Section, JASDF,
Interview, December 13, 1971.




Japanese strategic commentator translated the 1970 U.S. Defense White
Paper as follows
:
In Asia, that takes No, 2 spot to Europe in the U.S.
global strategy, no U.S. ground forces will be committed,
but economic and military aid will be, where needed,
and air-naval support if absolutely required to protect
U.S. national interest.
A balanced Japanese force would relate to this interpretation in two
ways: it would require no U.S. assistance, or only military supplies
in the event of low-level violence; dependence in the event of a large
attack would be more likely to be determined in the U.S. interest.
Counterforce strategies, tactics and equipment would be required
to implement such' an autonomous policy. It is far from reality, and
Professor Momoi Makoto placed such a concept in the "thinking stage;"
59two steps before planning and capability. Advocates of such a posture
have argued that steps should be taken to enhance functions such as
reconnaissance and counter-attack in order to reach some degree of
independence, "within the limits of our own capacity." They believe
that such a policy not only would give more autonomy to Japan, but
would be more responsive to its security needs in view of the evolving
U.S. posture.
58M. Yasuda, "U.S. Defense Strategy and Japan," 3-part article,
The Daily Yomiuri
, April 1-3, 1971.
59Professor Momoi, Interview, December 3, 1971,
Ibid. , and see Momoi, "Limits to Self-Defense Power," loc . cit.
,
Mr. Kaihara, although an outspoken advocate of continued cooperation
with the U.S., is very critical of the real capability of the SDF. He
recommends a policy of retrenchment to less sophisticated equipment and
increased eraphasis on logistics and passive defense. Within the
strategic parameters established, that is advocacy of more autonomy.
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There is no conclusion. Professor Momoi believed that "a fatal flaw
in the Japanese defense posture is the lack of strategy." Lack of
strategy means that no guiding principle can offset the other pressures
existent in the construction of defense policy. A final assessment of
Professor Momoi 's statement awaits the conclusion of this study. It is
possible, however, to agree that no single strategic theory dominates in
Japan: diversity and contradictions are the rule.
blMomoi, Interview, December 3, 1971.

Ill,
INTERNAL VARIABLES: THE SOCIETY AND THE INSTITUTION

This section of the thesis examines those national and institutional
variables which may limit and curtail the policy-maker although they
may not commonly be recognized as strategic variables. Civil dissent
could invalidate an otherwise viable military option, while national
unity might permit a seemingly impossible task. Historical experiences
at societal and institutional levels color later interpretations and
decisions, and affect the policy and the force structure. These
variables have the potential to limit the response to threat or to
condition its evaluation.
Elements of national power have been identified and categorized by
various students of international affairs. Aron consolidated all factors
as three fundamental elements which are comprehensive and serve to
illustrate the focus of this section of the study. Aron defined these
three categories as the "milieu, or space occupied by the political
units; resources, or the quantity and quality of implements and combatants;"
and lastly, "the collective capacity for action."
The first element, milieu, might be called the theater of operations.
The considerations discussed in the first section serve to define the
milieu which delineates the existence of threat.
The second element emphasizes the need to consider the resources
available as a base for national power. Resources may be considered at
several levels of potentiality. The availability of resources at any
level may be altered through policy measures such as stockpiling or
diversion of resources to strategic manufacture. Natural resources may
therefore be considered an aspect of policy objectives and compose a
portion of the potential force structure. Together with the ready






structure, it comprises the policy-maker's product. Both ready and
potential resources relevant to airpower will be perused in sections V
and VI.
The "collective capacity" of a state refers to its capacity to
utilize its resources within its theaters of action. Collective
capacity may be analyzed at several conceptual levels. Within the
military organization, command and control at the flight, squadron, or
wing level bear on the capability of the force structure to apply its
resources. Military force efficiency is a derivative of its capability
to coordinate and integrate its functions with other branches to carry
out operations. The entire force structure relies on the governmental
decision-making process. These also are finished products which the
policy-maker and military planner might be expected to include among
policy goals.
There are other, broader indices which the policy-maker must
consider when evaluating national strength. Domestic consensus and the
society's technical capacity are essential bases to force structure
capability. The policy process must consider the external threat, but
must base plans for a stable, optimum relationship on internal variables
including the political system, the social structure and specific
institutional factors applicable to the force structure.
In discussing a similar concept of "national style," Hoffmann
concluded that "what is unique is each nation's experience." Aron also
noted that "none of these three terms.... is exempt from history.'' This
concept of capacity is both historical and dynamic. Experiences
2
0p_. cit. , p. 93 .





condition perceptions and responses, and while history is very important,
it is also imperative that the domestic condition be viewed from a
current perspective.
The Japanese Constitution, the political opposition and post-war
pacifist sentiments in Japan have been widely considered to be sources
and examples of the deep societal division over defense policy and
indicative of strict societal limitations as regards the planner.
Societal limitations are important to the defense planner, and they must
be considered in any state's policy formulation process. This aspect of
Japanese capacity is discussed in Chapter 3 where the dynamic aspects
of these issues are emphasized in order to define more clearly their
relevance to the 1972 Japanese policy-maker.
While social limitations tend to receive thorough analysis, another
aspect of collective capacity is often neglected. Japanese military
policies partially result from military history, and views of air power
are conditioned by the unique history of Japanese military aviation.
History is important in any case, but particularly significant in Japan
where the current leadership were directly involved in the World War II
defeat and the rebirth of military aviation. Chapters 4 and 5 shift the
focus from the society to the institution. While Chapter 4 peruses the
background of air power policy in Japan, Chapter 5 examines the evolution
which reincorporated air power in the Japanese force structure. These
institutional factors, internal to the military establishment, help




THE CONSTITUTION, POLITICS AND
THE SOCIAL MILIEU
This chapter examines the political controversy over defense in
Japan and related constitutional arguments; it then investigates the
society's opinion of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) . Both these domestic
constraints are dynamic variables, and recent trends in Japan are
emphasized. Commentators commonly assume that these variables have
created stringent limitations on the options of military policy. Whatever
the historical or theoretical validity of such assumptions, recent
trends indicate that reappraisal is necessary.
The political controversy over defense in Japan, which may be
broadly considered a dichotomy between the government and opposition
parties, is seemingly an endless argument. Article IX of the Constitution
has served as the legal basis of this continuing imbroglio. The
assumption of an anti-military sentiment in Japan has been based on
Japan's experience with nuclear warfare and its defeat in World War II.
The resulting pacifism and related "nuclear allergy" presumably limit
Japanese defense planners.
The policy-maker is constrained by these elements only to the
extent that an otherwise viable alternative is prohibited. Therefore,
these aspects of the national environment will be evaluated with
particular emphasis on current values and their degree of relevance to
options available in 1972. Although social opinions sometimes do not
distinguish between the branches of the Defense Forces, their particular




The Politics of Article IX
Japanese national security policy has been discussed most often
in terras of constitionality . The U.S. Security Treaty, the U.S. bases
and the Self-Defense Forces are criticized for their alleged conflict
with Article IX. The constitutional issue reemerges yearly as a tool
for criticism of defense budgets. The significance of Article IX is
well known, even to those who know little else about Japan or its national
security policy.
When interpellated on the Constitution in 1950, the Prime Minister
had cited aircraft as one of the types of weapons which would be
offensive and illegal under the Constitution. Although the situation
has changed greatly in the past twenty years, it remains relatively
easy to impute offensive characteristics to aircraft.
Article IX of the Japanese Constitution has been exposed to a
great deal of discussion, and the legal historical arguments will not
be reviewed in detail. However, the Air Self-Defense Force feels
particularly exposed to the constitutional issue because of its weapons
and the nature of some policy options theoretically open to it. For
that reason, it is appropriate to review some aspects of the
constitutional limitations existent in Japan.
A constitution is a dynamic instrument. It may be modified by
interpretation; its limitations primarily have meaning in terms of
current values and needs. A constitution is a document, a legal paper;
For background, see Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Commentary on the Jnpnnese-
Constitution (Tokyo: Nihon Hyohom: Ltd., 1965), Professor Miyasawa
has written extensively on the Japanese Constitution. An excellent
English language source is Dan Fenno Henderson, ed . , The Constitution
of Japan, Its F i rst Twenty Years, 1947-1967 (Seattle: Univ. of Washington
Press, 1968). Also see Emraerson, Anns , pp. 50-53, 108-119, for views
on Article IX and its effect on the SDF.
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however, the full extent of its meaning is shaped by the actions and
decisions taken in its name. Finally, a constitutional limit is
significant with regard to policy only if it eliminates an otherwise
viable alternative. It would be rather meaningless to say that Article IX
of the Constitution prohibits a large strategic bomber force if that is
not a viable Japanese policy option with or without Article IX.
The origin of Article IX remains uncertain; however, the Constitution
is still considered the "MacArthur Constitution", and Article IX the
"MacArthur Article". The written history did begin with General MacArthur
when he included his views on the topic in a memo to General Whitney:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.
Japan renounces it as an instrumentality of settling its
disputes and even for preserving its own security. It
relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the
world for its defense and protection.
No Japanese Army, Navy or Air Force will ever be
authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be
conferred upon any Japanese Force. *
A draft constitution was written by the Government Section of the
Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) after the initial Japanese
version proved unacceptable; it was presented to the Japanese in the
form of an ultimatum on February 13, 1946. The SCAP draft read as
follows
:
Article VII. War as a sovereign right of the nation
is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever
renounced as a means for settling disputes with any
3SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan , Vol. I, p. 102.
^Emmerson, Arms , described the scene where General Whitney threatens
Foreign Minister Yoshida with Publication of the Government Section




No array, navy, air force or other war potential will
ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will
ever be conferred upon the state.
While there was some consolidation from MacArthur's memorandum, the
origin of the article seems certain. The Japanese did not question the
article and it was submitted to the Diet in that form. During the Diet
discussions, the article was amended pursuant to a proposal by Mr. Ashida
Hitoshi. The final, official text of Article IX showed some revision:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceeding para-
graph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 6
This amendment was not debated and Mr. Ashida waited five years
before he explained the reasoning behind his actions. He believed the
phrases he added had guaranteed that Japan had not forfeited the
sovereign right of self-defense. By adding "in order to accomplish the
aim of the preceeding paragraph," forces were only illegal if to be
used contrary to paragraph 1. However, there appeared to be little
public discussion of the matter at the time and only a few raised their
Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, Commentary on the J apanese Constitution
(Tokyo: Nihon Hychom Company, ltd, 1965), p. 57.
From officia
Office, ASO, JASDF
l translation provided by Legal Section, Air Staff
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voices in disagreement.' Edward Martin could write in 1948: "there
seems to be agreement on the proposition that Japan should never be
Q
permitted to have an army, navy or air force."
But the situation in Asia began to change rapidly and new inter-
pretations of Article IX began to appear. The originator, General
MacArthur, touched on the subject during a 1950 New Year Statement to
the Japanese: "Japan retains the inalienable right of self-defense
against unprovoked attack."" The political leadership in Japan also
went through a difficult period of reinterpretation. Prime Minister
Yoshida argued that the National Police Reserve could not be called
rearmament because it was only established to maintain internal security
and therefore had no "war potential." The next step was the establish-
ment of the National Safety Agency on August 1, 1952, and General
Tatsumi Eichii suggested to Prime Minister Yoshida that these forces
were concerned with military matters and Article IX should be revised.
The Prime Minister became angry at this suggestion and said his old
position was still valid. The Safety Forces were not charged with
external defense, and they therefore had no war potential.
^U.S. Navy Far East Memorandum, dated July 15, 1947, cites one
instance of Article IX criticism when the no-war clause was denounced
by a Communist Party representative at a public rally. The JCP would
ammend the Constitution he said for Japan had the right to military
forces and "to declare defensive wars."
8Edward M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York:
American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p. 39.
9The New York Times , January 1, 1950.
10Prime Minister Yoshida changed his position on the defense
forces during the 1950-1954 period and I rely heavily on General Tatsumife
description of these charges and his arguments with the PM over the
Constitution, Interview, February 22, 1972. General Tatsumi favored
Constitutional revision. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of General
Tatsumi 's relationship with the Prime Minister. .
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The Self-Defense Forces presented a different problem for it did
have responsibility for external defense. There was an air defense
force which was to fly jet interceptors, obviously not for internal
security. Again General Tatsumi suggested that Article IX should be
altered. The Prime Minister disagreed once more, however, he based his
opposition on a different rationale. The Self-Defense Forces were war
potential, but war potential in self-defense was permissible if not to
be used for the settlement of international disputes.
This shift in attitude in 1954 corresponded to the realities of the
Defense Forces and also a shift in public opinion. There was a significant
amount of public support for rearmament during 1953, and the Progressive
12Party assumed the vanguard of the movement. In February 1953, the
Progressives adopted a resolution at their party convention which
supported constitutional revision. The resolution specifically referred
to Article IX, and the party's defense committee received approval of
its rearmament plan. The Progressive position enjoyed a high point of
popularity in 1953 and early 1954, but support for revision of Article
IX began to erode rapidly during 1954. Twenty-five of forty daily
newspapers supported revision in 1954; by 1956 five of thirty-four took
the same position. In December 1954, the first Hatoyama Cabinet took
Yoshida's earlier position: the Constitution allowed a "minimum degree"
1:LYoshida, Interview, February 22, 1972.
12Henderson, Constitution
,
pp. 52-62, including public opinion
polls.
13
"Progressive Party's Defense Special Committee Fivc-Ycar Defense







of military forces to effect the right of self-defense. During
November 1955, the two conservative parties formed a new coalition and
their arguments emphasized the constitutionality of the Self-Defense
Forces. In view of public opinion, the task became one of rationalizing
rearmament and Article IX rather than altering the Constitution.
The current position of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
is quite similar to that taken in 1955. The LDP infrastructure includes
a "Constitutional Research Council" which has been primarily concerned
with revisions of the Constitution. " The council has researched
proposed charges for five years, and has recently decided to recommend
no change of Article IX. Instead they proposed that new articles be
added proclaiming the legality "of the Self-Defense Forces, the need for
-I o
self-reliant defense, and national security." The chairman of the
council admitted that even those proposals had little hope of adoption
by the LDP. 19
Several factors make it likely that the LDP will continue to avoid
the issue. Opponents of the SDF have repeatedly attempted to press the
constitutional issue in the courts. The Japanese courts have steadfastly
refused to rule specifically on the issue. Perhaps the most definitive
opinion to date was delivered in the Sunakawa Case, one of the most
famous on this issue:
Royama Masamichi, "Problems in Self-Defense," The Annals of the
American Academy
,
Japan Since Recovery cf Independence , Vol. 308, 1956.
Miyasawa Toshiyoshi, "The Constitution in Trouble," Japan Quarterly
,
July-September 1959, Volume VI, No. 3, pp. 293-294.
17Ikeda Hajime, "Constitution Change Believed Unlikely," The Japan
Times






....this Article renounces the so-called x^ar and prohibits
the maintenance of the so-called war potential, but
certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the
right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign
power. The pacifism advanced in our Constitution was
never intended to mean defenselessness or non-resistance.
The legal opposition to the Self-Defense Forces has not subsided, and
any case against the government which may raise the constitutional
issue has received the support of opposition politicians and publicists.
Many defense lawyers are retained and the case subsequently is appealed
21through all levels of the Japanese judicial system.
22
The Air Self-Defense Force faced two similar cases in 1971.
Both the Naganumo Case in Hokkaido and the Fujioka case in Hyakuri
involved land acquisitions by the ASDF which have been contested, using
the alleged illegality of the JASDF as the basis of their arguments.
The JASDF expects that both cases eventually will be decided in its
favor; lower level decisions have upheld the government position.
However, the cases are a constant issue; the tactics of delay and appeal
keep them in the courts almost continuously. 2^ This, of course, has been
the. goal, and the primary reason opposition parties support the cases.
20Supreme Court of Japan, Judgement Upon Case of the so-called
"Sunakawa Case" (Tokyo: General Secretariat of the Supreme Court, 1960),






pp. 111-113, described the evolution of the
"Eniwa Case," in which volunteer legal support was utilized.
22
This information was provided by Major Torino Masaru, JASDF,
Legal Officer, Legal Branch, ASO, Interview, December 10, 1971. The
cases are not actually contested by the JASDF because the government is
always represented by the Justice Ministry. The legal branch of ASO
does act as investigative office and technical advisor in cases involving
the JASDF.
23The case involving Hyakuri Air Base land began with a government
purchase in 1957, Ibid .
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The constant exposure keeps the issue in the public view.
Public opinion also acts to deter any revision of the Constitution.
Despite the fact that the Constitution was imposed during the Occupation
and is popularly referred to as the "MacArthur Constitution," public
opinion polls oppose revision, particularly of Article IX. Only twenty
percent of those polled in 1970 supported any change and less than
seventy-five percent of that group favored changing Article IX.
Popular opinion is not a serious problem for the SDF, because the great
majority, seventy-five per cent or more, support the existence of the
25Defense Forces. The public generally has accepted the government
position that the Constitution allows the SDF and this was borne out in
a poll taken in February 1971. When asked the meaning of the
Constitution, thirty-two percent replied that no military establishment
was allowed; thirty-nine percent believed that the SDF was permissible.
Twenty-nine percent were unsure of its meaning. ° Similar surveys
27taken in 1967 and 1968 revealed nearly identical results.
^Seron Chosa , Public Opinion Survey Pamphlet printed by Sorifu
Koho Shitsu (Public Relations Division of the Prime Minister's Office),
October 71, pp. 66-75, from 1970 national survey by Nippon Research
Center. Also see Seron Chosa
,
February 72, pp. 20-21 for examples of
Constitutional support.
25Seisaku Geppo, April 1970, Central Survey Co. public opinion poll,
September 69, the SDF had better exist; yes-75%; no-10%; don't know-15%,
Mainichi
, June 15, 1971, Mainichi Press Survey on Defense. Do you think
SDF are necessary? Yes-71%; No-24%; Don't Know-5%. The Communist
Party members were the only group opposed, by a 47-51 margin. Of the
24% opposing the SDF, only 7% based their opposition on the Constitution.
Yomiuri
,
public opinion poll published August 7, 1969, fjcnerally
supported these statistics and included a party preference breakdown
showing, for example, 57.9% of JSP members prefer the SDF at current
strength or stronger.
26Seron Chosa
, February 1972, pp. 20-21.




Furthermore, there have been some indications that opposition to
the Defense Forces is not based on the Constitution. In the 1971 poll
which was cited above, the respondents were asked: "Apart from the
28Constitution, should Japan have a military force for its self-defense?""
Those saying no totaled thirty-three percent; the yes vote was forty-six
percent; and twenty-one percent did not know or had no opinion. Again,
29
this ratio had remained constant over the preceeding four years.
The polls actually reflected a slightly higher opposition to the Self
Defense Forces outside the constitutional reference.
If there are significant political reasons for avoiding constitutional
revision, there remains the strategic issue. What defense options are
prohibited by the Constitution and how important are such restrictions?
The Vice Chief of Staff of the JASDF, Lieutenant General Shirakawa
30
Motoharu, contended that the issue was "basic" to ASDF capabilities.
General Okumiya believed that Article IX is a "very great problem"
•an
facing Japan. These men and many others believe that there is a
"basic philosophical difference" between the government and the opposition
which would mean a different interpretation of Article IX and the
32
disbandment of the Defense Forces if the latter came to power. They
do not necessarily believe that the change would be made immediately.
28Seron Chosa , February 1972, pp. 20-21.
29
Ibid .
30Interview, December 10, 1971.
31
General Okumiya Masatake, Interview, November 18, 1971.
This view also was expoused by Masuhara Kcikichi, senior LDP member
and member of the Diet, Interview, February 19, 1972; and Mr. Ogawa
Raita, editor of Koku Shlmbun , Interview, February 18, 1972. Also see




Mr. Ogawa, for example believed an opposition government would depreciate
combat and operationally ready procedures and move slowly towards
demilitarization.
However, an opposite view exists which holds that the opposition
parties would make very few if any changes in the SDF if they came to
so
power. The majority of all opposition party members questioned in
1971 declared they supported the Defense Force so there appears to be
some political basis for the assumption although the opposition has
used the Constitution continuously as a basis for attacking the SDF.
From the formation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) in 1950 to the
submission of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, the opposition parties
have charged the government with violation of the Constitution. Most
recently, they charged the government with "flagrant violation" of the
constitutional principle of civilian control due to their handling of
the new defense build-up. * Despite all the protestations and governmental
"concessions," there has never been any significant alteration of the
35defense budget as a consequence of Diet deliberations.
The application of constitutional restrictions must be effected
by the courts or through the political process. The reluctance of the
33Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Interview, November 10, 1971. I am indebted
to Mr. Kaihara for directing me into a closer investigation of the "SDF
positions" of the various opposition parties.
3
^This issue dominated all newspapers for the month of February
1972, while the opposition boycotted the Diet over the charges. For
opposition charges see The Japan Times , February 8, 1972; February 11,
1972; and February 23-24, 1972.
35The 1972 budget (for the first time) has been reduced slightly,
but will not actually change the expenditures or direction of policy
because of the bureaucratic procedures for procurement. "Nothing has
changed" Mr. Kaihara declared, interview, February 29, 1972. For details
on the political input to the policy-making process, see Chapter 7.
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courts has been noted; the absence of budgetary modifications suggests
that the Diet has not participated actively in the application of
Article IX. The Diet, of course, is a tyrannical body in that the party
with a majority may pass its programs whatever the opposition attitude,
but that is not common in the Japanese Diet. The LDP has shown
restraint and issues normally are discussed fully. There are, however,
two basic factors which degrade the political impact on this issue.
The Diet has very little expertise in military affairs, and the five
political parties display an amazing consensus on the status of the
Self-Defense Forces.
The Diet and the government are virtually void of personnel with
previous military experience. General Genda Minoru and Admiral Hoshina
Zenshiro now in the upper chamber of the Diet are conspicuous exceptions.
There are men like Masuhara Keikichi, who have served as civilian
administrators in the Defense Agency, but their early experiences were
in the Internal Bureaus or police organizations. The most outspoken
Diet member on military affairs in recent years has been Nakasone
Yasuhiro, and he is a career politician.
The absence of personal experience is magnified by the lack of a
standing defense committee. The establishment of such a committee has
been supported by the LDP and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) , but
opposed by the other parties, particularly the Socialist Party.
The growing technological expertise required to interpret a defense
budget exacerbates this problem.
-^The most recent effort for a defense committee stemmed from the
February 1972 controversy over defense and was promptly attacked by





There is no pressure to remedy the lack of expertise. The lack of
specifics has enhanced the use of constitionality as an emotional,
political tool by the opposition, and the absence of perceived threat
leaves the government little leverage to force discussions into specifics.
The LDP itself feels no threat and no need to obtain technical advice on
its policies. Most leaders of the Defense Forces are certain that Prime
Minister Sato would not recognize them in public. A striking example
of this disregard occurred in 1969 when Prime Minister Sato went to the
United States to confer on the return of Okinawa without any conferences
with the Joint Staff Council, even though the Defense Forces would be
37
charged with Okinawa's defense.
It is generally assumed that there are greatly divergent opinions
on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces. The Communists,
the Socialists and the Komeito repeatedly assert that the current
forces exist in violation of the Constitution. The LDP position is
reflected by the Defense Forces as the party has been in power since
Japan's independence: the Self-Defense Forces are legal; they may only
be used for defense; and they may not be dispatched overseas. The
Democratic Socialist Party supports the constitutionality of the SDF
and opposes revision of Article IX. It supports "autonomous defense
38power in keeping with the Constitution." However, it does believe
that the present level of the SDF is sufficient and any further increase
would be detrimental to Japan's security.
37
Okumiya, Interview, November 18, 1971.
38"Democratic Socialist Party Views toward the Govcrnment-LDP
Decision for Automatic Extension of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty,"






The Komei Party has often called LDP defense policies unconstitutional,
"these defense policies already have revised the Constitution for the
30
worse. It has also called for the return to the "peace Constitution -
to realize peace without armaments."^ Some ambivalence remains as
suggested by a recent statement of the Party's secretary-general:
"Our doubts about the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces are
extremely strong."^1 Moreover, Komeito proposals have been vague and
contained a National Land Guard Force, the "Koku do Keke Tai."^ 2 It
has avoided discussing any specific organization, missions or armament
for this force.
The Communists have been adamant about the current status of the
SDF and their proposals for it:
The SDF law and the Defense Agency Establishment Law
will be abolished, and the SDF, which are armed forces,
violating the Constitution, subordinated to the U.S. and
for the suppression of the people will be disbanded. *3
However, the Communists have not insisted that the Constitution is
immutable; they have suggested that revisions might be necessary after
4A
Japan became "truly independent." Despite their denunciation of the
SDF, the Communists have agreed that:




As quoted in Emmerson, Arms
, pp. 110-111.
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Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971.
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"Japan Communist Party's Security Measures," Akahata (Red-Flag
Organ of JCP)
,






As a future problem, we have to consider that develop-
ments both within and without the country may produce a
situation in which, in order to defend the independence
and sovereignty of the country, some defense measures
of a military nature may be required. *5
Therefore, they also have acknowledged the possible need for a defense
force. Their essential objection would appear to be its orientation
rather than its existence.
The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has given the appearance of being
most radically opposed to the Self-Defense Forces. It has denied that,
once in power, it would alter the Constitution: "it is necessary to
protect the constitutional system to the last."^ 6 The Self-Defense
Forces are unconstitutional and would be dissolved when the Socialist
Party came to power. The JSP has advocated a policy of unarmed neutrality
to realize peace and protect the "precious treasure of the peaceful
Constitution."* 7 This "clear and resolute" statement becomes somewhat
muddled, however, when JSP proposals for dissolving the SDF are examined
in more detail.
The Defense Forces are to be converted into a National Police
Corps, or "Koku Minki Satsutai." 48 They will be different, the JSP has
asserted; the Police Corps will be relieved of "coping with direct
Akahata (Red Flag), June 11, 1968, as quoted in Emmerson, Arms
,
p. 110.
"Let Us Make Japan's Constitution of Non-Armament and Neutrality
the Constitution of the World," Japan Socialist Review , January 1, 15,
1970, Nos. 194-195, p. 36; However, it should be noted that Socialist
approved drafts of an altered Constitution have appeared and subsequently








, p. 32, Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971.
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aggression" and will maintain "peace and order at home."^ Even this
distinction is later confused, for the Socialists have indicated that
this police corps will "supplement" the prefectural police. Furthermore,
its strength and equipment will be maintained in accordance with four
factors
:
1) The stability of the government, or the balance of
forces between the government and the hostile forces (in
and out of the Diet)
.
2) The degree of control over the Self-Defense Forces.
(It is necessary to lead the Self-Defense Forces to
understand the policy of our Party and cooperate with us
by carrying out personnel transfers and replacing
militarist education with correct education.)
3) The degree of realization of the foreign policy of
peace and neutrality promoted by a socialist government.
(A collective system or separate systems for guaranteeing
peace, demilitarized zone in Asia and the Pacific, and
a major belt of non-aligned neutral countries between
the two major camps.).
4) Overwhelming public opinion (to dissolve the SDF). 50
These conditions of dissolution paint a totally different picture.
The last one suggests that very little will be done without "overwhelming"
support; and current public opinion overwhelmingly supports the SDF.
The third factor makes the size and mission of the SDF, or police corps,
dependent on the external situation, belying the previous assertion that
it was only concerned with domestic order. The first two factors are
the most ominous of all; they indicate that the 'new' defense forces
would espouse the socialist viewpoint and be used to support the
49
"Let Us Make Japan's Constitution of Non-Armament and Neutrality
the Constitution of the World," Japan Socialist Review , January 1, 15,





government viewpoint in the Diet and outside it.
A closer look at the various party policies regarding the Self-
Defense Forces reveals that a great similarity in their views has
developed. No party has actually intended to dissolve the Self-Defense
Forces and remedy the 'violations of the Constitution.' The SDF have
been criticized primarily because it is an area in which the government
has been vulnerable. The opposition parties have vehemently opposed
any revision of Article IX because they would be left without one of
their most reliable points of criticism. While the Defense Force will
continue to be called unconstitutional, it seems unlikely that the
opposition will have the interest, the expertise or the true intent of
altering probables policy alternatives.
The operational forces feel little restriction because of the
Constitution. The defense planners within the Air Self-Defense Force
discussed their difficulties and limitations in effecting budgetary
and operational planning at length with the author. The subject of
constitutional prohibitions was not mentioned. Budgetary and bureaucratic
limitations were far more pressing. There has been good reason for
the lack of concern with the constitutional problem as it has not been
translated into specific policy limitations. When Director-General
Arita authorized the planning for the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, he
gave no "constitutional" limits; in fact he only promulgated a very
52
abstract guideline without specific limitations.
^Colonel Yamada Riyoichi (now Major General, JASDF) , Chief,
Defense Section, ASO; Colonel Hase Kiyoshi, Chief, Defense Branch, ASO;
Colonel Katao Nobora, Chief, Annual Program Branch; Colonel Kume Toyahisa,
Chief, Medium and Long Range Plans Branch, Interviews, December 13, 1971.
COJ Mr. Yasuda Hiroshi, Defense Councillor, Japan Defense Agency,
Interview, February 10, 1971.
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In interviews held with operational personnel at air bases at
several locations in Japan, the Constitution rarely was mentioned as a
problem in Japan. In a roundtable discussion at the Air Staff College
with several field-grade instructors, the Constitution was mentioned only
briefly although the problem of public attitude and SDF morale was
discussed at length. ^ While talking to cadets at the Air Officer
Candidate School, the constitutional issue was raised. One cadet replied
that it was not really an issue; the Constitution was ambiguous and
should be changed, but that was merely a technical problem. -^ In sum,
there is little evidence that the Constitution has constrained recent
choices regarding policies or operations of the JASDF.
It is possible to argue that the above theory may be applicable
within limited policy options, essentially the maintenance of the
status quo or minimal growth; however, the constitutional limitation
would prohibit a wider range of strategic alternatives. Therefore, an
autonomous nuclear force or strategic deterrence capability are not
possible policy options. Such an argument may be true, but it does not
concern the major point addressed here. The current, viable policy
options are constitutionally and politically possible. If there developed
a drastic change in the international environment or the threat to
Japan, it seems probable that a strategic deterrence force could be
-* 3
I participated in this discussion on November 30, 1971, with five
officers of the JASDF, Lt. Col. Ozaki Yasutada, Lt. Col. Fujii Tsutcmu,





^Visit to Nara Air Base, January 14, 1972. There were other
opinions among the many people I talked to. Some felt that it was a
limitation. JASDF could have only tactical and not strategic weapons
for example. However, when only asked what are the major problems of




built while still claiming the integrity of Article IX. The Chinese
have built a nuclear missile force only for self-defense, repeatedly
promising that it would never be used first. It is very difficult, if
not impossible, to designate a weapon offensive or defensive. In 1972,
Article IX is a useful Japanese tool for dealing with friend and foe,
but less significant as a limitation on security policy options.
Pacifism in Japan
The Self-Defense Forces have been characterized as a. foreign legion
in their own country. One Air Self-Defense Force General was returning
from a visit to the United States where he had been the official guest
of the United States. The general was reported to have said that he
could feel his social status falling more rapidly than the aircraft as
it descended to Haneda International Airport. -* The SDF was very
unpopular in its early days. If pacifism was the stoning of the first
young cadets at the Defense Academy, then there definitely was a strong
err
strain of pacifism in the 1950 's.
In discussing pacifism in Japan in 1972, it is helpful to consider
the opposite phenomenon, militarism. Various sources inside and outside
Japan have charged that militarism is reviving. One author recently
suggested that Japanese public opinion could "compel" nuclear armament.-''
The primary goal is not comprehensively to examine militarism or pacifism,
but to place the prevailing Japanese social attitude toward defense
-'-'Story related by Taoka, Interview, December 1, 1971.
^Lieutenant Commander Baba Toshihaya, JMSDF, was a member of the
first class of the Defense Academy and related incidents of rocks being
thrown at him while in town with his uniform on.
57Morton Halperin, "Reports Japan," The Atlantic , April 1970,





somewhere along a militarist-pacifist continuum. For this purpose, a
definition contrasting the two extremes is applicable. Militarism could
be defined as the assumption that military force and the use of violence
is the most efficient method of effecting international relationship, and
a national policy which implemented that assumption. Pacifism, on the
contrary, would be the assumption that military force and violence
are the most inefficient methodology of international affairs, and
therefore, it advocates abandonment of their use.
Prime Minister Yoshida made a statement in the Diet, June 26, 1946,
which represented early Japanese pacifism:
As to the clause of the draft constitution forsaking war,
it does not recognize any armaments or the right to make
war against any country. Therefore it means we have
forsaken war, even the right of self-defense, to battle
other countries. In wars of recent years, many have been
fought in the name of self-defense, including the
Manchurian Incident and the great Asian War. War using
the right of self-defense appears to be righteous, but I
believe that it is harmful to recognize such a right. 58
James Buck suggested in 1967 that a total change of the social structure
occurred during the Occupation which permanently limited the options of
the Self-Defense Forces. There were many significant changes
implemented during the Occupation; land reform, monetary reform, and
democratization. Although these occupational reforms could be called a
political revolution, there remain many unique Japanese characteristics
which contribute to a basic Japanese conservatism. Jobs are still often
for life, and organizations employ the college background and the family
of their employee, not just the individual. The Confucian values
relevant to a hierarchal society are still apparent in Japan. Professor
CO
Quoted in Asahi Shimbun , January 1, 1972,
59Buck, "The Japanese Self-Defense Forces," loc. clt . , pp. 597-602,
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Watanabe, after discussing societal change in post-war Japan, concluded
that; "Japan still is a modernized clan, and consists of many vertical
societies large and small.' While there have been many changes in
Japanese society after World War II, it would not be correct to say that
it has changed fundamentally. Nor was the early pacifism of the
Occupation a permanent change. There has been some movement away from
the previous strict interpretation and there is ample evidence that
Japan is no longer willing to abandon the use of force in every
circumstance. Twenty-five years after Prime Minister Yoshida's statement
to the Diet, another statement made by Prime Minister Sato reflected
a different national attitude:
I believe that our country should have as a basic principle
the ideal to have freedom and peace, but also with the
pride that we defend our own country and maintain adequate
size self-defense forces. This also will contribute to
the lessening of tension in Asia. 61
The change in Japanese attitudes toward defense has not been a
total reversal, and there remain significant limitations to the increase
in support enjoyed by the Defense Forces. Some sections of Japanese
society still oppose and ostracize the SDF. A recent public opinion
poll showed only seventeen per cent of students supported neutrality
with self-defense while forty percent supported unarmed neutrality.
Professor Watanabe Kazutaka, "Philosophy of Management in Japan,"
prepared for Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Japan, April 1966, provided
by Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force, Japan; p. 8.
Quoted in Asahi Shimbun , January 1, 1972, from Diet speech
October 20, 1971.
Of all occupational classifications this was the onlv group who
showed such support, only 8% of housewives, for example, supported
unarmed neutrality, "Public Opinion Poll Concerning the SDF," Seisaku Geppo ,
April 1970, p. 33.
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The Japanese academic community also has generally opposed the Defense
Forces. In 1968, the majority of major Japanese universities voted to
exclude all Self-Defense Force personnel. This ban remains in effect
today. 63
Outside the academic sector there appears to be less opposition to
the SDF although some observers have felt that the entire Japanese
social attitude is inimical to uniformed military pride. General
Okumiya has pointed out that Japan does not have an Army , Navy or Air
Force but only Self-Defense Forces. Conscription, military justice,
national security measures and emergency mobilization procedures are
some of the aspects of the normal military force structure which have
not been developed in Japan. There is no award system in the SDF,
limiting the means by which heroic or meritious service can be recognized
An expression of the general lack of pride in the uniform is the
The civilian graduate program for JASDF was cancelled in the 1968
school year, Colonel Teramura Sumio, JASDF, Chief of Training Section,
ASO, February 14, 1972. There are signs that this policy may be
reversed in the future according to some, including Professor Ando
Nisuke of Kyoto University, Interview, January 14, 1972. Mr. Kaihara
points out that the most vehement opponents of current national security
policies and the Defense Forces are the strongest proponents of Mao
Tse-tung who said, "the central duty of the revolution - is the seizure
of political power through armed forces and the solution of problems
through war." In "Anzen Hosho no Tadashii Kangae Kata," loc . cit
.
,
pp. 2-4. There are, of course, many non-Maoist acamedicians who oppose
the SDF.
^Ogawa, Interview, December 27, 1971; Okumiya, November 18, 1971.
650kumiya Masatake, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, December 1965, p. 27.
66See Auer, "Postwar Sea Forces," Chapter VII, for a detailed
description of these differences. I am citing these differences as
possible elements affecting the morale and attitude of SDF members.
Operational deficiencies caused by these situations is a different matter
and will be discussed in the course of Sections V and VI.




reluctance of military personnel to wear their uniforms to and from
work. This situation is changing, however, and one experienced United
States Air Force officer remembered that a uniformed officer could not
be found on the street in the mid-1960 's while it is commonplace to
see men in uniform in 1972. °
While general social acceptance of the military may be improving,
militarism in Japan has become an often discussed topic that obviously
worries many Japanese. The majority of them do not believe that militarism
has revived in Japan, but on the other hand, a majority also believe that
it is a future danger. 59 When asked why there is a danger of militarism
or why they believe that militarism has revived, the majority cited the
LDP policies and the buildup of the Defense Forces. Japan is sensitive
to external opinions, and recent charges of militarism from the United
States and China have heightened speculation in the press. One section
of the special New Year's edition of Asahi Shimbun was dedicated to
"Gunkoku shugi o Tsusekisuru," the study of the drift to militarism.
"Colonel Richard G. Leech, U.S.A.F., former Air Attache to Japan
1967-1970, January 27, 1972. It is more common to see men travelling
to and from their base in uniform outside the Tokyo area. At Matsushima
and Komatsu bases most personnel wore their uniforms to and from work,
(in a much more hospitable atmosphere than Tokyo)
.
Seron Chosa . December 1971, pp. 45-47; "National Opinion Poll,"
Asahi Shimbun
,
January 3, 1972, (U.S. Embassy Translation); "National
Poll", Mainichi
,
October 18, 1971 (U.S. Embassy Translation). Only 5%
believe militarism has revived, an average of 25% believe that it "is
reviving"; 40-45% see revival in the future; and 55-60% believe that
there exists the "possibility that militarism may revive." Only 25-30%





January 1, 1972; also see Matsuda Michio, "Militarism
in the Mind," Asahi Evening News
,
January 1, 1972, a long, polemic
article on the revival of militarism.
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The Defense Forces have done little to combat this trend of public
opinion although there have been several reasons for their ineffectiveness
in public relations. The principle of civil control has been translated
to complete dominance and any public statements on policy by the
uniformed officers have been frowned on if not totally prohibited.
The SDF were unpopular and looked on as stepchildren of the Occupation
at their inception and have been hesitant to make contact with the
press and public. Many uniformed officers remain suspicious of the
Japanese newspapers and feel that the newspapers have been dominated
by Communist or leftist elements; they have viewed the press as opponents
rather than friendly critics. Even friendly members of the press
receive only limited support and feel that the SDF should attempt to
create more positive relationships. The JASDF only began recruiting
over radio and television two years ago, and did not disseminate
pamphlets for that purpose until 1965. The editor of Koku Shimbun
pointed out that the Air Self-Defense Force was "so concerned over
political sensitivity that they did not want to be discussed." 7 ^ There
has been greater effort expanded in this area as the Defense Agency
recently earmarked one million dollars for public relations, and the
JASDF, for example, takes public figures on "invitational flights" at a
cost of over $1650.00 per jet ride.
72
The extent of civilian control will be discussed fully within
the framework of the policy-making structure explained in Chapter 6.
730gawa Raita, editor of Koku Shimbun (Wing) and strong supporter
of the JASDF, expressed this view, Interview, December 27, 1971.
7/
*Ogawa, December 27, 1971.
75
"Flight on SDF Trainer Interceptor." Ma inichi , January 17, 1972.
The JASDF also has attempted to publicize emergency flights which
deliver medicine or rescue stranded mountain clicibcrs, etc.
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Although there has appeared to be an amelioration of the social
atmosphere in Japan, some anti-military sentiments clearly remain, and
the Defense Forces remain very low on the public's list of national
priorities. There has been great sensitivity in Japan to the "people's
welfare" and disruption of the people's welfare may cause sensational
results. The U.S. Navy "Blue Angels" flew to Asia in 1971 at the
invitation of the Japanese government and were to give three performances
at the Japan International Aerospace Show which began October 29, 1971.
The show was the first of its kind in Japan; it was co-sponsored by
Asahi Shimbun
,
the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors and the
Japan Aeronautical Association; eight countries and one hundred forty-five
companies were represented. Yet, the mayor of one small town complained
of the noise and danger to the 'people's welfare' caused by the initial
Blue Angel's demonstration and they were first asked to alter their
performance and then were cancelled entirely.
In the same manner, kichi kogai
,
or the base nuisance has been a
primary irritant in the U.S. -Japan security relationship. The damage
the bases do to the people's welfare is a most sensitive issue.' Even
the militarism issue is related; when Japanese were asked what influences
militarism would cause, most replied in terms of personal austerity
78imposed, conscription imposed, or their personal freedoms deprived.
These concerns heavily outweighed the fear of war because of militarism.
I was present at the show and involved in the circumstances of
the cancellation. The government has allocated almost $33 million over
the next five years to noise countermeasures , The Japan Times ,
February 24 , 1972.
77
See Hughes, "Guardianship," pp. 99-107, for detailed description
of the effects of "kichi kogai" in 1968.
78Asahi Shimbun
, January 3, 1972.
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The people's welfare is a constant point of political attack by the
opposition parties. It was put into common western terms by Defense
Councillor Yasuda when he said the issue in Japan is "guns versus
butter and the Japanese people prefer butter. " ,y
When Japanese anti-militarism is viewed in this fashion, it appears
very similar to sentiments expressed in many other states. No unique
social or cultural characteristics appear to mandate the attitude;
it is one which has been evident in many societies before, including
80
Japan, and will appear in many more. It is a common human emotion,
based on important rational objections to violence, particularly the
organized violence of war. However, it has proven a rather unpredictable
sentiment, and the sudden perception of an imminent threat to Japan
could well alter the preference of butter before guns. Japanese
national pride could play a role in such an opinion shift, and there
are indications that the Japanese national spirit remains quite strong.
In 1905, Professor Nitobe Inazo wrote that "Bushido was and still
81
is the animating spirit, the motor force of our country." " Bushido
was more than a code of chivalry in Japan, it has been the basis of
moral education, the combination of different elements which formed
8?
the Japanese notions of right and wrong. Bushido dominated Japan
for over seven hundred years, and as Professor Nitobe noted; "were
(it) a mere physical force, the momentum it gained in the last seven
79 Interview, February 10, 1972.
80Kennedy, Japan and Her Defence Forc es, Chapter III, describes
the social pressure for disarmament in Japan after World War I.
81Nitobe Inazo, Bushido, _The Soul of Japan (rev. ed . Tokyo:





hundred years could not be stopped so abruptly." Japanese pacifism
seems a rather transient phenomena when compared to the long history
of Japanese bushido morality. The Emperor has remained a symbol of
the Japanese state, and more Japanese still pay homage to those symbols
representing Japan than to any religion of the East or West. In Herman
Kahn's words; "the Japanese people have almost always had a very clear
conception of themselves as being special, as being Japanese and
Q C
therefore unique."
If the Japanese spirit suffered in the defeat of World War II
and the subsequent occupation, there have been indications that
national spirit has begun to reassert itself. The growing self-
confidence of Japan was evident at the 1964 Olympic Games hosted in
Japan, the World Exposition held in 1970 at Osaka and the recent
winter Olympic spectacle held in Sapporo. This self-confidence has
begun to spread to the political arena where Japan is dealing with new
boldness and strength.
83
Inazo, Bushido, The Soul of Japan
,
p. 170.
I was fortunate enough to visit Kyoto during the New Year
Holiday, 1972, where I was graciously hosted by Professor Emeritus
Taoka Ryoichi, Japanese Representative to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration and Member of the Japan Academy and his son Taoka Shunji,
Defense Affairs Reporter for Asahi Shimbu n. During visits to the
famous Shinto and Buddhist pilgramages during the Japanese holiday
period, I was impressed with the dominance of nationalism whatever
the nature of the shrine. Japanese national feeling appeared to remain
a "motor force" of Japan in 1972. The many Japanese I saw in Kyoto
were not worshipping the state, they were celebrating the fact that
they were Japanese.
85Herman Kahn, The^rnerging Japanese Superstate, Challenge and
Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 21.
86The return of Okinawa has contributed to the Japanese attitude,
and their new assertiveness may be seen in the Japanese claims to the
Senkakyu Is. and to the Northern Territories. See Crocker Snow,
"Japan Now Seeks Return of Russian-held Islands," Boston Globe ,
May 20, 1972 for similar comments by a current observer.
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The reawakening of pride may also encompass the military heritage
of Japan. Legislation is under consideration to give national support
to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. This shrine has been referred to as
the tomb of the unknown soldier, but it is more than that; it is the
87
major symbol of the Japanese martial spirit. It is a shrine to
all the past and future war dead of Japan and it is very closely
related to the symbol of the Emperor. The government-supported
legislation has indicated significant support for the reinstatement
of the shrine. It is interesting to note that China considered the
re-emergence of the Shrine so significant that they leveled a specific
attack on it as the base for "Japanese reactionaries" to propagate
"militarism." 88
This indication that Japan has regained some degree of respect
for its military heritage have been accompanied by an increasing public
awareness of defense issues. In August 1969 a Yomiuri poll on the
Security Treaty revealed that 53 percent of those sampled had some
89
concern about the "defense problem of Japan." Only considering the
male population interviewed the percentage was more impressive with
78 percent being concerned about Japan's security. Only 27.6 percent
of those polled believed that there was no country who would force
87William P. Woodard, "Yasukuni Shrine," The Japan Chri s tian
Quarterly, Spring 1971, pp. 74-75. Although Mr. Woodard opposes the
concept of the shrine as a Christian, he concludes that the majority
of Japanese support its reinstatement.
88New China News Agency , December 26, 1971, as quoted in Japan
Times , December 27, 1971.
89Yomiuri , August 7, 1969 (U.S. Embassy translation).
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unjust demands on Japan by the use of force. 90 part of the reason
for an increasing awareness of national security affairs is the change
in Japanese public opinion toward the United States' defense commitment.
In June 1969, 37 percent of those polled believed that the U.S. would
come to Japan's defense versus 29 percent who said the U.S. would not
defend Japan in an emergency; but in October 1971 only 30 percent
believed the U.S. commitment and 38 percent disbelieved it. Polls
also have indicated that the Japanese public increasingly sees the
SDF as an instrument for the national defense. Only 24 percent of
those interviewed in 1967 believed the SDF were needed primarily for
external defense, but 50 percent thought so in 1970, more than a
92100 percent increase. Only 10 percent of another poll believed
further strengthening of the SDF was "desirable," but another 34 percent
said it was "unavoidable" versus 40 percent who saw it as "not
desirable. ""3 These polls show the division of opinion in Japan on
the defense issue. The opinion shifts also demonstrate a natural
phenomena; as people perceive of the SDF as a function of the national
defense, they will relate the necessary strength of the SDF to their
^Yomiuri , August 7, 1969. 40% believed there were such countries
and 32% were unsure.
9 1Yomiuri
,
October 19, 1971, (U.S. Embassy translation) and the
1971 data is reinforced by a poll reported in Scron Chosa , December 1971,
pp. 64-71, in which 29.6% said U.S. will defend, 38.2 said no, and
37.7 hard to say.
92Seisaku Geppo
, April 1970; What are the duties of the SDF?
1970 1967
Ensuring the Security of the Country 50% 24%
Maintenance of internal public security 22% 21%
Dispatch in case of disasters 13% 33%
Co-operation for public welfare 2% 6%
Don't know 13% 16%
93Yomiurl, October 19, 1971.
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perception of the threat. If the threat increases the majority may
not see increased armaments as desirable, but they will see them as
"unavoidable."
There also have been indications that the morale of the SDF has
responded to the increased public awareness of defense matters. The
Defense Agency promulgated a moral code for SDF personnel in June 1961
entitled "Mental Attitude of Self-Defense Personnel." It was a
temperate document, calling on each man to develop "his will to improve
himself, his love of others, and his concern about the race and the
95
fatherland." " Even this document was subject to criticism and some
commentators recalled the "Imperial Rescript for Soldiers," and "Field
Service Code" of the Imperial Army.-
Despite criticism from certain quarters, morale has improved;
public recruiting and the increased incidence of personnel wearing
their uniforms outside the bases have been cited in support of this
trend. On December 12, 1970, Director General Nakasone met the Emperor
at the Imperial Palace to report "various matters under his competence.""'
It was the first time the chief of the Defense Agency reported to the
Emperor and this was followed by another first when the Imperial
Household officially invited the Chief of Staff of JASDF to the Shinjuku
Palace. ASDF officers saw this as a significant increase in their





p. 2, note the fact that no call to love Japan or Japanese,
only to be concerned, my emphasis.
96Asahi , June 28, 1961.
97Yomiuri , December 15, 1970 (U.S. Embassy translation).
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prestige and national stature and were most proud of the event.
Another indication of the increased confidence of the SDF personnel
was the recent criticism of their attitude by Senator Ueda Tetsu, a
Socialist Diet Member: "they (SDF personnel) said the SDF was
responsible for defense and they did not have to bow their heads to
civilians. If this is the spiritual position of the Fourth Defense
Build-up Plan, we are faced with a great problem. "^° Perhaps even more
significant, the statement quoted by Senator Ueda did not raise any
general public outcry.
Another important factor in the evolution of SDF attitude centers
on the increased responsibility they sense. Japan is only now becoming
an independent country according to General Okumiya, and in his words;
"before you think of peace you must be able to defend yourself."
Director-General Nakasone stressed increased responsibility and the
resultant pride during his first broadcast to the men of the Defense
Forces.
The work of the SDF is the defense of the nation. You
yourself have chosen to take on this task which someone
must shoulder, for Japan, our country, to survive. You
must take pride in this noble mission. i
Lieutenant Colonel Okazaki Yasutada, JASDF, Faculty (War History),
Air Staff College, November 15, 1971. Colonel Okazaki mentioned this
fact and its significance as he saw it in a group discussion, and
all the officers present agreed they were proud when it happened.
^ 9
"Tokubetsu za Dankai 4 Jibo no Kobu Keikaiu o Kiru" (Special
Discussion: Review of the Aviation Portion of the 4th DBF), Koku John
(Aireview) , January 1972, p. 77.
General Okumiya, Interview, November 18, 1971.
*As quoted in Asagumo , June 11, 1970.
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Again in a New Year's Statement, Director-General Nakasone stressed
his belief that "autonomous defense" was a new reality which was
increasing the mission of the SDF:
I ask all members of the Self-Defense Forces to have
full awareness of these changes in the environment and
to deepen their pride and sense of mission as. SDF
members. *"*
Terms such as "deepen their pride" and "noble mission" were not used
in reference to the Self-Defense Force of 1960, but were used in 1970.
There are exceptions to this trend and one young air force officer
recently commented that he thought of "unconstitutional" when he heard
the word "Koku Jieitai." However, many SDF men feel less estrangement
and more prestige than at any time in the history of the Self-Defense
Forces.
Domestic Restraints - 1972
Political, constitutional and societal factors do limit the options
of the decision-makers who formulate Japanese defense policy. These
elements have played a significant role in restricting policy options
over the past twenty years. There remain options which are not viable
due to domestic considerations although options such as nuclear weapons
or strategic capability also have been rejected on other grounds.
Any national policy is similarly constrained in type if not degree.
The social pressures which Japanese policy-makers face in 197 2 do not
generally prohibit them from exercising otherwise rational policy
directions. The general public trend in Japan has been toward greater
acceptance of the need for defense and the Defense Forces.
102
As quoted in Asagumo , January 14 , 1971.
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The Constitution, as presently interpreted, provides rather flexible
limits on defense armaments. The continuing political debate on
national security has focused on moral and legal arguments. It has
not investigated substantive defense policy alternatives; its influence
on the policy-maker has been superficial. The defense issue has been
used as a political tool and often the politicians who debate the topic
have been uninformed and uninterested in substantive results.
There appear to be no international restrictions to Japanese
rearmament in 1972 although massive rearmament v;ould trigger a large
protest, particularly in Asia.
Therefore, a new or different political consensus could revise
the Constitution and accelerate rearmament. Is a new consensus
evolving, or could a new consensus be reached? Japan is only twenty-
six years away from the fury of atomic warfare and the humiliation of
defeat. Deep anti-military emotions remain in the society; these
emotions have been reinforced by the desire for more individual freedoms.
The feelings have also been supported by the relatively high degree
of security felt by the great majority of Japanese. Were Japan
threatened, it is quite conceivable that the homogeneity, the spirit
and the martial pride of Japan could reassert itself.
Nakasone Yasuhiro, perhaps the most prominent nationalist in Japan,
but also an astute politician who is aware of Japanese public sentiment,
recently expressed this emerging Japanese pride in rather forceful terms:
There is no other country which had developed its economy
even to the extent of almost catching up with America, in
a bare 25 years, from the very ashes, after its defeat in
war. Furthermore, this nation is a homogeneous people,
that is, the Yamato Race, who have grown up together for
2,000 years in an island nation, and speak only one language,
the Japanese language. Their educational level is extremely
high. In The Greater East Asia War, the.v manufactured
Zero Fighters, and they manufactured (many other) outstanding
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weapons. Since they are such a superior people, who
have all those abilities, it is conceivable that foreigners
will, at times, fleetingly think how fearful they would
be if this nation was to start thinking about a military
expansionist policy or how terrifying it would be if it
was to have atomic bombs, especially when they look at
this country's amazing reconstruction since the end of
the War and its economic growth. 103
Social limits do exist and they will continue to exist. However,
they stem from the current Japanese situation. If a need for accelerated
rearmament were demonstrated to the Japanese people, it is unlikely
that constitutional limitations or pacifist sentiments would prohibit
any options which Japanese leaders wished to exercise.
I f\ oxuo
"Dialogue^ Between Nakasone Yasuhiro and Ishibashi Masashi on





September 2, 1945, found Japan a defeated, crushed nation, ravaged
by a long costly war and facing the humiliation of unconditional
surrender. Japan had suffered tremendous damage; entire cities had
been laid to waste although foreign troops had not set foot on the
mainland. Japanese air power had been unable to stop the American
bombers, and it bore responsibility for the extent of destruction.
Every Japanese decision-maker, in uniform or out, is personally aware
of the failure of Japan's air defense. The pre-war history of military
aviation and the lessons learned by Japan remain a significant input
to the decision-making process.
Most national military organizations at the turn of the century
were characterized by a separate army and navy. Japan was no exception,
and the leaders of the Mejii Restoration took care to establish a
modern army and navy which followed those modern national force
structures. Aircraft added a new tool to military actions and airspace
a new medium in which warfare could be conducted. As this new era of
warfare evolved during World War I, aviation was adopted by both
armies and navies. Japan, in the normal pattern, had two air forces;
and while this was not uncommon, the extent and scope of the disparity




The modernization of the Japanese military structure actually began
before the Shogun was overthrown.-'- The first British Naval Mission
to Japan arrived in 1367 and the first formal French military mission
to the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) arrived in 1872. A previous,
informal French mission had arrived before 1865. When the Mejii
Emperor came to power, the competing influences of two distinct
military systems were already present. Although the missions were
officially recalled, other groups, often including the same personnel,
soon replaced them and continued their respective training.
The Japanese have a long history illustrating their unique
receptiveness to foreign instruction, and this situation was no
exception. They mimicked their tutor's tactics, dress, and equipment.
The Imperial Japanese Navy (UN) went so far as to celebrate Queen
Victoria's birthday. This emulation included the adoption of their
mentors' strategies; strategies which became deeply entrenched after
the successful Sino-Japanese and Sino-Russian Wars. By 1905 British
big navy strategy versus the continental theories of Army dominance
had divided the two services; they were operating with conflicting goals
See Ernst L. Presseisen, Before Aggression : Europeans Prepare
the Japanese Army (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965), for an
excellent and thorough discussion of the early European military
missions to Japan and their results. While somewhat more emphasis
is placed on the French and German missions to the Imperial Army,
there is a thorough discussion of the tactics and strategies adopted
by all the branches.
Ibid.
,
p. 10, also see Captain M. D. Kennedy, Some Aspects o f
Japan and Her Defence Forces
,
(London: Kegan Taul, Trench, Trubner
and Co., Ltd., 1928), pp. 18-20, Appendix I.
3Taoka Shunji, Interview, December 1, 1971. This custom was
stopped after World War I.
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and competing for limited resources.
Another factor which exacerbated the division was the independence
of the two ministries. Under the Mejii Constitution they were firsts
among equals in the Cabinet.^ No other branch of government was capable
of imposing a joint or unified strategy on the two military services.
Therefore, the two branches continued to develop autonomously, without
full coordination, much less integration.
The division between the Army and Navy was well established by
19l0 when the first heavier-than-air craft was piloted by a Japanese.
Baron Shigeno Kiyotake of the Imperial Japanese Army had trained in
France and during December 1910, Japanese Army pilots were establishing
Japanese records for aviation in French- and German-built aircraft.
The Navy Department sent two officers each to the United States and
France in July 1912, and by 1916 a small domestic pilot training
program had been established by the Imperial Navy. Military aviation
received little emphasis before World War I, but the Japanese attitude
visibly changed subsequent to the war.
Mabuchi Ryoitsu, "Ninon Sangyo no Hyaku hen" (100 Years of Japanese
Industry), Jiyu (Freedom), February 1969, p. 68.
The Army and Navy Ministries later, based on Imperial Ordinances,
called for active duty officers. Without Cabinet cooperation no active
duty officer would replace one who resigned, forcing the Cabinet to collapse.
Okumiya Masatake and Horikoshi Juo, Zero San: Kihon Kaigun Koku
Sho Shi (Zero Fighter; A Brief History of the Japanese Naval Air
Force), (Tokyo: Nihon Shappon Kyodo Kabushki Iaisha (Japanese
Publishing Corporation), 1954, Appendix II, p. 256.
7General Sanagi Sadair.u, JASDF, (Ret.), former Chief of Staff of
the JASDF, letter to the author, January 20, 1972, some of the detailed
information provided by General Sanagi was obtained from Vice Admiral
Kuwabara, Chairman, Mihon Kaigun Koku-shi Hcnsan InVai (Japan's Naval
Air History Comm.), Nihon Kaigun Koku-shi (Japan's Naval Air History)
(Tokyo: Jiji Tsushin-sha (Jiji Press), 1969, 4 Volumes. General Sanagi
participated in the work of compiling these volumes. Also, Admiral
Kuwabara Torao, UN (ret.), one of the first Naval Aviators in Japan,
Interview
, February 16, 1972.
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They were not only impressed with the use of aviation in Europe;
its value had been demonstrated in the seige of Tsingtao. German
warships had taken shelter in the harbor at Tsingtao under the pro-
tection of shore batteries and immune from the Allied Fleet. A
Japanese cruiser had three Forman seaplanes aboard which were
instrumental in dislodging the Germans and securing the fall of
Tsingtao. 8
The increased emphasis on aviation after World War I was exemplified
by the arrival of two separate military missions to assist Japanese
development. In January 1919, a sixty-three man "Aeronautics Guidance
Group" arrive from France. This mission was led by Colonel Faure, a
French Army officer; it remained in Japan for more than a year
establishing the Army aviation training program. In 1921, the French
mission to the Imperial Army was followed by a British mission to the
Imperial Navy. This "British Naval Aviation Mission," was headed by
the "Master of Sempill"; Colonel Sempill's mission arrived in July
1921 with the final contingent leaving Japan more than two years
later.
The primary objective of these missions was to train pilots and
maintenance personnel and to establish permanent training programs.
However, they did teach operational lessons learned during the war,
o
General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; Sanagi, letter





p. 259; Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
Kennedy, op cit
. ,
p. 35, Sanagi, letter, January 20, 1972;
Okumiya, Zero San, p. 261. Colonel Sempill was a retired officer
as were all the other members of the mission at the British Government's
insistence. Although the British payed little official attention to
its progress they gave "no little advice and support" unofficially!
Sanagi, letter, January 20, 1972.
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therefore increasing the operational and organizational gulf between
the Japanese Army and Navy. x French aviation emphasized short range
air-to-air and air-to-ground missions performed semi-autonomous ly
behind the continental battlefield. English Naval Aviation emphasized
integrated strategies with aircraft only operating in conjunction with
a naval operation. Japanese reliance on British naval aviation was
established even before the Sempill Mission in 1919 when the Navy Depart-
ment proclaimed the policy that the "adaption of foreign aircraft
12
and equipment would primarily rely on British origin." By the early
1920 's the differing influences were obvious as the Imperial Japanese
Army had a separate Commander, and Air Army Headquarters. No such
13
autonomy developed within the Imperial Japanese Navy.
The first manufacture of engines and airframes began in 1913 and
1914, but significant development of the aviation industry began in
1919-1920. There were limited resources to be applied to aviation
and Army-Navy competition immediately spread to the aircraft manufacturers,
The two services took different approaches to industry; the Army
relied upon industry for design and development while the Navy
established a research and design center at Yokosuka in 1913. The
Navy subsequently maintained its own research, experimental and repair
In addition to 52 pilot and 130 maintenance graduates, the Sempill
mission provided a gunnery and bombing course, 4 reconnaissance and 12




Kennedy, op_. cit .
, pp. 116-125; Sanagi, Interview, November 11,
1971, VADM Kuwabara, Interview, February 16, 1972. The Aviation
Bureau was set up as an external organ of the War Ministry in 1920,
Okumiya, Zero San . This organ was to become the nucleus of civil
aviation in Japan.





facilities; and it utilized the manufacturers as mass producers while
it provided guidance to the companies. An aircraft company, therefore,
had difficulty manufacturing aircraft for both services, which resulted
in a dual aircraft industry paralleling the military itself.
The extent of the difference was immense and difficult to describe,
but the most basic concepts of operations and maintenance were involved.
Naval aircraft specifications were in feet and inches from their
Anglo-Saxon mentors, while army aircraft were built using the metric
system. Therefore, the Magoya plant of Mitsubishi, which was producing
identical models, was forced to maintain two autonomous production
lines and no parts were interchangeable; even the threads on the same
bolt would be slightly different! An army pilot would discover that
the throttles on a navy aircraft went the opposite way, therefore it
was impossible to integrate basic training.
There were efforts to integrate military aviation; in fact they
began in 1920. Public opinion in Japan strongly supported disarmament
measures in the early '20s, and some consolidation of the post-war
1
8
military establishment did occur. At the same time, in October 1920,
a "Committee on Army and Naval Aviation," composed of both army
and navy officers, was organized to investigate various aviation
Mabuchi Ryoitsu, former aeronautical engineer of IJA, Interview,
November 27, 1971; also Sanagi, letter; Sanagi, Interview; and later
all the aircraft companies manufacturing naval aircraft were designated
Naval Facilities.
Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971.
Kuwabara, Interview, and Sanagi, Interview. Admiral Kawabara
recalled that the Navy throttles pulled back to open because it took
both arms to pull the seaplanes off the water and it was convenient to




see "Chapter III, The Japanese Fighting Forces
and Disarmament," pp. 104-125.
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19problems and to report to the Army and Navy Ministers within two years.
The Committee did consider the organization of an independent air
force and their final report to the secretaries read in part:
There are merits and demerits in both a unified air force
system and separate air services under the army and the
navy. Because it is too early to reach any final conclusion
on the matter, it is recommended that the present status
be continued. 20
At approximately the same time, an independent air force was
proposed to the Minister of the Army by some army aviation personnel.
This proposal did not mention naval air, and the Army General Staff
21
was against an independent air force at the time. There were a
series of unofficial and internal proposals for unification and/or
independence within the Imperial Army, although the Army never officially
proposed such steps to the Navy. The Navy General Staff consistently
opposed any such step as they considered the air arm an integral part
of naval strategy and tactics.
In May 1936, a Navy captain instructing at the Naval War College
issued a joint statement with an instructor of the Army War College
which criticized the dual structure. The statement proposed the
organization of an independent air force, and it was submitted to both
the Imperial Army and Navy. It was disregarded by the Navy and the
instructor was transferred to another post. ^ The problem finally
1 9 Sanagi, letter.
20









received some official attention from the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics
in 1939. The problems of separation, and the lack of a strategic air
arm were discussed. As a result, an Army-Navy Committee was formed
I
to deal with the dual air structure. It limited its immediate goals
and hoped to coordinate training, material, maintenance specifications
and operations in order to utilize better the limited resources
available. The gulf between the two air forces made any coordination
difficult, and integration was declared infeasible at the time. A
few limited successes were reversed by the expanding war and the
0/
growing competition for resources. From 1937, the competition for
resources was exacerbated by the dual strategies of the Army and Navy.
The naval anti-U.S. strategy and the Army anti-Soviet strategy split
25the industry "which was incapable of implementing the dual goals."
Again, no one was strong enough to win or force a compromise.
December 7, 1941, found the gulf between the two air arms as great
as ever, and the pressures of war precluded any further efforts at
integration. The successes early in the war stilled those concerned
with aviation weaknesses, and the mobilization of the aircraft industries
initially provided adequate equipment. However, by June 1944, aircraft
shortages began to create serious problems for the Japanese. The
decline was first caused by a transition to new models; then plants
were destroyed by earthquakes in December 1944 and January 1945; finally,
the B-29 raids had crippled production by June of 1945. The equipment,
*Sanagi, Interview; and Mr. Ogawa Raita, Executive Editor, Koku
Shimbun
,
Interview, December 14, 1971.
25Mabuchi, op_. Cit .
,
p. 159.
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Final Report on Progress
of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 December 1946 (pro-
vided by the U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.), p. 78.
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armament and oil shortages exacerbated the organizational difficulties
which were coming to the fore.
Neither the Army nor Navy Air Force relished the idea of defensive
operations. Both were primarily concerned with attack; however, the
bombing of the homeland, which began seriously in June 1944, forced the
27
reorganization of some air units in Japan. The air defense of Japan
was assigned to the Imperial Army Air Force. Heavy B-29 raids over
Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka began in November 1944, and Army aviation found
it was woefully unprepared. The speed and altitude of the B-29's
required an early launch and resulted in very limited endurance for
the fighters. Their radars were undependable and diversionary tactics
90
by the B-29 s were very successful against the air defense system.
An alert system was established, however the B-29's began simultaneous
small raids with one major attack and further confused the defenders;
"this had a demoralizing affect on the air regiments which were under
29
staffed and under equipped to combat such tactics continuously."
After February 1945, fighters from U.S. carriers joined the bombers
and proved another insurmountable problem. The appearance of land-based
fighters further crippled the Japanese air defense. By June 1945,
the air force was not launched during daylight raids or against small
27
Imperial Japanese Government, Imperial Japanese Army, Homeland
Air Defense Operations Record-Central Sector . This monograph was
compiled from Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff Record
in accordance with SCAPIN No. 126. It was compiled by former officers
working In the Demobilization Bureau and translated by G-2, Headquarters,
Far East Command (Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of









raids in an effort to conserve the few remaining elements.
Thus, two months later, when the final blows were delivered to
Japan, no effective air resistance could be mounted against the nuclear
attacks. In the words of Occupation authorities, the Japanese air
forces, "though numerically substantial, were incapable of effective
31
air combat resistance. " There were many reasons for their failure;
the lack of fuel and equipment has already been mentioned. In
addition, all replacement pilot training had been disrupted by the
constant attacks and there was a shortage of qualified pilots. Even
with these limitations, there remained the fact that those resources
available to Japan were not utilized in the most efficient manner. A
unified command structure or additional emphasis on air defense would
not have changed the course of the war. It might have lessened the
devastation, and these air power lessons of World War II have continued
to influence policy-makers in 1972. The lessons of air defense
emphasis and unified command may seem simple, yet It is advisable to
analyze these two factors more closely and to evaluate their lessons
and the Japanese interpretation of these lessons.
It has been noted that the helplessness of the Japanese, situation
in 1945 was complicated by the joint command structure. There were
some naval air units on the mainland tasked with the air defense mission,
and the desperation of impending defeat did generate some effort
toward integration of the remaining forces. At an Army-Navy top-level
conference on March 3, 1945, the Army requested that the Army and
Navy be consolidated. In order to reach agreement, "the Army will agree
30
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to let its Army aviation operate under Navy Command." This proposal
did not materialize, however, and on July 13, 1945, the Army and
Navy signed the "Agreement Between the Army and Navy Relative to Air
..33
Operations.
The agreement recognized that the anti-aircraft defenses "must be
strengthened" and the enemy aircraft coming to attack the homeland
must be destroyed. The "main objective" was cited as the "combined
3 S
operations of the Navy and the Army." However, despite the military
pressure and the hopelessness of the situation, unified command proved
elusive:
The supreme commands of both air forces will during
operations be situated in the same locality or in close
proximity to each other and will endeavor to maintain
close cooperation . In time of emergency the commanders
of both forces will immediately cooperate with each
other. 36
It does not matter that unified command would not have changed the
course of the war. It was perceived as a vital factor but could not
be implemented. Shortly after the surrender, General MacArthur called
the victory "a triumph for the concept of the complete integration
32Sanagi, letter.
33Imperial Japanese Government, July 13, 1945, translated by G-2










of the three dimensions of war, ground, sea and air." General
MacArthur also quoted General Yamashita, the Imperial Army Commander
in the Philippines; "diversity of Japanese Command resulted in complete
lack of cooperation and coordination between the services.""*
The Commanding General of the Imperial Japanese Air General Army,
General Kawabe Masakazu made an interesting assessment of the Japanese
air defeat soon after the surrender:
We did not have any power to attack (by air) ; we could
only defend the Home Islands. We expected that this
(special attack—Kamikaze) defense would bring us to
the point where we could win the war. It is not sound
tactics to employ the AAF defensively to win the war.
It was the force of circumstances which caused the
decision. 39
Even in defeat, the role of air defense was depreciated by the
commander, and his attitude illustrated the general military repudiation
of defensive measures.
In the post-war years, there has been widespread criticism of
that view, and the importance of air defense has been stressed repeatedly.
Japanese observers have often compared the unsuccessful air defense of
Japan in 1945 to the successful air defense of England in 1940. The
"precedent of the Battle of 3ritain" is repeatedly used in discussions
37 SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan , September 1945 to
September 1943 , Report of Government Section (2 Volumes, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), Volume II, Macarthur









of air warfare involving the Japanese islands. There are compelling
similarities between the two situations. Both are insular nations
and aerial bombardment was' the first weapon brought to bear, for
without its success further operations were impossible. British success
prevented German invasion and was a significant turning point in the
war. Japanese failure led to the destruction and collapse of Japan.
There are, however, some differences between the circumstances of
Britain and Japan. The German goals were limited in the early stages
of the Battle of Britain, and they concentrated on Channel convoys and
southern ports. The second month of the air war saw the Germans
switch their emphasis to the Royal Air Force, and it was not until
the last stage that industrial centers were attacked. The final stage
was sporadic, vengeful bombing, and it was not carried out primarily
to achieve strategic objectives. The primary goals of the Germans
began with the engagement and destruction of the Royal Air Force;
not because of their defensive capabilities, but because no invasion
was possible against the naval strike capability of the Bomber Command.
The U.S. goals in the strategic bombing of Japan were different; cities
and industrial centers were the primary targets and no specific effort
was made to engage the enemy air force.
The air war over Britain in 1940 was an air to air battle primarily
between fighters. The German bombers were rarely sent alone; when
42
they were, the results were disastrous. The technological match
^ Kaihara Osamu, "We Should Know Ourselves," pp. 24-25. During my
research in Japan, Japan's defense was often compared to the Battle of
Britain by men in and out of uniform.
Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hou r (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,






was nearly equal. In Japan, the B-29's were superior aircraft. They
flew much higher and faster and were unsupported by fighters. A great
portion of the Japanese defensive problen was reaching the bombers,
or interception; a problem the British did not face. The Battle of
Britain was an air superiority battle, while the Battle of Japan was
an air intercept battle with different goals, strategies and tactics.
Demobilization
The second phase in the history of Japanese military aviation is
the history of its absence. Aviation of all types was banished at
the outset of the Occupation, and the extent and the limitations of
the gap are part^of the heritage of military aviation in Japan.
The first official instruction to the Japanese ordered "all
Japanese aircraft, civil, military and naval," grounded pending
demobilization instructions. The aircraft were to be disabled
immediately and with few exceptions the propellers were taken off all
aircraft. This step was completed by October 1, 1945. *^ After the
termination of a temporary courier service, all Japanese aviation
activities were terminated. The dismantling of Japanese aviation
proceeded on five fronts; personnel, military aircraft, airfields and
installations, aircraft industries, and commercial and civil aviation.
^Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Headquarters, General Order
Number One (SCAPIN 1), September 3, 1945.
*SCAP, Supplement //l, Progress of Demobilisation of the Japanese
Armed Forces Ground Air Navy
,
15 February 1946, provided by the U.S.
Naval History Division, Washington, D.C., enclosure S; the few exceptions
were some aircraft retained by the United States and 27 civil aircraft
which the GOJ was allowed to operate as a courier service until
October; see SCAPIN 23, Authorization to Operate Aircraft, September 13,
1945; SCAPIN 77, Retention of Aircraft; and SCAPIN 108, Courier Service
Transferred to FEAF, October 9, 1945.
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Discharge of personnel began immediately after the formal surrender.
By December 1, 1945, there were fourteen men remaining in the Navy and
they were discharged within fifteen days. The rate of discharge of
the aviation personnel is depicted in Figure 4-1. These were the
official reports of demobilization and discharge; the actual discharge




Progress of Personnel Demobilization
Japanese Air Forces Demobilized By
Strength - 15 Aug. 45 1 Sept. 1 Oct. 1 Nov. 1 Dec.
Army 262,000 62,000 248,000 253,602 262,000
Navy 291,537 187,543 281,105 285,801 291,523
Totals 553,537 249,543 529,105 539,403 553,523
These numbers included only air force personnel based on home
islands; those overseas were lumped with other units.
Source: See FN 44.
On August 15, 1945, Japanese aircraft strength was reported at
u
16,397 military aircraft of all types and 939 civilian aircraft.
Almost 3700 of the military aircraft were overseas at the time of the
surrender; those aircraft remaining in Japan were demobilized. In the
early days of the Occupation the aircraft were demolished with no intent
to salvage materials, but that policy was revoked and a scrapping
-* SCAP , Final Regort on Progress of Demobilization of the Japan e s_e
Armed Forces
,
December 31, 1946, provided by the U.S. Naval History






program was substituted. The results of the demobilization effort are
portrayed in Figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2
Progress of Aircraft Demobilization -*-
Deceraber 1, 1946
Total Balance Allied Research
Total A/C Disposed on Hand Destroyed Scrapped Operations Intelligence
12,735 11,146 1,589 9,766 1,092 188 100
Those "on hand" were awaiting scrapping operations.
Source: See FN. 44.
The Occupation forces assumed control of 233 airfields in Japan and
South Korea. Of those fields, 50 were required by the occupation air-
forces with 17 actually basing U.S. air units. Some fields beyond the
50 officially required were being utilized by the Occupation forces for
billeting, offices and storage. All Japanese equipment at the air bases
was destroyed and those fields not required by the Occupation forces
were returned to the Japanese for conversion to farms and salt fields. ^7
There were eight major aircraft companies still producing aircraft
as the war ended. Occupation authorities halted all production of
aircraft, aircraft parts and related equipment. Jigs, dies and other
tools related to aircraft manufacturing were destroyed, although
equipment which could be utilized in production not related to war
potential was left intact. Some factories v;ere converted to other
168 fields were returned in this manner (excluding seadromes
returned). Japan was forbidden to use them as land fields for aircraft,
SCAP, Final Report on Progres s of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed
Forces
, December 31, 1946, provided by the U.S.- Naval History Division,




tasks such as the production of bicycles and automobiles.
All other areas of aviation were affected by SCAPIN 301, "Commercial
49
and Civil Aviation, promulgated on November 18, 1945. The five
operative paragraphs of the instruction illustrated the totality of
Occupation prohibitions:
1. You will abolish by 31 December 1945 all governmental
and semi-governmental bodies concerned with commercial or
other civil aviation in any of its aspects except those
activities specifically authorized for operation under the
direction of the Supreme Commander.
2. You will take necessary measures by 31 December 1945
to effect the dissolution of all companies, partnerships,
or associations of any kind which have been engaged in
any way with relation to commercial air transport or
other civilian air operations, or in pilot or other train-
ing related to aircraft design, construction, maintenance
or operation.
3. You will submit to this headquarters not later than
15 December 1945 a register of officers, principal
operating officials, professional engineering and research
personnel, pilots and instructors of the organizations
affected by the above dissolution.
4. On and after 31 December 1945 you will not permit any
governmental agency or individual, or any business concern,
association, individual Japanese citizen or group of
citizens, to purchase, o\rn, possess, or operate any
aircraft, aircraft assembly, engine, or research, experi-
mental, maintenance or production facility related to
aircraft or aeronautical science including working models.
5. You will not permit the teaching of, or research or
experiments in aeronautical science, aerodynamics, or
other subjects related to aircraft or balloons.
48 SCAP, Final Report on Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese
Armed Forces
,
December 31, 1946, provided by the U.S. Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C., p. 65.
49




Despite the total embargo on all aspects of military and civil
aviation, there were some thin strands of continuity, and efforts in
that direction began almost immediately. In the words of the Shin Meiwa
Industry Company:
During the World War II, our company suffered from enormous
damages, but fortunately we could retain a great majority
of (our) experienced aircraft engineers, skilled workmen
and machineries. From the termination of the War, it has
been our serious intention to get back to the original work
as soon as possible. -1-
Although few positive steps could be taken in this regard, there were
several attempts to retain the nucleus of aviation. The factories
themselves retained their personnel, if only to produce bicycles, or in
52
some cases pots and pans. They allowed the employees to live in the
factories and to use the area for growing food. This protection was
extended to some Army and Navy aviation personnel; they also were
53
assisted by the companies in the immediate post-war era.
The civil aviation community also attempted to maintain some
cohesion. All the civil airline pilots kept in touch by mail and local
meetings. Occasionally local representatives went to Tokyo where they
met and contacted Occupation authorities in an effort to lobby for a
Introduction, Itami-plant, SMDI-6, Shin Meiwa Industry Co. Ltd.
,
ex-Kawanishi Aircraft Company, introductory pamphlet, dated
August 7, 1954.
^ Mr. Gene Kawakami, Aircraft Division, Shin Meiwa Industries,
Interview, February 16, 1972; General Sanagi, Interview; Ogawa Raita,
Interview, December 14, 1971; and Mr. Doba Hajime, Defense Analyst,
Yorm'uri Shimbun
,
Interview, March 2, 1972; Mabuchi, Interview, November
27, 1971.
53Ogawa, Interview; Doba, Interview.
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revival of aviation. Through this unofficial group, civil pilots
were informed early in 1951 that Japan Air Lines would resume operations
in the future, and they began x^ork as cabin crewmen in anticipation of
their return to flight operations.
Even within the governmental machinery itself there existed one
area where ex-military officers gathered. SCAPIN 137, October 14, 1945,
approved the Japanese plan for demobilization which included two
demobilization ministries for the army and navy. They were later
reduced to bureaus, but continued to contain a nucleus of ex-military
officers and to be valuable points of contact for many others. Purge
records and other demobilization registries required by the Occupation
were an excellent source, of information for rearmament planning. Thus,
on March 17, 1951, the Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division
could present to SCAP a document concerning the "Situation of Former
Japanese Servicemen and Investigation Data concerning Re-Organization
of Air-Sea Force.' It included the number of pilots still qualified
to render service and fly, by rank and specialty. Similar data on
technicians by specialty was also presented, indicating the thoroughness
58
of the records that had been maintained.
Captain Kiraoto Eijii, Japan Air Lines, Director, Senior Flight
Crew Council, Interview, December 7, 1971. Captain Kimoto has flown
for Japan Air Lines since 1938 and was a part of this unofficial
organization.
Ibid .
56SCAP, Political Reorientation, Vol. II, 454; See Auer , "Post-War
Sea Forces," pp. 139-143, for a detailed description of the evolution
of this core of personnel.




, enclosure (1) and (2).
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Mabuchi Ryoitsu was describing the aviation industry after World
V7ar II when he said, "the leaves and the branches were destroyed but
59
the trunk and the roots remained." However, he could have been
speaking for all aviation, military and civil. The community of
personnel with the technical, intellectual and administrative skills
necessary to the rebirth of military air power had emerged relatively
intact from the demobilization.
As the Occupation drew to a close and a national defense establishment
began to emerge in Japan, the total disestablishment of aviation
connected bureaucracy left the Japanese great flexibility in construct-
ing the new bureaucracy to deal x^ith national defense. Japanese leaders
had not forgotten, however, the unique "lessons" they had derived from
the failure of air power in World VJar II, and these were to play a role
in the future organization and employment of air power in Japan.
59Mabuchi, "100 years," loc. cit . , p. 168,

Chapter 5
THE BIRTH OF THE AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
July 1, 1954 narked the point of departure for a new era in Japanese
defense posture. The birth of the Air Self-Defense Force effected a
shift in defense policy which directly recognized an autonomous
responsibility in the external defense role. However, July 1 not only
marked the beginning of an era, but also the conclusion of another.
The efforts made to establish a comprehensive defense structure, the
resistance thereto and the history of the changes which eventually
permitted an air force to emerge remain relevant to the nature of
Japanese air power today.
A force structure is rationalized in terms of threat. That threat
may be real or imagined, truly feared or utilized to cover other
intentions; however, it is always the threat as perceived or explained
by the decision-maker. In Japan, the rather peculiar situation arose
in which a national force structure began to evolve in an occupied
nation. Thus, there were two decision centers evaluating the threat
and deciding the necessary response. Although veto power lay with the
United States until the Occupation ended and with Japan afterwards,
both parties played an active role in the evolution of the defense
structure.
The changing U.S. perception of threat in Asia was the key factor
which enabled the force structure to begin to evolve. There was little
doubt of U.S. perceptions when General Kenney raised the American flag
in Tokyo which had flown over Hickam Field on December 7, 1941. Japan





was the only threat to peace In Asia. Secretary of State Byrnes evinced
the same conclusion when he proposed the "disarmament and demilitari-
zation" peace treaty for Japan.
As the deficiencies of the United Nations became apparent and the
realities of the post-war era erased the euphoria of the San Francisco
Conference, a new concept of threat in Asia began to emerge. The
American-Soviet confrontation dominated the evolution of world politics
in 1947, and the U.S. concern began to shift; protection from Japan
changed to protection of Japan. The National Security Council recognized
a threat to Jaoan in November 1948 and recommended that a 150,000 man
national police force be established. By 1950, the United States was
publicly citing the threat to Japan and the common interests held by
the two nations as indicated in a famous speech by Secretary of State
Dean Aches on:
(The United States must assume) the military defense
of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interests
of our security and in the interests of the security of the
entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of
Japanese security.
Japan began to react to the changing situation in August 1947, when
a joint U. S. -Japanese security policy was proposed in the Ashida
^Emmerson, Arms
, pp. 59-74, thoroughly discussed the early efforts
to formulate a Japanese peace treaty. The Byrnes' proposal was made in
June 1946.
•^Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 72.
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin
,




Memorandum. 5 Japanese leaders at that time remained hopeful that the
United Nations or other international solution could avoid the need for
rearmament and the U.S. could provide security temporarily pending such
a solution. A security treaty was widely expected in Japan by 1949,
and various aspects were being discussed publicly.
The eruption of war in Korea dashed Japanese hopes for avoiding
rearmament, and the escalation of the threat prompted more rapid
armament planning by both the United States and Japan. Prime Minister
Yoshida had opposed rearmament , however the Chinese-Soviet alliance,
the war in Korea and the related reduction of American garrison forces
forced reevaluation of the security problem.
The Prime Minister was unfamiliar with military affairs and turned
to Lieutenant General Tatsumi Eichii for advice in the summer of 1950.
Yoshida did not trust military men but had known General Tatsumi when
they served together before the war at the embassy in London. The
Prime Minister opposed rearmament for domestic, economic and social
reasons, and also feared the anxieties rearmament would cause among
Japan's Asian neighbors. Despite those factors, events in Asia and the
increasing U.S. pressure to rearm led Yoshida to allow rearmament planning
to continue with official blessing. He eventually would preside over
Boei Nenkan
, 1970, p. 188, refered to the Ashida Memorandum as
the first indication of Japanese concern with defense (at the political
level). See Weinstein, Defense Policy
, pp. 20-36 and Emmerson, Arms ,
pp. 62-64 for discussions of early Japanese views on security.
interview with Ceneral Tatsumi, Ex-IJA, February 12, 1972. General
Tatsumi became the Prime Minister's personal advisor on all military
matters. He acted both as technical advisor and go-between throughout
the establishment of the defense forces. This was corroborated by
VADM Terai Yoshimori, Interview, February 16, 1972 and others. Also
see Ueinstein, Defen s e Policy
,
p. 59, FN 40 and Auer, op_. cit . ,
pp. 146-160 for further confirmation of Gen. Tatsumi' s role.

136
the establishment of the Safety Agency and the Defense Agency.
It became increasingly apparent during the Occupation that some air
protection was necessary. Unidentified aircraft, presumably Soviet,
were first sighted in June 1947, and with increasing regularity
thereafter. The Fifth Air Force (5AF) received a command letter in
April 1948, which reemphasized its initial occupation mission to maintain
Q
"military air control over Japan." However, a new mission was added
in May 1949 when a similar letter directed 5AF to "provide for air
9defense including air warning service for Japan proper."
Japanese military planners were also well aware that air power
would be a useful tool in their defense. The Demobilization Ministries
established early in the Occupation were forced to consolidate as their
role decreased and they eventually evolved into the Liquidation
Division, Demobilization Bureau of the Welfare Ministry by 1951.
Their initial records, compiled as the Imperial forces demobilized, had
been maintained intact.
Beginning as early as 1946, the ex-officers who manned the
demobilization bureaus had discussed informally the possibility of
rearmament and the possible structure of a future force. They contacted
American military personnel in 1949, and by 1950 they were utilizing
the demobilization records to provide data on personnel available for
U.S. Commander Naval Forces Far East, Summary , October 15, 1947,
provided by U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.





p. 9. The 5AF, late in 1948, released an information
booklet which indicated the USAF already assumed it was defending Japan.
See Auer, "Post-war Sea Forces," for a detailed description of
this evolution, pp. 139-143.

137
rearmament . VThen SCAP asked for data on rearmament on March 3, 1951,
the Second Demobilization Bureau responded two weeks later with a 70
page document.
This plan and all subsequent ones assumed that Japan would have an
indigenous air power capability. There were several private and semi-
private rearmament plans drawn during the 1950-1953 period. Doba
listed seventeen plans and all but two included air forces which ranged
12
from 1000 to 7000 aircraft. Those ex-military officers who began
planning in the late 1940' s also presumed that Japan would have a
13
comprehensive force structure including air forces.
The United States and Japan agreed that a threat existed. They
14
also agreed that^the source of threat was the Soviet Union. They
11Second Demobilization Bureau, Liquidation Division, Repatriation
Relief Agency, "Situation of Former Japanese Servicement and Investi-
gation Data Concerning Re-Organization of Sea-Air Force," dated March 17,
1951, provided by LCDR James E. Auer.
12Doba Hajime, Nihon no Gunji Ryoku (Japan's Military Power) (Tokyo:
Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, January 1, 1963).
13Two of the earliest planners in aviation were Lieutenant General
Arinuma Genshiro, JASDF, ret., Interview, March 7, 1972, and Vice
Admiral Terai Yoshimori, JMSDF, ret., Interview, February 16, 1972.
Then Colonel Arinuma jointed the NPR in 1952, but had served with Colonel
Hattori Takushiro's War Studies group from its inception in 1948 and
dealt with aviation aspects of rearmament. He was later one of the
original three men who began the official planning for JASDF. Then
Commander Terai was the aviation specialist in Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo's
group of rearmament planners who began work at approximately the same
time. Both of these men believed there was never any doubt that
aviation would be included in the Japanese force structure.
This is perhaps an obvious truth considering the prevalent view
that Communism was a monolithic entity, however, the Japanese and
Americans agreed that the only direct military threat was from the
Soviet armed forces. General Otto P. Weyland , Commander of FEAF at the
time (letter to the author, April 30, 1972) and General Tatsumi agreed
that the Soviet forces were the only threat considered.
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agreed that air power would be necessary in the Japanese defense.
However, they did not agree on the priority that air power should be
accorded within the Japanese defense structure nor the organizational
form which it should assume. Moreover, differences of opinion were not
limited to Japan and the United States, but were apparent among different
internal factions.
Controversy among the U.S. forces developed during joint planning
to reorganize and reinforce the National Police Reserve and Maritime
Safety Agency. The planning, which began in 1951, had been generated
by U.S. Far East Command (FEC) proposals on National Police Reserve (NPR)
reinforcement and a U.S. offer of patrol frigates and landing craft.
It became apparent that the U.S. was not emphasizing air power develop-
ment, and early in 1952, General Otto P. Weyland, Commander Far East
Air Forces (FEAF) , took action. He approached General Mark Clark, then
Commander of the Far East Command, and suggested that it "was time for
parallel discussions on the foundation of a 'new' Japanese air arm."
General Clark replied that such plans were premature and should be
delayed.
U.S. Air Force commanders in Japan were dissatisfied with this
approach as they soon indicated. Japan's air defense was then assigned
to the Japan Air Defense Force (JADF) , commanded by Brigadier General
Delmar T. Spivey. Upon learning that the U.S. Army felt political
Richard D. Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force , 1955-1956,
provided by Office of History, 5AF, USAF, Japan, pp. 3-3, discussed the
Air Force reaction to Army plans. Auer, "Post-war Sea Forces, " pp. 166-
176, discussed the formation of the joint planning groups concerned
with acceptance of the U.S. ships and their efforts. The Japanese
committee which worked towards the estahlishnent of the Coastal Safety
Force was called the Y - Committee and was closely associated with
Admiral Nomura's unofficial planning group.
16Letter to the author, April 30, 1972.
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and economic restrictions would not permit an indigenous air force, he
responded with a rather pointed question to his commander, FEAF:
Does FEAF have any information which would lead it to
believe that it is the intention of our government, the
Japan Logistical Command, or the Air Force to continue
to furnish the Japanese indefinitely with air defense
forces? 17
If not, the General felt that some program to initiate an indigenous
air arm should commence. General Spivey also went on to summarize his
view of the priorities involved:
It seems to me that modern air weapons have relegated land
forces to a third priority in any future defense of these
islands. World War II provided the example needed to show
the strategic vulnerability of Japan to air power. If we
desire to have Japan as our partner in securing Western
democracy in the Pacific, the necessary air power must be
provided. The expenditure of all or major portions of
Japan's defense effort on the lowest priority force cannot
be justified. 18
General Spivey went on to inform General Weyland that JADF had developed
a comprehensive plan to provide air defense to Japan.
Part of the United States Air Force's (USAF) dissatisfaction with
the FEC resulted from the fact that it was not a truly joint command. 19
The Security Advisory Section, which was responsible for joint planning,
consisted entirely of Army officers. The air advisor was an infantry





19General Weyland, letter to the Author, April 30, 1972. Also see
R. P. Martin, "How Much Air Power for Japan?," Aviation Week , December 29,
1952, pp. 17-18, and "USAF Tightens Japanese Air Defenses," Aviation
Week , February 16, 1953, pp. 13-16, for published versions of the split




man. The array's concept of an air force emphasized the close air
support role. This reflected General Clark's viewpoint as he had been
an exponent of army-controlled tactical air. Thus, the Air Force felt
their views were not being heard. It became apparent that their initial
efforts in 1952 had little effect when a new FEC Staff Study was
completed on June 12, 1952. It again recommended to Japan that ground
forces receive major emphasis in its planning. °
Meanwhile, the United States Navy had been discussing rearmament
with the Japanese planners since early in 1951. Admiral Nomura's study
group presented Admiral Arleigh Burke with a defense proposal on
January 29, 1951, which had been drawn up for Admiral Nomura to present
to Ambassador Dulles when he was in Japan. The plan envisioned a
two department force structure with the majority of air power in the
sea force. The Demobilization Bureau plan presented to the U.S.
similarly envisioned a sea-air force. Admiral Burke and other naval
officers felt that this was the most efficient and effective way to
utilize air power, and in the summer of 1951, Admiral Burke proposed a
two department force structure with tactical air assigned to the ground
22forces and other air missions under navy control. Then, in June 18,
1952, Secretary of the Navy Kimball forwarded a Naval War College
study entitled "Japanese Organization for National Defense" to Admiral
20
Far East Command records, provided from Modern Military History,
National Archives, 5/092/1952 by Department of the Army.
Admiral Burke, record memorandum, January 29, 1951, Burke papers,
U.S. Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.
22Admiral Burke, Interview, August 10, 1971.
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23Nomura's group. The study suggested a two-department force and urged
that sea and air power be integrated.
During the year and one-half between Nomura's proposal to Dulles
and the Kimball suggestion, Admiral Nomura's group had worked closely
with the Y-Conmittee. Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, who had been associated
with Admiral Nomura, was selected to head the Y-Committee. Yamamoto,
like General Tatsumi, had served in London while Yoshida x?as there.
Therefore, when Tatsumi began to meet with Yoshida in 1950, he took
Admiral Yamamoto along on some occasions to provide advice on naval
affairs.
They found that Yoshida particularly opposed an air force because
he felt it utilized "offensive weapons," and he foresaw serious economic
and technical difficulties in establishing an air force. General Tatsumi
strongly believed that an air force was essential to Japan's defense.
He felt the British success in the Battle of Britain was an important
lesson for Japan. All three men had been in London before the war, and
the two military officers reminded Yoshida of the British experience as
proof that an aircraft could be defensive and was crucial to an island's
defense. The Prime Minister agreed and the planners continued preparing
for a comprehensive force structure.
The "lessons of the war" were evident to many civilian officials
and military officers as they related to the stature of the new air
23
The reply to this proposal was entitled "Former Japanese Navy
Men's View on 'Japanese Organization for National Defense'," dated
August 1, 1952. The letter sprang from talks between Nomura and Kimball,
see Nomura Kichisaburo, An Inside Story of the Establishment of the
Defense Forces," February, 1960, Anzen l.'osho Kenkyu Kai, Kaivokoku
Nihon no Slioyai (The Future of Japan as a Maritime Nation) (Tokyo: Kara
Shoba, 1970), Chapter 3.
General Tatsumi, Interview, February 22, 1972.
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force. Most who participated in planning during that era felt there
25
was never any doubt about the independence of an air force. Admiral
Yamamoto and General Tatsumi were aware of Yoshida's feelings and
believed that the force would have to be independent. When Admiral
Terai brought up the subject of an air-sea force at the Y-Committee
proceedings, he was told by Yamamoto that the issue was already decided
and that air power was to be independent.
Therefore, by the time Secretary Kimball proposed an air-sea force,
the view of Admiral Nomura's group had changed drastically. The
reasons which caused the ex-navy officers to acquiesce in an independent
force were admirably expressed in their reply to Secretary Kimball.
From a military point of view, they agreed that "a separate air force
is unnecessary and undesirable for a small defense establishment such as
Japan is going to build. 1 They agreed that Japan must meet an
invading force out over the sea to defend the homeland effectively;
therefore, air defense would be most effective in a sea-air organization.
They felt that these military issues were secondary to the political
problem. They pointed out that most Japanese "consider that Japan's
primary defense against external aggression has to be sought in the
2P
air." Even though American strategists might try to convince Japan
that sea and air defenses could be undertaken by the U.S. forces, the
people still would believe that air defense should be the most important
-'The consensus of all whom I interviewed with the exception of
those few involved early in 1951 such as Admiral Burke and Admiral Terai.
2f>
Admiral Terai, Interview, February 16, 1972; General Tatsumi,
Interview, February 22, 1972.
27
"Japanese Navy Men's View," p. 8.
28 Ibid., p. 9.
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task of the Japanese forces.
Therefore, there must be an air defense service, and if it was not
independent, the navy officers feared it would fall under army control.
They pointed out the psychology of overhead protection being related
to the army, the historical relationship of air defense and army, and
the early dominance of the NPR. These factors led them to conclude
that if Japan did not have an independent air arm, "the responsibility
for the homeland anti-air defense will surely be incorporated in the
Army." 29
They noted the large imbalance between the National Police Reserve
and Coastal Security Force (CSF) where there was an 8 to 1 budget ratio,
and concluded that the addition of air power to the army could make them
so dominant as to be dangerous. Not only would they easily dominate
30the defense structure, but later perhaps again the government itself.
Thus, most Japanese concerned with military planning had concluded
early in 1952 that Japan would be served best by an independent air
force structure. Soon after General Weyland was rebuffed by General
Clark, he was approached by Admiral Nomura's group. Besides Nomura, the
group which approached him initially included Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro
of the UN, Major General Harada of the IJA Air Force, and several
leaders from the business community. They informed Weyland that they




"Japanese Navy Men's View," p. 10.




General Weyland, letter to the author, April 30, 1972. The first
contact between General Weyland and Admiral Nomura was early in the
summer, approximately the time, Nomura had replied to Secretary Kimball,
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General Weyland was happy to assist the group and began a program of
very private briefings which were presented by his operations and
32intelligence staffs in FEAF. They x-7ere briefed on the threat from the
Soviet Union and China, including approximate force levels, capabilities
and radii of action of potentially hostile air forces. The group
became convinced, or already were, that the "most immediate and greatest
threat to Japanese security lay in hostile air power and that the
best defense lay first in a viable air power structure.""
By this time, late in 1952, the Japanese group began consideration
of the organization of an air power structure. They tentatively agreed
that the structure would be most effective as an autonomous organization
not attached to either the ground or sea force. The group which
received the FEAF briefings began advocating their position within
government and industrial sectors.
The Japanese government privately announced in February 1952, that
it was planning a unified defense organization and queried the U.S.
on the feasibility of an air advisory group. Japan preferred that
air advisors be provided through existing groups to minimize the
possible political effects if the planning became public. The U.S.
Army also urged this procedure, but the USAF refused to supply advisors
under those conditions. The Air Force was aware that the U. S. Navy
32
An account of one of the briefings by General Banfill, Chief of
Intelligence. FEAF, was carried by Asahi , September 19, 1952, and again
by Aviation Week , December 29, 1952, p. 17. As ah i reported that there
were 14 Japanese present at the briefings. U.S. Army Headquarters
(or FIX) were not aware of the briefings.
33General Weyland, letter to author, April 30, 1972. The caveat,
"or already were," is also General Weyland's observation.
3Zt SCAP, record memorandum, March 1, 1952, Records of FEC, National
Archives 5/092/1952, authorized by Department of the Army.
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and Army were providing advice directly through their own organizations,
35
and would not place air force advisors under army control. This
was the last U.S. Army effort to control the advice provided by the FEAF,
and by June 1953, the FEC acceeded to the USAF position that they offer
all assistance directly. Thus, both Japanese and U.S. military planners
had agreed to the concept of an independent air force by the summer of
1953.
The Japanese characteristically began long-range studies for the
new air force at the same time they approached General Weyland. Admiral
Nomura's study group formulated a plan for a 33 squadron, independent
air force in the spring of 1952. The plan was unofficially submitted
3fi
to the government', apparently through the Y-Commit tee. Whatever the
first contact between the private rearmament planners and government
officials concerning air power, it soon became an on-going series of
informal consultations. Admiral Yamamoto was close to Mr. Yamada
Makoto, Chief of the Safety Bureau and later head of the Air Prepatory
Office. General Tatsumi consulted with Mr. Masuhara Keikichi who headed
the National Police Reserve until August 1952 and then represented
37
Japan in the first official liaison with the U.S. on air force planning.
Martin, "USAF Tightens Japanese Air Defenses," loc. cit . , p. 16,
also reported that JADF had submitted at least two plans to begin
integration of Japanese into the air defense network and the FEC had
turned down both proposals.
The Y-Committee was charged with the specific responsibility of
planning the Coastal Security Force to operate ships offered by the
U.S. However, by 1952 concurrent planning was going forward on the
concept of a unified defense force and the possibility of an air arm.
Admiral Terai , General Tatsumi and Mr. Ogawa all believed that the
informal plans first were first transmitted through the Y-Committee
though none were positive of the method. Doba, Japan's Military' Power
,
refers to 3 plans as Y-Committee plans, meaning Admiral Nomura's group.
37






Some of the men engaged in official planning were members of groups
which had conducted private rearmament studies as in the case of General
Arinuma.
The official planning for a unified defense structure, which began
early in 1952, continued within the National Safety Agency (NSA) after
it was formed. The Seido Chosa Iinkai , or Systems Research Council,
oo
was located in the Safety Bureau of the Agency. Comprised of uniformed
and civilian officers, it studied the long-range aspects of rearmament
and internal Japanese capabilities. It also performed an intelligence
on
function, studying the armaments of other countries. The committee
produced two series of rearmament plans, the first beginning in March 1953.
Their second draft, in June 1953, coincided with the evolving consensus
that the proposed Japanese air power structure would be autonomous.
The size of air force envisioned in the second and subsequent plans
was similar to the earlier unofficial plan from Admiral Nomura, and
proposed approximately 1500 aircraft.
Some critical aspects of the new air force remained to be settled,
particularly the method by which the air force would be attached to the
unified organization, and the new air force's scope or number of air
power missions which would be placed under its control. No real progress
could be made on these detailed issues until a political decision to
Eoei Nenkan , 1970, p. 189, and Masuhara, Nihon no Boei , p. 47,
discuss the formation of the Committee. General Arinuma confirmed that
it continued the studies which had preceeded the formation of NSA. One
nexvspaper, Mainichi , September 7, 1952 reported that a rearmament
committee had been formed including Tatsumi and Yamamoto. They were
still advising Yoshida, but not within an official committee although
they did unoficially advise and guide the committee.
39
Despite the fact the USA had no responsibility for external defense!





alter defense policy goals and establish a complete defense structure
was reached. That decision was signified by the Shigemitsu-Yoshida
Communique which altered defense policy and cleared the way for
establishment of the Air Self-Defense Force.
General Weyland proposed that a Japanese air force should be
independent and co-equal to the other two branches when he first
discussed the air power problem with Admiral Nomura's group. He believed
that a structure similar to the U.S. Department of Defense would be
appropriate with one exception. He urged "that all military aviation
/ o
be concentrated in a single service." The primary arguments for this
view were economic; logistics and training could be concentrated, and
operational effectiveness would be retained by assigning joint service
responsibilities to the air force.
General Ueyland exchanged views with the Headquarters, USAF in
Washington, and in July 1953, he organized an office within FEAF which
was known as the "Air Advisory Group, Japan." Its mission was to
"formulate general policy and procedures necessary to guide initial
planning for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force." This office
provided working-level contact with the men who would formulate JASDF
guidelines.
No special office for air force planning had been established at
that time by the Japanese, but two months later, in September , two
uniformed officers and one civilian were ordered to the Systems Research
41
See Chapter 6 for discussion of this policy evolution. The
communique was dated September 27, 1953.







Council in anticipation of the forthcoming political decision. Colonel
Arinuma Genshiro was a former IJA air officer, Colonel Ito Motoe was
a former UN aviator, and Mr. Takahashi Giichi was a civilian from the
internal bureau whose specialty was lav;. The three-man operation
began as Bu Shitsu
,
or simply a separate office in the Systems Research
Council. They immediately contacted their USAF counterparts and joint
discussions and planning began at once. The initial Japanese committee
expanded to eleven members late in November as the pace of planning
increased.
A plenary meeting of USAF and NSA officials was held on October 7
to discuss various planning guidelines. General Ueyland represented
the USAF and Mr. ^Masuhara Keikichi headed the Japanese group. Views
were exchanged on various aspects of air force organization and, while
both groups were primarily interested in a strong air arm, some
differences emerged.
^ 5LGEN Arinuma, Interview, March 7, 1972; also see JDA, Koku
Jieitai So Setsushi (The History of the Foundation of the JASDF)
,
pp. 20-21. The committee officially consisted of three members, but
another officer, Colonel Yahagi Juro, was already working with the
committee. The Committee was formally established on October 5, 1953.
This discussion of the origin of joint planning and the concepts
which were exchanged and debated is based primarily on interviews with
Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, senior Japanese representative, February 19, 1972;
General Hayashi Keizo, Chief of 1st office (Ground Staff), December 9,
1971; Mr. Kaihara Osamu, Chief of Safety Section and active in the
negotiations, November 10, 1971 and February 29, 1972; Colonel Arinuma
Genshiro, original member of air force planning group, March 7, 1972;
General Otto P. Weyland, Commander, FEAF, April 30, 1972 (by letter);
Colonel E. B. LeBailly, working head of Air Advisory Group, December 9,
1971 (by letter). Ranks and titles noted are those held at the time of
planning. Additionally, two letters provided by Japanese sources amplify
U.S. views; (1) from Gen. 0. P. Weyland to DG Kimura Tokutara, dated
October 8, 1953, and (2) from General J. E. Hull, Commander FEC, to
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru dated December 1, 1953.
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The Japanese civilian officials, including Mr. Masuhara, Mr. Kaihara
and Mr. Yamado Makoto, wanted all aviation in one branch and so were
in accord with USAF views on that point. However, they disagreed on
the best method of integrating the new air force. The Japanese officials
were advocates of a strong centralized command. They had tried to
establish a unified command when the NSA was formed and still considered
this preferable.
They proposed, therefore, that the new air force be attached directly
to a joint commander who then would have dual authority, commanding the
air force directly and also controlling the entire defense force. They
felt that this would indicate the primacy of the air defense mission
and make it first among equals. It also would be a step towards the
unified command they envisioned.
The Japanese did not agree on the issue as the uniformed officers
generally were inclined to side with the U.S. planners. The pressure
for a unified command had been generated in part by the experiences of
World War II, however, some previous advocates of that course were
having doubts after one year with the Safety Agency. For example,
General Hay ash i supported the arguments for a unified command structure
in 1952, but when the argument arose again, he felt that NSA experiences
48
had demonstrated the need for separate operating staffs.
The U.S. representatives had strong opinions on both subjects;
General Weyland wrote to Director General Kimura immediately following
47
Masuhara, Interview, February 19, 1972. Mr. Masuhara was the
primary advocate of this particular idea. He stressed that he agreed
completely with USAF officials who wanted primary emphasis on air power
and only differed on the best way to achieve that goal.
48
Interview, December 9, 1971.
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the first plenary meeting and stressed the importance of an independent
and co-equal third force. The Japanese were relying heavily on U.S.
aid in developing the new air force and General Ueyland alluded to that
assistance:
An air force organization separate from and co-equal with
the National Land Safety Force and Coastal Safety Force is
felt to be best suited for receiving advice, assistance
and training from the Far East Air Forces.
Mr. Masuhara felt that the Prime Minister initially agreed with him,
but the pressures for a force structure similar to the U.S. continued,
and on December 1, the Commander of the Far East Command wrote directly
to the Prime Minister and offered his views on the impending establish-
ment of an air component. He noted that "the organization of the
defense establishment is a prerogative of Japan as a sovereign nation,"
and declared that he did "not intend to encroach upon this sovereignty
50in any manner." However, he did feel that:
The unity of purpose of the United States and Japan concerning
Japan's defense posture recommends the creation of an
organizational structure in the Japanese air arm sufficiently
similar to that of the United States air arm to permit close
alliance and common methodology and application. ->1
Furthermore, the similarity between the U.S. forces and Safety Forces:
...has facilitated the exchange of materiel, services,
and ideas between analogous components having primary
responsibilities in equipment procurement, in the operation
of weapons and weapon systems, and in personnel training.
In the interests of economy and ef fectiveness , I feel
it would be desirable also to follow this pattern in the
49
Letter dated October 8, 1953.




organization of a separate and co-equal Japanese Air
Safety Force.
The support for "separate and co-equal" had become overwhelming. Perhaps,
as General Tatsumi believed, there was never any doubt that the air
force would be an independent and equal branch, but U.S. influence did
53play a role.
If there were few doubts about the eventual air force status, there
remained significant controversy over the scope of its operations.
General Weyland and his staff held the same view which the General
initially had expressed to the Nomura group, and he reiterated it in
his letter to the Director-General:
It is felt that all air elements of the Japanese security
forces should be concentrated under an independent and
co-equal Third Staff. Under such an organization, your
available air strength should be able to provide the
greatest security within a limited budget through flexible
utilization to meet all Japanese air requirements. Such
a centralized organization should realize great savings in
pilot and technical training, logistics support and
personnel requirements. Furthermore, if funds allocated
in the national budget for aviation are diversified, there
will be no single concentration of air power adequate to
cope with the threat which faces Japan. It is further
felt, upon study of Japan's economic conditions, even
with assistance from the United States, that the creation
and maintenance of three separate and distinct air arms
is economically inf easible.-3 ^
The Japanese planners, particularly the civilians, agreed and the
predominant opinion appeared to favor the inclusion of all military
aviation in one branch. The only dissent came from the ground and
maritime branches which included aviation branches in being by the
52
Letter dated December 1, 1953.
53
Interview, February 22, 1972.
Letter, October 8, 1972, my emphasis.
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summer of 1953. The ground forces started a pilot school at Hammamatsu
in October 1952, and early in 1953 an office of naval aviation was
established in the second staff of the NSA. 5 The fact that air
branches already existed in the other two services appeared to be their
strongest argument and there were indications that all air power would
Sfv
be centralized as planning progressed in November.
General Hull's letter to the Prime Minister also touched on this
subject, and here it played a decisive role:
In view of specific requirements of parent-service integration
and coordination, it is my belief that liaison and naval
aviation should be integral parts of the Japanese National
Safety Force and the Japanese Coastal Safety Force,
respectively. '
One source suggested that the letter was prompted or even drafted in
58part by General Weyland. He obviously did not write that section and
the reason for General Hull's inclusion of the remark is uncertain.
Kaihara felt that the U.S. Navy had some role in instigating the
letter. General Hull's own belief in the need for integrated air
support could have been the cause.
Issues such as joint training and the exact divisions of aviation
resources between the branches continued for years, but the tide had
turned and the Japanese gave up the idea of integrating all aviation
55Admiral Samejima Hiroshi, JMSDF, Interview, December 7, 1971.
56Admirul Terai, Interview, February 16, 1972, felt the lack of U.S.
Navy support had made the issue critical; Mr. Kaihara felt that those
supporting integration of all forces were in control.
57










On January 12, 1954, the Koku Jurabi Shitsu , or Air Preparatory Office,
was founded in the National Safety Agency. A total of 47 personnel
were gathered under the leadership of Mr. Yamada Makoto to plan the
Air Self-Defense Force. This committee completed a tremendous amount
of work in a very short time. Working very closely with the FEAF, on
a daily basis in most cases, the details of logistics, training,
administration and operations were established. The committee helped
to write the new defense lav; and was guided by it as they ironed out
the organizational details prior to July. 62
They were also guided by the preliminary joint planning which had
occurred over tha previous year. The general size of the force
structure had been decided; the scope of its operations had been
delimited; and the nature of the organization and its method of integration
had been determined.
60Interview, February 29, 1972, the training problem continued
until 1968, but it was generally an evolution towards greater separation.
A joint training order was not issued immediately upon reorganization
in July, but in August JASDF's responsibility for training was affirmed.
The U.S. Navy reacted strongly at this time and withheld trainers which
they had agreed to supply until an independent MSDF training program
was established. By March 1958, the joint program began to disintegrate
and all phases of pilot training were separate by 1968. General Okumiya
Masatake, Interview, November 18, 1971, was Commander of the 2nd Flying
School when the MSDF began their own program. Admiral Samejima also
provided background on this evolution.
61JDA, History of Foundation of JASDF
,
p. 20.
62Major General Ogawa Hideto, Interview, March 4, 1972. Then Major
Ogawa was one of 4 supply planners and recalled the rush of planning
and large workload. Each man had an area of responsibility which he
alone was responsible for. He planned with a USAF counter part and
was individually responsible for coordination with fellow planners in
areas of possible conflict or overlap.
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The United States, particularly through its military representatives,
had played a most significant role in the formation of basic concepts.
The U.S. representatives actively negotiated and offered positive
guidance at each step in the development of the force structure.
Yet, the U.S. negotiators had not dealt with a blank tablet. The
Japanese came to plan an air force with many ideas of their own origin.
While in many cases they accepted U.S. proposals, the impetus for
establishment of the air force and the emphasis it received came from
the Japanese. U.S. influence played a significant role in organization,
but basic precepts of air force size and role were of Japanese origin.

IV.
THE FORMULATION OF DEFENSE POLICY

The first three sections of this study set the stage on which the
Japanese decision-makers concerned with defense policy work. A singular
aspect of the foregoing parameters was the lack of constraint imposed
on the policy-maker. As a result, the external and internal variables
which have been discussed provide little circumstantial evidence; they
provide scant knowledge of the substance of Japanese defense policy.
The absence of circumstantial imperatives emphasizes the policy-making
process, and also allows a less integrated policy. The lack of
cohesion is magnified by the nature of Japanese decision-making which
gives added significance to factional viewpoints within the policy
formulation structure.
Broad aspects of Japanese defense policy will be noted in this
section although those aspects which relate to air power will be
emphasized. In particular, those defense policy interest groups which
are primarily concerned with air power applications will be isolated
and evaluated. Thus, the defense policy application to air power and
the air force structure input to defense policy will be considered.
Japanese defense policy has been treated in monolithic terms during
the 1950' s and 1960's. The finished product, or the government's
official policy statements have received overriding consideration. The
policy formulation process and the disparate views of the groups which
participate have not been considered. In the Japanese case, the lack of
defense imperatives and the absence of definitive policy make the
viewpoints of relevant interest groups essential to understanding the
substance and direction of policy.
The various interest groups relevant to policy formulation are
identified in Chapter 6 and their policy viewpoints analyzed. These




factional viewpoints would constitute the government policy were any
one group's views comprehensive and their influence dominant.
Chapter 7 involves a detailed analysis of the decision-making
process. It will illustrate the relative access to this process enjoyed
by various interest groups and will indicate their relative influence
on final policy. Such an analysis also will provide insight to the
degree of policy integration which actually occurs and to the number of
decisions that are resolved at the apex of the structure.
Therefore, this section provides an initial synthesis of Japanese
defense policy. Subsequent sections of the study which analyze the





At the outset of any discussion of Japanese defense policy, it is
necessary to examine the question of the existence of that policy.
When asked the major weakness of the Air Self-Defense Force in 1971,
General Genda Minoru slammed his fist on the table and said "no policy,
no strategy. "L On the other hand, the Socialist Party believes a
grand strategy does exist which reflects "the desire of the Japanese
2government to dominate Asia again."
The majority of informed opinion in Japan agreed with General
Genda' s assessment as Japan prepared to implement another defense
build-up plan. The Secretary General of the National Defense Council,
Kaihara Osamu, said "we have no policy." Professor Momoi Makoto of
the National Defense College linked Japanese defense problems to "the
absence of any guiding principle." The Chief of Staff of the JASDF,
General Ishikawa Kanshi, concluded that ASDF policy had been limited
to imitation of U.S. air defense policy. The minority opinion, aside
from socialist polemics, theorized that Japan consistently maintained
a policy of total reliance on the United States for external defense
Interview, November 17, 1971.
Japan Socialist Review , November 15, 1969.
3
Interview, November 10, 1971.
Interview, December 3, 1971.
Interview, October 12, 1971. This view was reinforced by many
sources and relates to the discussion found in Section I concerning the
various theories of defense policy. For another viewpoint emphasizing




in the post-war era. Professor Royama Michio agreed that defense
policy is a reflection of Japanese foreign policy. However, he
concluded that Japan has had no systematic foreign policy in the past
twenty-five years and therefore no defense policy. It only had contended
with the status quo , hence "no direction or cogency to the defense
„7program.
Whether policy or non-policy, Japan's defense is a question that
cannot be separated from the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty and the broader
picture of Japan-U.S. relations. The basic framework of Japanese and
U.S. security relations has been discussed in Chapter 1. However, the
core of the U.S. commitment to Japan may be reduced to the operative
portion of Article V of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
Q
with its constitutional provisions and processes.
History demonstrates that crises sometimes create new interpretations of
commitments; interpretation could enable the United States 'legally' to
do nothing while acting in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Nor does the commitment's existence necessarily explain Japanese
interpretations and reservations. Their interpretation of the commitment
balanced against their view of the threat is in essence a definition of
the parameters of Japanese autonomous defense policy. Therefore,
Japan's attitude towards their autonomous defense structure is one
Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy ; see discussion in Section I.
Interview, February 5, 1972.
8
Signed January 19, 1960.

159
method of clarifying their interpretation of the treaty.
If they intended to rely totally on the U.S. commitment, the Japanese
force structure should reflect a preoccupation with internal security.
If Japan believes the U.S. commitment is suspect in one area, for
example low-level local attack, the force structure should emphasize a
capacity to deal with such threats. If Japan is planning towards
eventual military dominance in Asia, allocations of resources would
reflect their intent to project influence militarily. Therefore, this
analysis will focus on the internal aspects of defense policy, not in
disregard of the Security Treaty, but because the domestic structure
also may be used to define the security relationship.
Policy is designed to deal with present or future situations. The
absence of any manifest threat to Japan enables emphasis on the future
dimensions of policy. The absence of threat also reduces the demand
for defense policy and again raises the question of its existence.
With the caveats noted and within the limitations cited, this question
may be addressed further.
Policy represents a decision, and the nature of Japanese decision-
making bears on the definition of defense policy. The establishment
of a defense policy is an innovative decision rather than an implemental
one; and the Japanese methodology for reaching such a decision has some
unique aspects. Japanese decision-making is often referred to as a
"consensus" method, however this is an over-simplification which
results in a distortion of the actual process. Herman Kahn
Q
described the system as "diffuse, group-centered decision-making."
9Kahn, Japanese Superstate
,
p. 40-41. I have relied on Kahn, pp. 40-51,
Richard Halloran, Japan: Images and Realities (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969), pp. 90-100, and discussions in Japan as background for
this view of Japanese decision-making.
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This term gives a better image of the Japanese process where all
interest groups have access to present their views on any decision.
As the final decision is reached every effort is made to accommodate
the special viewpoints of each interested party. The process is further
complicated by the giri and on systems of duty and obligation existent
in the Japanese culture. The on-going nature of policy-making enables
giri and on to play a significant role in the evolution of policy.
Two prevalent bureaucratic manifestations of this process are the
systems of ringi and matonari. Ringi is a process whereby junior members
of a bureaucracy or private corporation reach a consensus on a particular
issue at their level. They draft a position paper on the issue which
must be approved by the director of the particular section or bureau.
The paper then is circulated through that department and other interested
departments for discussion, comments and opinions. The initial document
may be recirculated several times with many changes made before a
consensus is reached. It will repeat this process at appropriate
levels until it reaches the apex of the organization for a final
decision. As Kahn noted, the leadership then is under serious pressure
to take action from the consensus established below them.
Matomari is a related process where the initiative comes from the
leadership rather than the lower echelon. The leader of a decision-
making group states a problem on which all other members are asked to
comment. Each member indicates his position although he "only exposes
a slight portion of his thinking;" he does not commit himself totally
and refrains from harsh criticism of others' views. The discussion




, p. 92, also see Auer, "Postwar Sea Forces,"
p. 310, for discussion of this process.
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proceeds with various parties partially indicating their viewpoints
and all trying to establish the others' positions. If and when agreement
is reached, it will be stated by the senior member. If no agreement
is reached, no decision is forced on the group, and they adjourn to
consider the problem further. Informal meetings or mediation may be
12
used in the interim to assist in reaching some accord. By the next
meeting, the agreement normally will have been reached, but only in
the event the parties concur. "All else is subordinate to this point.' ^
It is possible to argue that the processes described only differ
slightly from American or other western systems of bureaucratic
decision-making. In the American bureaucracy, decisions are promulgated
from the apex of the decision-making process. The leadership has the
authority to issue such a decision with or without the consensus of
the bureaucracy. However, if the bureaucracy is dissatisfied with the
decision, it in fact may be altered by minor implementing actions which
are taken contrary to the goals initially established. In both the
American and Japanese situation one might say that the lower bureaucratic
levels influence and alter decisions, yet, there is a significant
difference: in the American bureaucracy, the organization only operates
with established goals, even if those goals are not fully implemented.
In Japan, the organization may continue to operate without any relevant
goals. In the United States, implementation contrary to a top level
decision is possible where the leadership is unaware or unconcerned over
In the February 1972, dispute between the political parties over
the defense issue, the time-honored custom of senior member mediation
was evident as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Funada






such alterations. On the other hand, bureaucratic implementation
without any top-level decision would be an unacceptable risk, for the
bureaucracy would be unsure of the parameters of the impending decision.
In Japan, the decision has been discussed thoroughly; even if no decision
is reached, the parameters are understood and various sectors of the
bureaucracy may continue making implemental decisions reflecting their
own policy outlook. Their knowledge of the issues and the various
points of disagreement prevents them from directly violating or fore-
closing others' views. Thus, the absence of a decision is neither
conspicuous nor critical, as it is in the American process. Unless a
situation emerges which mandates a final decision, it is quite possible
that such a decision will be delayed; different interest groups will
dominate aspects of the issue which they may implement.
This discussion has centered on the bureaucratic decision-making
process; however, the elements do have relevance outside the bureaucracy
in the broader concept of decision-making or policy formulation.
Japanese policy implementation does not rely on a goal-oriented
environment. Implementation may occur in certain aspects of defense
capacity, for example, without any final consensus as to policy goals.
The complexity of this process makes it difficult to identify the
originator of any one aspect of policy or to isolate the dominant
influence in policy formulation. A final policy decision may be
diffusely authored with different goals representing the special interests
of groups who participated in the decision. Each party has an effective
veto on the establishment of a new policy by withholding its consent,
and in the interim, policy may be determined by effective control of
the various aspects of the problem.
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This discussion of Japanese decision-making has particular application
to defense policy for several reasons. The absence of imperatives in
the Japanese security problem have been cited. As a result, there has
been little pressure for a final decision. The absence of a final
decision does not mean that no accord has been reached, but that some
areas of disagreement among the various participants do remain. Nor
does the absence of a final decision mean there is no policy. Instead,
the policy may be an interim amalgam of the various viewpoints of the
relevant interest groups. It is not possible to assume that the
parameters of such a policy were decided or even completely acquiesced
to by the senior member of the group, the political leadership in this
case.
The top-echelon leadership of the Japanese Government may be
considered the Senior member' of the decision-making group on defense
policy, however, there are others who have an interest in and access
to the process. It is important to identify these groups and to
delineate their policies, because those individual policies may
constitute a portion of Japanese defense policy through their ability
to implement a particular aspect. Interest groups may be non-govern-
mental; although defense policy represents a government decision,
outside groups have interests and can be considered possible participants.
It should be noted that a group may participate without a comprehensive
policy covering all aspects of the issue, or if a comprehensive policy
is proposed, certain sectors may be emphasized.
The formulation of Japanese air power policy involves a decision-
making process which has been underway for over twenty-five years.
Heads of the government have participated, as have the Defense Agency
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and the Air Self-Defense Force. ^ The Finance Ministry, the Foreign
Ministry, The Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the
Economic Planning Agency have been represented on the National Defense
Council and have access to national security planning. Non-governmental
sources have also played a role, and in a parlimentary system the
political party is one important input. Although the party and the
political leadership are closely related, differences in institutional
goals enable some distinction in the emphasis of their policy objectives.
The aircraft industry has been miniscule as compared to the Japanese
industrial complex, however it has maintained a voice in the formulation
of policy. These groups have distinctive policy viewpoints which may
be isolated and defined.
Other potential groups have failed to make a significant impact
within the policy process through the first twenty years of post-war
defense planning. The opposition parties face the dilemma of ideology,
and lack of substantive alternatives which limit even their external
affect on policy formulation. They have not developed shadow cabinets
or established Diet committees with which they could gain access to
the defense policy process and express their own viewpoints. Therefore,
the opposition parties have made little substantive input to defense
policy considerations.
The various public media have also been a potential source of
policy initiatives. In addition to the individual expertise of
commentators, particularly within the great national newspapers , the
The JDA and the ASDF represent a civilian and uniformed continuum
of the military bureaucracy which began with pre-JDA participants.
The GSDF and MSDF also have viewpoints as to air power planning which
will be considered when the uniformed viewpoint is discussed in detail.
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media provide convenient means for articulation of private and public
opinion representing the views of special interest groups and general
public sentiment. Although newspapers have not ignored defense
completely, they generally have not assumed any constructive role as
a defense policy interest group. Newspaper reports and editorials have
emphasized the constitutional, political and social issues, and avoided
the substance of defense policy alternatives. Some contend that the
newspapers are leftist and opposition-oriented; others portray them as
members of the establishment. -* Such an argument is interesting but
irrelevant to the issue. Whatever the press's general posture, it
has not played a significant role in constructing defense policy
alternatives.
The defense intellectual community could be another source of
innovative ideas on defense policy, one commonly used by governments
to examine possible alternatives and suggest new approaches to national
security. As noted in detail in Chapter 2, the defense intellectual
community in post-war Japan has remained small, diffuse and unorganized.
It has limited access to the decision-making process. Possibly because
of the general alienation of academia to military topics, the government
does not appear to be generally receptive to academic opinion. Outside
of the National Defense College and other small institutions noted,
there have been few strategic discussions of national defense. The
intellectual input has been essentially limited to personal relationships,
The influence of a particular analyst may be significant because of his
Several military leaders, both retired and on active duty, have
expressed suspicion of the motives and orientation of the major news-
papers, while Richard Halloran, Images
,
Chapter 7, contended the
newspapers are another element in the establishment and play a
prominent role in building consensus.
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contact with a Director General of the JDA or with a Prime Minister;
however the results of this participation are rather limited and no
clear intellectual position can be ascertained.
The Space and Technology Agency, although not a permanent member
of the National Defense Council (NDC) , regularly sends a representative
to attend its meetings. The close relationship of technology, space
and military power suggests that the agency would play an important
role in defense policy. It does not primarily through its own choice.
Mr. Ichinose Teruo, Space Development Councillor for the Science and
Technology Agency, assured the author that "space research in Japan is
unique that the military is completely excluded." Because of this,
the Agency must compete for resources in all cases. Beyond opposition
to defense allocations they have not proposed policy alternatives due
to the lack of intercourse between the two agencies.
Political Leadership
Japan's parlimentary government has been ruled by the Liberal-
Democratic Party or its predecessors since independence. With the
exception of one six-month period in 1947, every post-war Prime Minister
has come from the conservative parties who have dominated Japanese
politics. The party organization of the Liberal-Democratic Party has
been geared to have a direct influence on the government through a
secretariat, a policy board, and a research council. Research council
committees correspond to the government ministeries. While the defense
policy viewpoints of the LDP and the government leadership are obviously
quite similar, it is appropriate to distinguish between them. The LDP
16
Interview, February 25, 1972.
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is an interest group with secular, power-oriented goals, but the
government leaders operate at the apex of the policy structure; they
are the "senior members" of the group. The security of Japan is a
primary Cabinet concern; the LDP, although not unconcerned, has
naturally emphasized the continued success of the party.
Japanese leaders began to discuss the security problem in 1947 when
the possibility of a Peace Treaty arose. The discussions within the
Japanese government led to the "Ashida Memorandum" which was informally
presented to the United States in September 1946. ' At that time, the
government wished to rely completely on the United States for external
18defense, "to have Japan's security guaranteed by the United States."
The planned domestic structure would concentrate on internal riots or
disorders.
The Ashida Memorandum reflected the 1947 viewpoint of the Japanese
leaders, and the Occupation authorities deemed it inappropriate at the
time and refused to discuss the subject formally. By 1950, the United
States opposed such a Japanese policy because it wished Japan to
contribute to its own defense, external as well as internal. The
rearmament pressures existent during the Peace Treaty negotiations
19
were generated primarily by special envoy John Foster Dulles. His
position, uncompromising at first, was modified during the negotiations.
See Weinstein, Postwar Defense
,
pp. 12-40, for details on the






Baron E. J. Lewis Van Aduard, Japan From Surrender to Peace (New
York: Praeger, 1954), pp. 157-200; Nishimura Kumao , "Situation at the
Time of the Japanese-American Security Treaty" in Nihon No Anr.en Hosho
(Japan's National Security) (Tokyo: Ka j ima Kenkyujo, 1964); and
Weinstein, Postwar Defense Policy
, pp. 58-63, all illustrate examples
of the Dulles position on rearmament.
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Prime Minister Yoshida responded to the request for "gradual rearmament"
by outlining "a project, long under consideration, for increasing both
our land and sea forces and placing them under the control of an embryo
Ministry of Defense." 20
Yoshida' s first commitment to Dulles regarding Japanese intention
to rearm came in January 1951. The commitment was formalized in the
preamble to the first Security Treaty: "that Japan will itself
increasingly assume responsibility for its o\m defense against direct
and indirect aggression. ,I/;/- It was a tenuous obligation at best
because it could be found only in the preamble, and there expressed in
terms of the United States "expectation" that Japan would assume external
responsibilities. Although some concessions had been granted, there is
little evidence of a change in Japanese policy toward implementing
rearmament. In 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida again denied any intention
to rearm: "we will not rearm. To rearm we must ask the consent of
23the people and revise the Constitution." The National Safety Agency
was established in August 1952, and its missions were limited to dealing
with indirect aggression: to take action "in cases of special need to
maintain peace and order in our country and to protect human lives and
,,24property.
20Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs, The Story of Japan in Crisis
,




, also see testimony of Okazabi Katsuo before the Commission
on the Constitution, in Kempo Shosakai , Kempo Chosakai Dai 3 Jinkai
Dai - 30 - kai Sokai Gijiroku
, Tokyo, 1959, p. 8.
22
U.S. -Japan Security Treaty, September 8, 1951.
23Quoted in "Kokai Rongi no Naka no Jieitai" (The Self-Defense Forces
in Diet Discussions), Keizai Orai
,
June 1967, p. 119.
Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan , October 1970, p. 34,
quoted from Safety Agency Law.
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Internal and external pressures for a policy change increased, and
a significant policy shift did occur on September 27, 1953. A joint
communique released by Prime Minister Yoshida and Progressive Party
President Shigemitsu declared a new direction:
In consideration of the present international situation
and the spirit of national independence which is arising
within our country, we will clarify the policy of
increasing our self-defense strength and formulate a
long-range defense plan commensurate with national abilities
and in keeping with the gradual decrease of United States
Forces stationed in Japan. Together with this measure
as a first step, we will amend the Safety Agency Law in
order to reorganize the National Safety Forces into the
Self-Defense Forces and to add the mission of defense
of our country against direct aggression to the
former's mission."
This statement was the final indication of a policy shift which had
been favored by domestic interest groups as well as the United States,
and it enabled the Japanese defense structure to continue to expand.
Japanese-U.S. talks on mutual security and mutual security assistance
were scheduled to begin in October and presented the immediate
*) ft
imperative that a new Japanese consensus be reached. However, the
policy had been advocated within Japan by both uniformed and civilian
interest groups, and a series of studies and plans already proposed by
27
the Safety Agency illustrated the growing Japanese consensus. The
25
Japan Defense Agency, The Defense of Japan , October 1970, p. 35,
quoted from Safety Agency Law, a series of meetings led to this
significant policy shift which are discussed in Boei Nenkan , (The Annual
Report on the Defense Agency) 1970 edition, (Tokyo: Boei Nenkan Kanko
Kai, 1970), p. 188. The text of the quote was compiled from the different
translations. My emphasis.
26The Ikeda-Robertson talks were held in Washington during October
1953.
27These will be discussed in more detail in discussions of JDA and
JASDF policy development, supra.
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establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, on July 1, 1954, represented
the first concrete steps taken to implement the new policy: "the
primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend the nation
28
against direct and indirect aggression." This was particularly
relevant to air power, the primary orientation of which was toward
external threats.
The National Defense Council (NDC) , established on June 3, 1956,
has represented the apex of substantive defense policy formulation.
Cabinet and Diet "decisions," which effect NDC "recommendations,"
rarely make any changes. The NDC is officially the "supreme advisory
body of the Cabinet on national defense problems;" its membership
29
consists of the Frime Minister and five other Cabinet members. The
paucity of high level consensus on defense policy is illustrated by
the fact that in the first ten years of its existence the National
30Defense Council made only eleven recommendations to the Cabinet.
Of those, the most significant was the "Basic Policies for National
Defense," decided by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957. This document
reiterated the purpose of national defense "to prevent direct and
indirect aggression;" it then went on to set forth four national policies:
1. To support the activities of the U.S., and to promote
international cooperation, thus contributing to the
realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the livlihood of the nation and to enhance
the spirit of patriotism, thereby establishing a foundation
essential for the nation's security.
28
JDA, Self-Dcfcnse Forces Law , Law No. 165 of June 9, 1954, Article
3, (official translation).
29
National Defense Council of Japan , Secretariat, National Defense






3. To develop efficient defense capacities progressively,
taking into account the national strength and the actual
conditions of the country, as well as keeping within the
limits necessary for self-defense.
4. To meet foreign aggression in accordance with the
Japan-USA security arrangements until the U.N. has become
capable of discharging its function of arresting such
aggression more ef fectively.-^l
This major policy consensus also was precipitated by the necessity
of events. Prime Minister Kishi hoped to negotiate a major reduction
in the U.S. force structure in Japan during an impending trip to the
United States. The policy was established as the basis for negotiation
and later internal support before he left Japan. These four principles
remain the basis of the Japanese government attitude towards defense
policy fifteen years later. Neither interest group pressures nor a
changing international environment has forced a new consensus.
The United Nations has been very popular in Japan; and the first
basic goal reflected Japanese public opinion. The Japanese government
has remained fully aware of the limitations of the U.N. in security
affairs. There are, in fact, limitations to the support Japan might
provide the United Nations in this area. The Japanese have repeatedly
declared that they would not. dispatch troops in any role, even at the
request of the U.N. 32
Early in the occupation, the Japanese government took the position
that indirect aggression or civil violence represented the major
threat to Japan's security. The second policy reflected that perception
and spelled out the primary method of dealing with this threat.
31National Defense Council or Japan , Secretariat, National Defense
Council, October 1967, Appendix 3.
32
Defense of Japan , October 1970, pp. 39-40, also Nishimura,
Philosophy of Self-Def ense
,
October 11, 1971, p. 34.
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Domestic spending to promote the people's welfare continued to receive
first priority in the government budget in 1972. The direct relationship
between a higher living standard and national security was made before
May 1957; Prime Minister Yoshida had resisted pressure to rearm more
rapidly in 1950 because of this economic philosophy. The principle
remained equally important in 1972. When recent shifts in the inter-
national economic situation resulted in a decrease of the economic growth
rate, the defense program was reduced because it must be "adapted to
the reality of (the) current and immediate future domestic situation."
The third principle included a reaffirmation of the second, for the
commitment to gradual development of defense capacity was conditioned
by the phrase "within the bounds of national capabilities." However,
this was an important step for Japan and represented the new consensus
that the Self-Defense Forces would continue to expand within economic
parameters. The principle recognized the formula for the continued
reduction of U.S. garrison costs and conditional U.S. troop withdrawals
which had been agreed to the previous year by Secretary of State Dulles
and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. The principle remained valid for
the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan (DBP) which reaffirmed Japan's intention
35
of 'building up gradually our autonomous defense set-up."
The third policy was a precondition to the validity of the fourth.
The Security Treaty was to be the primary tool "to cope with aggression."
Japan did not say total reliance; in fact, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
Nishimura, Philosophy on Self-Defense , October 11, 1971, p. 24.
3/!,See Hughes, "Guardianship to Partnership," pp. 56-70, for details
of the U.S. -Japanese security negotiations which were conducted during
this period.




had agreed two years before that Japan gradually should assume "primary
responsibility for the defense of its homeland." However, such a
commitment did not reflect Japan's available military potential.
Increasing military capability and reliance on an ally were not contra-
dictory policies.
The imbalance of capacity and policy was apparent in air power
policies which *?ere illustrated by United States and Japanese attitudes.
The two nations first exchanged notes on the subject in January 1953.
Japan began by noting constant violations of its airspace and acknowledging
that it did not "possess at present any means effectively to repel such
37
violations." Japan requested that the United States "take effective
and appropriate measures to repel them for the protection of the
common interest of Japan and the United States of America." The
United States acquiesced to the request and instructed the military to
take necessary measures "with all practicable assistance from the
39Japanese Government." The exchange of notes was reaffirmed by a "U.S.
Note on the Air Defense of Japan" after the 1960 Security Treaty.'40 The
balance of actual U.S. and Japanese air forces present in Japan has
changed dramatically since 1953, or even 1960. The policy, as expressed
in the agreements has not changed. The permanence of these policies
reflects the government's extreme caution in this area, and the difficulty
of obtaining any consensus within the policy formulation structure.
3
^"Dulles-Shigemitsu Communique," New York Times , September 1, 1955,
p. A.
Murphy-Okazaki Exchange of Notes on Air Defense, January 13 and 16,
1953, provided by Commander, U.S. Forces Japan.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
Provided by the Commander U.S. Forces Japan.
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The government statement made at the time of Security Treaty extension
in 1970 reflected this caution when it in part replied to the initiative
of Director General Nakasone who was campaigning for a revision of the
Basic Principles:
The very enthusiasm about autonomous defense is a basic condi-
tion for maintaining national security, but it will be
difficult to preserve security independently. Therefore
efforts will be made to consolidate self-defense power in
conformity with national power and the domestic situation
and to maintain the peace and security of the Far East,
including our country, by the Security Treaty structure. 41
The National Defense Council specifically reaffirmed the Basic
Principles when it approved the Fourth Defense Build-up Program outline:
"the program will be carried out in accordance with the nation's basic
defense policy approved by the Cabinet May 20, 1957."
Japanese defense policy, as enunciated at the apex of government,
has displayed two singular characteristics. It has addressed military
capacity in most broad and general terms. Any number of different,
even contradictory actions could be explained in terms of the vague
principles outlined above. Secondly, it has been unresponsive; new
policies have not emerged despite significant, even radical changes, of
the internal and external situation. The Japanese decision-making
process would suggest, however, that new trends or initiatives in policy
would not occur at the top level, but at lower levels or within the
different interest groups participating in policy formulation.
Although there has been no distinct division between the policy
positions of the various groups, it is possible to categorize them
As quoted in Nihon Keizai , August 16, 1970 (U.S. Embassy
translation)
.
** 2As quoted in The Japnn Times , February 8, 1972.
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generally as either status quo or revisionist in orientation. The
Liberal Democratic Party, The Finance Ministry, The Foreign Minister
and The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) have tended to resist changes
to current security policy, albeit for different reasons. On the other
hand, the Defense Agency, The Air Self-Defense Force and the aircraft
industry have favored modification of the current policy, again for
different goals.
The Liberal-Democratic Party
It is difficult to distinguish LDP policy attitudes from government
attitudes for the obvious reason that in many cases the same men
dominate each sector. In the Japanese parlimentary system the LDP is
the top-echelon of government, and their basic conservative philosophy
has been magnified by other factors. The LDP can be characterized as
a coalition of factions representing, in part, varying degrees of
conservatism, and the factions themselves are vertical groups bound by
their loyalty to a personal leader. The coalition within the faction
is maintained in order to gain power; often the leader is a present or
future candidate for Prime Minister. The basis of the inter-factional
coalition is primarily related to the acquisition of power as opposed
to overriding ideological principles. The leader of the party is more
of a balancer than a leader, and the maintenance of the balance
discourages innovation which is uncharacteristic of Japanese leadership
anyway
.
The executive structure of the party entails another element of
diversity. The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is the major
advisory body to the Executive Council of the party; it indirectly
advises the National Defense Council. The operating structure of the
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Policy Affairs Research Council consists of divisions and committees
which correspond to the ministries of government. The party policy
normally reflects the consensus of these committees as well as a
consensus of the factions; it consequently resembles the vagueness of
governmental policy.
The LDP directly participates in the defense policy process; when
Nakasone proposed a revision of the basic defense policies, he met with
top LDP leaders at the party headquarters before making his proposals
tp the National Defense Council. The attitudes of the LDP leaders
often corresponded to their primary interests: the Security Research
Council Chairman expressed support for the general idea of autonomous
defense while the Foreign Affairs Research Council Chairman asked "that
a cautious attitude be taken in revising the basic policy."
As opposed to broader government objectives, the party is concerned
with its own unity, strength and continued power; consequently, it
favors the least possible controversy with which revisionist parties
could make political gains. It naturally views the security issue in
that framework and is hesitant to take any initiatives which could
disrupt factional unity or raise issues that might be utilized by the
opposition. On balance with this, the party relies on industry,
particularly for financial support; it also has an interest in insuring
that industrial viewpoints are presented to the government.
Although the LDP is a distinguishable interest group, its policy
position on defense is general and vague. The scope of its interests
extends to all aspects of governmental affairs, and to achieve consensus
/





within the LDP is as difficult, if not more so, then within the bureaucracy,
Furthermore, its primary concern with the balance of power in domestic
politics accentuates its conservatism.
The Finance Ministry, The Ministry of International Trade and Indus try
and the Economic Planning; Agency
Japanese defense spending has had very low priority in the allocation
of government resources. This has effectively implemented the second
basic principle of defense: to promote the national welfare. The
Japanese white paper on defense expounded the principle:
Furthermore, in order to insure the security of the nation
fully, it is necessary to take political, economic and
social measures for the establishment of an internal foundation,
such as the promotion and increase of economic power, pro-
motion of social welfare and the improvement of education.
The Finance Ministry and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) serve as the
bureaucratic means by which the policy is implemented; they deal in the
allocation of government resources, and therefore, are concerned with
the amount and priority of defense spending.
Defense budgets have often been compared in terms of a percentage
of GNP. In Japan, the percentage dropped from 1.73 in 1954 to .79 in
1970. It not only has become a most common method of describing the
budget, but an almost absolute guideline for defense spending. The
defense planner must begin with a monetary sum fixed by this percentage.
The current defense build-up plan has been delayed, in part, because
47
of opposition from the EPA based on this guideline. The tentative
^Defense of Japan , October 1970, p. 29.
hi
"Ibid . , p. 97.
Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972.
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approval given the plan in February 1972 included no financial data.
The EPA opposed promulgation of such data because international monetary
realignments altered the EPA's economic growth forecasts. A lower
annual growth meant the defense plan would involve spending in excess
of the programmed percentage of GNP. Such a possibility violated policy.
Not only was the JDA forced to revise their plan, but were not allowed
to present a modified proposal until the EPA revised their five-year
economic forecast.
The delay of the defense build-up was forecast over a year before
when the plan was first proposed by the JDA. The Finance Ministry
publicly noted that the projected 18 percent yearly growth of defense
spending might outgrow the economy and the national budget. Such
increases would mean "heavy sacrifices from 'civil' spending in the
field of social welfare and others, and such a state of affairs would
49
not be tolerated." The Finance Ministry is a most powerful, semi-
autonomous bureaucracy within the Japanese government, and some believe
that it "makes" foreign policy and defense policy because of its
extensive influence. It has played the role of watchdog and master of
the Japanese budget over the past twenty years and imposed limits on
defense allocations with near total authority.
The principle of national welfare priority not only assigns a low
priority to defense spending, it additionally relates that spending to
the "promotion and increase of economic power." The government's
48
Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972. This is the second time
that a DBP was delayed by the Finance Ministry and/or EPA. In 1960,
the 2nd DBP was delayed one year by the Finance Ministry, Nihon no Roc i,
p. 53.






financial bureaucracies limit defense spending; they also concern
themselves with the distribution of the military budget. The Finance
Ministry, along with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) , has actively supported the principle that defense monies be
spent in a manner beneficial to related industries.
Support of defense industries has been a consistent Japanese
principle, one which began with very early defense planning. An
Aircraft and Ordinance Section was established in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry in August 1952, and an Aircraft
Production Council, also in MITI, began operations one month later.
Their goals were to improve production and engineering techniques in
Japanese defense industry and to coordinate its development. They
were charged with implementation of the controls authorized in the
Aviation Law and Aircraft Industry Promotion Law passed by the Diet in
CO
1952. An Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law, passed June 3, 1954,
gave more control to MITI. It continued to act as an industrial
policeman and industrial spokesman in 1972, and it remained deeply
involved in the promotion of defense industries.
The powerful bureaucracies concerned with financial allocations
and industrial interests give added emphasis to the defense principle
of social welfare priority. A natural bureaucratic tendency to control
future competition aggravates the imbalance of influence. Primacy of
social welfare has been translated to a limit on military expenditures
L. M. Garret, U.S.A.F. Industrial Planning with the Japanese Air
Self-Defense Force
,
96 pages , undated (1958), prepared under authority
of the Office of Information Services, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
Japan, provided by the Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force,
Japan, p. 2.
52Aviation Law, Law No. 231 passed July 15,. 1952, and Aviation
Promotion Law, Law No. 237, passed July 16, 1952.
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which has been divorced from strategic needs. The principle has also
been used to justify allocation of resources in order to stimulate
defense industries. Stimulation of industry is not an unusual goal of
defense policy; however, the concept that industrial promotion might
be more important than operational capability has reflected an uncommon
situation. Those priorities indicate the special interests and influence
53
of the government bureaucracies outside the defense structure.
The Foreign Ministry
The Foreign Ministry naturally has focused on the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements. They have been well aware of the Nixon Doctrine
and concerned wi£h the stability and dependability of the United States
commitment. They hesitate to support the principle of autonomous
defense, even within the security treaty framework, for fear it will
tend to deemphasize the alliance.
The Foreign Ministry has recognized the need for U.S. military
capability in maintaining regional stability, and they do not want an
expanded SDF participating in this role. They agree that the direct
military threat to Japan is very remote, and resist the autonomous
defense theory because of the destabilizing effect it could have on the
U.S. security commitment. The section of the recent Defense White
53
A recent example of this occurred in September 1971, when the JASDF
was forced to choose the T-2, home-built advanced jet trainer over the
F-5 which could have been imported at a much lower price per aircraft.
The number of aircraft requested by JASDF then was not approved because
the total bill was too high. They now will receive less aircraft
then necessary to implement their training program because of the
primacy of the domestic production principle. See Chapter 9 for details
of the allocation process.
54
This discussion of the Foreign Ministry position is largely based




Paper which dealt with the Security Treaty was finalized after consultation
with the Foreign Ministry and it expressed their caution:
At any rate, in the case of the initiation of an armed
attack against our country, Japan and the United States
must both act to meet it most effectively. Therefore, it is
necessary for the two countries always to be in close
communication with each other, to endeavor to communicate
ideas, and to maintain close relations. 55
The rapprochement of the nuclear powers, the Nixon Doctrine, and
domestic instability in Japan reflect the need to reexamine the basic
concepts of defense in Japan. Yet, the Foreign Ministry has not
concerned itself with the details of the SDF's capability and would
prefer to move slowly toward increased autonomy and increased reliance
on the Self-Defense Forces.
Autonomous Defense
Jishu boei , autonomous defense, received a great deal of attention
during discussions of the Fourth Defensive Build-up Plan (DBP). Those
favoring a new defense policy often used jishu boei as their keynote.
The Japan Defense Agency, the Air Self-Defense Force and the Japanese
aircraft industry were among the defense policy interest groups
identified with autonomous defense.
Although each of these supported jishu boei , the meaning of the
term varied with each group. Their disparate views on the scope of
autonomous defense reflect in the different policies they have advocated.
Although the arguments for a more independent defense stature have become
prominent in the 1970's, closer analysis reveals that recent arguments






The Japan Defense Agency
Director-General Nakasone assumed leadership of the Defense Agency
in January 1970. During the ensuing year and one-half, he drew
unprecedented attention to the defense forces and the jishu boei theory.
However, this was not the first time the civilian defense bureaucracy
was associated with efforts to alter existing policy.
Seido Chosa Iinkai
,
the Systems Research Committee discussed earlier,
was formed within the Safety Bureau as the Safety Agency was established.
The Committee, primarily constituted for long-range defense studies,
included civilian and uniformed personnel. Sub-committees studied
economics, organization, equipment and other facets of national security.
The Systems Research Committee represented the first civilian parti-
cipation in the military planning process. Earlier plans by the private
groups headed by men like Admiral Nomura and Colonel Hattori were
dominated by the ex-uniformed viewpoint. The new committee was
established within the civilian sector of the Safety Agency and
represented a new concept of civilian participation. In March 1953,
the committee promulgated the "first draft" of the government's defense
planning. More than sixteen drafts in two separate series were prepared
before the First Defense Build-up Plan was approved on June 14, 1957.57
The first draft was called the "Report on Studies of Systems and
Organizations"; while the proposed quantity of equipment reflected
uniformed influence, the basic premise of the plan revealed advocacy






(a) The objective of national defense is to maintain
domestic security, and to prevent the intentions of
aggression by foreign powers during peacetime, and in the
event of aggression, to repel such aggression and to
maintain supply lanes on the seas, and to preserve the
independence and peace of our nation.
(b) Under the present conditions of two opposing groups
of nations, to take part in the collective security of the
free nations rather than to attempt such efforts single-
handed.
(c) Under the existing domestic situation, national defense
must allow due consideration for the domestic economy,
security and morale of the people.
(d) Dispatching of forces overseas will not be considered.
Action will be limited to territorial and maritime
defense. 5°
The first paragraph reveals the assumption that Japan would assume
responsibilities for external defense. That premise was not agreed to
within the political hierarchy for seven months, until the Yoshida-
Shigemitsu Communique in October. The Diet did not approve it until
June 1954. The committee also worked on the basis that primary
importance would be "attached to air power;" again, more than one year
59before the Diet approved the formation of an air force.
The initiatives were supported by the civilian leadership, but a
significant portion of the impetus came from the uniform influences in
and out of the Safety Agency. After the establishment of the JDA
and the formulation of the Basic Policies for Defense, the civilian
leadership provided few initiatives during the SDF's development.
Civilians had not participated in military affairs before the war.
National security planning and military appropriations were rarely








recruited primarily from the former Home Ministry, especially the
Police Bureau. They were unfamiliar with national security policies
and military strategies. Technical discussions regarding development
directions also went beyond their expertise.
There are indications that the JDA has begun to develop some autonomy
and a higher level of civilian expertise. After 1964, it has shared in
the allotment of university graduates within government. These young
bureaucrats are JDA officials; they are permanent and their primary
loyalty lies with their agency. As the JDA develops internal cohesion
and autonomy, it will be more likely to develop independent views
reflecting its primary interests and responsibilities. A more autonomous
posture was indicated during the JDA's participation in the debate
over the Fourth DBP which has been called the "Nakasone Plan".
Although his style of presentation publicized it, the plan was being
formulated within the Defense Agency before Nakasone came to office.
Prime Minister Sato called for more "autonomous defense" in a
November 1969 speech when he declared Japan should rely on the U.S.
for only the nuclear deterrent. After the elections in January 1970,
Nakasone began to emphasize the need to reduce Japan's reliance on the
U.S. commitment. In his first meeting with the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo,
Nakasone urged joint usage of the remaining U.S. bases and continued
withdrawal. 62
JDA's lack of autonomy contributes to their lack of initiative,
see discussion in Chapter 7.
61New York Times , November 3, 1969, p. 8.
New York Times, February 14, 1970, p. 9.
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Nakasone revealed his intent to alter the Basic Defense Policy
during an unofficial session of the National Defense Council held
July 22, 1970. ~ It was one month after the automatic extension of the
Security Treaty and the Nakasone proposals were based in part on the
new treaty status which allowed abrogation by either party on one
year's notice. Also, a new defense policy could help legitimize the
Fourth DBP which was to begin two years later.
The Nakasone Proposal was keynoted by "autonomous defense;" he
specifically proposed that the four principles of 1957 be replaced by
"five principles of autonomous defense:"
1. To adhere to the Constitution and be thorough in
national defense.
2. To unite with diplomacy and try to harmonize with
various other national policies.
3. To perfect the civilian control system.
4. To maintain firmly the three non-nuclear principles.
5. To supplement the insufficient self-defense power
with the security treaty setup. ^
The Director-General was appealing for a greater emphasis on Japan's
defense capabilities and less reliance on the U.S. Security Treaty.
The 1957 policy proposed meeting external threats with the U.S. commit-
ment supplemented by the Defense Forces, while Nakasone proposed
supplementing the SDF with the Security Treaty. Nakasone did not
advocate abolishing the security relationship; on the contrary, he
called it a basic principle for safeguarding peace in the Pacific and
63The Japan Times , July 20, 1970, p. 1.
For various amplifications of the new principles see Ninon Kclzai ,
November 2, 1970; Japan Times , July 25, 1970; Nakasone, Perspective of





criticized those who believed a war should be fought by the SDF alone.
Jishu boei has been severely criticized by Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-
General of the National Defense Council. Kaihara, a long-time official
of the Defense Agency, has represented an important segment of opinion
within the defense bureaucracy. He has related autonomous defense to
the efforts to dismantle the U.S. base structure, and condemned the
idealism of "autonomous defense" policy. °° He argued that "it is no
more than an expression of determination and hope. It is not backed
up with reasonable analysis that intended results shall be acquired.
It is a model of one who does not know either the enemy or himself."
Kaihara, with all his criticism, shared some basic assumptions with the
former Director-General. Both men believe that the U.S. security
relationship has been essential to Japanese defense and that the SDF
has not been capable of defending Japan. Both men argue that Japanese
defensive capacity must be improved. Both may be called revisionist
in terms of the policies which have characterized Japan's attitude
toward security.
However, at that point the two views diverge. The Nakasone theory
was implemented in the draft of the Fourth DBP which emphasized the
68
"renewal and modernization" of front-line armaments. ' The Air Self-Defense
Nakasone, Perspective of the Defense of Japan
, p. 2; and Sankei ,
April 22, 1970.
Interview, November 10, 1971; Kaihara Osamu, "The Defense of Japan
and U.S. Military Bases," 1970 (undated), text of speech provided by
Mr. Kaihara; Kaihara Osamu, "The Important Points in Improving Defense
Capabilities," May 1971, outline of speech provided by Mr. Kaihara.
'Kaihara, "Boei Ryoku to wa Namika Gutaitekini Kangaeyo" (Lets
Consider the Defense Capability Realistically), Ki.ji Seiki , January
1971, pp. 4-5.
68The New DBP , April 27, 1971, p. 5.
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Force was scheduled to acquire new fighter aircraft, reconnaissance
69
aircraft, fighter-support aircraft, and transport aircraft.
Kaihara decried the emphasis on aircraft and other major weapons
system components. He believed that it was important to distinguish
between an aircraft and a complete weapons system. A weapons system
is only complete when trained men, with experience, supporting facilities
and ammunition complement the aircraft. Kaihara argued that this has
not been done, and he concluded that autonomous defense was a sham. The
policies being followed damage the security relationship but do not
provide autonomous defense at any level.
The disagreement reflected in the Kaihara and Nakasone viewpoints
is a significant one; it begins with a different perception of threat
and divergent concepts of the military role in policy responses.
Although both propose changes in basic defense policy, Kaihara' s goals
are more limited. His proposal adapted policy to the existing situation
and aimed for quite limited autonomy. Mr. Nakasone displayed little
concern for current posture; his policies imply a greater long-range
autonomy and a larger military role.
In addition to the internal differences of opinion, external
opposition dimmed any chance for adoption of the JDA's proposals. After
Nakasone raised the issue in July 1970, the proposals were referred to
a vice-ministerial level committee by the National Defense Council.
69
The New DBP , April 27, 1971, pp. 6-7, F-4J fighter, RF-4E
reconnaissance, FST-2 fighter support, and C-l transport.
Kaihara, "We Have to Know Them as Well as Ourselves." Kokubo ,
April-August 1971, pp. 69-73. The assertions made by Mr. Kaihara will
be examined in detail when the implementation of policy is discussed






This "Defense Affairs Administrative Liaison Council," representing the
JDA, Foreign Ministry and Cabinet, negotiated for three months without
success, and Nakasone attempted to break the deadlock by calling for
a Cabinet-level conference early in November.''1 Although this was not
successful and no new principles have replaced the old, Nakasone
declared that "the process of deliberation is more important than a
73
conclusion," and the process of deliberation has continued.
The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force
The uniformed military viewpoint on defense policy has been muted
in the post-war era for obvious reasons; however, it has existed for
a considerable period of time. As has been noted, former Imperial Army
and Navy personnel began considering Japanese defense needs in 1946,
long before rearmament seemed a possibility. The ex-military involved
in defense planning requested by the Occupation authorities in 1951
saw their goal as "rearmament for the self-defense and survival of our
country." They went on to say that "the new force to be created
must be autonomous and independent."'" The first advocates of autonomous
defense were arguing their position in March 1951, nineteen years
before Director-General Nakasone advocated the posture.
72Nihon Keizai , November 2, 1970.
73
Yomiuri, October 3, 1970.
74
See Chapter 4.
Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division, "Situation of
Former Japanese Servicemen and Investigation Data Concerning Reorgani-






Autonomous defense meant nondependence on other states to the 1951
planners, and following military planners have continued to operate
with that philosophy. The military officers who planned the embryo
air force in 3 953 worked under the assumption that the JASDF would
one day be independent. They planned with the expectation that the
Air Self-Defense Force would have both offensive and defensive
capacity. The plans written by the Air Preparatory Office included
light bombers as late as the Seventh Draft which eventually was used
as the basic blueprint for the formation of the JASDF. The bombers
were not deleted until the First Defense Build-up Plan was adopted in
1957. 78
The military ^officers have not been able to implement their beliefs,
but they remain fully aware that a strategic defensive posture is
necessary to autonomous defensive capacity. Some counter-attack
capacity. was a goal in 1953 and it remains an objective in 1972. General
Genda argued that current ASDF capability and an autonomous defense
requirement was comparable to "asking a baseball team to play nine
79innings without taking a turn at bat." Air Self-Defense Force
officers have been taught that it is incorrect "only to regard defense
80in total defensive power."
77
This view was corroborated by General Arinuma Genshiro JASDF,
ret., early member of the Air Preparatory Office, Interview, March 7,
1972, Lieutenant General Eugene B. LeBailly, USAF, letter to author,
December 9, 1971 and General Otto P. Weyland, USAF, letter to author,
April 30, 1972.
78Arinuma, Interview, March 7, 1972.
''Interview, November 17, 1971.
80





The Air Self-Defense Force has assumed that it was the front line
of defense for Japan:
It is unthinkable that ground battle could occur before
the air and sea battle, and it is unthinkable that landing
operations could occur before partial, local air superiority
could be established. "
Furthermore, they have recognized the need to maintain air superiority
over the peripheral sea in support of . the JMSDF; it is imperative "in
82
order to carry on sea operations." The military leaders also have
been aware that the JASDF was incapable of exercising such a defensive
strategy:
The present air defense strategy of Japan is based upon
the JASDF which takes charge of defense, and the U.S.
Forces which take almost full responsibility for offense.
Nor have they been satisfied with such a situation:
It may be more correct to say from this that Japan does not
have an air defense strategy. If the level of the U.S.
Air Force presence is decreased, Japan's defensive power
may only be maintained through our shouldering a greater
responsibility
.
Aware that its force was inadequate for independent defense and
constantly advocating that goal, the JASDF has emphasized development
since its inception. General Sanagi, Vice Chief of Staff, then Chief
of Staff, for the first five years of JASDF's existence, remembered
81







. , p. 160, also reflected in opinions of General Ishikawa,
Chief of Staff, Interview, March 7, 1972; and Lt. General Takahashi,







that pilot training, technical training and development were most
important while operational capacity was only a secondary consider-
QC
ation. " General Ura, another former Chief of Staff of JASDF, led
the survey team charged with selecting the semi-automatic radar system.
The radar network was and is the basis of the Japanese air-defense
network; however, General Ura recalled that the most important criterion
in the selection was economy, and the requirement "to maintain
development space."
The JASDF has emphasized development to the exclusion of other
goals which may have conflicted. Air defense or interception has been
the primary functional emphasis in the first twenty years of the Air
Self-Defense Force; yet from 1963 to 1965, Japan refused an American
offer to sell two squadrons of F-102 all-weather interceptors. The
aircraft were offered as the U.S. transferred air defense responsibility
to Japan, and would have been part of a package including aircraft
and all support equipment. Shipping all the equipment back to the
United States was an expensive undertaking and Japan, therefore, was
87
offered the package at a very low price. However, the air force
leadership finally supported the government's decision to decline the
offer because it endangered the completion of the defense build-up
CO
program then underway. 00
85
Interview, November 11, 1971.
86
Interview, December 23, 1971.
87
Interview, Mr. Katsuyuki K. Kakudo, MDAO, U.S. Embassy Japan,
February 15, 1972.
More specifically the follow or purchase of F-104's, Kaihara,
Interview, February 29, 1972. Aoki Hideo, "Japan's Aerospace Defense,"
loc . cit .
,
p. 119, argues that the ASDF cave up trying to p,et F102's.
In any case, they did not want to risk the development program.
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The defense of an island is facilitated by denying the attacker
control of the sea surrounding the island, thereby enhancing the value
of a natural defensive barrier. The JDA draft defense plan referred
to this obvious truth about the defense of Japan:
If any direct aggression on a limited scale should happen,
it will be countered primarily by our own defense power,
to secure air superiority and the control of the sea over
the areas around Japan to the extent necessary to limit
damages and repel such aggression in its very initial
stage. 89
The MSDF cannot operate effectively in the peripheral sea without air
cover. The JASDF has acknowledged the validity of such a policy and
the needs of the maritime force, yet naval support has not been
emphasized. The JASDF' s equipment selection, operational research and
tactical training reflect its preoccupation with the interceptor
90
mission. Even the interceptor tactics have been focused on the
defense of the air bases; air defense of GSDF facilities, MSDF ports,
and industrial concentrations have been deemphasized. The ASDF has
defined its primary responsibility as the defense of its air bases,
regardless of the fact that air base protection does not provide air
91
superiority over the shores of Japan, let alone the peripheral sea.
In strategic terms, the value of air superiority lies in the fact that
the airspace may be utilized as an additional medium of warfare by the
side obtaining superiority. The JASDF has deemphasized the balanced
89
"The New DBP," p. 3.
90
These aspects of ASDF operations are discussed in detail in
Section V.
Several senior officers of JASDF told the author that they
considered air base defense primary.
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air force which could utilize air superiority if it were achieved.
There can be little doubt that the lack of perceived threat has
contributed to the military's lack of concern with current combat
capacity. It also would appear that uniformed objectives have not been
limited to the small, semi-autonomous force envisioned by Kaihara.
When asked why the JASDF had concentrated on air defense to the exclusion
of a balanced force, a senior JASDF Commander replied, "Nito o oumono
ito mo eizu ," or "chase two rabbits, catch neither." This old Japanese
proverb suggested that air force leaders were aware that development
proceeds most efficiently if available resources are concentrated.
Historical, political and social factors made air defense a logical
choice. It also should be noted that air defense required maximum
technological development; in terms of weapons system technology it
would be much easier to expand from the air defense mission rather than
to it.
When the ninth Chief of Staff, General Ueda Yasuhiro, assumed office
in July 1971, he was asked what goals he envisioned for the JASDF.
He replied that he wished to "make this one of the greatest air forces
92in the world." Autonomous defense has been a long-held, long-range
goal which envisioned independent defense. The uniformed leadership
has had no secret rearmament plan; General Ueda also declared that
education and social amelioration of personnel must precede the
93implementation of any projects. However, JASDF leaders have looked
beyond a small, balanced, limited-autonomy force toward a more
absolute interpretation of jishu boel .







John Emmerson concluded that "no military-industrial complex worthy
of the name exists now, while defense production is 0.4 percent of
the industrial production. Such a conclusion, if taken to mean no
industrial influence on defense policy, would seem to require two
separate deductions: that the industry has neither the size nor
cohesiveness to generate influence, and/or it has no access to the policy
formulation process. Access to defense policy-making will be discussed
in the following chapter; however, Emmerson' s statement was more
directly related to the industry's capacity to generate influence on
defense policy. The industry's size and cohesiveness are related to
this capacity to formulate any substantive defense policy, and the
aircraft industry may be examined from that viewpoint. Its relation




Military purchases accounted for 60 percent of the total sales of
the Japanese aircraft industry in 1969; but that was 60 percent of a
relatively small component of Japanese industry. The aircraft industry
accounted for 0.7 percent of Japan's machinery production and 0.4 percent
96
of total industrial output. In addition, the Japanese aircraft
industry is comprised of divisions of much larger industrial enterprises.





Chapter 11 describes the capacity of Japans aircraft Industry as
it relates to potential air power. The emphasis here is on policy
goals of the aircraft industry.
96
"Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors report to Ministry of
International Trade and Industry," as reported .in JPK Aviation Report ,
May 3, 1971, pp. 6-8.
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their parent industries, aircraft divisions are minute; on an industry-
wide average, they accounted for less than 5 percent of the corporate
97
sales or production totals of their parent companies. This general
description gives the impression that the aircraft industry is small,
dependent on the military, and fragmented. Despite these appearances,
and there is a degree of truth in each assertion, other elements
greatly enhance the influence of the industry.
The aircraft divisions of the large conglomerates are relatively
more important to their individual companies than size alone would
indicate. Economically, the government contracts are cash contracts
and provide ready surpluses of capital within the division which may
98be transferred elsewhere giving the company more flexibility.
Military technology has been important to all Japanese industry, and
technological "spin-off" benefits from advanced aircraft designs have
99played a prominent role in broader industrial development. One
good example of this is widely known in Japan. The brakes on the trains
running on the New Tokaido Line, the famous "Bullet Trains," were
designed from technology learned during license production of the
F-104. These benefits provide the aircraft divisions with a greater
97
"Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors report to Ministry of
International Trade and Industry," as reported in JPE Aviation "eport
,
May 3, 1971, p. 5; also provided by Mr. Arimori Mitsuo, Executive
Director of the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors, Interview,
February 23, 1972. The ensuing discussion relies heavily on the
information and analysis proferred by Mr. Arimori.
98
Mr. Shimomura Makoto, Manager, Business Section, Aircraft Division,
Shin Meiwa Industry Company, LTD, Interview, February 16, 1972; Arimori,
Interview, February 23, 1972.
'^Shimomura, February 16, 1972; Arimori, February 23, 1972; for an
excellent review of this subject with particular reference to early
benefits to Japan, see Daniel L. Spencer, Military Transfer of Technology ;
International Economic Transfers via Military Ftv-Products and Initiative ,




degree of autonomy than figures alone would indicate, and the size of
the parent companies becomes a positive rather than negative aspect of
their influence.
Industrial cohesion has been enhanced by a large number of aircraft-
related organizations. They include the Japan Aeronautical Association,
the Aircraft Engineer's Association, the Flying Association, the Rocket
Industry Association, and the Space Activities Promotion Council of
Keidanren, among others. Two of the most important organizations
are the Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors (SJAC) and the
Defense Production Committee of Keidanren (DPC) . The two play different
roles; together they unify the industry and coordinate its activities
with the entire defense industry.
The SJAC is the primary association of the manufacturers , and it
was formed in 1952 by former aviation companies in anticipation of
resumption of aircraft production. °^ When the member companies wish to
contact the government, they normally operate through this society.
It has conducted conferences at which government representatives
sometimes participate. The government often uses the society to
distribute information to the companies. The former is the major
purchaser, and there is no free competition among the manufacturers.
Each aircraft division maintains special relations with certain
U.S. companies, and the selection of an aircraft may decide the primary
manufacturer. The Society also plays a role in this process.
100
See Directory of the Aerospace Industry in Japan , Society of
Japanese Aircraft Constructors, September 1, 1971, pp. 93-95 and Endo
Kimsaku, ed. Wing International edition, Japanese Aerospace Directory
1971-1972 (Tokyo: Koku Shimbun Sha (The Aviation Press Company),
April 1, 1971), pp. 64-66, for a complete list of the various industrial
organizations connected to the aircraft industry.
101
Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.
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Although defense contracts are issued by the Central Procurement
Office (CPO) of the Defense Agency, MITI is dominant in the selection
of companies. The SJAC and the Defense Production Committee both
1 f)9participate within the Aircraft Industry Council of MITI. MITI
decides the allocation of contracts according to three principles.
First, the facilities must be kept busy and no contract should exceed
productive capacities. Secondly, the company must be capable of
maintaining the technical standards required. Lastly, MITI considers
103the economic situation of the company. When a contract is issued,
the government assigns a prime contractor; however, it also specifies
percentages of the contract to be assigned to other companies in order
to insure a balanced industry. In all these decisions SJAC acts as a
channel of information between government and industry.
Keidanren is the Federation of Economic Organizations. The
association includes all major industrial organizations and represents
the broad outlook of the leaders of the various industries in Japan.
It takes an overview of general Japanese industrial welfare, and, as
such, has played a significant role in the post-war era. The Defense
Production Committee of Keidanren was formed on August 12, 1952, and
is composed of those industries related to defense production. Its
concern is to "best utilize the industrial capacity of Japan and to
.,104
protect the defense production capability. The DPC maintains a
102




, HITI may consider economic health of entire company
rather than aircraft division.
104
General Sanagi Sadamu, Interview, November 11, 1971 (General
Sanagi is an advisor to the DPC; also Mr. Habuchi Ryoitsu, Research
Associate, Defense Production Counsellor's Room, Keidanren, Interview,
November 27, 1971, and Arimori, February 23, 1972, were instrumental
in explaining the nature of the DPC.
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rather unusual status among the various committees within Keidanren;
it includes a Secretary-General and permanent staff with several full-
time advisors. Research and recommendations are submitted by this staff
and considered by sub-committees which meet less frequently on an
as-called basis. The Aviation Sub-Committee consists of aviation
division presidents and is identical to SJAC membership. The Chairman
of the SJAC is a Director of the Defense Production Committee.
Thus, these two organizations, the DPC and the SJAC, serve to focus
aircraft industry goals and to coordinate and integrate those goals
within defense industry goals. This process of unification acts to
magnify and clarify the views of the aircraft industry regarding Japanese
defense policy. The broad view of Keidanren has not reflected a pure
profit motive and therefore has translated the individual industry
goals into a policy more closely corresponding to national interests.
Fukui Haruhiro recently wrote that, since 1952, the DPC of Keidanren
had acted "as a semi-official link between the government and business
circles." ' In fact, cooperation began the year before when Keidanren
formed an Economic Cooperation Forum in February 1951 which was a
forerunner of the DPC.
The DPC produced a "Keidanren Plan of Rearmament" in February 1953
which indicated early big business support for a degree of autonomous
defense. It proposed a large, three service military establishment
including 2,200 fighter aircraft and 900 medium bombers. The total
Fukui Haruhiro, Partv in Power : The Japanese Liberal Democrats
and Policy-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970),
p. 211.
Doba Hajime, Ninon no Gunji Rvoku (Japan's Military Power),






cost was to exceed the yen equivalent of 4.3 billion dollars over six
years, although it proposed that eighty percent of the cost be borne
by the U.S. 107
The Defense Production Committee was primarily interested in the
industrial side of defense capacity, and after the political decision
to adopt the external defense mission, the DPC concentrated on defense
industry proposals. In March 1954, it presented the government with a
proposal entitled "Opinions and Suggestions as to Improvement of the
108
Defense Industry." The five major points could be summarized as
follows:
1. Government gradually should increase self-defense power
and support the improvement of the defense industry.
2. Modern defense production cannot be made on a year
by year basis, and the government must develop defense
through the use of long-range programs. Measures must be
taken to improve information and resources in liason
with the U.S.
3. Two areas of demand must be considered for future
defense production: a) Production of equipments for the
SDF, and b) export of weapons to the free countries of
the Far East and Southeast Asia.
4. The production of modern weapons with the newest
technology will improve industry in general. Japan
should actively pursue technological training and off-
shore procurement.
5. In order to nurture industry, the government should
assist through research and development, tax advantages,




Doba, Nihon no Gunj i Ryoku
, p. 211.
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The suggestions forwarded in this report were in many cases adopted by
the Government. The formula to increase defense power was adopted in
1957; and long range programs in the form of defense build-up plans
also have been used since 1957. Advanced technology has been obtained
through licensing and cooperation with the United States.
Within four months of the DPC report, a Japanese government proposal,
entitled "Tentative Plan for Reconstruction of Defense Industries," was
forwarded to the U.S. military commander in Japan by Prime Minister
Yoshida. The Yoshida letter stressed Japan's inability to build up
full scale defenses, and said that during the initial period of build-
up Japan would have to rely on financial assistance and offshore
procurement orders from the United States. The Prime Minister
continued
:
I am anxious to see the reconstruction of our defense
industries speedily carried out with a view not only to
perfecting our national defense structure but also to
enable Japan to meet the defense needs of other free
nations of Asia. By mobilizing our latent industrial
power in this manner we shall be able to contribute sub-
stantially to the organization of free Asia's defense and
at the same time improve our national economy suffering
badly from dollar shortage.
For that purpose it is essential that the industries
are provided with proper equipment and technologies
and that they are assured adequate and steady orders for
their products.
m
Many of the DPC's suggestions were embodied in the letter. Yoshida's
comments regarding the desirability of weapon exports directly reflect
the DPC's proposal. The goal, not yet achieved, has remained an






eventuality hoped for by the aircraft industry. ' The United States
already had agreed on the mutual advantage of improving Japanese
defense industry capacity, and in August 1954, a joint committee was
formed to negotiate U.S. assistance in support of defense industry
rehabilitation. The United States has continued to play a significant
role in Japan's defense industry development. Grant aid was discontinued
in 1963, but participatory programs such as the serai-automatic radar
identification system continued. In addition, the great majority of
Japanese military aircraft have been produced through licensing
agreements with the United States.
As already noted, the "Nixon Doctrine" and automatic extension of
the Security Treaty caused many reverberations throughout Japan in
thinking about defense policy; industry was no exception. Leaders in
related industries realized the large potential budgets in the Fourth
DBP and began to campaign for autonomous defense. On May 23, 1969, the
President of Keidanren reported that defense industries must be
strengthened and that "autonomous defense power" was mandatory for
113Japan. Five days later, the Japanese armament industry called for
a defense budget equal to 4 percent of GNP and publicly advocated arms
exports. The defense industry also began to push for changes in the
112
Arimori, Interview; Shimumura, Interview. The current "official"
Japanese policy on weapon export, is decided on a case by case basis
by MITI based on 3 points: 1) no export to Communist states, 2) no
export if prohibited by U.N., 3) no export, if states at war or danger
of conflict. The last point is the catch-all phrase and the one which
manufacturers urge be interpreted less severely. Sato has taken the
phrase to permit the export of "weapons for self-defense." The push for
export has received impetus from the Nixon Doctrine.
113







procurement system. The five-year plans provided stability, but they
also constrained expansion in an era of much more flexibility. There-
fore, a rolling system of defense plans was proposed, each five-year plan
to be revised on an annual or biennial basis. Finally, in conjunction
with the above proposals, interested industries undertook a major
effort to emphasize domestic production.
In June 1969, officials of the JDA met with the Defense Production
Committee whose members "emphasized the importance of domestic production
for autonomous defense." The meetings continued, and on August 12,
1970, the DPC presented a plan entitled "Our Viewpoints as to the
Problems of Improvement of the Next Defense Build-up Plan." In addition
to the areas already discussed, it recommended the establishment of a
National Defense Committee including members from the private sector to
advise the Director-General. These efforts for regular access to the
JDA were realized in October when monthly meetings between the JDA and
the DPC were instituted. 117
Director-General Nakasone attempted to increase competition among
defense industries during the first months of his tenure. After the
announcement of this policy in April, the defense industry instituted a
campaign against it. By November 16, 1970, Nakasone had accepted an
invitation to discuss the matter with Keidanren and other industrial
representatives who explained "that the consolidation of the industrial
"Defense Planning and Industry," The Oriental Economist ,
June 1969, pp. 8, 12.







basis through joint development and joint production" was the first
118
consideration. The subject of competition has been dropped.
The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors has echoed the
defense industry's demands. In the SJAC 1970 Annual Report, the editors
admitted that the SDF had not been "primarily instituted to foster
growth of the industry:"
However, there is no denying that the nation's self-
defense power is never independent of the capabilities
of its military equipment industry. It is also true that
air defense will fail to perform satisfactorily without
sufficient production and maintenance support. In other
words, the industry is one of the more important links
in the chain of national defense capabilities. ^"
The SJAC also advocated a rolling defense budget, and particularly
emphasized domestic production of aircraft. The aviation industry has
depended heavily on imports of technology, and is anxious to become
more independent. It has hoped to have the government participate
financially in research and development, but would like to carry out
research within the industry. The exportation of aircraft and related
120
systems have been strongly advocated by the SJAC.
The aircraft industry has not limited itself to direct advocacy of
weapons systems, but additionally made strategic recommendations.
Its spokesmen have advocated a strategic defensive posture in preparation
for limited war with primary emphasis on the maintenance of air and
sea superiority around the periphery of Japan. They do not propose
independent defense, however, and instead advocate a certain time period
•1-*8Mainichi
,
November 17, (U.S. Embassy Translation).
119
As quoted in JPE Aviation Report , August 10, 1970, p. A.
Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972. .
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of resistance "in order to prevent occupation until the U.S. forces
121have time to arrive." *~" While they advocate semi-autonomous defense,
they propose "a unique Japanese aircraft industry as before World War
II."
122
The third group to advocate jishu boei falls somewhere between the
other two. The Defense Agency has advocated autonomous defense only
within the context of U.S. cooperation, while the Air Self-Defense
Force has favored a potential capability for independent defense. The
aircraft industry has stressed independent production capacity, but
foreseen an operational reliance on the United States.
Whatever the policy positions of the interest groups which have
been discussed, no one of them alone makes policy. The political
leadership, which theoretically could make policy, has relied on a
policy statement promulgated on May 20, 1957. Even then the statement
was vague, giving few guidelines to indicate the type of defense
structure necessary to implement the policy. Therefore, the defense
policy currently applicable has depended, in part, on the relative
influence of the interest groups which have been discussed.






The previous chapter emphasized the nature of Japanese decision-
making and the divergent viewpoints of the various groups who participate
in defense policy formulation. Both of these aspects of Japanese
defense policy have magnified the importance of the decision-making
process. The delineation of this process will serve to clarify the
relative influence of the various groups and identify areas of policy
which individual groups dominate.
The supreme body in the Japanese parlimentary system is the National
Diet, however it has issued no guidelines for the formulation of defense
policy. Prime Ministers do not issue such guidelines, nor has the
National Defense Council originated defense policy. Its decisions, for
example the approval of defense build-up plans, indicate acquiescence
to policies which originated within the bureaucracy. Even the "Basic
Policies for National Defense": were ex post facto policies, recognizing
a consensus achieved within the bureaucracy. This lack of direction
also applies to the Defense Agency where, for example, Director-General
Arita gave only abstract guidelines and basic ideas to the three
services when he directed them to begin work on the Fourth Defense
Build-up Plan.
The uniformed military begin the defense policy planning process
without guidance. The defense budgets and defense build-up plans which
they originate are defense policy in Japan. In the absence of current





policy statements, these plans have been the primary indications of
defense policy directions. The lack of guidance is not unusual nor
critical as it conforms to the traditional bureaucratic decision-making
system. One senior JASDF officer noted that the Japanese bureaucratic
"principle of non-responsibility" may be added to the constraints which
insure that new policies will be acceptable, wherever initiated. To
take controversial initiatives, and therefore responsibility, often
means ejection from the system. Like most bureaucracies, the Japanese
bureaucracy breeds conformity.
Defense planning begins in the uniformed military branches and
proceeds through the civilian leadership of the JDA who submit
recommendations to the National Defense Council.
Such a simplified description is not incorrect but misleading; it
provides little insight into a complex process. Planning does begin
with the individual services. The Defense Section of the Defense
Division of the Air Staff Office (ASO) initiates a planning cycle five
to six years before implementation of a defense plan. This is the




Two parallel series of defense studies originate concurrently. One
!
group of studies is conducted under the authorization of the Joint
Staff Council (JSC). This includes a ten-year Joint Long-Range Strategic
Study (JLRSS) , which begins seven years before scheduled implementation;
a five-year Ijoint Staff Operational Plan (JSOP) completed concurrently
The following discussion relies heavily on Major General Yamada
Ryoichi, Chief of Defense Section, Colonel Hase Kiyoshi, Chief Defense
Branch, Colonel Katao Noburo, Chief Annual Program Branch, and Colonel
Kume Toyahisa, Chief Medium and Long-Range Plans Branch who helped to




with the JLRSS; and a one-year Joint Staff Counter Study (JSCS)
programmed annually just before scheduled implementation of the defense
budget. The fact which all these plans have in common is that they
will never be implemented. They are not approved by the Director-
o
General and are not formulated with financial restrictions in mind.
The Air Staff Office is primarily concerned with a similar series
of plans which are authorized by the Director-General and eventually
lead to budgetary planning. A ten-year Air Force Operational Plan
(AFOP) is programmed five years before implementation. It is revised
every five years under a sliding concept of policy formulation. These
plans provide conceptual requirements, and specific hardware needs are
not included. Four years before implementation of a DBP a Five-Year
Fiscal Study and Financial Planning (FYFS+FP) begins, and this evolution
continues until the five-year period of the Defense Build-up Plan.
Actual budget planning is conducted concurrently over the final two
years before implementation.
Fifteen months before implementation of the budget, the Defense
Section draws up a program proposal. After some coordination with the
internal bureaus of the JDA, a Program Guidance letter is promulgated
by the Director General. The budget is then formulated by the Defense
Division of the Air Staff Office and nine months before implementation
it is submitted to the civilian leadership within JDA. The policy
initiatives would appear to remain with the military at this point.
However, two factors already limit uniformed autonomy. The Joint Staff
Council plays little or no role in this planning avenue. Virtually no
inter-service coordination exists because of the JSC's weakness, and







the civilian leadership takes charge of balancing the three separate
budget proposals.
Figure 7-1 portrays the official JDA organization, however, it is
somewhat misleading in regard to the planning process. The chart
suggests that ASO planning would be reviewed by the civilian bureaucracy
after it was formulated and submitted. This has not been the case; the
internal bureaus have participated in the earliest stages of planning.
Additional influences, some external to the JDA, are also brought to
bear during the initial stages of planning. Figure 7-2 illustrates
this process whereby the civilian bureaucracy within the JDA and
external ministries participate in planning through working level
coordination. The chart simplifies internal JDA relations and emphasizes
the set of functional relationships which involve air power. The
planning branches within the Defense Section confer with young Finance
Bureau, Equipment Bureau and Defense Bureau officials through all stages
of program formulation, long before any proposal is officially forwarded.
The external contacts depicted between MITI-Equipment Bureau and
Finance Ministry-Finance Bureau are effected by the personnel policies
existent in the JDA. For example, within the Finance Bureau, the
Bureau Chief, Division Chief, Assistant Division Chief and two of the
functional offices are normally filled by Finance Ministry personnel.
Those persons serve in the JDA for approximately three years, and then
return to their home ministry. Their primary loyalties lie with the
Finance Ministry. The resultant Bureau-Ministry relationship permits
Hata, Interview, November 22, 1971; General Yanada, Interview,
December 13, 1971; General Okumiya, ret., Interview, November 18, 1971.
General Utsunomiya Michio, JASDF, Commandent Air Staff College, Interview,
November 30, 1971, was a former Chief of the Defense Division and he
emphasized the existence of continuous coordination with the Defense























































































































































the Finance Ministry to affect directly the early stages of defense
planning. Therefore, the apparent advantage of initiative held by the
ASO planners has not been significant. No cohesive plans may be
formulated before external modifications are introduced. Nor has the
advantage of initiative pertained to the JDA. Only the Defense Bureau
reflects the JDA viewpoint. The Equipment and Finance Bureaus tend
to reflect the views of the ministries which supply their officials.
Moreover, the Equipment Bureau-MITI relationship permits the
introduction of another external influence. The aircraft industry,
primarily represented by the SJAC and the DPC of Keidanren, has had
great influence within the Heavy Industry Bureau and the Aircraft and
Ordance Division''of MITI. The Aircraft Industry Council, an advisory
body to MITI, incorporates private sector membership, with both the DPC
and SJAC represented. Although the aircraft industry influence is
twice removed from the immediate planning process, the companies "are
kept informed" of progress before any plan is announced by the Director-
General.
After leaving the hands of the uniformed officer, the budgetary
proposal or five-year defense plan is submitted to the Director-General,
or in reality the Internal Bureaus. Defense plans are submitted to the
Defense Bureau where the three service programs are integrated in
coordination with the Finance Bureau. Conferences are held with the
Finance Ministry at this time, and though unofficial, are important and
Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.
Shimoraura, Interview, February 16, 1972.
7Yasuda, Interview, February 10, 1972. Also Hata, Interview,
November 22, 1972 reported that tempers sometimes run so high between
Defense Bureau and Finance Bureau representatives that Secretariat
officials act as go-betweens.
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represent direct external participation. The Sangi kan Kaigi
, or
Counselor's Conference, then considers the proposal. It consists of
twelve men, including defense counselors and bureau chiefs. The
Administrative Vice-Minister chairs the council.
The decisions of the council are unanimous so the unit veto of the
Equipment Bureau, Finance Bureau, or Counselor for Foreign Affairs may
prevent unanimity. Again, external influences are projected into JDA
deliberations. While the influence of the Foreign Ministry, Finance
Ministry and MITI increase as a planning cycle progresses, the influence
of the uniformed services rapidly decline. The Chiefs of Staffs are
"guest members" or technical advisors to the Counselor's Council. Thus,
at this early stage in the planning process, they are no longer co-equal
participants.
Important programs are forwarded from the Counselor's Council to
the Chogi , or Staff Council, which is the supreme decision-making organ
within the JDA. It normally meets only four or five times a year and
includes the Director-General, Parlimentary Vice-Minister, Counsellor's
Council and Director of the DFAA. The Chairmen of the Joint Staff
Council, the Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of auxiliary organs also
participate in these meetings as technical advisors.
The uniformed role diminishes as the civilian sector conducts
these conferences although the Chief of Staff of the JASDF does have
regular access to the Director-General. However, the Chief of Staff is
not a "voting member" of the Counselor's Council and Staff Council.
One member of the civilian bureaucracy in the JDA admonished the author
"please remember this is peace time," after being asked about the status
Q
Yasuda, Interview, February 10, 1972,
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of the uniformed chiefs. Defense Councillor Yasuda put it another way:
"political decisions are more important and the uniformed chief must
feel the sentiments of the Director-General." The Chief of Staff has
no accepted avenue of disagreement; to do so publicly would be fruitless.
The Director-General would be called to the Diet to explain and the
Chief of Staff would have succeeded only in embarassing his superior.
Such action constitutes violation of "the principle of non-responsibility;"
q
normally the Chief of Staff would be expected to resign.
At the same time, external influences continue to increase. Not
only do the interested ministries have continued access to policy
formulation through their affiliated bureaus , the ministries begin
informal direct negotiation before any proposal, whether budgetary or
planning, leaves the Defense Agency. Portions of the Defense Agency
white paper referring to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were written
in the Foreign Ministry. Defense Plans and Budgets are negotiated
with the Finance Ministry before as well as after the Director-General
announces them. Equipment purchases must be negotiated directly with
MITI, often by MITI bureaucrats who may be found in the Equipment
Bureau and the Central Procurement Office.
The aircraft industry's influence increases, with direct contacts
supplementing their previous influence in MITI. From its inception
the DPC has maintained regular contact with officials of the JDA, and
in October 1970 monthly meetings were institutionalized in order "to
Q
In the past, Chiefs of Staff have taken responsibility in contro-
versies not of their own making, playing the scapegoat for defense
arguments. Recent controversies over the Fourth DBP and Okinawa
reversion indicate they may no longer be willing to do so.
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promote the defense industry and domestic production, and research and
development." The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors
participated in the Fourth Build-up Plan to the extent that it made
broad recommendations emphasizing the need for home production emphasis
and a dependable production level for the five-year period. These
recommendations were made directly to the Director-General.
The Director-General forwards proposals to the National Defense
Council; however, they do not go directly to the ministerial level of
that body. All proposals are normally considered by the secretariat.
The role of the secretariat is to analyze the forwarded defense proposals
and "record the positions of the various ministries and evaluate the
plan's pluses and minuses.' The secretariat is composed of the
Secretary-General and nine counselors, three of whom serve exclusively
for the National Defense Council. The other six counselors serve
concurrently and their positions illustrate the influences of the
various interest groups:
1. Chief, Security Section, North American Bureau,
Foreign Ministry.
2. Budget Examiner-Defense, Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry.
3. Chief, 1st Section, Defense Bureau, Defense Agency.
A. Senior Planning Bureau, Economic Planning Agency.
5. Chief, Aircraft and Weapons Section, Heavy Industry
Bureau, MITI.
Ishizawa, "Gradual Increase of Defense Power", loc . cit .
,
pp. 34-35; the regular monthly meetings are normally held with Equipment
Bureau leaders, General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971.
^Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972.
12Secretary-General Kaihara, Interview, February 25, 1972.
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6. Chief, General Affairs Section, Minister's Secretariat,
Science and Technology Agency.^
At this point the uniformed influence, even in an advisory capacity, is
effectively eliminated although the law provides that the Chairman of
the Joint Staff Council may be called to the NDC to state his views.
Industry also has had access to the National Defense Council. Both
the DPC of Keidanren and the SJAC unofficially contact the National
Defense Council. The Defense Production Committee has formulated
comprehensive written proposals before any major decision such as the
adoption of a five-year plan. It has not recommended specific aircraft
types, however, it has commented on certain industrial skills which
should be utilized or capabilities desired at the end of a five-year
plan. The companies operate primarily through individual contacts
;
however, they regularly deal with the Aircraft and Weapons Section of
14
MITI, whose Chief is a concurrent Counselor of the NDC Secretariat.
The Secretariat forwards its analysis to the Council, although
recommendations are usually considered by an Assistant Council comprised
of the Secretary-General and nine Vice-Minis ters appointed by the
Cabinet. The National Defense Council is the supreme advisory body on
defense policies. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and is regularly
attended by seven to eight Cabinet members. It sits at the apex of the
governmental process just described, however its deliberations are
affected by another, parallel process.
Before the National Defense Council acts on policy decisions, it
receives recommendations from the LDP. In order to generate these
13
"National Defense Council," p. 8.
Shimomura, Interview, February 16, 1972.
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recommendations, the LDP has established a process to consider defense
policy which in some ways corresponds to the government evolution. The
Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) is the major policy-making organ
within the LDP, and defense recommendations are considered by that body.
Initial deliberations begin in the National Defense Division and the
Security Committee, or Anzen Hosho Inkai . These two party organs are
important to the Defense Agency for they, especially the Security
Committee, are the defense bureaucracy's primary points of contact with
the political party. The JDA would be further isolated from the
decision-making process without this outlet for its views. Security
Committee and National Defense Division proposals are considered by
the Policy Affairs Research Council, and as Figure 7-3 illustrates,
other interest groups come to bear at that point.
Two factors suggest that the political side of policy formulation
is more advantageous to the JDA than the official process. There is
first a structural advantage; the Security Committee is equal in stature
to the other policy committees and it operates independently. Related
to its autonomy is a natural sympathy towards the subject it studies
and a good deal more freedom of expression than exists within the
bureaucracy. It is, therefore, an excellent place at least to air
strategic views.
Balanced against these aspects which tend to give strategic views
larger influence in the LDP are the basic political orientation of the
party structure and the lack of expertise within the LDP. Those who
have had a measure of interest and experience in military affairs









































the problems or needs of the Self-Defense Forces. The party's basic
concern is to remain in power, and criticism of the Security Treaty and
of the Defense Forces is a most popular opposition tactic. Initiatives
in that area understandably receive a rather skeptical review in the
party process. This disparity between the outlook of the Security
Committee and that of other interested Committees was illustrated during
the LDP review of the Nakasone initiatives in 1970.
The views of other interested committees are brought to bear during
the discussions of the PARC. Therefore, before a policy decision is
brought to the attention of the leadership in the Executive Council
and Leaders Meeting sessions , the weight of the other interested
bureaucracies normally has established a consensus similar to the one
achieved through the official government process.
The aircraft industry also makes its weight felt in party discussions.
Respected and powerful organizations such as Keidanren and the SJAC
obviously have access to the political party. In addition, the companies
themselves make contacts with individual politicians or with factions
within the LDP. 17 Political competition takes money, and financial
support is one area in which the aircraft companies can provide needed
assistance and in return receive consideration of their views.
Mr. Masuhara, Interview, February 19, 1972; General Genda, Inter-
view, November 17, 1971.
16Nihon Keizai , July 24, 1970 (U.S. Embassy translation), The
Chairman of the Security Committee expressed his support and the
Chairmen of the Policy Research and Finance Committees expressed their
"caution." The LDP did not recommend the Nakasone principles be
accepted.




The political leadership rarely alters or even seriously questions
the recommendations which they receive at the ministerial level of the
National Defense Council. The membership of the Council represents the
same interest groups which dominate the entire policy-making process.
The Director-General, the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister
are representative of the process which developed the consensus below.
The MITI minister, although not a member, is among those regularly
present. The one group without representation is of course the uniformed
military.
Therefore, there is little likelihood of the NDC altering the
consensus so laboriously achieved. In addition, the Prime Ministers
who have led Japan in the post-war era have not been known for their
understanding of military affairs. General Tatsumi, Prime Minister
Yoshida's personal military advisor, was called on because Yoshida
did not understand the strategic and technical aspects of military
alternatives being discussed as the Occupation ended. More than twenty
years later, Prime Minister Sato stirred a storm of criticism in the
Diet through inadvertent comments on the ensuing defense build-up plan.
The 6lip of the tongue occurred because the Prime Minister did not
understand the relationship between the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan
18
and the 1972 Defense Budget.
Although political intervention rarely occurs in the process,
-politicians have the capacity to intervene and disrupt the consensus.
The selection of Japan's first fighter aircraft illustrated this
18
Taoka, Interview, February 10, 1972; Kaihara, Interview, February 25,
1972. He had been briefed that very few major 4th DBP projects were
funded in the FY 1972 Budget. His answer in the Diet was that the 1972
Budget "has absolutely no relation" to the 4th DBP. The comment was
ridiculous; 1972 was the first year of the proposed 4th DBP.

220
phenomena as well as other characteristics of the policy-making process.
The ASDF began operations under the tutelage of the U.S.A.F. and the
primary concerns in its first three years of existence were education
and development. Even limited operational responsibilities were not
accepted before 1958.
The JASDF faced its first major decision in the selection of a
fighter aircraft to follow the F-86. This was not only an equipment
decision, it was a significant policy decision. There were perhaps five
different fighter aircraft discussed in 1957 when the JASDF began active
consideration of the new weapons system. As a result of the first
evaluation trip in August 1957, the choice narrowed to either the F-104J
built by Lockheed -'or the Grumman 98J, or F-11-1F as it was later
19designated. The F-ll had greater mission flexibility with better
instrumentation, ordnance loading and endurance. The F-104 was strictly
an interceptor with limited range, but far superior climb and time to
target performance. It was a higher performance aircraft with regard
to speed and altitude capabilities. Choice of the F-ll would have been
tantamount to opting for a limited, balanced concept of development;
choice of the F-104 reflected emphasis on technological development and
concentration on the air defense mission.
In initial discussions, the JASDF leaned toward the F-104, and
throughout the selection process there remained a great deal of support
for the F-104 within the ASDF. However, the first Japanese investigative
mission to the United States met with a great deal of smugness at
19Garret, USAF Industrial Planning with the JASDF , p. 89.

221
Lockheed: "what did you come here for when it has already been decided. "^
During the trip, some officials in the Pentagon recommended the F-ll
although U.S. Air Force officers in Japan had supported the F-104. This
was the first major JASDF decision in which the U.S. did not take part.
The U.S. Air Force remained neutral throughout, and in February 1959,
the Chief of Staff (COS) of the USAF told General Sanagi, then the
JASDF' s Chief of Staff, that he would support any choice the ASDF made. 21
The selection had been discussed within the Defense Agency for over
one year, and upon General Sanagi' s return from his trip to the United
States, he made a final decision for the F-ll and obtained the support of
the Defense Agency. Tentative proposals favoring the F-ll had been
made during 1958, and they received no significant opposition from the
17bureaucracy or political circles. When the F-ll choice was forwarded
to the National Defense Council, a "tentative" selection was made, probably
meaning it was approved by the secretariat. 23 Doba also believed that
Of)
Description of Lockheed attitude towards the JASDF mission headed
by General Nakamura, from July-September 1957. "Fx ome Gute" (Over the
FX), Koku Joho (Air Review), January 1958, p. 39. It was during this
mission that the choices were narrowed to the F-10A and F-ll.
21
General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; General Ura Shigeru,
UASDF, ret., accompanied General Sanagi and felt that the U.S. recommended
the F-ll, and this fact influenced General Sanagi, Interview,
December 23, 1971. However, an Aviation Week article published March 9,
1959, supported General Sanagi's contention that the U.S. had a "hands-
off policy," "Politics Bogs Japan's Choice of New Self-Defense Force
Fighter," p. 303.
^lr. Doba Hajime, defense correspondent, Yomluri Shimbun , Interview,
March 2, 1971; General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; Mr. Ogawa
Raita, December 14, 1971; "Japanese Fighter Hits New Snag," Aviation
Week , June 22, 1959, p. 82.
23Aviation Week , June 22, 1959 reported that the NDC made a tentative
choice, General Sanagi indicated that approval did not go beyond JDA,
although it was approved by the Director-General after several top-level
sessions of the Staff Council.
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Prime Minister Kishi agreed to the F-ll, although not in a formal NDC
decision.
At this point the entire process was disrupted and eventually
reversed, primarily by the opposition of Mr. Tanaka Shoji, member of the
Diet arid Chairman of the Audit Committee. There was no official
explanation for his intervention because budget requirements were not
being considered by the Diet at that point. He publicly attacked the
F-ll in the Audit Committee, and privately called on and attempted to
influence other LDP members , even calling them traitors if they supported
the F-ll. 25
The attack bore results rather quickly; by June the decision was
delayed and the Defense Agency announced that a new evaluation team was
being sent. On July 18, 1959, General Sanagi resigned as Chief of Staff
and was replaced by General Genda Minoru who left Japan within three
26
weeks as the head of the new evaluation team. The evaluation group
returned on October 26, and on November 6, only eleven days later, the
National Defense Council chose the F-104J.
General Genda strongly defended his choice, noting that no one had
flown the aircraft before he went to the United States and arguing that
0/
Mr. Doba reported that the Grumman representative actually sent
a telegram to Grumman reporting the sale, and Grumman sent "donations"
to the LDP. Interview, March 2, 1971.
25Doba, Interview, March 2, 1971. The substance of Tanaka's
argument was that the F-104 was a production aircraft while the F-ll was
only a design. This was not correct although some instrumentation on the
F-ll had not been tested and it had not been selected by the USAF. The
U.S. Navy was purchasing the F-ll.
260gawa Raita, "Brief History of Koku Jietai," pp. 4-6. General
Genda left Japan on August 8.
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the flight performance of the F-104 "was beyond comparison. "^ General
Ura, the F-104 project officer and a later Chief of Staff, unequivocably
28
supported General Genda. The point here is not to question the views
of either General Sanagi or General Genda, because different strategic
viewpoints did exist within the JASDF and still do. However, as Mr. Doba
noted, the decision was effectively made before General Genda left
Japan. The evaluation trip had been interpreted as a formality preceeding
reversal even before it left. The disruption, the new inspection trip
and the rapid decision reached after its return suggest that such an
interpretation is correct. No one needed to order General Genda to make
a new decision, not only was he primarily concerned with interception
capability, he was well aware of the events leading to his appointment.
One final question is what motivated Mr. Tanaka, who led the fight
for reversal. Many refused to speculate, but Mr. Tanaka was later
indicted on several charges of blackmail, bribery and fraud. Although
none of these charges were related to the F-104 selection, there was
29
some room for speculation that personal greed could have been a motive.
Regardless, there were other indications that great financial pressure
was exerted to reverse the decision. The Japanese were aware that a
fierce sales battle had begun in Japan among the competing American
companies. A similar aircraft selection was being made in Germany, and
on the assumption that one selection could influence the other, there was
a good deal at stake. The U.S. forces had been cutback and offshore
27
Interview, November 17, 1971.
28Interview, December 23, 1971.
General Sanagi, for example, declined to comment on Tanaka 's
motivation. Others, however, directly charged that he had been bribed
by Lockheed and their representative, the Marubeni trading house.
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procurement reduced; therefore, the competition for defense contracts
also had increased substantially within Japanese industry.
Lockheed was dealing through the powerful Marubeni Trading Company,
while Grumman initially worked independently. Lockheed had signed an
agreement with Kawasaki for licensing, and this complicated matters
because Mitsubishi was considered the most likely choice for the fighter
production. 30 Prime Minister Kishi's faction also had close relations
with the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, possibly influencing his initial opposition
to the F-104. However, Lockheed then wrote the Prime Minister indicating
their willingness to break the contract with Kawasaki and sign with
j-i
Mitsubishi; Kishi later discontinued his support of the F-ll selection.
The F-104 was cheaper, which meant Finance Ministry support, and selection
of Mitsubishi guaranteed the balance desired by Keidanren and MITI.
This incident demonstrated that the bureaucratic consensus may be
disrupted, but only by intervention at the highest level. If substantive
choices do become a political issue, they may be swayed through political
pressure. The controversy also illustrated the high-level access to the
decision-making process which is enjoyed by industry. Finally, the
helplessness of the ASDF and the JDA in a major controversy was readily
apparent. Although some uniformed factions supported the F-104, and
regardless of the relative merits of the two aircraft, the F-ll choice
was reached after long deliberations. When it was abruptly reversed,
the Defense Agency was silently acquiescent.
The incident also indicated that civilian control, although its
motives might be questioned, worked effectively in the controversy.
30Garret, U.S.A.F. Industri al Planning with the JASDF , p. 89.
Mitsubishi refused to sub-contract under Kawasaki.
31
Doba, Interview, March 2, 1971.
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However, the silence of the JDA in this controversy and others sporadically
draws criticism that civilian control is ineffectual. Secretary-General
Kaihara contended that civilian control has not been endangered, but
argued that it has not been as strict as it may seem and that the
uniformed branches receive what they want the majority of the time.
On the contrary, military leaders have felt that civilian control was
so strict that ASDF plans have been altered against its wishes without
being given the opportunity to air the JASDF's complaints. -" a portion
of Kaihara 's statement is correct, in that many minor decisions made by
the JASDF go unquestioned. Outside of defense plans or major budget
requests, uniformed planning and decisions have received little attention.
Within its own sphere, including training, education, tactics and minor
allocations of resources related thereto, the JASDF has been rather
autonomous; outside that sphere it has had "no voice."
The civilian side of the defense bureaucracy also has little voice
in major decisions. Part of the reason for their absence "of voice"
lies in the fact that external influences begin at the branch level where
ASDF planning begins. One good example of this phenomena was the
selection of the second FX. The F-4 Phantom was officially selected on
November 1, 1968, but the controversy over its selection occurred much
earlier. The second FX was selected through a computer program. This
process was devised in order to avoid the "difficulties and miscalculations"
which occurred in the first F-X selection. The computer selection
format only shifted the controversy to the formulation of the program
which would be fed to the computer.
32Interview, November 10, 1971.
General Ishikawa, Interview, February 17, 1972.
^General Ura, Interview, December 23, 1971.
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The Defense Division of the ASO began work on the program in 1966,
and early in 1967 the Finance Bureau and Defense Bureau were participating
35
at the branch level. The computer program to decide the second F-X
awaited approval later in 1967; Kaihara, then representing the Defense
Bureau, refused to see the plan which had been drawn up in the Operational
Research Branch of the Defense Division of the ASO. The Finance Bureau
agreed with the proposed process which would select the most technologi-
cally advanced aircraft with the highest performance characteristics.
This reflected the technological impetus desired by industrial groups
while providing a nucleus of the world's most advanced fighter aircraft
for the JASDF. The external ministries and the JASDF were in accord.
Mr. Kaihara, reflecting his previously described viewpoint, emphasized
limited autonomy and wished to have the program rewritten to choose a
cheaper, more flexible aircraft. Such a choice would enable the JASDF
to spend more money on ammunition, training, fuel reserves and dispersal
capability, thereby attaining a limited but realistic autonomy. In the
words of Hata, "political pressures were applied," and Kaihara resigned
in the summer of 1967.^" The plan was submitted immediately after his
departure and the following March the choice for the second FX was
narrowed to three aircraft. None were comparable to the type favored by
Kaihara, who openly advocated the Northrop F-5.
Mr. Kaihara, then Defense Section, Defense Bureau; Interviews,
February 25, 1972; Mr. Hata Ikukiko, then young official in Finance
Bureau, Air Office, who was working on this project, Interview, November 22,
1971; the majority of this episode relies on these two men who were the
principals, although some aspects were filled in by JASDF officer.
36Hata, Interview, November 22, 1972. Kaihara agreed that selection
of the F-4 over the F-5 was part of the reason he "was fired" (his
expression) from the Defense Agency.
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Perhaps the most important aspect of this short controversy was
that the uniformed leaders were scarcely aware of it. The men in the
Defense Division were aware that the computer plan had been delayed
"somewhere above the ASDF," but they were unaware of the nature of the
delay. Senior officers in the JASDF assured the author that there had
been no controversy, and denied any conflict over the selection of the
F-4. One Japanese writer suggested that the selection of the F-4 meant
that military choices were dominating defense planning and showed a
37
weakening of civilian control. Nothing could be further from fact.
The brief controversy over the F-4 selection represented a conflict of
goals between two civilian groups; one the Defense Agency, the other a
conglomeration of industrial and bureaucratic interests. The fact that
the JASDF viewpoint corresponded to these interests showed a similarity
of goals in the particular case, but indicated no growth of military
39influence.
The principle of civilian control remains strong in Japan; in fact,
the layers and varied pursuits of the interest groups which dominate
the uniformed viewpoint demonstrate a unique submergence of strategic
interests. The civilian leadership's lack of understanding of military
37
Ogura Yoshinori, "Nippon Ryoku ga Shimpan Sareta Toki, Jieitai
wa do Ugokuka?," (How is the Japanese Defense Force Going to React When
Japanese Territorial Air is Violated?), Ushio, Volume 113, June 1969,
pp. 114-115.
38
Keidanren opposed the Kaihara viewpoint, Mabuchi, Interview,
November 27, 1971.
39The Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system selection
is another example of general agreement between the interest groups.
Although the ASDF first recommended a different system, they finally
settled on Hughes because it provided the most "development space",
General Ura, December 23, 1971 was the project officer. It was the
cheapest insuring Finance Ministry support, and it meant Nippon Electric,
which needed work, would build It; hence MITI support.

228
needs and the weakness of the immediate civilian superiors within the
JDA are perhaps the greatest irritants to uniformed officers. Outside
of its control over the uniformed services , the civilian bureaucracy of
the JDA has been very weak. Thus, when the Air Staff Office accepts a
choice forced on it by the Internal Bureau, it may then find the JDA
unable to obtain the compromised requirements.
This situation developed recently when the JASDF submitted plans for
improvement of the advanced trainer aircraft inventory. Money had been
alloted for the T-38, or F-5, in 1969, but had to be utilized to complete
the purchase of F-4 aircraft which were costing more than expected.
As the next budget was negotiated, the ASO reiterated its requirement
for 80 advanced trainers. The air force preferred the F-5 because it
was much cheaper, but the Internal Bureau then announced a decision to
continue development of the home-built XT-2. This delayed any purchase
decision one year as the XT-2 was far from production. Tremendous
pressure had been applied by industry through MITI, and money was
contracted to continue XT-2 development. The JASDF received assurance
from the Defense Agency that money would be alloted if XT-2 aircraft
were chosen, and there would be no reduction in the inventory requested.
Then in September 1971, the mass production decision was made. The XT-2
aircraft was selected, and the number of aircraft was reduced. The
XT-2 cost twice as much as the F-5, and Finance Ministry spending limits
were applied, forcing the JASDF below its minimum stated requirements.
The goals of social welfare and industrial capacity clearly superseded
^°U.S. Embassy Official. Negotiations with the U.S. for the F-5
have continued although there now appears little chance the aircraft
will ever be purchased.
The initial JDA request was reduced. The JASDF then faced further
reductions in negotiations with the Finance Ministry.
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the goal of operational capability.
One final aspect of the Japanese defense policy process emphasizes
its importance. While it can be altered by pressure from above as in
the F-104 selection, it cannot be bypassed by individual interest
groups. The political controversy which arose in February 1972 was
triggered by Prime Minister Sato's inopportune remark. As has been
noted, that reflected Sato's unfarailiarity with defense matters, but the
confusion had been caused by an attempt to bypass the policy-making
process.
Director-General Nakasone was easily the most spectacular head of
the Defense Agency and he began what may have been the most spectacular
attempt to bypass^the process. The Fourth Defense Build-up Plan was by
any standard a major defense decision, and particularly so in view of
United States' policies and the growing Soviet presence in Asia. In
September 1970, some 18 months before the NDC would pass on the measure,
Nakasone announced the total financial expenditure which JDA proposed.
The other ministries had not been consulted; the EPA had not been
asked about projected national income; and there apparently had been
few, if any, political consultations within the LDP. The speech
announcing the plan was delivered in Washington, D.C., adding insult to
injury for many bureaucrats. Then in April 1971, the entire JDA draft
plan was released, one year before its scheduled implementation. The
JDA "invited any kind of constructive criticisms on this draft plan from
,,43
various segments of our nation.
^ 2Nakasone, Proposals , September 10, 1970, p. 8. Approximately
16 billion dollars over 5 years.
43
"The New DBP," letter of transmittal.
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It became apparent that some acute criticisms awaited the Fourth
DBP although Mr. Nakasone departed via a cabinet reshuffle on July 1,
1971. By August, some opined that the plan should be delayed one year.
The Finance Ministry publicly announced that the plan was impossible.
The Secretariat of the National Defense Council, headed by Mr. Kaihara,
was openly critical of the capabilities promised in the plan and the
development directions programmed. The international financial
readjustments which occurred in late 1971 contributed to the impasse as
the EPA announced that no plan was possible until a revised forecast of
economic growth could determine the maximum defense budget based on
percentage of GNP. The rapid succession of four Director-Generals
during the last half of 1971 exacerbated the situation as did the
heightened political tension during the Okinawa reversion discussions in
the Diet.
The political leadership was willing to delay consideration of the
plan because of the political tension, and the JDA was willing to avoid
the pressures from the Finance Ministry and the difficult questions from
the Secretariat. As late as January 1972, speculation continued that the
plan would be delayed; one observer reported that the NDC had not even
discussed the JDA proposals.
The JDA had not submitted their proposals to the NDC in hopes of
bypassing the secretariat and the necessary bureaucratic consensus which
seemed an unlikely prospect. The Defense Agency was not without support,
^JPE Aviation Report , August 2, 1971, p. 1. , in an article captioned
'Policy: 4th DBP Big Delay Ahead?"
^ 5Ibid . , also Kaihara, Interviews, February 25 and 29, 1972.
1972.
460gawa, Interview, February IS, 1972; Yasuda, Interview, February 10,
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for Keidanren and the Industry favored the build-up plan; they had
exerted their influence on the LDP and the Sato faction in an effort to
avoid any dead period which could be caused by delays in implementation.
As a result, the Finance Minister testified to the Diet on February 4
that the 1972 budget represented a one-year extension of the Third DBP,
and the Prime Minister testified on the same day that the Fourth DBP would
begin on schedule although the budget was not related. The resultant
impasse forced the NDC into an emergency session and on 7 February the
Fourth DBP was approved, but only in outline form without financial or
equipment details. The Council could not reach agreement on details
and the effort to bypass the defense policy process collapsed. The
effort, begun in the JDA, supported by industry, and acquiesced to by the
political leadership, only demonstrated bureaucratic strength.
The defense plan would not be approved until the economic forecast
appeared in September. In the meantime, it would return to the Defense
48
Agency for reformulation and resubmission. After twenty days of
deadlock, the LDP agreed to revise the budget and the Diet resumed
deliberations. The defense budget revision was the first ever in post-
war Japan and some heralded it as a new political involvement in the
defense policy process. This was not the case; less than one-half of
one percent of the budget was cut, and slightly over ten percent of the
amount was "frozen" until after the Fourth DBP was approved. The
Japanese government does not complete negotiations on contracts authorized
in the 1972 budget until the last month of the fiscal year, therefore the
47
Kaihara, Interview, February 25, 1972.







"frozen funds" will not cause any actual changes in defense spending.
Contracts to be let on the funds which were cut will be negotiated
normally. If the funds cannot be reinstated in a supplementary budget,
they will be included in the following year's budget and disbursed
immediately. The time difference to the company is less than one month,
and the companies may obtain low-cost loans to remedy any deficit.
The bureaucracy had agreed to the defense budget, and appearances of
change were a mirage.
This section must end without a conclusion, for the policies and
processes which have been postulated may be better integrated after
examining the result of the various policy positions which is the
defense structure. Before going on to that structure, the importance of
the policy process bears repeating. Concepts such as military-industrial
complex, or military-industrial-political complex have not been particularly
relevant as they contribute little to understanding defense policy
formulation. No interest group can be completely disregarded because
all groups have some chance to participate. The aircraft industry has
become pox^erful; the political input may be significant if aroused; and
the uniformed viewpoint dominates in some areas, if only by forfeit.
However, the process by which Japan formulates defense policy is of
primary importance. This bureaucratically-dominated defense policy
process enables and regulates the access and influence of interest groups.
Kaihara, Interview, February 29, 1972. With interest charged to
the government, no doubt.

V.
THE READY FORCE STRUCTURE

As long as survival remains a primary national goal, and as long as
the use of force remains a viable tool of international intercourse,
national security policies will include plans to deal with the use or
threat of force. No modern nation has renounced the use of force in the
unique manner which Japan has; in 1972, no developed nation was spending
as small a portion of its resources on the engines of force. Yet, even
the Japanese have maintained the Self-Defense Forces and recognized the
possibility that force may be used against them.
If national security policy exists in part to defuse, deter and, if
necessary, defeat that possible use of force, and if national defense
policy may be defined as that portion of national security policy which
is concerned with the military aspects of contending with the use of
force, then the national defense structure is one of the means which
would implement the policy. The air force structure represents the
tools with which air power would be used to implement national defense
policy. However, the diverse, multi-authored policies so far delineated
do not constitute a whole, and examination of various force structure
aspects may further identify the dominant interest groups, and as a
result, provide insight into dominant policy goals.
Emmerson, after discussing the effectiveness of the Self-Defense
Forces for three pages, concluded that: "the words 'effective' and
'adequate' are meaningless unless one can answer the questions; 'effective
for what?' and 'adequate for what?'"* Such a conclusion would be accurate
if one's goal was to determine a specific power relationship, or to
forecast the results of a particular confrontation. It is not correct






or probable missions may be determined. For example, the air defense
mission requires a series of operational steps to be successful. Weapons
system performance may be judged against those requirements. A system's
strengths and weaknesses may illustrate areas of policy which receive
emphasis or are treated superficially.
Air power goals have been stated in the Self-Defense Force Law, in
international agreements, in defense policy statements, and by the JASDF
itself. Those goals have created requirements which may be assessed
through evaluation of the force structure. Such an evaluation must
probe more deeply than current operational readiness; policy also
addresses problems which may occur in the future. Part of any current
policy will include future modifications of the force structure to better
achieve new goals. The training procedures discussed in Chapter 8 and
the budgetary allocations discussed in Chapter 9 are oriented toward the
future force structure.
However, another part of the policy-maker's task is to maximize the
use of forces presently available; therefore, current command procedures
and operational capacity discussed in Chapter 10 indicate the reality of
current policy as well as the goals of past policy.
The limitations in operational capacity described here illustrate
the options selected by policy makers, past and present, and do not
criticize the capabilities of the JASDF' s leaders, operators or technicians.
The growth of Japan's air power potential has been nearly as spectacular
as its economic recovery. Twenty years ago no aircraft industry and no
air force existed in Japan; in 1972, it has designed, developed, produced
and flown a supersonic fighter. The specific capabilities discussed only
demonstrate the foreseeable results of policy decisions, and therefore





In a ceremony at Matsushima Air Base on July 6, 1954, Lieutenant
General Uemura Kentaro formally hoisted the flag of the new Air Self-
Defense Force. The first Chief of Staff then led a cadre of 275 men;
in 1972 General Ishikawa Kanshi led 40,242 men, a "community of technicians"
training for the increasingly complex business of waging aerial warfare.
The Air Self-Defense Force has viewed itself as a uniquely modern
organization, unhampered by prejudices of the past. There was no
separate air force organization in Imperial Japan, and the defeat and
occupation interrupted any bureaucratic continuity from the air arms of
the old Imperial forces. Moreover, aviators from both branches realized
the inadequacies and failures of the previous organization and were
willing, even anxious, to try a new approach.
Despite those factors, there were also pressures for continuity.
The primary goal of the early Air Self-Defense Force was growth, whether
in manpower, equipment, facilities, or technological proficiency. A
first step towards this goal was to begin with the most qualified people,
and for this the planners turned to ex-Army and ex-Navy personnel.
General Uemura Kentaro, who held a civilian post within the National
Safety Agency, had been nominated to be the Chief of Staff (COS) of the
new Air Self-Defense Force. Although Uemura had been involved in the
post-war organization, he was a civilian bureaucrat before the war and
The quote is from a description of JASDF that was made by LCEN




knew little about aviation matters. General Akiyama Monjiro, ex- Imperial
Army, and General Sanagi Sadamu, ex-Imperial Navy, were called to the
Safety Agency early in June, just before the establishment of the ASDF. 2
They were told that General Sanagi had been selected to be the Vice Chief
of Staff (VCOS), and that between them, they would be responsible for
selecting personnel for the new air force.
Much of the organizational planning was complete, and the NSA had
prepared a list of preferred candidates. Although the two leaders worked
with the list, they were not limited by it and their choice was final.
^
The purge had been rescinded completely and their greater freedom of
choice resulted in a particularly high level of expertise among these
early selections. Figures compiled by the Demobilization Bureau in 1951
indicated there were over 3000 naval air officers still able to reenter
military service. There was a larger number of former IJA officers
available, leaving Akiyama and Sanagi great flexibility in their
o
Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; General Hayashi Keizo, first
Chairman of the JSC, Interview, December 9, 1971; and LGEN Arinuraa
Genshiro; Interview, March 7, 1972.
There were several qualifications for the VCOS; in addition to
having an aviation background, he would need to speak english, be a few
years under the maximum age (58) permitted in the JASDF, and have the
broadest experience possible from the old forces because he was going to
be General Uemura's technical expert.
^General Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971. One of the interesting
aspects of this was the exclusion of General Genda from the list. P. M.
Yoshida had not liked Genda during his service with him in Britain during
the war and he had been excluded. General Sanagi insisted that Genda be
included, and it was only through Sanagi' s efforts that Genda joined the
ASDF which he later led after replacing Sanagi as COS in 1959.




One constraining factor was the requirement that the key positions
and senior ranks be balanced between ex-Army and ex-Navy officers.
Although there had been a lengthy period between the old organizations
and the new, the two factions did compete for influence as the planning
was completed and they were carefully balanced at the senior levels.
There were four major organizational divisions beneath the COS and VCOS;
civilians, ex-UN and ex-IJA were all represented:
Chief of Staff LGEN Uemura Kentaro Civilian
VCOS LGEN Sanagi Sadamu UN
Chief of Operations Division MGEN Akiyama Monjiro UA
Chief of Comptroller Division MGEN Kanaya Eijiro UA
Chief of Personnel Division MGEN Matsumae Misao IJA
Chief of Materiel Division MGEN Genda Minoru UN8
Equal selections were made through the grade of Lieutenant Colonel,
however below that the Army dominated as indicated in Figure 8-1.
Factions and competition between them have been very much a part of
Japanese society. They did and have continued to exist to some degree
within the JASDF. They have not appeared to be harmfully divisive in
recent decisions, nor did they then. General Hayashi, Chairman of the
JSC, remembered no difficulties because of factional disputes; in fact,
he did not remember being aware of any factions. General Ura, a
Sanagi, Interview, November 11, 1971; especially in the junior
ranks, the UN had suffered tremendous loss of life in the island campaign
and more young IJA pilots were in Manchuria or the homeland. In addition,
the IJA staff school had continued throughout the war giving their younger
officers an experience advantage.
7
Ibid.
"Ibid . , names listed in Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force ,
p. 29.
















































































































































































































































































charter member of the JASDF and later COS, felt the varied backgrounds
were a great help to the JASDF. The ex-IJA officers were skilled in
logistics, planning, administration, and maintenance. In turn the former
Navy officers were superior in training techniques, engineering and
development. The net result of the balance was a more solid base from
which to begin. Some felt, however, that later army dominance was
part of the reason for over-emphasis of air defense.
Beyond the IJA-IJN relationship, Figure 8-1 also illustrates the
overall dominance of ex-military officers. The one general officer
without any Imperial military background was General Uemura; since he
was relieved by General Sanagi, all JASDF general officers have had
pre-war military experience. In late November 1954, a U.S. survey
showed that 71.1 percent of the key JASDF officers had served more than
ten years in the Imperial forces, and 32.6 percent graduated from a
field-grade staff officers school of some kind. Not only did 100
percent of air force generals still have wartime experience in 1970,
12but 310 of 338 Colonels were also from pre-war military backgrounds.
Although the total number of ex-Imperial officers has declined steadily,
their dominance of virtually all leadership positions has continued.
Inevitably their influence will decline, and by 1982, 1945 academy
graduates will have reached retirement at age 58.
Figure 8-2 depicts the major officer sources over the past twenty
years. The total number of yearly inputs began to fall in 1961 when
the ASDF reached a total strength of more than 38,000 personnel. Of the
10Interview, December 23, 1971.
11U.S. MAAG records, January 13, 1955.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































300 to 400 officer candidates accepted yearly, approximately 30 percent
normally are graduates of the Defense Academy. These career oriented
officers numbered 20 percent of the officer corps in 1972. The first
graduates of the Defense Academy were promoted to Lieutenant Colonel
in 1972; in 1982, as the last Imperial Academy graduates retire the
eldest Defense Academy officers will have twenty-five years of service,
and some will have become general officers themselves.
There appears to be almost inevitable competition between Academy
and university graduates. They have been the major elite inputs to the
JASDF; the warrant officer, enlisted promotion and high school programs
have been secondary in advanced promotion potential. Personnel adminis-
trators and other senior officers denied any differentiation between the
two groups of officers, as did many of the young officers themselves.
There were, however, some more outspoken officers who felt that the
Defense Academy graduates were first among equals in assignments and
promotion. There was little basis to make comparisons in 1972 as the
most senior Defense Academy graduates have had fifteen years of service
and remained in field grade ranks where promotion differentials had not
become significant. However, they constituted a large core of elite,
career-oriented officers, and it would seem probable that they will
dominate JASDF leadership by the latter half of the 1980' s.
These officers have been and will be dedicated career officers.
After their graduation from the Defense Academy, they have no obligation
to enter military service. They may resign at any time during their
careers. Competition for the Academy has remained high, as Figure 8-3
indicates, although the top graduates of high schools normally compete
for prestigous universities rather than the Defense Academy. One senior




Defense Academy Input and Output
With- Commissioned*
Applicants Accepted Entered Graduates drawals (JASDF)
1960 6872 722 511 464 52 402 (117) 1964
1961 5734 802 537 497 42 455 (112) 1965
1962 5334 794 534 498 28 470 (116) 1966
1963 6047 879 540 495 33 462 (100) 1967
1964 5611 945 525 465 68 397 (99) 1968
1965 6053 903 520 465 60 405 (90) 1969
1966 7087 841 541 491 68 1970
1967 7394
>
833 512 463 1971
1968 6456 822 495
1969 5358 827 578
1970 ' 4831 822 519
1971 4121 861 555
* Commissioned one year later.
Source: Japan Defense Agency
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the very top of their high schools , and were respected in their subsequent
dealings with the civilian bureaucracy. However, any fear that the
standards of graduates have suffered because of the lesser prestige of
the military are unfounded. They have proven to be extremely competent,
highly professional and articulate military officers. J
Up to 1972, the JASDF had not faced a serious problem in attracting
young officer candidates through the Defense Academy or from the
universities. In fact, the ASDF has been able to meet its manning
levels throughout its rank structure as illustrated in Figure 8-4.
Colonel Mita Yujiro, Chief of the Personnel Section, was responsible for
the JASDF recruitment program during 1971, and he felt that general
recruitment was not a critical problem then nor would it be in the future
14
if authorized manning levels remained constant. Figure 8-5 supports
this conclusion in that JASDF loss rates have been stabilized after 1966
when the manning quotas were stabilized. If the loss rate can be
stabilized at less than 5000 men per year, the magnitude of the recruiter's
task will remain manageable.
However, there are also indications that recruitment could become
more difficult in the future. As the Japanese economy continues to grow,
the job market continues to expand. In 1965, there were 8 workers for
every 5 jobs offered, but in 1970 there were only 3 workers for every
5 jobs offered. 15 The problem for recruitment was even more critical;
This statement is a conclusion of my own relations with the
Defense Academy graduates and it coincides with the opinion of every
foreign and Japanese observor with whom I raised the issue.
^Interview, December 13, 1971. During the first two quarters of
FY 1971 (April-September 1971) the JASDF had 2.5 applicants for each
recruiting quota, Eoeicho Koho , December 24, 1971, p. 14.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































below 19 years of age there were 5 job offers for every young high
school graduate. "
This labor shortage has been aggravated by a shrinking population
growth rate. In 1965, there were 4,050,000 in the 15-19 age group; in
1970 that number will decrease to 2,950,000; it was forecast to reach
2,220,000 by 1975. 17 That age group then will remain stable until 1985.
One Japanese institute has forecast that the Japanese population will
18increase only 320,000 in the next fifty-five years.
There have been some indications the JASDF has begun to feel
increasing competition for young men. The major source of enlisted
recruits remains the high school, but an increasing percentage must be
recruited from middle schools. In 1967, 78.6 percent of JASDF recruits
came from high schools and 20.7 percent from middle schools. Two years
later the same sources provided 70.8 percent and 28.1 percent, respectively.
The shift to a lower education source has not affected the IQ level of
20
the recruits; it increased slightly from 1967 to 1972.
Recruiting statistics have not been especially discouraging, but
the JASDF does rely on skilled technicians; the recruits which it obtains,
in both enlisted and officer categories, must be able to learn and perform
increasingly complex, technical tasks. The JASDF faces more or less
unlimited competition for those recruits because there is no conscription
19
16EPA, Economic Survey of Japan , 1970-1971, p. 104.
17
Ibid..
18Population Problem Research Institute, Welfare Ministry.
19JDA Statistics. The Japanese school system resembles the U.S.
due to occupation reforms: 6 years (primary) - 3 years (middle) - 3




in Japan. In view of public opinion in 1972, conscription will be
impossible in the foreseeable future; therefore, competition for graduates
almost inevitably will increase.
Some new techniques have been employed by the JASDF in recent
recruiting efforts. Public advertising has been used for the past five
years, including newspapers, radio and television. Local recruiting
offices, which are jointly maintained by the three branches, have been
reinforced also, permitting more thorough local liason. The ASDF has
expanded its public relations effort. For example, it has invited
young people to the air bases and, where possible, has offered them a
chance to fly.
The substantial inducements offered to a young person who is
contemplating joining the Air Self-Defense Force focus on three different
areas; benefits, nature of the life, and education.
Military pay in Japan has increased tremendously as Figure 8-6
indicates. The 1972 salary of an Airman Second Class with one year of
service was nearly double that payed in 1954 to a Master Sergeant with
twenty years service. A 1st Lieutenant with four years of service made
more in 1972 than General Sanagi did when he assumed the post of Vice
Chief of Staff less than eighteen years before. As spectacular as the
percentage increases in pay have been, they do not compare to the change
in per capita income index over the same time period. Japanese average
per capita income was 74,734 yen per year in 1954; it had risen to
21
561,734 yen per year by 1970, an increase of more than 750 percent.
Average starting salaries for junior high school graduates shot upward
during the same time frame, from less than A, 000 yen per month to over





History of Japanese Military Pay - Selected Examples-*-
AIRMAN STAFF MASTER LT. LT.
RANK 2ND CLASS SEARGENT SEARGENT 1ST LT. COLONEL GENERAL
(1 year (10 years (22 years (4 years (16 years (24 years
YEAR service service service service) service) service
1954 6,000 10,800 19,200 19,665 34,800 58,200
1959 7,600 15,500 20,700 23,300 42,200 74,600
1962 9,500 15,500 21,900 25,200 45,300 78,000
1964 13,800 21,800 28,200 33,100 56,100 124,700
1967 17,800 27,700 34,800 41,000 67,100 137,000
1969 20,000 30,700 38,300 45,000 72,900 146,656
1970 28,200 41,200 49,600 57,300 89,200 186,000
1972 33,200 47,500 56,700 65,000 99,300 203,000
% Increase 553 475 295 331 286 348
All salaries (in yen) presented on monthly basis. Normal advancement
assumed. Multiply by approximately 16.7 to include bonuses in yearly
salary.
Source: Compiled from JDA records.
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2225,000 yen per month. These salaries were comparable to the starting
salary of the JASDF, and salary increases come quickly in private
companies. The JASDF' s salary increases have been large, but they only
have kept pace, if that, with the remainder of the society.
In addition, there is more to the normal Japanese benefit system
than the salary. Housing, allowances, retirement pensions, and medical
care are often included in the salary offered a Japanese worker. The
JDA has not fared well in intra-government housing allotments, and the
fringe benefits offered by the military have not been competitive with
private industry. Professional prestige, often an offsetting benefit
for military service, has not been a positive value in Japan.
The young man who might enter the JASDF is also interested in
advancement. Promotion is a problem in any military service; the leaders
of the air force have been concerned about promotional patterns and have
attempted to improve them, however the picture has become a rather dismal
one. In 1960, it took an average of ten years to become a Master
23
Sergeant; in 1970, it took twenty years. Comparable slowdowns have
occurred in all the non-commissioned officer grades. Officer's promotions
have also been slow although not critical. The first graduates of the
Defense Academy may be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1972 or 1973,
after 15 to 16 years of service. That promotion rate has compared
favorably to U.S. military promotion rates.
Tangible benefits have not been a particularly convincing rationale
for entering the JASDF, and therefore, part of the recruitment effort








diverse elements of military life which may be emphasized; either the
patriotism, discipline and spartan atmosphere of the military; or the
fascination, uniqueness, pleasure and comraderie of military life.
Recent recruitment efforts have emphasized the latter, pointing out the
chance to travel, the good working conditions, and the companionship of
the collective life.
While patriotism and discipline have not been stressed in the
recruitment campaign, they are taught after entry into the JASDF. Japan
has no system of military lav; and the few cases which become legal rather
than administrative problems must be prosecuted by the Ministry of Justice
and conducted within the civil judicial system. Chapter IX of the SDF
Law is entitled "Penal Provisions," and Articles 118 to 122 provide for
punishments up to seven years' confinement for violation of their
provisions. Article 122 forbids sabotage, absence without leave,
disobediance of a direct order, and neglect of duty among its provisions.
The article has made the JDA unique among Japanese government organi-
25
zations as no other has a similar law.
Very few cases reach this stage and the great majority of military
discipline is exercised through Article 46, Disciplinary Punishment:
In the event any self-defense personnel fall into any of
the following categories, disciplinary punishments of
dismissal, demotion, suspension, forfeiture of pay or
reprimand shall be taken against such self-defense personnel.
a. In the event of violation of duty obligations,
or negligence of duty.
2<!,Colonel Mita, Interview, December 13, 1971.
25Mr. Kosuge Hironaka, Chief, Legal Branch, ASO and Major Torino
Masaru, Legal Branch, ASO, Interview, December 13, 1971. Professor
Tagami of Hitotsubashi University has maintained that Article 122,
because of its exclusive nature, proves that the SDF is a military and
is unconstitutional because Article 75 of the. Constitution states there
shall be "no special tribunal."
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b. In the event of conduct unbecoming a member of the
Self-Defense Forces.
c. In the event of violating this law or any order based
on this law. ~
Punishment under this system ranges to dismissal without pay and allowances,
and as the generality of Article 46 suggests, almost any misbehavior may
27be included within its scope. Punishment given under Article 46 may be
dealt without the offender's agreement; his only recourse is to appeal
to the "Fair Board." The "Fair Board" was established within the Defense
Agency pursuant to Article 49 of the Self-Defense Law and is composed of
civilian personnel within the internal bureaus.
If discipline is an indication of morale, the ASDF has had excellent
morale for it has suffered minimal discipline problems. With 600 men
in the Maintenance and Supply Group at Komatsu Air Base, an average of
only six cases a year were serious enough to enter in the unit discipline
29log. Figures from other units revealed a comparable one per cent
annual discipline incidence rate. This is an astounding record if
Of)
compared with a comparable American unit. Those interested in a life
of discipline would be well suited to the organization.
Beyond reimbursement for their services and the intangible benefits
31
of military life, the JASDF has placed great emphasis on education.
Self-Defense Forces Law, No. 165 of June 9, 1954 as amended.
27
Kosuge and Torino, Interview, December 13, 1971.
28
Torino, March 2, 1971. Defense Councillor Yasuda chaired the
"Fair Board" in 1971, which indicated the seniority of its membership.
29
Major Kuroki Masaru, JASDF, Chief of Staff, Maintenance and
Supply Squadron, Komatsu Air Base, January 13, 1972.
30
Based on several years as a personnel and legal officer in Naval
Air Squadrons!
31
Colonel Mita, Interview, December 13, 1971.
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Recruiters emphasize the skills which are taught in the Technical
Schools, and point out their wide and lucrative application in Japanese
industry. Recruiting has been based on the concept of a limited career,
encouraging those to join who are not considering lifetime employment,
but wish to use the ASDF as a stepping stone to improve their position
in life. The Air Self-Defense Force has concluded that five years is a
break-even figure; if the man gives five years of service after he has
been trained he will have been a positive asset.
The lure of education has been a popular device among military
recruiters in any situation where they must rely on volunteer forces.
It has received a great deal of emphasis recently in the United States.
However, the educational aspects of military service recently have
received top-level attention in Japan; some suggestions have gone beyond
the old concept that the military was limited to teaching new skills.
On June 30, 1970, the Japan Defense Consultation Group recommended
to the JDA that:
The SDF should be characterized as an educational organi-
zation as well as a military force. SDF members should
receive a certificate of education for their schooling
and training which should be recognized in the society.
With the adoption of this system, young people of school
age could be recruited into the SDF, avoiding recruiting
competition with private companies. 32
Director General Nakasone already had proposed a similar idea to the
Security Investigation Council of the Liberal-Democratic Party in March;
1 wish to propose that the Self-Defense Forces be utilized
as a seat of national education, with required educational
facilities being provided within the units, so that SDF
32Japan Defense Agency Consultation Group, Report on the Defense




men who are graduates from junior high schools may be
officially recognized as having acauired the qualifications
of senior high school graduates upon termination of their
years of service and that they may be similarly treated
by the general public as regular graduates from senior
high schools. I further suggest that arrangements be
made for SDF men who are graduates from regular senior
high schools to be treated as regular university graduates
after completing their service with the Self-Defense
Forces. 3
Only thirty percent of JASDF's recruits currently come from the junior
high school or middle school, and Nakasone proposed that the Defense
Forces should obtain all recruits there, with a few exceptions. 3 ^
Such a concept could have wide application in Japan, particularly
if the size of the Self-Defense Forces remained static. The JASDF,
for example, could retain a small body of highly qualified technician-
instructors, but produce many more qualified technicians annually.
These men would have a working knowledge of current ASDF technology,
and would be useful in the event of rapid expansion of the force
structure.
The JASDF almost certainly will face increasing recruitment problems
in the future although they have faced none that are critical. The
proposals to institutionalize and legitimize military education may
greatly alleviate future problems. Such a solution also would broaden
the societal base capable of mobilization in a sort of unofficial reserve.
The JASDF has employed one other method of dealing with private
sector competition. Pilot retention has been a universal problem for
military services because of the high salaries which pilots may command
from airlines. The rapid expansion of Japan Air Lines in the early
Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan's Defense in The Future , speech to the




1960's caused a serious problem for the JASDF, and in 1962, the JDA,
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Communication and the airlines
negotiated an agreement to control pilot loss. 35 The airline companies
agreed to hire only 31 pilots each year from the military. The JASDF
agreed to release experienced pilots in their mid-30' s who applied and
wished to fly for the airlines. The ASDF also has accepted 70 civilian
students in its pilot training program each year, provided them with
basic flight training and released them to the airlines. They had trained
540 pilots for the airlines through 1971. Although the airline
pilots only receive abbreviated training, they have a noticeable impact
on the Training Command where they constitute 10 percent of the student
load.
Training
There were four major commands in the Air Self-Defense Force in
1972: one operational command, one supply command, and two training
commands. That balance was symbolic of the emphasis which training has
received. Most military organizations concentrate on training in
peacetime, and from its inception, the ASDF has considered training a
primary objective.
Training may consist of group training or individual training.
Although both go on and may not be completely separated,
individual training tends to be emphasized over team training, particularly
General Shirakawa, Interview, December 10, 1971; Mr. Kimoto
Eiji, Japan Air Lines, Interviews, December 7, 1971, January 25, 1972,
Some companies did not fall into line immediately, but two years ago
all problems were solved.
36Colonel Morokuma Misao, JASDF, Chief Training Office, Flight
Training Command, Interview, January 10, 1972.
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in formal training situations. Crew training is often conducted less
formally in the form of on-the-job training (OJT) within operational
units. Individual training has been managed by the Training Section of
the ASO. Curricular details are not programmed there, but major subject
matters, course objectives and approximate course lengths are set
37forth within the Training Section.
All education external to the ASDF has been controlled within this
office. Opportunities for education outside JASDF have been available




a. GSDF, 80 officers and enlisted per year to various
technical schools.
b. MSDF, 22 officers and enlisted per year to
various schools.
c. Joint Staff College, 10 officers, normally
Lieutenant Colonels, per year to a ten month
course.
d. National Defense College, 5 officers, Colonels,
per year to one year course.
e. Defense Academy, 32 officers per year for two
year graduate study on natural science subjects.
This program, equivalent to Master's level study,
has been instituted to replace post-graduate study
at civilian universities which has been denied
to JDA personnel. (see 3 below).
2. Intra-Government.
a. National Police Agency, 3 officers and 12 enlisted
per year in National Police Academy and other
subdivisions to study advanced police skills.
b. Transportation Ministry, 1 officer per year to
Weather Academy and 2 officers per year to an Air
Traffic Control School.
37Colonel Teramura Sumio, JASDF, Chief of Training Sections, ASO,
Interview, February 14, 1972.
3 The following description of educational opportunities is based
primarily on data provided by Colonel Teramura, Ibid . The list is not





c. Space and Technology Agency, 1 officer per year,
to study aerospace psychology and medicine at
Aerospace Laboratory.
3. Civilian Institutions. Until the 1968 school year,
approximately 10 officers per year were sent to private
universities for 2-year Master's programs and 3-year
Doctor's programs in technical subjects. This program
was terminated by the universities under pressures
from radical groups.
a. Tokyo Education College, 1 officer per year to
physical education program.
b. Tokyo Industrial College, 150 officers and 30
enlisted per year to 4 week course on labor
management for those who have reached mandatory
requirement.
c. Language Training, Chinese, 2 officers per year;
Korean, 2 officers per year; German, 3 officers
per year; French, 3 officers per year.
d. Dental Technicians, 4 enlisted per year.
e. Computer Programming, 8 officers per year to
3-month course.
4. Industry.
a. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 1 technical officer
for one year electronics study.
b. Ishikawajima - Harima Heavy Industries, 1 technical
officer per year for studying jet engine technology.
c. Nippon Electric Company, 1 technical officer per
year for electronics study.
d. Nippon Aviatronics Company, 1 technical officer
per year for electronics study.
e. Japan Radio-Electronics Association, 70 enlisted
per year for electronic transmitting license.
5. Overseas training.
a. Private Institutions: 2 officers per year are
sent to U.S. universities for technical post-
graduate training in fields such as aerospace weapons
and electrical engineering.
b. Foreign Military Staff Colleges, 1 officer per year
to the Command and Staff course at the Air Univer-
sity in Maxwell, Alabama. 1 officer per year to
a European staff college, either in England or
W. Germany.
c. 1 officer per year for systems management training
in U.S.
d. 2 officers per year for intelligence training in
the U.S.
e. 30 officers and enlisted per year for NIKE training
and upgrading in the U.S.
All education provided by the JASDF carries no extra-service obligation.
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However, career orientation is an important part of the selection rationale
and the retention rate on those selected for these programs has been
39
over 95 percent. No post-graduate education or similar training is
offered in political, economic or other social sciences.
The three primary categories of training within the ASDF are pilot
training, technical training and professional training.
The technical training and flying training programs were planned in
close cooperation with the U.S. Air Force even before the establishment
of the ASDF. Early in October 1953, General Weyland requested that the
U.S. Air Training Command (ATC) "provide training specialists to aid the
Air Advisory Group and the Japanese Air Planning Group ( Seido Chosa
Iinkai ) in developing a training program involving all the aspects of
flying and technical training necessary to conduct of the ASDF." There
was some delay in dispatching an ATC team due to political sensitivity,
but on December 18, 1953, General Weyland wired the Chief of Staff that
the political climate had improved; "present circumstances indicate the
possibility of 1 April 1954 as the date for placing technical and primary
flying training schools into operation." He requested that the ATC
team be formed and dispatched as soon as possible, and on January 18, 1954,
the team, composed of three Lieutenant Colonels and one civilian, left
39
Colonel Sumio, Interview, February 14, 1972.
40
The absence of such training perhaps contributes to the JASDF s
lack of communication and therefore influence within the bureaucracy.
41
From Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force
,
p. 12.






the United States for Japan.
When they arrived in late January, the. April establishment date still
appeared feasible in light of the mutual security negotiations underway,
the lead-time estimated for USAF personnel and the logistic adjustments
required to support the new force. The situation appeared urgent and the
four-man team began work immediately. They immediately began planning
with the U.S. Air Advisory Group and the Japanese Air Planning Staff.
Within the ensuing thirty days , the plan for training was written
44in its entirety. It delineated the requirements for establishing the
Japanese program. The final program was based upon the concept that
personnel with wartime experience would be trained first, and it contained
seven principal elements:
1. Refresher Flying Training, is designed to take the
World War II Japanese pilot, provide him with refresher
pilot training (and then diverted to some advanced train-
ing program)
.
2. OJT Technical Training, which is very similar in general
terms to the flying program, only applicable to the
technical skills, will take the Japanese craftsman and or
tradesman, give him appropriate OJT and/or refresher
training in his skill, (and he will then be fitted into
JASDF)
.
3. Conversion Flying Training, will take the refreshed
WWII pilot and train for either fighter pipeline or
transport pipeline training.
4. Instructor Training, applies both to the flying and
technical area. This is to be done largely within the
From Burns, USAF Assistance to Japan's Air Force , p. 12. Team
members were LCOL Robert D. Curtis, LCOL Wayne R. Pipher, LCOL Jesse A.
Irwin and Mr. Chester L. Buecker. Colonel Trwin returned later as the
commander of a squadron charged with implementing the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program (MDAP) applicable to the JASDF.
' General Arinuma emphasized the importance of this group, citing
the special influence of Col. In/in, Interview, March 7, 1972. This is
borne out by the U.S. assessment In Burns, op_. cit . , pp. 14-18.
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(United States). (In either area these individuals would
return to become the instructors in the new Japanese
program)
.
5. United States Pipeline Training. Certain specialist
skills which due to lead time considerations or abnormal
training costs, (will be scheduled) in the formal ATC
training system.
6. Formal training in Japan with USAF assistance, is
limited to areas of sheet metal repairmen, machinists,
supply and other general categories of training in which
FEAF is conducting training.
7. Formal JASDF Training Schools, four in number: a
technical school, primary pilot school, basic pilot school
and a crew training school. (Schools to be manned and
staffed by JASDF) and will receive advice, guidance,
assistance and supervision as feasible and necessary
(from U.S.). 45
The planning groups had completed the program by March 1, 1954, and it
had been accepted "in principle" by all the interested parties. It
only awaited Diet "legalization" to be put into operation.
Preparation for operations did not await Diet approval and on March
10, 1954, just after the program had won approval, the Director of the
Advisory Group instructed USAF units to begin preparations to commence
flying training. Matsushima Air Base had been selected for conversion
training; early in April, USAF men and supplies were arriving there to
support the training. By May, they were prepared to receive students,
and the first class arrived on 21 June, just nine days before the JASDF
47
was established.
"Plan For Flying and Technical Training in Support of the
Activation of the Japanese Air Force," quoted in, Burns, op_. cit . ,
pp. 17-18.










The Japanese actually began pilot training long before these events
occurred. A flying school was established under the auspices of the
National Safety Agency on October 15, 1952. It began training with U.S.
army instructors and provided training for both army and navy (Coastal
Safety Force) personnel. Although not official policy, the students
there were all ex-Imperial pilots and they felt that the "larger objective
of the school was to prepare to form an Air Force."
In 1954 the Kammamatsu Flying School became the Refresher Training
Base for the JASDF. Two-thirds of the pilots trained there became
JASDF pilots and constituted the initial inputs to conversion training.
The Hammamatsu school was the only entirely Japanese-operated training
function during the JASDF' s first eighteen months. It rapidly became
the nucleus of the training command.
Major General Kawaminimi was the initial Commandant of the First
Flying School. He had directed flying at Hammamatsu from its beginning
in 1952, and he remained there until relieved by General Arinuma in 1955.
General Kawaminimi was instrumental in the formation of JASDF training
and deserves the title of "the father of Japanese pilot training."
Major General Kawaminimi met then Captain Hartenberger when the U.S.
liaison officer arrived in Hammamatsu in September 1954; his earliest
remarks illustrate his attitude and suggest the importance of the USAF
^8Major General Muraoka Hideo, JGSDF, Chief of Aviation Section,
Ground Staff Office, Interview, December 20, 1971, General Muraoka was
one of the first ex-Army pilots at Hammamatsu; also see Koku ioho
(Air Review), March 1953, p. 75, for story of early development.
49
Colonel F.dmund K. Hartenberger ,MDA0, U.S. Embassy, Interview,
February 15, 1972. Col. Hartenberger was one of first Americans diverted
to Matsushima and then became the first USAF liaison officer with the
1st FTS. General Ishikawa served under General Kawaminimi and supports
this assessment of his role, Interview, February 17, 1972, as did others
who worked with Kawaminimi. Also see Burns, op. . cit .




1 want you to know that we are babies; we know nothing
of aviation; we lost the war and we have lost touch. We
must pretend and believe that we know nothing. I would
like all the U.S.A.F. regulations and we will translate
and promulgate them. After the Americans leave, we then
will have time to adapt them to our own uses. 5°
General Kawaminimi did not limit his effort to emulate the USAF in
training procedures. Regulations governing all aspects of operations
were translated in the same manner.
Direct U.S. influence in pilot training began to phase down early
in 1955. The Japanese were hesitant to assume total control of training
as rapidly as the USAF had planned, but the phasedown was continued
with minimal delays. By mid-1956, all training was transferred with the
exception of the F-86 program. It was to become an advisory program six
52
months later, in January 1957. In conjunction with the phasedown,
the aircraft used in training were turned over to Japan, beginning with
91 aircraft in January 1955. 53
Although direct U.S. influence in training ended, guidance and
advice continued; the United States has maintained a limited advisory role
into the 1970's. The magnitude of the U.S. effort from 1954 to 1956
Hartenberger, Interview, February 15, 1972. This paraphrase of
General Kawaminimi 's remarks was Col. Hartenberger 's best recollection
of his statement.
"hlartenberger, February 15, 1972; General Sanagi, March 4, 1972;
Lt. Colonel John Holman recalled similar wholesale translation when he
served as one of the first jet instructor pilots at Tsuiki from
October 1954-Jay 1956; Interview, February 24, 1972. Lt . Col. Holman
and his student, now Chief of Staff General Ishikawa, were the pilots of
the first postwar jet flight in a T-33 aircraft.
52




IIdqtr. MAAG Report, 10 June 1955.

262
left an indelible mark. There remain great similarities in training
displays, briefing systems, and other operational procedures.
The Flying Training Command (FTC) includes four wings directly
concerned with pilot training and an Aviation Cadet Training Group which
gives initial instruction to high school graduates selected for the
aviation cadet program. Flight training has been conducted in phases
as illustrated in Figure 8-7. (see next page) Although the pipeline
structure itself is not unique, several factors are significant. The
majority of pilots enter the fighter pipeline and it dominates pilot
training resources. Only the fighter pilots receive all their training
through the FTC. The training is long and difficult. The two years in
flight phase is significantly longer than comparable U.S. Navy or Air
Force training. Although the JASDF has hoped to shorten the program when
training aircraft are updated, they do not intend to alter its formidability.
The difficulty of entering and completing the flight training program is
indicated in Figure 8-3.
FIGURE 8-8. Pilot Elimination Rate, JASDF
Pilots
Total Remaining % Failure Rate %
Aptitude Test 70 30
Phase 1 (Solo) 66.5 5
Phase 2 (Transition) 53 I8
Basic Fighter 48 10
Advanced Fighter 47 2
Source: Colonel Morokuma, Interview, January 10, 1972
54My own observations were supported by other working level observors,
including Major Claude C. Blanch, U.S.A.F., Air Advisor, Defense Objectives
Branch, COMUSJAPAN, Interview, November 16, 1971. Major Blanch worked
continuously with the JASDF; he was the sole survivor of the Air Advisory
Group.
55This is a very popular program with over 1500 graduates annually
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The aptitude test is given at the beginning of the English course
to all qualified candidates from the Officer Candidate School and the
Aviation Cadet Course. It is a strenuous, four-week examination, as the
results suggest. Despite this, only 67 percent of those passing the
aptitude test become pilots.
The nature of the program suggests that the quality of the product
has been much more important than quantity. This has been borne out by
the further training required of F-104 pilots. They must graduate, go to
an F-86 wing for a minimum 18 months and have 500 hours of experience
before they can apply for transition to the JASDF's front line, fighter.
The Flying Training Command could expand its output with few additional
resources; it has-' 2,722 personnel assigned and 170 instructors for only
352 students. 56
The result has been a limited number of pilots , although their
relative, experience level is very high. At the end of 1971, the JASDF
reported 1,212 pilots with the following levels of pilot experience:
152 pilots with less than 1000 hours, 360 pilots with 1000 to 2000 hours
and 700 pilots with more than 2000 hours of flying. The JASDF
apparently has planned to maintain this small, experienced core of
pilots because the JDA recently testified that the JASDF planned only a
200-pilot increase by 1977. 58
Colonel Morokuma, Interview, January 10, 1972.
57JDA Statistics; also Boeicho Koho , December 24, 1971, p. 12. The
GSDF has 106 fixed wing and 607 helo pilots; the MSDF has 635 fixed wing
and 289 helo pilots. The Japanese total 2,846 military pilots.
-*°As reported in Kokujoho (Aireview) , November 1971, p. 142. Estimates
for all three branches came to 3100 pilots, less than 300 more than they
are currently reporting. Mr. Kaihara criticized this approach to pilot




The Technical Training Command (TTC) also has emphasized quality;
it, too, derived many of its operations from the USAF. If possible,
technical training had more intensive U.S. influence than pilot training.
The technical aspects of modern aviation were one of the areas of great
advance in the postwar era, and consequently it was an area where the
Japanese had lagged most. However, one very important characteristic
of Japan helped to offset this liability. At the beginning of the war
Japan had become a more mature industrial power; even in the post-war
era, occupation reforms stressed education, then economic revival. The
literacy levels had remained high, and by 1955 Japan was producing over
65 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, over 20,000 cars and 100 times
59
as much steel as in 1947. The average Japanese was quite capable of
learning the technologies required without the problems which might be
expected in a less developed society.
This factor proved important quite early in the technical program,
because over 300 Japanese were sent to the United States for technical
instruction to form the basis of their own training program. Their
grades were average and above; in the first 18 months of the program
only one failure was reported. Similar reports were made by the U.S.
units in Japan which were including Japanese students in their training.
The high technical aptitude of the society has continued to facilitate
the training problem. The First Technical School at Hammamatsu trains
in aircraft maintenance techniques, taking students from a 12-week basic
training course and placing them in schools on electrical repair,











0.5 percent. Even more remarkable was the ease with which the technical
schools converted to prepare for the F-4 Phantom, one of the most modern
aircraft weapon systems. The Technical Training Command was required to
support that transition; it began teaching all required technical skills
indigenously after only 43 instructors trained in the United States.
In addition to the technical training directly provided by USAF
units in Japan and the United States, the USAF planned, supplied, and
directed the establishment of the technical training center. The
JASDF was not aware of program requirements and USAF personnel wrote
those, using USAF requirements as guidelines. Over 25 hard core courses
were established, including weather, photography, communications, supply,
radar operation, and varied aircraft system maintenance courses.
One particular example of USAF influence and Japanese capacity
occurred in the training program established for the Aircraft Control
and Warning (AC&W) system. It began some six months before the ASDF
was formed, and it relied on an On the Job Training (OJT) and a cellular
team concept which permitted informal training within operational U.S.
radar sites. In August 1954, the ASDF formed a "shadow" AC&U adminis-
trative network permitting rapid training and experience without joint
command difficulties. The program proved a great success; 1300 people
were trained in the first year of the program and by 1955, Japanese
Major Matsuo, JASDF, Instructor (F-4 maintenance) First Technical
School, TTC, January 11, 1972.
62 lb id.
,
confirmed by ?fDA0, U.S. Embassy.
63Sce Burns, qp_. cit . , pp. 106-115, for a detailed description of











operators were participating in USAF exercises. 66 Operational ACaW
sites were being manned and operated by the JASDF in 1957, "with but
little supervision from USAF personnel."
Air technical training has proceeded apace, and more than 125,000
personnel had received schooling through 1971. The Technical Training
Command was training at the rate of 8,500 personnel per year in more than
200 courses during 1971. The command structure centered around the five
technical schools listed in Figure 8-9. More than 90 percent of the
enlisted men entering the JASDF receive some training from the TTC
before their first operational assignment.
Both enlisted and officer training has been based on a dual cycle
concept. Upon entering the service, the training which a man receives
enables him to carry out basic skills and gives him the background to
benefit from OJT. If he stays beyond the expected five years of service
and demonstrates career motivation, he will return to the TTC to the
advanced courses emphasizing special technical skills and managerial
development.
The 8500 men trained each year is greater than the 5000 men lost
each year. That suggests that the Technical Training Command has not
only maintained the level of its "community of technicians," but has
increased it. In addition, the training provides another social benefit.
The JASDF has regularly discharged more qualified personnel than they
have received, thereby benefitting the economic community and bettering
See Burns, qp_. cit . , p. 124. The Japanese were reported to have
"performed very well."
Maurer Haurer, Brief H istory of 41st Air Division 1952-1960 ,
May 1960, (USAF Historical Division), p. 9.
JASDF, Technical Training Command, Command Briefing , paper,
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Military organizations not only require technical skills; organi-
zation and command are also essential to operational capability. As
the JASDF began its short history, leadership was the last of a myriad
of problems. The academies of the IJN and IJA were among the most
highly regarded educational institutions in Japan, and both the Navy
and Army maintained respected staff schools. The officers from those
professional backgrounds provided the JASDF with a core of experienced
leadership in the early, formative years.
Organizational and staffing procedures evolve with the evolution of
weaponry and tactics; moreover, new, untrained officers were soon
entering the ASDF. The development of effective leadership through
professional education had to be an on-going process. Some have felt
that this area has been neglected with a resultant loss of pride,
discipline and dedication necessary in the professional officer. Ogawa
Raita criticized the lack of officer's meeting places and the absence of
espirit de corps and comraderie among young officers. He attributed
this problem to lack of officer education, a lack of a consistent
philosophy of management, and disassociation of older from younger
officers.
If military bearing among its personnel, cleanliness of its bases,
professional knowledge of its officers, readiness rates of its aircraft
and the lack of disciplinary problems are indicative of successful
leadership, then it has prevailed, for in each of these areas the JASDF
has excelled. There are, however, other areas of operational preparedness
which lend credence to Ogawa's assessment.
69
"Koku Jieitai no Mondai ten" (Problems of ASDF), Wing Shifflbun ,
January 12, 1972, also Ogawa, Interview, March 3, 1972.
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In any case, the final assessment of the leadership and professional
competence of a military organization must await an operational test.
It is, however, possible to review the extent and content of professional
education. Figure 8-10 outlines the officer training system, demonstrating
the grades at which an officer may hope for education and the types of
schools available.
The officer candidate programs have been the common ground of
professional training. The most important of these is the Officer
Candidate School at Nara. All officer sources receive their orientation
to the ASDF there. Even the Aviation Cadets who come to Nara primarily
for English training are exposed to other selected subjects. Figure S-ll
illustrates the balance between the subjects which are taught to the
various officer sources.
The military discipline field includes war history, national
defense requirements, the mission of the JASDF and the meaning of
patriotism. It only receives 5 to 9 percent of the candidate's time; it
seems clear that 'spiritual training' does not receive undue emphasis.
Military academics are emphasized which include introductions to command
and staff concepts, air defense operations and weaponry courses.
International law and economics are taught in the general academics
section; English is also included in this section. The miscellaneous
training consists of outside lectures, field trips and military ceremonies.
These curricula are very comprehensive and intensive as compared with
similar courses in the United States.
The next chance the officer has to add to his military training is
the Squadron Officer Course which is given three times each year at the
Air Staff College. The major subject areas of that course are command
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course includes air defense operations, intelligence, logistics and
research and development. The yearly input to this course nearly equals
the number of officers who entered the JASDF annually during the period
1965 to 1970, therefore, the great majority of officers have the opportunity
to attend the course.
After the Squadron Officer's Course, middle field grade officers
next compete to go to the Command and Staff Course. Here the competition
becomes very rigorous, with an average 700 officers per year competing
for 33 to 38 appointments. Social sciences and national and inter-
national politics are included in this curriculum. Strategy and tactics
are emphasized with particular attention focused on national defense
policy, war theory, logistics and other operational elements.
The senior Air War Course is given to only ten students per year,
either Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels. The social sciences and politics
receive more emphasis and the students spend a large percentage of their
time on individual research projects. The Air Weapons Course is taught
at the Staff College, and combines aspects of both the technical and
professional fields. It introduces political affairs and operations,
but concentrates on system engineering and technical administration.
Primarily for technical officers, it provides the "knowledge and skills
required as senior commanders or senior staff officers to he engaged in
72
research and development and administration of technology."
70
Teramura, Interview, February 14 , 1972.
71LGEN Utsunomiya Michio , JASDF, Commandant, ASC, Interview,
November 30, 1971, provided the great majority of the information on the
various courses of the Air Staff College.
72JASDF, ASD, Command Uricfing
,
provided by LGEN Utsunomiya.
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Two other courses outside the Air Staff College framework provide
additional professional education. The Joint Services Staff College is
quite similar to the Command and Staff Course, although with a somewhat
different orientation.
The National Defense College program is open to officers of Colonel
rank. It is the equivalent of a graduate school of professional military
studies. Five officers per year attend the ten-month course which covers
the hroadest aspects of defense policy and military strategy.
The professional training available to JASDF officers is comprehensive
and yet available to a significant percentage of the officer corps. It
complements the pilot training and technical training programs
,
providing
virtually every officer with a combination of functional and professional
education.
The personnel of the JASDF are highly trained and competent
professionals. They represent the primary emphasis accorded education,
and are capable of providing the nucleus of a significantly larger force.

Chapter 9
THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
The verb to allocate nay signify the assignment of a specified amount
of resources for a certain purpose, or it may suggest a system by which
a set amount is distributed among various groups. Both aspects of
allocation bear on the defense spending problem. There are questions of
priorities: what priority does defense have on government funds; what
priority does air power have on defense funds; what priority does air
defense have on air power funds? There are the related questions of
assignment: What amounts of money have been assigned to air power, and
what size of forcti do they and could they support? On what basis are
monies distributed within certain programs? Do cost-effective analyses
support the selections of weaponry? Answers to these questions should
serve to explain the rationale behind Japanese defense spending and help
identify the groups and the policy objectives dominating the allocation
process.
In 1972, the air force structure included 14 fighter squadrons,
4 NIKE missile groups, 1 reconnaissance squadron and the equivalent of
two squadrons each in the Transport Wing and Air Rescue Group. This
roughly equalled 23 squadrons which is one method of evaluating and air
force size. Size can be discussed in terms of several different units;
for example, aircraft, squadrons, or wings.
The Air Transport Wing has two locations and two aircraft types,
roughly distinguishable as squadrons. The Air Rescue Group has 8
squadrons which are in reality detachments. They are discussed in
squadron units in order to obtain a common unit air force-wide. The
training aircraft are generally not considered in this discussion because




Squadrons are the lowest unit divisions which combine mobility and
a sustained operational capacity. Comparison of aircraft totals can be
hazardous because raw numbers tell little of actual operational ability
or mission diversity of the force structure. A fighter aircraft assigned
to a training squadron does not have fighter capability without the
logistics, intelligence services and command network which a fighter
squadron provides.
Because of these factors, historical comparisons with original force
goals have more significance when both numbers of aircraft and squadron
units are used for comparison. The rapid development of individual
aircraft weapons system's capacity and the introduction of surface-to-
air missile groups make squadron unit comparisons more meaningful.
There were great disparities between the many private plans which
were proposed for Japan in the early 1950' s. Some plans did not include
aircraft and one included 7000 aircraft. Nearly all of the original
private groups assumed that Japan's air force would have an attack
capability which partially explained the large number of aircraft the
plans entailed. The first semi-official Japanese proposal which the
Demobilization Bureau gave to SCAP in 1951 included 2400 aircraft and
approximately 60 squadrons. Admiral Nomura's group passed a 33 squadron
plan to the government in 1952, but the first plan formulated by the
NSA's Systems Research Council included 6744 aircraft, rivaling the
highest figures proposed. The Progressive Party proposed an air force
of 52 squadrons and 2340 aircraft. This plan also included offensive
2For details of this plan's origin, see Chapter 5.
3 See Chapter 5 for details of the relationship between the private
planners and government planners. Masuhara, Nlhon no Boei , p. 48.
Annex 3, p. 12.
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fighters, fighter-bombers and patrol aircraft.
The second and subsequent drafts from the Systems Research Council
approximated the 1500 aircraft and the 33 squadrons which had been
proposed by the Nomura group. These figures became the point of
departure for subsequent planners. Organizational plans were formulated
during early 1954, using the 33-squadron structure. The joint U.S.-
Japanese planning for a training program was based on a 36-squadron
structure, including medium-bomber and fighter-bomber squadrons. By
June 1954, the 33-squadron figure had been agreed to within the fledgling
ASDF and constituted the final ASDF proposal on force level. Light
bombers were still included and remained part of the JASDF proposals
until 1957. 7
In 1957, there was a significant readjustment of the proposed force
structure and it occurred for two distinct reasons:
The first DBP was promulgated in 1957, and each service's plans were
subject to the hard realities of economic limitations. Political
sensitivity was a factor in the ASDF plans as it became apparent that
bomber aircraft would not be a suitable weapon in the light of constitutional
interpretations. Elimination of the bomber squadrons naturally cut the
size of the force. It was difficult for air force planners then to argue
that they needed more of the remaining types of aircraft in their proposed
inventory
;
General Sanagi, November 11, 1971; Mr. Ogawa, February 15, 1972;
General Ogawa, JASDF; March 4, 1972, General Arinuma, March 7, 1972; all
mentioned the 33 squadron figure when discussing the 1953-1954 planning
process and proposed force level goals.
6
Burns, op_. cit .
, pp. 15-16.




The ASDF also had internal problems with the 33 squadron structure.
1954 to 1957 had been a period of rapid expansion, and in early 1957
the aircraft accident rate took a sharp turn upward. Accidents were
detrimental to operational capabilities and also exacerbated hostile
public opinion. Because of these two factors, the JASDF readjusted
their force level proposals in 1957 and projected a 23-squadron goal. 8
The 23-squadron structure has remained the basis of the JASDF'
s
planning in the 1970' s. They have approached that goal, and the Fourth
DBP proposals indicated their satisfaction. No increases in aircraft
fighter squadrons were planned, nor were changes programmed in reconnaissance
or transport units. Only NIKE missiles were scheduled to increase, from
4 to 7 units. Therefore, the total operational complement will continue
to approximate the 23-squadron guidelines.
The JASDF has experienced relatively little trouble in obtaining
their force-level goals, particularly in view of the low priority which
defense in general has been accorded. Annual defense budgets are
compared to GNP and overall government spending in Figure 9-1. The
figures bear out the low priority of military spending as the JDA has
received an increasingly smaller share of a continuously increasing
government budget. The deemphasis of military claims on the budget has
corresponded to the national policy on defense which dictates the priority
of social welfare and the growth of defense only within national
capacities. The low level of military spending has not necessarily
constituted a disregard of national security. In the absence of external
threats of force such a policy could enhance national security.
o
General Ishikawa Kanshi, COS, Interview, February 17, 1^77. General
Ishikawa was one of the planners at that tine. Mr. Ogawa, Interview,




Gross National Product, Government Budget
















1951 351 2,204 15,226 15.95 2.31
1952 507 2,590 17,702 19.58 2.87
1953 348 2,853 20,906 12.21 1.67
1954 375 2,777 21,735 13.51 1.73
1955 374 2,814 24,623 13.31 1.52
1956 396, 3,026 27,641 13.11 1.44
1957 398 3,290 31,246 12.12 1.28
1958 412 3,703 32,736 11.14 1.26
1959 432 4,200 37,802 10.29 1.14
1960 444 4,903 45,019 9.07 0.99
1961 509 5,853 55,146 8.71 0.92
1962 593 7.119 60,165 8.34 0.99
1963 687 8,491 71,044 8.10 0.97
1964 780 9,229 82,029 8.41 0.95
1965 848 10,401 90,695 8.16 0.94
1966 958 12,436 105,883 7.71 0.91
1967 1,075 14,453 124,352 7.44 0.86
1968 1,171 16,436 146,611 7.13 0.80
1969 1,374 18,721 173,750 7.14 0.79
1970 1,581 22,082 201,222 7.16 0.79
1971 1,864 26,151 245,510 7.13 0.76
Source: JDA Statistics 360 Y/l$
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In absolute terms the defense budget has grown significantly.
Professor Ishizawa has noted that Japan's defense spending percentages
would be much different had Japanese economic growth equalled that of
9
Western Europe in the past two decades. If Japan had maintained an
average 4 percent growth rate from base year 1952, while defense
spending increased at the actual rate, the defense budget would have
equalled 2.5% of GNP in 1961 and 4.5% of GNP in 1968. Japan would face
a military burden equal to the NATO countries of Western Europe.
The ASDF's relative success in obtaining allocations within those
parameters may be explained in part by the high priority which air
defense has held among the Japanese defense missions. The Systems
Research Council based their rearmament planning on the presumption that
primary emphasis would be placed on air power. *" When the JASDF was
established Director-General Kimura announced that air power would be
developed as the primary line of defense for Japan.
The United States was surprised by the emphasis the Japanese placed
on air power allocations. Although all parties had agreed in principle
to an air force, the force goals assigned the air force and the amounts
of money deemed necessary by the Japanese raised some controversy among
American officials in 1953. 11 U.S. military officials opposed the
Japanese air power force-level goals as late as October 1953 because
they felt the cost would be prohibitive to Japan. Characteristically,
the U.S. was anxious to see the concept implemented while Japan was
confident that an air force would be established eventually, and wished
q
Ishizawa, op_. cit .
,
p. 41.
10Masuhara, Nihon no Roei
,
p. 48, Boei Nenkan , 1970, p. 189,
See discussion in Chapter 5.
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to discuss long-range force directions.
In the late 1950' s, the JASDF budget shot upward as the first
build-up program x^as implemented. The air force received 56.2 million
dollars in 1956 which was 14 percent of the defense budget. 27 percent
of the budget, 118 million dollars, was alloted to the air arm in I960. 12
As Figure 9-2 illustrates, the air force share of the budget continued
to increase until 1964 when the majority of the F-104's had been purchased.
The budget share has decreased since that time, partly as a result of a
lull after the F-104 contracts were authorized, and partly because of
increased emphasis on MSDF shipbuilding programs.
The JASDF has continued to fare very well in intra-JDA resources
allotment. It received 23 percent of the defense budget in 1971 while
only responsible for 16 percent of defense personnel. By comparison,
the USAF received 28 percent of the defense budget with 30 percent of
13the personnel. In addition, the U.S. Air Force was responsible for
several operational roles including a significant portion of the U.S.
strategic forces while the JASDF maintained one major operational command.
This type of comparison between a military superpower and a non-
nuclear force must be made with caution and deductions reached with care.
The relatively large percentage of money alloted to the JASDF with its
low personnel totals and limited operational role does, however, suggest
different functional priorities of defense spending. Some differences
do appear when the Japanese defense budget is compared to that of the
United States. Figure 9-3 illustrates the relatively low priority which
12Asagumo, November 11, 1971.
Figures compiled from Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird,
Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1973 Defense
Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program , February 15, 1^72 (Washington, D.C. ,




Individual Service Budgets, 1961-1971
(360Y - $1)
Budgets - $ million % of JDA Budget
GSDF MSDF ASDF GSDF MSDF ASDF
1961 204 119 145
19.62 231 134 183
1963 266 147 216
1964 301 161 246
1965 355 189 221
1966 417 216 237
1967 462 236 264
1968 522 270 273
1969 588 318 313
1970 701 387 349












Source: Compiled from JDA; Boei Nenkan ; Asagumo , November 11, 1971
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because a small percentage of the
JDA budget is alloted to the internal bureaus and other




Functional Comparison of JDA-DOD Budget Expenditures
1971-1972 Fiscal Period
(percentage of total budget)
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1.5 Research and Development 10
Source: Laird, FY 1973 Defense Budget and JDA, JFY 1971 Budget .
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Japan has assigned research and development and the high priority assigned
14procurement. The differences between personnel expenditures and
operational expenditures are not significant because many costs are
interchangeable and could be categorized in either area. Other U.S.
estimates suggest that some operational expenses could be considered
personnel related. At any rate, Japanese and American operating
expenditures are quite similar when personnel costs are included.
The JDA procurement emphasis is particularly significant in view of
their lower use rate on petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) and other
expendable materials. Major equipment procurement totalled 353 million
dollars in 1971, which was 62 percent of all procurement and 16 percent
of the entire budget.
The emphasis on procurement has been magnified in the Air Self-
Defense Force where only 35 percent of the 1971 budget was utilized for
personnel costs, while equipment purchases accounted for 24 percent.
Major purchases accounted for 85 percent of the procurement effected
by the Air Materiel Command; all general supply and minor item purchases
were obtained with the remainder. Figure 9-4 portrays the development
of the air force budget over the past six years and demonstrates the
growing emphasis on equipment procurement. This will continue to rise;
more than 191 billion yen already had been committed to future purchases
by the 1971 and previous budgets. Some recent published reports have
14See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of the Research and
Development effort.
All dollar amounts discussed in the 1971 budget will be based on
Y308— $1 which is the new monetary exchange rate.
Lieutenant General Sato Noriro, JASDF, Commander Air Materiel
Command, February 28, 1972, Interview.
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indicated that approximately 50 percent of the entire funding requested
for the Fourth DBP, 2.7 trillion yen, will be utilized for major equipment
purchase.
Major items already dominate JASDF procurement with over one-half
the monetary amounts dedicated to aircraft, SAM or radar equipment.
Major purchases programmed in the Fourth DBP have continued this trend.
The emphasis on major components has resulted in shortages in other
functional areas and other procurement categories. Two categories, supply
and facilities construction, have suffered considerably because of the
minimum financial support they receive.
The JASDF spent 8.45 million dollars on aircraft ammunition in the
Third DBP. That was an incredible .0433 percent of the monies expended. 19
Expenditures for fuel and other war reserve materiel have been similarly
short, and the result is an extremely small war reserve supply. That
portion of the budget has continued to decrease, exacerbating a critical
20problem. The supply problem can be illustrated in the training command
where each student flies only ten 'hot' missions in the basic fighter
21pipeline. Guns only are fired, giving the young pilots no experience
in missile firing which is the primary air-to-air weapon. The same
situation has prevailed in the operational squadrons where a pilot may
1 8Toyo Deizai , September 19, 1970 (U.S. Embassy Translation), also
Bee Nippon no Anzen Hosho
,
p. 101, and Ishizawa, "The Gradual Increase
of Defense Power," pp. 54-55.
19JASDF, Outline of JFY 1971 Budget .
20
General Sato, Interview, February 23, 1972.
21Colonel Nakanura Satoshi, JASDF, Vice Commander, First Training
Wing, Hammamatsu Air Base, Interview, January 10, 1972. Hot missions




go for more than a year without a hot mission.
Some observers have noted that the lack of resources dedicated to
training, the limited areas in which pilots may train, and the shortage
of modern training aircraft could cause an acute shortage of pilots in
23the ensuing five years. Air Force officials believe they can avoid a
pilot shortage if_ they receive the aircraft and other resources they have
requested; however, a shortage remains a real possibility. There were
plans to train more than 2 pilots for each F-4 with 27 front-seat
l
ry r
qualified and 18 back-seat qualified in each 18 airplane squadron."
With the recent training delays because of a serious aircraft accident
and the current budgetary limitations, it seems improbable that the goal
will be reached as planned.
Aircraft cannot operate without fuel and the JASDF has maintained
a rather limited backlog. It has attempted to maintain a 2.5 month
supply at the air bases and one month of emergency supply centrally
located near Kure. The total 3.5 month estimate is predicated on normal
usage. 25 in the event of actual mobilization, consumption in all
likelihood would increase and current reserves would not last the
predicted time periods. Air force planners have been aware of the possible
^Interviews with air force pilots.
23
Kaihara, Interview, November 10, 1971; JPE Aviation Report ,
September 13, 1971. The limited areas for training are a result of the
mid-air crash between a JASDF F-36 and an ANA 7 27 airliner. The XT-
2
selection for JASDF' s new advanced trainer will result in shortages
which will be discussed in detail, supra.
^Lieutenant General Ueraura Eichi, JASDF, Commander, Flight Training
Command, Interview, January 10, 1972.
25Kaihara, "We have to Knov/ Them," pp. 70-72, also Interview,
November 10, 1971. Koku Shinbun reported on Julv 21, 1^71 that JASD1
had no fuel reserves and would be forced to cut flight hours if additional




fuel problems and while military reserves are limited, extensive commercial
reserves exist which are sometimes located on joint-use bases. These
supplies, if available in an emergency, would extend the fuel reserves
significantly.
A more critical war reserve shortage has existed in ammunition
reserves. A recent Commander of the Air Defense Command suggested he
would be quite happy if his command was still operational when the fuel
reserves ran short. In 1971, the four primary weapons in the inventory
were general purpose bombs, 50 calibre ammunition for the F-86's, 20
MM ammunition for the F-lOA's, and heat-seeking missiles for both
aircraft. Conventional bombs were in short supply and outdated, most of
them being of Korean War vintage. The 50-calibre shells were in
abundance, and were virtually useless outside a limited air-to-ground
close support mission. 20MM shells are the back-up weapon for the F-104;
there was such a critical shortage of these that practice firing has
27been restricted.
An even more serious shortage exists in the supply of surface-to-
air and air-to-air missiles. These have been the primary weapons for
Japanese air defense. Five NIKE sites were scheduled to be operational
after the transfer of the Okinawa site. With the battalions scheduled
to be operating by 1971 at full strength, the force totalled approximately
Aoki, Interview, October 20, 1971. Mr. Aoki was a JASDF planner
before resigning to become editor of Koku .johq . Mr. Aoki also recalled
that studies were conducted which envisioned the possible emergency use
of gasoline in the J-79 engines. They would last about a week before
corrosion and high exhaust gas temperatures took their toll. Chapter in
discusses the extent and effectiveness of mobilization procedures.
27In a related area, the JASDF has been slow to allot money to buy
targets. The result has been subsonic practice or reliance on U.S.
aircraft to provide services.
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28130 launchers. At the same time less than three hundred NIKE missiles
were maintained in war reserve, only about two firings per launcher. 29
The heat-seeking air-to-air missiles have been the backbone of
JASDF kill probability in the air intercept mission. If only the F-104
fleet is considered, a combat launch of 125 aircraft would require a
on
minimum 250 missiles. It has been estimated that the missiles would
last less than a week if the F-104' s were only launched once a day. 31
Therefore, multiple launches and ideal loading easily could expend the
entire AAM inventory in one day. A Japanese general officer who
commanded the Air Materiel Command acknowledged that "we have only a
few days material."
It appears unlikely that the situation will improve as missile unit
costs continue to increase. The new Sparrow III radar-homing missile is
programmed to be the primary weapon for the F-4J, and its cost under
license-production is approximately 30 million yen per copy. One
hundred of them would exceed the total amount spent on ammunition in the
past five years. The 1000 needed would require 1.8% of the JASDF 's
share of the Fourth DBP, far more than will be spent with 1972 's priorities,
28
JDA Statistics. There are actually less launchers due to legal
delays in acquiring launch sites.
29
. Of the 358 NIKE's programmed in the 3rd DBP, 208 were to be
delivered by April 1972, JPE Aviation Report , April 19, 19 71.
125 Aircraft is roughly 2/3 of the fleet. An ideal load would be
4 AAM per aircraft because with only two the aircraft has a one pass
capability without the capacity for self-defense on the way home.
31
Kaihara, "We Have to Know Them," loc . cit . , pp. 71-77.
3?








Another area of allocation is the construction of air bases, or the
expansion and improvement of those in existence. The JASDF spent 232,000
million yen on facilities construction in the Third DBP, approximately
4 percent of the budget. Yet, the passive defenses of the Japanese air
34bases were very weak in 1972, as the strongest JASDF supporters admit.
Dispersal is a natural problem in an island nation, however, even
available dispersal areas have not been utilized fully. There were 20
civil airfields in Japan in 1972 which were capable of handling jet
airliner traffic, and 29 others which handle local traffic. " The Air
Self-Defense Force maintained some twenty fields, only eleven longer
than 6000 feet. Of those eleven, fighter aircraft were based on nine,
while the front-line F104's were based at only 4 airfields.
The probability of increased joint-use or other peacetime operational
use of civil airfields would appear to be rather remote. They already
have been overcrowded; Japan has needed to expand the capacity of many
of its minor airports. No program of emergency dispersal has been
promulgated although this would be a conceivable alternative. However,
it would require more than just paper plans; support equipment, ammunition,
and command and communication facilities would have to be provided prior
to activation of emergency dispersal plans. Nor are U.S. airbases
viable dispersal alternatives; other than Iwakuni and Yokota, Japanese
forces already have occupied the major U.S. air bases.
Building new bases is an expensive undertaking. The JASDF has
estimated it would cost 8 billion yen to construct an F-AJ air wing
34Aoki, Interview, October 20, 1971. Mr. Aoki , among informed
viewpoints, has been the strongest defender of A.SDF capabilities.
35Masatake Okumiya, Sora Va Kiken r.a Ippal (The Skv is Full of
Danger) (Tokyo; Mainichi Shimbun Sha, 1970), p. .96.
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installation in 1972 without considering land purchase and leveling
costs. That was more than has been spent by the ASDF on all their
construction projects in any one year and would amount to 35 percent of
all monies spent on construction in the Third DBP.
Another construction alternative is hardening, and from the viewpoint
of funding, it is the more attractive choice. The air bases have had
almost no preparation in this area. They have no aircraft revetments,
no separation in the parking areas, no reinforced hangars, no protection
for fuel dumps and extremely limited command post facilities. The F-104
bases, for example, have had all aircraft stored in close proximity,
either on the line or in an open hangar. One accurate attack would have
a high probability of destroying many aircraft, as would one saboteur's
blast. Yet, almost no resources had been allocated in this area through
the Third DBP. 37
The
#
purchase of front-line major equipment has and will continue to
occupy the major portion of the JASDF's procurement resources. The
Fourth DBP Draft has signalled that the C-46 transports will be replaced
by C-l's, the F-86 will be replaced by F-4J and FST-2 aircraft; the
training fleet will be modernized by T-2's; 2 additional NIKE units
38
will be formed; and new, mobile 3-D radar units will be put into use.
No mention was made of updating supply procedures or increasing war
reserves, nor were additional facilities planned or emergency dispersal
procedures funded.
36Estimates provided by General Yamada, Chief Defense Section, ASO.
3?
Mr. Ogawa, Interviews, January 21, 1972, and Mr. Knihara Intorvi
t/ember 10, 1971, both criticize JASDF strongly on this point. Mr.
id that the bases were like "Samurai dolls at the Boy's Day Festival,"
Movemb
sai
decorative but not useful
O Q
The New Defense Build-up Plan, pn. 6-7.
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Major equipment selections do signify policy directions if only
because they limit or direct the capabilities of the force structure.
There do appear to be principles which have guided the major Air Self-
Defense Force procurement programs. The first and perhaps most important
rule regards the method of purchase. From the inception of the Defense
Agency's contract purchases, they have been effected through licensing
agreements, primarily with U.S. manufacturers. The weapons system, or
portions of it, are then manufactured in Japan. The resultant per unit
price to the government is higher, while the immediate beneficiaries
of the policy are economic interests who enjoy the extra business plus
spin-off benefits from the advanced technologies. The government bases
its policy on the^.view that a healthy aircraft industry is part of the
foundation of national defense, and therefore must be supported and
encouraged.
This purchasing method results in less total purchasing power. It
is a tradeoff of current defense capacity for a larger, more flexible
potential capacity. Japan has demonstrated that it will sacrifice a
great deal in order to purchase via license. The F-5 day fighter was
first offered to Japan at $1.3 million per aircraft direct purchase,
39
while their licensing estimates were $1.7 million per aircraft. The
F-4 was offered at $3.5 million while the initial Japanese estimate for
manufacturing through license was $5.1 million. That price now has
increased to over $6 million per aircraft. Some company executives,
who deal with the Japanese regularly, estimate that licensing costs twice









The recent controversy over the selection of a new training aircraft
(TX) for the ASDF illustrated a new aspect of this industrial emphasis.
The foremost early candidate for the TX was the T-38 or F-5B, which was
41built by Northrop Aircraft Company. Then in early 1967, the concept
of home production became an issue when Director-General Matsumo Raizo
proposed that the TX be designed and built in Japan.
Although the JASDF resisted the program because of costs and time
delays, the first funds for development were allotted in 1967. At that
time, the JASDF still planned an interim purchase of advanced trainers
because the TX was not expected to be mass produced before 1974. Then
in 1970, XT-2 progress generated pressure to delay any other trainer
purchase and buy all T-2's. The JASDF made provisional estimates on
purchase costs of 80-90 T-2's and 120 models of a fighter-support version
in late 1970, and found that costs would total $2.8 million per aircraft,
43
nearly double earlier estimates. In March 1971, financial difficulties
with the Rolls-Royce engines multiplied the cost-overrun problem; by the
end of the year, the price had skyrocketed to over $4.5 million per
44
aircraft.
"weinstein, "Japanese Air Self-Defense Force - Restrained, But
Powerful," Air Force and Space Digest , December 1967, p. 63, mentions
the T-38, but the F-5B, an advanced version of the same basic design,
had flown in 1964. The aircraft was referred to as the "2-seat F-5"
in response to questions regarding the matter in Japan. The exact model
produced probably would have been an adaption of the F-5B.
42






March 1971, p. 2.
44Asahi, March 17, 1971. This was confirmed by JASDF officials.
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Despite the problems, plans for production of the T-2 continued
although JASDF requested cost estimates on the F-5 in April 1971.
^
5 The
discussions continued into September 1971 with the uniformed officials
insisting that 60-80 training aircraft were necessary to support the
pilot training program which in turn would have to support transition to
the F-4 aircraft. They proposed a split purchase of F-5's and T-2's.
At that point the F-5B under license production would have cost less than
one-half the domestically produced T-2. The aircraft were quite similar,
both weigh approximately 20,000 pounds with service ceilings over 50,000
feet. The T-2 was slightly faster, Mach 1.6 as opposed to Mach 1.4,
while their range was similar.
The issue was still in doubt in September and the resistance to the
Fourth DBF contributed to the pressure to purchase the F-5 as it became
apparent that the forthcoming budgets would be cut. As late as
September 13, the respected JPE Aviation Report forecast that the "buy
Japanese policy" would be reversed. However, the forces supporting
"home production" dominated and on September 25, Director-General
Nishimura reported to the Diet that the "buy Japanese" weapons procurement
49policy would not be altered. He additionally reported that the scale
of the defense plan would be reduced. For the JASDF, the decision meant
^ 5JPE Aviation Report
, April 26, 1971, p. 1.
46
Exact estimates vary with source. One senior JASDF General
declared that the T-2 was costing three times the F-5. With the changes
in the exchange rate this is quite possible with the F-5B costing
Y500 million to Y1500 million for the T-2.
'John W. R. Taylor, editor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft,
1971-1972 (London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1971), pp. 142, 370-371. Additional
XT-2 statistics provided by Oqawa, Interview, January 21, 1972.
48
September 13, 1971, p. 3.
A9
Ibid
. , October 4, 1971, p. 2.
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their F-5 request had been denied; their "minimum requirement" had been
slashed rather than delay purchase of the T-2.
The Defense Agency eventually proposed 36 T-2 aircraft to the
Finance Ministry late in 1971. Wing reported that it "was made known to
budget officials that the Japanese defense industry had already been
ready for the production of the Japanese-designed T-2's." The Finance
Ministry finally agreed to the purchase of 20 T-2's. Inevitable
further cuts appeared to leave the JASDF with less than one-half their
original program requirements.
The Japanese aircraft industry benefitted from this decision. Design
capabilities will be tested against mass production and operational use
in addition to the obvious economic benefits. The overall autonomous
capability of the industry will be enhanced. The decision-makers
displayed their willingness to sacrifice operational capability for
potential capacity.
Another guideline for major equipment decisions, although less
obvious, reflected Japanese preoccupation with technological advance
through procurement policies. The policy has been reflected in the
selection of the highest performance, most technologically advanced
weapons system units. If this choice were made in terms of an unlimited
budget, it also would mean the choice of the highest operational capability
vis a vis a particular mission. With a limited budget, the end result
may be different. The highest performance weapons system unit may not
provide the highest capability if the number of weapon units does not
comprise an effective system, or if another portion of the system has







suffered because of the unit selection.
When the F-104 was selected in 1959, it was at the forefront of
operational aviation technology. Again in 1968, the selection of the
F-4E(J) meant that Japan had opted for the most advanced aircraft weapons
system. The final selection was made between similar models based on a
computer program written by the JASDF. A more basic decision had been
reached earlier when the program to select the fighter was chosen. 52
Mr. Kaihara, then in the JDA, had opposed the F-4, or more accurately the
program which would select the aircraft.
His choice of the Northrop F-5 fighter was more than a preference
for a different model of aircraft. Figure 9-5 compares the two aircraft
and demonstrates the tremendous differences between them. The F-4 was
a significantly more flexible weapons system; an extremely high performance
interceptor, it also could carry more bombs than a World War II Flying
Fortress.. The F-5 was also versatile and could be used in ground support,
a tactical fighter or interceptor roles. However, its performance in the
interceptor mission was limited and would not have represented any unit
performance increase over the F-104.
Although there were major differences between the two aircrafts'
performance, there was also a startling comparison in the unit cost
differential. Mr. Kaihara's proposal can be compared more effectively in
terms of the total F-4 program allocations through 1972. Japan had
funded a total of 169,386 million yen for the F-4 procurement plan,
paying for the licensed production of 102 F-4's. At an assumed cost of
650 million yen per aircraft, Japan could license produce approximately





A Comparison Between the Performance






































Source: Taylor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft ; Captain R. J. Harlow,
USN, "Comments on Air Defense in Japan-1971," loc . cit .
The F-5E was utilized in this comparison because it is the F-5 model
which was designed for sales outside the United States. When the ASDF
was considering the FX selection it seems probable that Northrop would
have had similar drawing board proposals for development of the basic
airframe.
2
Ranges at these payloads would be very limited, approximately
250 NM for the F-4 and 100-150 NM for the F-5 with a hi-lo-hi profile.
Approximate.
^The cost used for the F-4 was based on a 1971 JDA estimate and
cost for the F-5 was based on Northrop selling price ($1.6 million),
multiplied by a factor of 1.35, similar to calculation of previous
JDA estimates of F-5 licensing costs.
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260 F-5's or directly purchase 340 F-5's. 53 More realistically, the
purchase of 150 to 180 aircraft would leave additional resources for
other areas of allocation which have been neglected.
The F-5 also would alleviate other weaknesses already mentioned.
It is a much lighter aircraft and is designed to operate from shorter,
more varied airfields. The F-5 would lower the cost of an emergency
dispersal program and reduce the vulnerability of the JASDF in this area.
Because more aircraft could be purchased, there would be greater mission
flexibility. For example, aircraft could be diverted to counter-attack
missions without degrading the continuity of the air defense posture.
The lower vulnerability and greater flexibility of such a program
could not be achieved without cost. The air defense mission perhaps
would suffer to some degree, at least in the interception capability of
54individual aircraft. There would be less flexibility in aircraft
industry potential.
The industrial benefits from the more advanced aircraft, and
concentration on procurement were obvious. The reasons for air force
support of the F-4 were less clear. Mr. Kaihara contended that the
uniformed officers simply choose the "best and biggest" aircraft.
"
53
' Those comparisons are reached using the figures quoted in
Figure 9-5 and budget allocations announced in JDA, Outline of Cabinet
Approved JFY 1971 Budget . The current exchange standard of 303 Yen/1$
Js used,
54
The JASDF air defense capability will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 10, Mjr, Kaihara pointed out that with the limited scope of the
radar network in Japan, the F-4 performance cannot be utilized effectively.
The F-5 intercept point would be within 20NM of the F-4. While he was
Correct to 50,000 feet, there would remain lesser kill probability
because of the less sophisticated F-5 weaponrv. Interview, February 29,
1972.
55Interview, February 29, 1972.
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That may explain some of the air force officer's attitudes, however many
officers have seriously considered strategic options available to the
JASDF within its limited budget. The F-4 selection may sacrifice a
limited operational flexibility, but it has preserved a wider range of
potential options. An expanded fleet of F-4 aircraft could provide a
much broader counter-attack capability and could be integrated into a
wider air defense system which might utilize its extended intercept
capacity. These options do not necessarily contribute to any current
operational capability; they do enhance the ability to. expand to other
roles. 56
There are other allocation procedures which suggest that the JASDF
has been more interested in a wider range of options than a comprehensive
local war capacity. Budget cuts normally have been made horizontally.
No program has been completely eliminated, but only reduced, which
indicates that the JASDF has been reluctant to close any option. The
procedures also expose the problem which has faced the defense planner.
Within the budget limitations which exist, the planner may either strike
a balance between major equipments, training and logistical support; or
he may emphasize only one of these aspects of operational readiness.
Mr. Ogawa R.aita concluded that readiness has been neglected in the past
due to emphasis on major equipment and the Fourth DBP has indicated the
same attitude will prevail through 1976. He contended that unless
the other aspects of operational readiness receive more balanced
Harlow, "Comments on Air Defense," p. 7, adds another reason for
the F-4 which is not related to latent capabilities. The F-4 enhances
the U.S. reentry capability because the aircraft is compatible with U.S.
front-line fighters meaning some rudimentary support equipment would be
in place.
J
"Koku Jeitai No Mondai Ten" (Problems of the ASDF) , Koku Shimbun,
January 12, 1972. (editorial).
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treatment, no capability will exist and manpower and money should not be
wasted on pseudo-readiness procedures such as standing alert. The
uniformed planners might reply that the ASDF budget has been so small
that a balanced application of resources would provide a minute force
irrelevant to Japan's needs.
Training and support functions have received little priority in the
allocation of resources. Training, although very important to the JASDF,
has received little funding support, particularly if training requirements
contravened other goals as in the T-2 selection. Logistical support
has been neglected and the resulting war reserve seriously detracts from
any effective operational stature.
Not only has the development of major weapons systems units dominated
resource allocations, the methods of choosing those units also has
emphasized the potential side of the force structure and its industrial
support. The Fourth DBP has indicated that the characteristics of policy





The nature and extent of the resources available to the Air Self-
Defense Force have been examined in the preceeding two chapters. The
allocation and application of personnel and budgetary assets help to
define the principles which guide the JASDF. The force structure which
results is primarily dedicated to the application of air power within
the national defense structure.
The capacity of that air power force structure in the execution of
various missions may further clarify the defense policy principles being
applied in Japan. An assessment of the measures taken to provide a
ready force structure, and the priority assigned various missions within
the structure define the capability of the Air Self-Defense Force. The
emphasis of certain capabilities or the disregard of others serves to
reinforce or disprove the Japanese defense policy objectives which have
been postulated.
It is necessary to add that such a deduction is true only if the
decision-makers are aware of the actual capability of the defense force.
There are indications that political leaders are not fully aware of real
defense capacities, however, both the civilian and military bureaucracies
are familiar with any weaknesses.
The criticism of informed commentators such as Ogawa Raita of
Koku Shimbun and Aoki Hideo of Koku Joho is widely read. Secretary-
General Kaihara's critical attitude towards the JASDF* s capability is
well known, and he, of course, has direct access to the National Defense




have been aware of air force capabilities and those capabilities reflect
their policy priorities, not their ignorance.
There are five distinct missions which may be utilized to categorize
the major theoretical air power contributions to the use of military
power. They include reconnaissance/intelligence, mobility/supply, air-
to-ground attack, air-to-naval attack, and air-to-air attack missions.
Each of these operational areas will be perused in detail, however one
aspect of operations which bears on any military mission must be examined
first. Command is that essential process by which collective force is
directed.
Command Network
Aron includes the "collective capacity for action" among his three
fundamental elements of power. At the time military force is applied,
that collective capacity will be expressed in terms of leadership. The
uncertainty involved in assessing leadership is a significant factor in
the general uncertainty of war. Any definitive attempt to define Japanese
leadership necessarily would include some discussion of the Japanese
character including psychological and sociological evaluations. Such a
discussion is outside the scope of this study.
However, one aspect of command may be assessed before it is
implemented. Any governmental system establishes some relationship
between itself, the state which it represents and the national military
force. From that arrangement to the communication channels between
operating units, there are levels, methods and procedures of command
which are the framework in which command will be exercised. The nature





of that command network, will directly affect the operational capacity of
the force structure.
The first unusual aspect of the Japanese command network is at its
apex. The Emperor is the symbol of Japan, not only because Article 1 of
the Constitution declared it, but because he symbolizes the great
national unity and pride which is Japan. It is rather unusual that the
Emperor, the symbol of Japan, has had no relationship to the Japanese
Defense Forces.
Moreover, the Defense Forces have had a unique relationship with the
executive power, which is vested in the Cabinet. Boeicho is an agency
rather than a ministry, Boeisho . Because of its status, Boeicho is one
step removed from the executive and faces an extra layer of civilian
control or command. Figure 10-1 illustrates the effect of agency status
in the Japanese parlimentary system.
The Prime Minister occupies two distinct levels of command; one as
head of the Cabinet, and one as head of the Prime Minister's Office.
Article 7 of the Self-Defense Forces Law refers to the Prime Minister
as the "supreme commander and supervisor of the Self-Defense Forces,"
2because he represents the Cabinet. Article 8 declares that the "Director
General shall, subject to the authority of the Prime Minister, direct the
functions of the Self-Defense Forces." Here the Prime Minister derives
his authority from his executive role as director of Sorifu, the Prime
Minister's Office.
2Official Translation. These and other discussions of the legal
aspects of JDA posture rely heavily on interviews with Mr. Kosuge Hironaka,
Civilian, JASDF, Chief of Legal Branch, ASO, December 13, 1971, and
particularly on Major Torino Masaru, JASDF, Legal Branch, ASO, December 13,



































Chapter II of the Self-Defense Forces Law deals with the roles of
the Prime Minister, Director-General and Chief of Staff in the command
network. Article 7 gives "command and supervisory" powers to the Prime
Minister and Article 8 gives powers of "command and supervision" to the
4
Director-General. However, Article 9 does not authorize the Chief of
Staff to command the JASDF; he is only directed to "supervise the
functions and personnel, assist the Director- General, and execute the
(Director- General's) orders." The Chief of Staff's role in the command
process has a vague legal basis, questioning the legal existence of a
uniformed leader. The situation is unique because Article 8 instructs
the Director-General to operate through the appropriate Chief of Staff.
What is the actual situation? Mr. Masuhara Keikichi, former Director
General, declared that "I only commanded one man In the Air Self-Defense
Force." General Ishikawa Kanshi, Chief of Staff, JASDF, agreed: "I
personally believe that I command my Air Self-Defense Force." On the
other hand, General Ishikawa acknowledged that the Chief of Staff has
no legal authority to command his units, and that the situation was vague
at best. 8
Within the JASDF, the command network is rather straight forward.
The commanding officers of the major commands operate subject to the
command and the supervision of the Director-General, as would be
expected. The commands do not overlap and problems of concurrent
Self-Defense Forces Law, official translation.
Ibid
.
, Article 9, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.
interview, February 19, 1972.





commanders or internal conflicts over operational control have been
insignificant. There is, in fact, only one operational command, the Air
Defense Command (ADC). The Reconnaissance Group is within the ADC, and
the Transport Wing and Air Rescue Group, though independent, are not
considered major commands.
Another important aspect of higher echelon command is joint, or
inter-service command, although not all agree to its relevance in Japan.
There are some who argue that any conventional use of force against
Q
Japan would be preceeded by air attack. If the air attacks were
repulsed, there would be little likelihood that the armed attack would
continue. It therefore is unnecessary to emphasize joint commands to
defend against integrated attacks.
A policy of this nature is particularly risky in warfare, whatever
the policy's theoretical value, it is, in colloquial terms, putting all
one's eggs in one basket. Moreover, the theory is materially suspect
in the Japanese case. Military force against Japan would be undertaken
to accomplish political goals. It is doubtful that conventional warfare
tacticians would rely on general indiscriminate bombing. Not only would
such tactics require considerable time to achieve success; they also would
be more likely to elicit external intervention. If the military goal is
an integrated attack to take territory, then a phased attack to achieve
air superiority first would be necessary only if air superiority were
critical to the attack's success. Air superiority is critical if the
defender can take advantage of his control of the air to repel attacks on
the ground or sea. To do that, the defender must be capable of coordinating
Q
Perhaps the major proponent of this theorv out of uniform is Aoki
Hideo, editor of Koku Joho (Aireview) , Interview, October 20, 1971. See





air power operations with relevant naval or ground forces. There are
exceptions, but it would appear, therefore, that joint commands are
theoretically important to the Japanese defense posture.
Joint command requirements are much more than theoretical needs as
one analyst noted:
As far as the 4th DBP is concerned, the army will continue
to be denied a specialized tactical air arm which would be
built around fixed-wing battle-field support aircraft of
its own. In other words, it will continue to depend on
the Air Self-Defense Force for such needs; the air force
will continue to be committed for full-fledged aerial support
for not only the army but also the navy, at least in the
4th DBP. 10
The need for better cooperation has been recognized in the ASDF; an Air
Ground Operations School has been in operation for approximately three
years. Its two-month course is given twice each year to pilots, ground
control intercept (GCI) controllers and GSDF officers. Map reading,
aircraft armaments and forward air control tactics are among the subjects
taught.
Although this course represents a step towards joint operations, the
opportunities for practice have remained very slim. The F-86 wing based
at Matsushima has been dedicated to the fighter support mission, yet
on the average it has operated with the MSDF less than 6 times per year.
Among young pilots based there for two years, one had one sortie against
a ship, another had none. Even communications between the MSDF and ASDF
are limited. General Okumiya pointed out that an ASDF reconnaissance
aircraft with pictures of a convoy would land at an ASDF base where no
1 JPE Aviation Report
, December 7, 1970, p. 2.
The school is located at Matsushima Air Base. MSDF sends one
instructor but no students. Interviews with Major Matsui, and Lieutenants
Iwasaki Katsuhiko and Tanaka Iwaki at Matsushima, January 18-19, 1972.
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one could analyze the pictures. There were no joint operations centers
in 1971 and the pictures would have to be physically transported to a
naval headquarters before the information could be utilized. z
The lack of coordination has resulted in some unfortunate incidents,
one of which has hampered joint operations even further. On March 9 and
10, 1971, ASDF F-86 fighters were scheduled to practice attacking a
Japanese destroyer in the Sea of Japan. They arrived on March 10 and
carried out their attacks, only to discover that mistakes of navigation
and identification had led them to attack a Soviet ship. 3 The Defense
Agency did not report the incident immediately and when the issue was
raised in the Diet, it caused a sensation in the Japanese press. The
Defense Agency already had apologized to the Soviet Union over the
incident; however, the furor in the Diet resulted in further restrictions
on joint exercises.
Large-scale operations between the services have been the target of
Diet criticism after the Mitsuya Kenkyu controversy in 1965. The
continuing criticism has reduced joint efforts to communications
exercises although joint plans continue to be written. The lack of
cooperation between the services and the difficulties experienced in
joint exercises suggest that the joint command structure is inadequate.
Primary responsibility for joint training, joint operation and joint
planning lies with the Joint Staff Council (JSC) . It has been specifically
charged with assisting the Director-General in the following tasks:
(1) Preparation of Joint Defense Plans and coordination
of defense plans prepared by the staff offices;
12Okumiya, Interview, November 18, 1971.
General Takahashi, Interview, December 6, 1971; Malnlchl , April 21,
1971, The Japan Times , April 23, 1971.
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(2) Formulation of policies for Joint-Training Plans
and coordination of policies for training plans prepared
by the staff offices;
(3) Basic policy, and unification and coordination, of
command orders to the Self-Defense Forces at the time of
operation;
(4) Operational command and orders issued by the Director-
General to special units which are composed of units of any
two or more of the ground, the Maritime and the Air Self-
Defense Forces ...
The final task was assigned pursuant to Article 22 of the Self-
Defense Forces Law which provided that defense operations undertaken by
the SDF which involve more than one service may be commanded by the
Chairman of the Joint Staff Council.
Yet, the Joint Staff Council is extremely weak. The Chairman has
very limited authority and each chief of staff possesses veto powers on
matters under his cognizance. Efforts have been made to strengthen the
JSC. The Council already has begun work on the Fifth DBP, hoping to
take the initiative in that area. Officers assigned to the JSC have
been encouraged to "take their uniforms off" and work there to develop
a broader concept of military operations. 5 Despite those steps, many
senior officers suspect that the JSC will continue to be weak.
Part of the Council's problem has been its manning procedures.
It has had no power of selection, but has relied completely on the
individual staff offices. Balance between the branches has been
stressed, and the men assigned to the Council have been aware that they
would return to their parent service where, in all likelihood, their
performance would be judged on the benefits which accrued to the parent
14
Defense Agency Establishment Law, June 9, 1954 as amended,
official translation, Article 26.




Additionally, the civilian leadership has been aware that a
strengthened JSC might usurp some powers previously held within the
internal bureaus, and they have opposed strengthening the organization.
The problem is illustrated in the process of budgetary formulation where
the JSC has been almost completely excluded while the services deal
individually with the civilian bureaus.
Even within the uniformed services, some oppose a strengthened joint
command. The GSDF would like their own tactical aviation to provide for
ground support; the MSDF would like to have aircraft for air defense and
surface attack. They have felt that these air power functions would be
most effective under their own command and have hesitated to support the
development of joint commands which might decrease the probability that
their own air forces would continue to develop.
The GSDF's HAWK air defense missiles are one example of the situation.
They have been considered part of the air defense system of Japan. The
Air Defense Command (ADC) is an ASDF command, but the HAWK missiles have
been under GSDF control. The units have not been under the ADC's
eeramand, and have been attached only through a communication line with
a "liaison officer" in ADC headquarters. The GSDF has advocated the use
ef HAWK as a field air defense weapon, and wish to move them to forward
areas in the event of operations. Therefore, the short-range point
defense portion of the ADC system has not been under the command of the
ADC and doubts exist about its availability in the event of an emergency.
General Takahashi, Interview, December 6, 1971. Another example
of the difficulty in effecting joint commands or any structural shifts is
the Search and Air Rescue services in Japan. Four separate and often
redundant SAR organizations exist: army, navy, air force and civilian.
Despite the logic of integration in this area, all attempts have been
repulsed and the organizations will remain independent through the 4th DBP.
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This situation has arisen because a joint command network has not
been developed. Plans may have been written to effect such commands if
the situation required, but a secret plan is no substitute for an
established network where various operational units have knowledge and
experience in operations under such a system. The absence of any such
system would be a serious handicap in the event joint operations became
necessary.
Possible military actions in Asia would be affected by overlapping
defense treaties and similar security arrangements, and an additional
complexity of command must be considered. Unified commands, or inter-
national command networks, are established to facilitate operations
involving two or more national forces.
The problem of Japanese security has most often been discussed in
terms of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty. Military operations taken
pursuant to that treaty probably would require operational coordination
which raises the problem of unified U.S. -Japan command provisions. The
need for such provisions became apparent in the early stages of the
JASDF's development, and the U.S. Fifth Air Force proposed a detailed
plan for integration of JASDF-USAF operations in 1957. Efforts for the
closer integration of operations continued in the 1960's, but with little
18
euccess.
The Murphy-Okazaki Notes of January 13 and 16, 1953, have remained
in effect as an addendum to the Security Treaty and they reiterated the
U.S. commitment in terms of Japan's air defense. They did not, however,
provide for any methods or procedures whereby such a commitment could be
Fifth Air Force History , July to December 1957, provided by
Office of Air Force History, Fifth Air Force, Japan, p. 422.
18
General Ura, Interview, December 23, 1971,
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implemented. The only agreement of this nature was signed on September 2,
1959, by Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, USAF, and Lieutenant General
Matsumae Misoo, JASDF. The Burns-Matsumae document was entitled the
19
"Agreement for Conduct of Air Defense of Japan."
This agreement was "designed to facilitate operations of these two
national air forces as one cohesive air defense system." All levels of
command were directed to "coordinate" with his national opposite and
communication networks were shared, but each retained the right to take
unilateral action and coordinate later. In reality, it was an agreement
not to agree:
United States and Japan National policy, at this time,
dictates that command of military forces of either country
should only be exercised through national command channels;
therefore 5AF and JADC shall retain their respective
national chain of command. °
-e*^
There has never been any unified command network; neither procedures nor
command relationships have been resolved.
The Japanese public has been extremely sensitive to any joint command
arrangement for fear that it would spell U.S. military domination and
result in the use of Japanese forces against the government's wishes."
1953, the Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) negotiations were delayed until
the U.S. government gave public assurance that military aid would not
21 ' ^*
require Japan to use its forces "except in self-defense." 4
19Text provided^ "'_.
t J^jr William R. Barret, USAF, Planning 'giv'i
Fifth Air Force, Jan..-.
:





Ibi d j tVie Burns- 1 v-.*:.iuraae agreement remains in
- effect today.
New York Times , June 27, 1953, p. 2., also see New York Tj
January 16, 1953, and March 15, 1953, for reports of the Japanese re
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The absence of a national security law in Japan has also hampered
the establishment of unified command procedures or unified operations.
Due to sensitivity to individual rights, particularly the freedom of
expression guaranteed in Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution, it
would seem a remote possibility that one might be passed. Article 59 of
the Self-Defense Forces Law provided for the protection of information,
but the remainder of the population has remained free to publish any
information regardless of classification or sensitivity. That freedom
has been practiced with great abandon, particularly by the press and
the opposition parties.
The one possible constraint to publication of security information
resulted from the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) of March 8,
1954, in which Japan agreed to protect secrets released in conjunction
with the military aid program. However, the law has not been used in a
conviction, and there were and continue to be doubts that it would or
will be enforced. The security problem restricted training in the
operational training programs initiated by the USAF, it hampered the
operational turnover of air defense responsibilities to Japan, and it
22
restricted cooperation between the two air forces.
Perhaps the major problem in effecting a unified command lay in
Japan's unwillingness to establish Rules of Engagement. This was
specifically cited in the Burns-Matsumae Agreement:
Interceptor Operation . Interceptor Operations will be
performed in accordance with standard operating procedures;
22Walter S. HIguchi, Historical Study of JASDF Training in the
Northern Air Defense Sector
,
prepared under authority of 39th Air Division,
Fifth Air Force, Pacific Air Force, USAF, undated (1966), approximately




however, JADC interceptors will abide by JASDF Rules
of Interception and 5AF interceptors will abide by
PACAF Rules of Engagement. Any decision to engage must
be made by the respective national commander delegated
authority to commit interceptors in action to engage. ^
Authority to engage has not been delegated in the Japanese system. No
standards have been established by which Japanese interceptors may fire,
9 A
even after bombs have been dropped on Japan. The ADC must await the
order of the Prime Minister.
This has not only affected the U.S. -Japan command relationship, but
autonomous Japanese capability. The restriction obviously could be
lifted in an emergency, but it has had two harmful effects. No standards
for operational practice may be applied with certainty, which could
cause confusion in the event mobilization occurred. Secondly, the
restrictions have had a psychological effect on the pilots: if there
are no conditions which allow them to attack an intruder, what is their
25
mission and why do they sit on alert pads around Japan? As a result,
they are a police force rather than a defense force, possessing only the
authority to shoot in their personal self-defense. This has been one of
the few areas where senior JASDF commanders have not hesitated to
26
disagree publicly with current practice.
Another problem within the autonomous command network has been the
status of emergency mobilization procedures. Article 103 of the Self-Defense
23
"Agreement for Conduct of Air Defense of Japan", p. 3.
24
General Takahashi, Commander JADC, Interview, December 6, 1971.
23
Ibid .
See for example Chuck Brown, "Russ Have Edge on Japan Planes,"
Stars and Stripes
,




Forces Law has been the only legal basis for mobilization steps such
as administration of installations, use of land or other properties, the
drafting of civilian assistance, and the expropriation of properties.
While the article might be relied on for authority in some forms of
mobilization, it has provided very little procedural guidance. It does
refer to certain articles of the National Disaster Relief Law, Law
Number 118 of 1947, but these provisions go only slightly beyond the
27generalities of Article 103. The article also declares that Cabinet
Orders will be issued to establish procedures for mobilization; as of
1971, no Cabinet Order on the subject had been issued. There have been
efforts from time to time, and the last drafting was done under the
^ 28
authority of Director-General Masuda who served during 1967 and 1968.
No work on a Cabinet Order was underway in 1971.
There are other laws which could provide the framework for mobili-
zation procedures. One related document is a Basic Law of National
29
Mobilization which was passed by the Diet in 1966. Diet discussions
specifically excepted it from application to defense mobilization;
however, it does provide for disaster control teams, fire fighting squads,
and first aid squads. Also included are measures for control of an
emergency broadcast system, and an emergency transportation and supply
30
system. It authorizes nothing, but has established a limited framework
for executing some related emergency measures.
2'The applicable articles are 23.2 paragraphs 1, 2, 3; 24,
paragraphs 1-5; 25; and 29.
28
Major Torino, Interview, February 10, 1972.
29
The law was pointed out to me by a Defense Agency official when I




Air Force planners have concerned themselves with possible measures
in the event of mobilization. For example, they have maintained close
relations with Japan's major overseas carrier, Japan Air Lines (JAL) , and
31been aware of its plans and operations. Regular conferences consider
matters of common interest. A former JASDF Chief of Staff was an
advisor to JAL and maintained a desk in the JAL operations center. The
JASDF has kept abreast of JAL plans and operations, and knows the average
number of aircraft overseas in the event a need arose for emergency
32logistical support.
Although measures cited above have had some application and ad hoc
plans have been at least discussed, the defense mobilization procedures
have remained less than satisfactory. Attempts to apply the Basic
Mobilization Law or to draft emergency laws could cause difficult
controversies when the emergency was at hand. The ill-fated Mitsuya
Kenkyu study dealt with mobilization requirements; it concluded that the
mobilization capacity was insufficient. 33 Current mobilization procedures
have not improved substantially; emergency air combat supply measures
34have remained inadequate. No integrated, nation-wide communications
system suitable for military use has been established.
The emergency command and control network and related mobilization
procedures, political and military, have been poorly defined and would
3
*Captain Kimoto Eijii, Director, Senior Flight Crew Office, Japan
Air Lines, Interview, December 7, 1971.
32Kimoto, Interview, December 7, 1971. Aoki, Interview, October 20,
1971. JAL now has 65 aircraft including 11 or 12 747 's; 35 or more 747's
are planned.
"General Ogawa, Interview, March 4, 1972.
34
General Sato, Interview, February 28, 1972.





provide little guidance in a defense emergency.
Intelligence and Reconnaissance
One basic difficulty in a defensive posture lies in the advantage
of initiative which accrues to the attacker. Accurate intelligence
estimates and thorough reconnaissance can help to blunt the disadvantage
of a defensive position. The intelligence gathering functions become
even more crucial in the event the force structure is not operationally
ready in some respects. Time to mobilize and augment the force structure
may be obtained only through adequate warning.
The Japanese have recognized this requirement, and Director-General
Nakasone emphasized the need for good intelligence to make autonomous
defense a reality. He declared that "Japan's posture may be likened to
that of a porcupine with the long ears of a rabbit. "36
Recent plans proposed by Nakasone included centralization of the
intelligence process, using the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency as an
example. Each service was to retain tactical collection capacities;
however, long-range collection and analysis was to be directed by a
civilian office with status similar to the Joint Staff Office and
attached to the Joint Staff Council. It would be headed by a civilian
and would have its work reviewed by an Intelligence Evaluation Committee
37led by the Administrative Vice-Minister.
This plan was met by resistance from all three services. Each
feared that its special interests would suffer in the process of integration.
Additionally, the uniformed personnel were unwilling to turn over another
•if:





, July 5, 1970; Mainichi , May 29, 1971; JPE Aviation
Report
, July 26, 1971.
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facet of military operations to the civilian sector of the JDA. After
Nakasone left the JDA, the pressure for centralized intelligence decreased
and almost no progress towards integration has occurred.
The "long ears of the rabbit" had not become very long by 1971. The
JDA maintained 18 defense attaches overseas; however, they reported
directly to the Foreign Ministry. Only after the Foreign Ministry
reviewed their reports would relevant data be forwarded to the Defense
Agency. Intelligence funding has been quite limited and the intelligence
community has relied heavily on the United States.
Japan's physical proximity to China and the Soviet Union has enabled
it to use passive techniques in intelligence gathering, including
electronic intelligence. The passive, listening techniques have been
well suited to JASDF efforts in radar or other electronic analysis. The
growing overseas communities of Japanese also have provided a human
source of information. Even the limited amounts of data which the
Japanese gather independently, often depend on United States analysis for
38
effective application.
The one reconnaissance squadron has been equipped with 20 RF-86F's.
The aircraft is basically the F-36 of Korean war vintage with cameras
rather than guns. It Is quite outdated, flies more slowly than most
civil airliners today, and has no Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) or
Electronic Counter Counter-Measures (ECCM) capability.
The F-86 has no independent navigation system, nor does it have the
range to be an effective offshore reconnaissance weapon. The MSDF must
38
This is not to say that the Individual intelligence officers are
not capable. They are very professional and well aware of their
shortages, but analysis relies on sophisticated equipment which has not
been funded. Nor is their reliance on the U.S. a one way street as the




rely on their P-2 and PS-1 patrol aircraft for maritime reconnaissance.
While those aircraft are capable of operating against submarines and
unarmed ships, they are helpless against warships. Were the RF-86 to
locate a ship and photograph it, the film would not be utilized
effectively. The JASDF has not been capable of analysis, and no communi-
cations network has been established to transmit these data from air
force bases to naval headquarters. The RF-86 could not be expected to
have any operational effectiveness outside a close support tactical
reconnaissance role.
The RF-86 will be replaced by fourteen RF-4E aircraft which Japan
hopes to buy in 1972. The original JASDF request for 21 was first cut to
18 and then 14. The RF-4 will give the JASDF a new generation of
reconnaissance aircraft and will enhance their capability, although the
39
small number of aircraft limits the scope and versatility of operations.
Japan, therefore, will continue to possess a limited intelligence
capacity and tactical reconnaissance capability. Both of these functions
are basic to autonomous defense. The ears of the rabbit are more
predilection than reality.
Mobility-Supply
Aircraft can provide rapid transhipment of men and supplies enhancing
the force structure's capability for surprise and flexibility. This
mobility may be tactical or strategic, ranging from intra-battlef ield
transport to inter-continental transport.
on
Tachibana Hasateru, "Senryaku-Senjutsu Teisatsu to Nippon no Boku"
(Strategic and Tactical Reconnaissance and Japan's Air Defense), Oun.1
1
Cenkyu (Japan Military Review), December 1971, pp. 94-95.
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The GSDF has provided its own intra-battlefield transport, primarily
with helicopters. In December 1971, the GSDF inventory included 90
multi-mission, medium capacity helicopters and 30 large transport
helicopters. The Fourth DBP tentatively authorized 11 more multi-purpose
craft and 4 more transports. The Chief of Staff of the GSDF was
quoted as saying "the strengthening of air mobility" is a major pillar
41
of the Fourth DBP. It has appeared that the GSDF will continue to
dominate the intra-battlefield aspect of aviation-based mobility. 42
The Japanese force structure has had no capability for long-range,
inter-continental mobility. The JASDF Transport Wing consisted of 40 C-46,
10 YS-11 and 2 C-l aircraft in 1971. The C-46 is pre-World War II
vintage and was being phased out of operations. The YS-11 is a Japanese-
designed aircraft, built primarily as a commercial carrier. With a
11,900 pound pay load, the operating range is approximately 670 nautical
miles (Nil) . If the payload is decreased to 7800 pounds , the range may
43be extended to 1200 nautical miles. The YS-11 may be operated from
^Wing International , January 18, 1972, p. 5.
"S^ing Shimbun , General Nakaraura in Interview; p. 10.
The GSDF's emphasis on airborne mobility has been criticized by
some observers who note that the GSDF does not have enough anti-aircraft
armament, cannons, or even mortars and pistols. Yet, airborne mobility
is useless without air superiority. These views were expressed by Mr.
Aoki and Mr. Taoka in "Tokubetsu az Dandai 4 Jibo no Kobu Keikaku or Kiru"
(Special Discussion: Review of the Aviation Portion of the 4th Defense
Build-up Plan), panel discussion, Koku Joho
,
(Aireview) , January 1972,
pp. 75-76. Mr. Kaihara also criticized the GSDF priorities in "We Have
to Know Them as Well as Ourselves," pp. 59-63, and noted that the GSDF has
many helicopters but only enough machine gun bullets for 11 minutes of
sustained firing per gun. Another reason for this priority could be the
GSDF's expectation that the helicopters could be later converted to an
attack mission, see discussion of air-to-ground attack, infra .
The maximum pay load is approximately 15000 lbs. (depending on model
and configuration) , but range is less than 200 NM with reserve fuel and
600 NM to dry tanks with that load.
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short runways as it only requires 4300 feet of operating length.
The JASDF has planned to replace the aging C-46 with the C-l, a
short-haul military cargo aircraft designed and built in Japan. This
aircraft is capable of using short, unpaved fields, and can drop
paratroops and palletized vehicles. The C-l, although larger than the
YS-11, still faces range limitations. The aircraft cannot carry its
maximum payload, approximately 10 tons, from Hokkaido to Kyushu.
Moreover, the inventory requirements generated by the JASDF received
an extensive, if common, trimming. Initially, 50 C-l's were contemplated
by the uniformed planners. However, the number proposed dropped to "at
least 40" of which 4 would be pre-production models. During October
1970, the number dropped to 32, then "about 30" during 1971 as the Fourth
46
DBP Draft was written. Of the 22 aircraft proposed in the 1972 budget,
47
11 were approved. The JASDF faced the prospect of further pressure on
the overall Fourth DBP, and it appeared unlikely that the cuts would be
restored later.
Mobilization capacity will remain doubtful during the period of the
Fourth Defense Build-up Plan. The JASDF will be operating between 20 and
30 transport aircraft. If pipeline requirements and operational readiness
maintenance limitations are considered, the capacity of the entire fleet
will be less than 200 tons per mission over 700 nautical mile staging.
The Ground Self-Defense Force, because of its small size and its deployment,
JPE Aviation Report , October 19, 1970, p. 4. Ranges: approx.
650 NM at 9.6 tons, 1100 NM at 6.5 tons and 1600 NM at 2.6 tons.
A5Ibid. , October 5, 1970, p. 4.
A6 Ibid. , October 19, 1970, p. 3, and May 10, 1971, p. 5.
Wing International
,
January 18, 1972, p. 5; 1 YS-11 transport
was approved for the MSDF which has a limited logistical capability of
less than ten aircraft.
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would require a rapid reaction if it faced an assault at an unexpected
area of the home islands, however, the Air Transport Wing would not
provide significant mobility.
Air-to-Ground Attack
The first two categories of aviation power considered do not apply
force directly, but perform supporting roles which facilitate the use of
force. The final three missions are divisions of one concept, the direct
application of force with an aerodynamic weapons system. There obviously
is more than one way to categorize the missions of attack aircraft.
Missions may be divided by range, strategic or tactical; by individual
targets, another aircraft or missile; or by the medium of the target,
ground, sea or air.
This last division is particularly appropriate for Japan. There
have been no strategic attack forces in post-war Japan, at least in the
sense that no Japanese weapons system has had the capability to attack
the homeland of an adversary. Therefore, a strategic-tactical categori-
zation has little relevance. In addition to its air defense mission,
the JASDF has had a responsibility for support of the GSDF and the MSDF.
Those responsibilities correspond to air-to-sea and air-to-ground divisions.
Army support can require two different attack missions, interdiction
or close support. Interdiction, or attacks on ground-based supply lines,
would be relatively unimportant in the Japanese case. The attacker's
supply lines would be on the sea until late in a losing war. Therefore,
the primary ground attack mission for the air force has been close air
support, direct attacks in support of army movements.
Four of the seven F-86 squadrons in the JASDF have trained for the
surface attack role which includes both ground and maritime support.
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Approximately 100 F-86F fighters have been dedicated to such missions,
however, maintenance limitations would lower the number of operational
aircraft available.
The pilots flying in the F-86 fighter-support squadrons do train
differently from their counterparts in F-86 fighter-interceptor squadrons.
They emphasize tactical support, air-to-ground gunnery and various bombing
48deliveries rather than the air-to-air phases of combat. " Live practice
in the support missions has been limited; the wing at Matsushima, for
example, has had an average five periods per year with the ground
forces. During those practice periods, the pilots have the chance to
operate with forward air controllers on simulated missions using cameras.
The F-86 doei not have great flexibility as a fighter-support
aircraft. It is an old airplane, and stress limitations have been
lowered on the airframe as structural weaknesses appear. A standard
weapons load for the F-86 could include 2 1000 lb. bombs, 1A 2.5 inch
rockets, and 1800 rounds of .50-calibre ammunition. With this load, its
49
combat radius would be 200 NM with five minutes on station. F-86's
based on the northern tip of Honshu at Misawa Air Base could not reach
the northern half of Hokkaido. Unless they could operate from Chitose
Air Base, the only suitable field in Hokkaido, airborne support would be
very limited in the event Hokkaido was invaded in the north.
48
The F-86 fighter-interceptor squadrons do include some support
missions in their annual requirements. The F-104 squadrons do no air-to-
surface practice and it is doubtful that they could have any value in a
supporting role.
aqF-104 performance is less satisfactory here, as it has a 100 NM
radius (hi-lo-hi) of action on a bombing mission. This, coupled with the
high loss rate when using the F-104 as a ground-support aircraft explains
why the Japanese have not used the F-104 in such a role.
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Close air support requires the closest cooperation between airborne
and ground forces, and this has proven difficult in Japan. The ASDF has
had no operational command chain dedicated to this role. Air Support
Operations Centers (ASOC) have been established in the three regional
sectors of the Air Defense Command and the JASDF has envisioned these
posts as liaison centers with the GSDF and the MSDF in the event of
emergency. As with the internal chain of command, establishing an
effective network of command and liaison in an emergency is an extremely
difficult task. As has been noted, joint practice periods have been
limited, and larger joint manuevers have been even less frequent.
One of the underlying factors behind the lack of cooperation may be
the GSDF's desire 'for their own airborne support. They have studied the
adaption of their helicopter fleet to gunships and rocket platforms, and
one of the design goals of the new Japanese helicopter will be an improved
weapons delivery platform. The GSDF leadership has been well aware of
ASDF limitations in the ground support role and has believed that the
ideal airborne support force should be under an integrated command. This
has not become an official GSDF position, but it would appear possible
that they might take such a stand in the future. Part of the GSDF's
emphasis on multi-role helicopters could be based on the 'secondary'
mission of close air support.
JPE Aviation Report , October 5, 1970, p. 6, and December 7, 1970,
p. 2.
General Muraoka, GSDF, Interview, December 20, 1971. They might
be supported by the MSDF who also has aspired to its tactical air arm,
infra . Such a development would relegate the JASDF to one direct combat
mission, air defense. The GSDF has evaluated fixed-wing support aircraft
such as the North-American OV-10 and Hawker-Siddely Harrier (V/STOL).
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The ASDF has pinned its future support capability to the FST-2,
which will be a development of the T-2 designed by Mitsubishi. It is
highly probable that the aircraft was originally designed with the close
support mission in mind. It is much larger than necessary for a training
aircraft and it resembles similar light attack aircraft in design and
52performance. The force level problem also has arisen in this
development program although no funds were to be requested until FY 1973
and deliveries were not to begin until 1974. The JASDF request for 126
FST-2 's was incorporated into the Fourth DBP draft. By October 1971,
JASDF delayed the purchase of thirty support aircraft to the Fifth DBP,
and it appeared that another 20 to 30 aircraft would be cut in negotiations
with the Finance Ministry. ^4 Therefore, JASDF probably will complete the
Fourth DBP with 3 fighter-support squadrons of 60-70 FST-2.
The 100 to 120 F-AE(J) Phantoms, primarily air defense oriented,
will help to provide the JASDF with greater flexibility in close support.
That capability will depend on the training given F-A pilots, the annual
requirements within the F-A squadrons, and the armament options which are
available to complement the basic aircraft. Without substantial reinforce-
ment from the F-A squadrons, the JASDF close support capability will
remain quite limited.
52
It is comparable to the British Jaguar or the American F-5.
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Nihon Keizai , October 22, 1970, JPE Aviation Report , May 10,
1971, p. 5.
5A
JPE Aviation Report , October 18, 1971.
Performance data on the aircraft is not available as the fighter-
support version is still on the drawing boards. Its basic size and





Japan is an island nation; the ocean is both an avenue of intercourse
with other nations and a barrier to them. A hostile sea could isolate
Japan, and there are those who have contended that Japan's sea lanes
must be protected. Interpretation of the Constitution has prohibited
the protection of the sea lanes, but there remains an important need for
sea power without that consideration. In the words of one Japanese
military critic: "Japan is an island country and the basic idea is to
prevent a landing by an aggressor." 5 ' It is natural that Japan would
prefer to defend the state on the sea surrounding it, minimizing where
possible the destruction and disruption of the homeland. This concept
was emphasized in the draft of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan:
....to secure air superiority and the control of the sea
over the areas surrounding Japan to the extent necessary
to limit damages and repel such aggression in its very
initial stage. 58
There are three separate areas where air power may contribute to the
control of the sea surrounding Japan. Airborne weapons systems may
attack submarines, surface ships or aircraft.
The airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role has been retained
by the JMSDF. ASW has been one of the most important MSDF missions and
There are also those who believe such strategies are archaic,
for a detailed description of the different views see Auer, ojn. cit . ,
pp. 276-312.
Mr. Murakami Karu, quoted in Kokujoho , December 1971, p. 51.
58






has been the primary purpose of the Fleet Air Force. The MSDF has
relied primarily on the Lockeed P-2V-7 and the. P-2J, a turboprop version
of the P-2V. The MSDF's request for their new ASW platform, the PS-1
flying boat, was cut drastically and it appeared that they would be
forced to continue to rely on the P-2. The ASW electronics package in the
P-2 is not completely modern, and the absence of nuclear weaponry makes
the submarine localization process even more critical. The MSDF
"operational, fixed-wing inventory" for ASW operations in 1971 was less
60
than 50 aircraft. That inventory is inadequate for a nation surrounded
by the ocean, and would appear to have severely restricted its capability
to carry out offensive and defensive ASW operations.
Both surf ace' attack and fleet air defense have been the responsibility
of the JASDF. However, it has had no capacity for fleet air defense
outside its land-oriented Air Defense Command. The only areas in which
MSDF might benefit from the air cover are those covered incidentally as
a result of the main air defense system. Such overlap has been minimal,
and the JMSDF has established an Air Defense Command within the fleet.
The MSDF's capability for air defense was limited to one guided missile
destroyer in 1971. However, three more guided missile destroyers were
programmed and the use of anti-air missiles on other ships has been
considered. VTCL aircraft have also been studied with a view toward their
Two excellent critiques of JMSDF ASW posture are Captain Robert
J. Harlow, U.S.N, (ret.), "A Review of Japanese Naval Air Posture, 1970,"
September 1970, courtesy of Captain Harlow (translated and printed in
Japanese, Asagumo) and Okumiya Masatake, "Japan's Naval Air Strength,"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings , December 1971.
60Harlow, Ibid .
,
pp. 15-16. Captain Harlow disregarded the S2F
aircraft which was being phased out.
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possible use on large destroyers or helicopter platforms.
Support of the MSDF through surface attack has remained the major
area in which the JASDF retained sole responsibility. The air force
leaders have recognized the need to support the naval forces and have
worked toward such a capability. The 4 F-86F squadrons training for this
mission have been the same 4 squadrons which have been preparing for
close air support. The aircraft limitations previously discussed apply
here as well as other limitations peculiar to attacking naval targets.
The F-86 has no internal navigation system, and the overwater portion
of a surface attack flight must rely on dead-reckoning (DR.) navigation.
The F-86F has no special weaponry designed for ships, and must use
regular bombs. The range of the F-86 precludes attack support outside
150 NM from the coastline.
Training opportunities have been limited, even for those squadrons
dedicated to the support mission. The 7th Squadron at Matsushima has
flown an average of 12 sorties every 3 months against surface ships;
twice each year a few pilots fly hot missions against naval targets.
Some squadron pilots had not flown such a mission though they had been
in a fighter support squadron for two years.
As was the case in the GSDF-ASDF relationship, some hesitancy
toward further cooperation may result from the MSDF's wish for a more
extensive air arm. Naval aviation has been interested in establishing
its own fleet air defense system incorporating aircraft and missiles.
Realizing that carriers may be far in the future, aircraft with vertical
take-off and landing capacity have been investigated. A vertical take-off
JPE Aviation Report , September 14, 1970, and November 30, 1970,
also Vice Admiral Samejima lliroshi, Commander, Naval Air Training Command,
Interview, December 22, 1971.
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and landing (VTOL) aircraft similar to the British Harrier would also
give the MSDF an attack capability. MSDF leaders would prefer their own
reconnaissance and attack forces, but see no chance before the Fifth
DBP. 62
The limited weapons system, the restricted training and the absence
of joint manuevers lowered standards; as a result, incidents were likely
to occur when the JASDF began to emphasize maritime support. The ASDF
was scheduled to participate in a MSDF exercise involving an 'enemy' and
'friendly' fleet during November 1969. ' The enemy fleet waited
throughout the day for an attack, and when it did not come they queried
the air commanders. They were assured that they had been attacked and
all aircraft had returned safely. The enemy fleet later discovered it
was the friendly fleet which had been attacked. The aircraft had returned
without discovering their error. Then, on March 10, 1971, ASDF fighters
mistook a Soviet destroyer for Japanese, and made practice attacks in an
.ncident already described.
These incidents resulted in additional restrictions on joint
manuevers at sea; any progress in maritime support capability was further
delayed. The FST-2 will not increase JASDF capabilities significantly
unless training techniques and weapons options are modified to focus on
the mission. Although air-to-surface missiles have been discussed, no
fi7
The MSDF would have preferred some role in reconnaissance after
the selection of the RF-A to replace the RF-86. No changes in command
and control have been announced although the internal bureaus at one
joint had suggested an ASDF pilot, in command, fly in the front seat while
m MSDF pilot fly in the rear.
This was the "S" manuever. The story was related to me by




money has been funded for research and development. The ASDF has not
been capable of effectively projecting air power into peripheral seas.
Air-to-Air Attack
Air-to-air combat may take two forms; one pits fighter against
fighter in an air superiority conflict, the other sends fighter against
bomber in an air defense role. These missions are distinct, and
different characteristics are required of the defensive aircraft. An
interceptor must have superior climb, airspeed and penetration capabili-
ties. An air superiority fighter is not faced with the evasion problem
because the offensive fighter is attacking it. Therefore, acceleration,
manueverability ar:d multiple weapons capabilities are particularly useful
to the air superiority fighter. Air superiority has been deetnphasized
in Japan in favor of pure air defense.
Japan stressed air defense from the inception of the Air Self-
Defense Force. The air defense mission, taken by Japan in a formal
ceremony on July 1, 1960, has represented the first line of defense.
Many reasons, historical, political and technical, lie behind the primacy
of air defense. Air defense demands on the budget have been alloted
first priority. The only major operational command is the Air Defense
Command. It has not been just a primary mission, it has been the primary
mission. The other air power roles discussed have been relegated to
less than secondary roles.
A significant controversy has arisen recently in Japan over air
defense capability. The general presumption during the 1960's was that
the air defense role was being filled adequately by the ASDF. Although
^Nippon no Anzen Hosho
,
p. 128, reports that the ASM is being
liscussed in terms of future DBP's.
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it could not defend against a missile attack, its anti-aircraft capability
received a rather uncritical analysis, particularly in the United
States. 65
Kaihara Osamu, Secretary-General of the National Defense Council,
and Ogawa Raita, editor of Koku Shimbun and long-time observer of
aviation affairs have been two of Japan's more outspoken critics of air
defense capacity. ° Kaihara has stressed the lack of war material, the
vulnerability of the radar sites and the airfields, and the lack of
operational training. He disagreed with the assumption that a maximum
of 500 aircraft can attack Japan and pointed out that the Soviet Union
may have over 1600 aircraft in Asia. Ogawa also deplored the vulnerability
of the radar network and the bases. He has been particularly critical
of the combat command structure and mobilization capacity, and has
contended that operational communications and supply have been insufficient.
These two informed observers have concluded that the air defense system
is very weak. In Mr. Ogawa' s words: "there is no complete air defense
,,67
weapons system.
See Weinstein, "Japan's Air Self-Defense Force—Restrained but
Powerful," Air Force and Space Digest , Volume 50, No. 12, December 1967,
Willis, "Japan Scrambles in Earnest," The Christian Science Monitor
,
September 13, 1969, and Major Gilbert M. Billings Jr., "Japan's Air Self-
Defense Force," Air University Review , July/August 1965. These men cited
weaknesses, but still made the general presumption that JASDF's air
defense was a coherent operational system, a presumption which deserves
at least to be examined.
""Mr. Ogawa was a zero pilot in the UN and has been a long-time
friend of the ASDF. In addition to numerous interviews with both men in
which we discussed these views, see the following published sources.
Kaihara, "We Should Know Ourselves," pp. 70-87, and Ogawa, "Problems of
the Air Self-Defense Force," and "Problems of the Air Self-Defense Force
at the End of the Third Defense Build-up Plan," Koku Shimbun , July 28,
1971.
Interview, March 3, 1972.

332
Another view of air defense capabilities has been most ably expressed
by Mr. Aoki Hideo, recently retired from the ASDF and now the editor of
Kokuj oho . " Mr. Aoki served as a defense planner and has been perhaps
the best informed JASDF supporter. Although he has recognized some
weaknesses, particularly the vulnerability of the bases, he has disagreed
with the pessimism of other critics. He has assumed that the Soviet
Union would not launch more than 500 aircraft because it would fear
counter-attacks from United States forces. Aoki has argued that the
radar network would be capable of handling such a force, and the defensive
interceptors would have a great advantage because of radar control and
greater endurance. Therefore, the attacker would need a numerical
advantage, and he has suggested that the often used ratio of 3 attackers
to 1 defender is the minimum required of a force attacking Japan. He has
contended that the effects of air attacks on bases and radars have been
exaggerated and that emergency deployments of Japan's fighter aircraft
would be possible.
Mr. Aoki concluded that the ASDF has not been evaluated properly.
"
Its critics have tended to overemphasize the power of the potential enemy,
and overcriticize Japanese capability because they knew more about it.
The deterrent effect has not been considered; it remains important to put
yourself in the other man's position; "after evaluating the radar network,
alert conditions, SAM missiles and U.S. Treaty structure. This is a very
£ o
In addition to an interview with Mr. Aoki, October 20, 1971, the
following articles are especially representative of his views; "It is
Possible to Protect The Japanese Sky," KokuJoho , October 1971, pp. 41-50,
"Autonomous Defense and Japan's Air Defense Capabilities," Gunji Kenkyu ,
1 July 1971, pp. 160-171.
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difficult country to attack."
Both viewpoints have been expressed in great detail, but without
critical evaluations of the assumptions made in each, definitive
comparisons would be repetitive and time consuming. However, there is
an alternative approach to the problem. One may agree with Mr. Aoki that
it is important to consider the problem from the attacker's position.
Before deciding to attack, the enemy would carefully study the Japanese
air defense system.
It is possible to examine the air defense system without relying on
assumptions regarding the size or nature of the attacking force. The
air defense mission requires four distinct operational phases: detection,
identification, interception, and destruction. Each of these phases
may be considered a link in the chain of air defense. It is only as
strong as the weakest link.
Detection is a momentary phase, completed when the enemy aircraft,
or bogey, is first observed on the radar screens. Detection range
depends on different variables including the altitude of the target,
the height and strength of the antenna, and the reflection area of the
target. For purposes of system assessment, all variables except bogey
altitude may be held constant, and the system may be evaluated in terms
of detection distance as a function of altitude.
Theoretically, the range of the Japanese radar system is computed
at 350 NM, but actual practice has given an operating detection range
of 220 NM at 70,000 feet. Range begins• to decrease below 10, 000 feet,
lowering to 60 NM at 1000 feet. Detection initiates »:he interception
70Aoki, "Autonomous Defense," loc. cit
. , pp. 169--170.
71
Aoki, "Protect the Japanese Sky," loc. cit
. , p . 44.
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solution and a shorter detection range will provide less time in which
to localize and destroy the incoming hostile target.
There are other characteristics of the radar network which bear on
its reliability and survivability. Figure 10-2 displays the 24 radar
72
sites which makeup the homeland radar network. The outer radii drawn
from the stations depict an optimum 220 NM range. While detection ranges
overlap at optimum detection altitude, the radars are arranged linearly
along the coast. If detection range decreases due to altitude or
electronic countermeasures , the problem becomes more acute as the inner
radii indicate. The destruction of four radar sites would be required
to establish a radar-clear track to the coastline at optimum altitude
although the failure of any three consecutive sites would hamper detection
seriously. A 5000 foot penetration could escape radar detection if one
site was destroyed.
The lack of depth in the network has made individual site survival
more critical and it has been an area of much concern. The radar sites
were built above ground and no point defense system was provided.
Their only defense lies with the interceptor fleet. A low-flying,
subsonic attack aircraft flying at 1000 feet and 600 knots could be over
a radar site 6 minutes after detection making it impossible to launch
aircraft in time to defend the sites.
The next phase of interception is identification, or a series of
radar localization steps which determine the aircraft to be hostile and
refine its location to the extent necessary to launch an interceptor.
The Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system facilitates these
steps and cuts the initial lag time from 4 minutes to 2 minutes or less.




FIGURE 10-2. Air Defense Radar Sites and Detection Ranges











Detection Range: Bogey at
40,000 feet.




BADGE is a computer system which enables the radar network to handle
300 to 500 aircraft simultaneously. Mr. Kaihara has warned, however,
that the system remains radar limited because the computer can not
73
overcome radar parameters. While 300 to 500 targets may be handled
across the network, a concentrated attack could overload individual sites,
The aircraft are on five-minute alert pads and there would be that
additional time delay before they launched. The total detection-to-
launch time would be approximately 9 minutes for manual operations and
6 minutes for BADGE identification. BADGE was operating approximately
10 hours per day in 1971. The system was capable of operations up to
12 hours each day without modification of the computer.
Interception; the third phase of the problem, may be considered
both in respect to elapsed time and area of coverage. Three separate
weapons systems are dedicated to the air defense of Japan. One other
system, HAWK, may be available for the mission. The first defense in
chronological terms is the aircraft. Seven F-104 squadrons and 3 F-86F
squadrons were assigned to the fighter-interceptor mission in 1971.
There were three operational NIKE batallions, located in Hokkaido,
Kyushu and Tokyo. There were 8 batallions of the mobile HAWK which is
a mach 3 SAM capable of intercepts to 50,000 feet and approximately
18 NM. Due to their mobility and the unpredictability of the command
structure, they are not depicted on Figure 10-3, which illustrates
the range of Japanese air defense weapons systems.
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"We Have to Know Them," loc . cit ., pp. 21-22.
7/,Aoki, "Protect the Japanese Sky," loc . cit .
,
p. 44.
75Boei Nippo (The Defense Daily), April 13, 1965. There were about
600-650 missiles available to the HAWK Battallions in 1971.
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FIGURE 10-3. Air Defense Intercept Ranges
C*
F-104 Combat Radius





Three squadrons of F-86F, totalling approximately 80 aircraft, remain
dedicated to interception. The F-86, with a 25,000 foot service ceiling,
has a maximum intercept altitude of 35,000 feet with guns and 40,000 feet
with missiles. However, it takes the F-86 17 minutes to climb to
35,000 feet if wing tanks are dropped and 30 minutes if they are not.
Severe range restrictions impair operations without tanks. Its slow
speed, less than modern airliners, further degrades its capability. In
the words of one F-86 pilot; "for the F-86 to have any chance of success,
it must be on a combat air patrol (CAP) and be equipped with missiles."
The excessive fuel which would be required to keep F-86's on station with
CAP procedures would seem to preclude that manuever. Therefore, it is
doubtful that the F-86 can have any effective role in the air defense
evolution. It has not been included in Figure 10-3.
The F-104 was Japan's premier air defense weapon in 1971. Its
time from launch to 40,000 feet altitude and 150 NM range is approximately
8 minutes in an afterburner climb. If military power is used, the inter-
cept will exceed 12 minutes. The F-104' s combat radius does not extend
77past 150 NM if the bogey penetration speed exceeds Mach 1. The combat
radius was calculated assuming that the aircraft carried two fuel tanks
78
which would be jettisoned. The fuel tanks use two weapon stations,
leaving the aircraft with 4 stations for heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles.
These are optimum altitudes; hot weather, for example, would
lower the altitudes.
Regardless of bogey altitude. The F-104 has reduced fuel
consumption at 60,000 feet but intercepts downward are difficult because
of wind shifts and control sloppiness at that altitude. This information
is based in part on published information about the F-104, but primarily
on interviews with officers who fly it.
TO
If they are not jettisoned, acceleration to MAC1I 2 would take 6
|minutes versus 90 seconds and use more fuel. If tanks are not carried,
the aircraft's combat radius drops to 75 NM.
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Intercept at 150 NM would leave the F-104 capable of making one stern
missile attack. Upon completion of such an attack, its fuel state
would require the aircraft to return directly to base; there would not be
enough fuel for any air-to-air combat, even in self-defense.
The ranges portrayed in Figure 10-3 are rather inflexible because
of the lack of adequate dispersal procedures and suitable alternative
bases. Mr. Aoki noted that other fields may be used in an emergency and
79
that fuels could be substituted. While that may be correct, the fields
would not have armaments, communication networks and the operational
support necessary to re-use the aircraft effectively.
Komatsu has been the optimum Japanese air base with relation to its
utilization of the intercept capabilities of the F-104. As Figure 10-3
indicates, the intercept areas of the aircraft and missiles overlap to a
great extent around the other bases. The overlap tends to detract from
each system's capability as the two systems cannot attack simultaneously.
The F-104 is capable of intercepting a 40,000 foot Mach 1.2 bogey
86 NM from the air base if the enemy aircraft is bound for the base.
If the enemy aircraft approaches at 5000 feet, interception is still
feasible; but at 1000 feet the base is indefensible, even to a subsonic,
80
600 knot penetration.
The intercept capability is influenced by the number of available
aircraft; for example, a large Inventory could permit effective deployment
of operational detachments. In raw figures, JASDF had 190 F-104' s in
1971. However, that basic inventory did not equal the number of operational
79
Protect the Japanese Sky," loc . cit .
,
p. 49.
80A11 of Japan is defenseless to a 1000 foot, Mach 1.7 attack.
This is not a suggestion that such a threat exists in force, it is an
example of the system's parameters.

340
aircraft available. The first consideration is the aircraft pipeline:
"the term pipeline originated with the oil industry and refers to the
81
oil needed to fill the pipes before delivery can commence." An
aircraft must return to the factory on a certain cycle during its
lifetime. The frequency and length of these periods could vary depending
on age, complexity, design, size, and the environment of the aircraft.
The pipeline unavailability for the U.S. Navy F-4 has been 22 percent.
If a similar 20 percent reduction was applied to the F-104 fleet, it
would leave 152 aircraft available to the squadrons. Those aircraft
would then subject to local maintenance readiness requirements, and
assuming an optimum 90 percent squadron readiness, 136 aircraft would
remain. This limited number of interception aircraft would also limit
the flexibility of the force.
Figure 10-3 depicts the ranges of the NIKE missiles which have
been estimated at 40 NM in the case of the 4 NIKE-AJAX squadrons in
Kyushu and 135 NM in the case of the 4 NIKE-J squadrons in the Tokyo
area and the 3 in Hokkaido. Each launcher squadron had 9 launchers,
making a total of 36 launchers around the Tokyo area, for example.
The missile is capable of reaction and intercept necessary to reach
most high performance air-breathing aircraft. Japan did not have an
anti-missile capability in 1972.
The ranges depicted in Figure 10-3 also illustrate the sporadic
nature of any fleet air defense capability. The optimum 150 NM is not
indicative of actual capability in the event of a low altitude attack
1Captain T. R. McClellan, U.S. Navy, "Aircraft Pipeline, The Tail








on an offshore ship. Low altitude engagement further reduces the range
of the F-104 to approximately 100 NM.
Destruction, the final phase of air defense, is the end product of
the interception process and is normally evaluated in terms of a ratio
of success to failure, or probability of kill (PK) . Two factors determine
the PK: the armament on the interceptor and its ability to penetrate
the defenses of the attacker.
The F-104 carries four heat-seeking missiles and a 20 MM cannon.
The cannon is generally ineffective in high speed intercepts, and
particularly so in a head on profile where two Mach 1 aircraft close in
S3
excess of 116,000 feet per second. Heat-seeking missiles must be
launched from the astern of their intended targets in order to function
properly. Therefore, the stern intercept has been the only effective
intercept profile for the F-104 (J); this profile requires a speed
advantage and is costly in terms of fuel and time.
The F-104' s guns are completely ineffective in other than visual
conditions. Heat-seeking missiles do not track reliably against a cloud
covered background. Therefore, instrument conditions severely limit
84
the probability of kill.
An attacking aircraft has at least two possible defenses against
interception, and the first is manuever. A manuevering aircraft is
particularly effective against a heat-rseeking missile. Secondly, it may
employ electronic counter measures (ECM) . ECM may be utilized during
go
See details of the intercept problem in Harlow, "Some Notes on Air
Defense In Japan - 1971," Kokubo (The National Defense), December 1971,
original english courtesy of Captain Harlow.
84
The NIKE is not hampered by weather, however it is susceptible




all phases of the air defense evolution. The attacker may attempt to
delay detection, slow identification and prevent localization by the
interceptor.
Training and practice for ECM and ECCM has been quite limited in the
JASDF. It has been forced to rely on U.S. aircraft to provide ECM
services for practice. The F-104 has limited ECM capability, and its
radar has been ineffective against a target which was emitting ECM.
Almost all modern attack aircraft have some ECM capability, and it has
become relatively simple and inexpensive to adapt elementary ECM measures.
It was difficult to take exception with one F-104 pilot who conceded
that "the Sidewinder (heat-seeking missile) was very good in straight
and level flight against a bogey which was day, VFR, and did not employ
ECM."
85
The preceeding discussion has focused exclusively on operational air
defense capability in 1971, but some relevant developments have been
underway. The extension of radar detection range has been a primary
concern to the JASDF. Detection may be extended through sea-borne
pickets or by airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft; AEW has been a
primary air force objective, but cuts in the 1972 budget reduced a major
8fi
funding proposal to "research and study on the radar." There have been
significant pressures to put this weapons system on a home-produced
airframe, and hope for an operational capacity during the 1970's has
dimmed. Possible steps designed to increase the survivability of the
detection network have been discussed. These include the construction
of mobile radar stations to back-up the fixed sites and point defense
85
Quoted from discussion with pilots at the Komatsu Air Base,




January 18, 1972, p. 3.

343
missiles to protect the sites. Some progress has been made on both
projects, however neither has reached the production stage.
The next major improvement will be the acquisition of the F-4E(J)
and its related armament, the radar-guided, Sparrow III missile. This
weapons system will exceed the capacity of the radar and controlling
network. Delivery of the F-4 was scheduled to begin in 1972, however,
squadrons will not be operational until the 1973-1974 period. Eight
aircraft were to be delivered in FY 1972 and 24 more in FY 1973. Total
inventory will again be a factor in overall readiness. When pipeline
and readiness estimates are applied, the JASDF will operate an average
of 85 operational F-4's. This will limit their availability for secondary
roles. The cost of the Sparrow III may exceed 30 million yen per copy
which will also restrict the number to be stocked and the availability
87for training.
These weapon system improvements will result in increases in the
overall air defense capacity. Japan will attain some degree of all-
weather capacity which it did not previously possess. The system will
remain range-limited by the radar-identification system. Overall
probability of kill will increase with the extended range, endurance
and improved armament of the F-4.
F-4 deliveries will not be completed until the late 1970' s, and for
at least the ensuing six years, the system will remain very fragile.
Even after the 1970' s radar weaknesses will leave the F-4 vulnerable on
the ground. Mr. Aoki argued that the system should be examined as an
attacker would examine It. After doing so, it Is difficult to disagree









structure and the disharmony of equipment has resulted in "no complete
88
air defense weapons system."
Opinions as to the success of the JASDF in the event of attack vary
greatly. Mr. Aoki "laughed at the story describing the destruction of
89
the Air Self-Defense Force." ' Mr. Kaihara estimated the ASDF would
last one hour in a Soviet attack, while one U.S. Air Force officer
suggested five minutes. ° A senior Japanese officer offered a more
balanced view when he predicted some success against a conventional
attack by aircraft using bombs; however, air-to-surface missiles and/or
ECM penetrations would leave the JASDF helpless. There is little doubt
that the vulnerability of the radar sites and bases, the small weapons
system inventory, the lack of war reserves, the inadequacy of dispersal
procedures, and the absence of rules of engagement severely detract from
the operational effectiveness of the Japanese air defense system.
There is a need for perspective when discussing air defense because
it is an extremely complex mission. The air defenses in North Vietnam
are among the most concentrated in the world. Parallel radar sites
control multiple missile launches, radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns
provide point defense and fighter aircraft supplement the missile/gun
network. While it has not been destroyed, it has never been able to
inflict unacceptable damages on the attacking aircraft. The overall kill
probability of the system has not exceeded 3 percent.
88Interview, March 3, 1972.
89
Aoki "F-4 wa Nippon no Sona de Dou Tatakauka?" (How is the F-4
Going to Fight in the Japanese Sky?), Gunj i Kenkyu (Japan Military Review),
March 1969, p. 68.
90





Japan faces geographical limits to its ability to extend detection
range. In the north, toward the Kuriles and Sakhalin, radar coverage
already has extended over Soviet territory. The narrow island provides
little depth to facilitate the interception solution. Mountainous
terrain makes dispersal difficult.
The Japanese system, with all of its limitations, has become one of
the most advanced in the world. Second only to the U.S. air defense
system in sophistication, it is similar to the NATO system which will
become operational in 1973. Considering the state of the art, it is a
very advanced and modern air defense network.
Perhaps one of the most significant differences is the priority
which this mission has been assigned in Japan. Because it has become
the first line of defense, failure is a more crippling defect in Japanese
defense than a similar failure elsewhere. Whatever the perspective,
the final operational conclusion was succinctly stated by a senior
commander of the Air Self-Defense Force: "we cannot carry out our duty
to the Japanese people." The primary line of defense has remained
suspect. Air defense was chosen as the first line of defense by the
policies which have been pursued in Japan. Those same decisions have
shown little concern for operational capacity in the past; they show
little for operational capacity in the near future.

VI.
THE POTENTIAL FORCE STRUCTURE

The potential of a nation's force structure may be considered a
derivative of the national strength. If a reason may be imagined which
would impart the will to mobilize for the use of violence, the resultant
force structure would equal a multiplication of resources and capacity
to mobilize.
Japan has a superior capacity to mobilize. It is a unitary national
state with a well disciplined, highly socialized population. Its
literacy rate is one of the highest in the world.
The technical skill of the population is also a valuable resource
in the mobilization process. In 1970, approximately 103,000,000 people
produced over 12 million television sets, 3 million passenger cars, and
93 million tons of steel. Mining and manufacturing more than doubled
from 1966 to 1971 and Japan generated more than 350 billion kilo-watt
hours of electricity during 1971. The general electronic and mechanical
expertise of the population has been rated among the highest in the
world.
Potential, at least short-range potential, in the field of aviation
has remained much lower. There were less than 9500 pilots in Japan in
1971, including private, commercial and military types. There were
approximately 1000 civil aircraft in 1970, from single-engine private
3
aircraft to multi-engine jet airliners. These figures represent a
relatively small base of aeronautical experience.
Economic Survey of Japan
, p. 159.
2
9492 as of December 1971, there were 5646 licensed civilian pilots
and 2846 military pilots. Boeicho Koho
, December 24, 1971, p. 12, and
Interview with Captain Kimoto of JAL, January 25, 1972.
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A more basic weakness has resulted from the dependence on foreign
natural resources. Japan imported 100 percent of its nickel, aluminum,
and uranium in 1971. Imports accounted for 99.9 percent of its petroleum
supply, and 91 percent of its iron ore and coking coal. 4 There would
be less than 45 days fuel supply in Japan if the Straits of Malacca was
closed and mid-east oil became unavailable. Beyond these shortages of
specific strategic materials, Japan has a low capacity for stockpiling
in the broadest sense of national strength. An island nation, it trades
around the world and relies on that trade for a great variety of
essentials from foodstuffs to iron ore.
Nonetheless, any nation may take steps to enable the mobilization
of those resources which might be available to it. Japan has displayed
little concern for operational mobilization procedures as noted in
Chapter 10. However, there are other, broader aspects of air power in
which policies may attempt to achieve a long-term, broad base for air
power mobilization.
,
A national air power structure, particularly an autonomous structure,
is based in part on the industrial capacity to manufacture the weapons
systems to be used by the air force. Military technology continuously
advances and it is particularly critical in aerospace warfare. Therefore,
an autonomous air power base also requires research and development in
airpower vehicles and weaponry. These two key bases of air power
capability will be addressed specifically in the ensuing two chapters.
4The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic
Survey, 1971 (London: IISS, 1972), p. 60.
Mr. Peter T. Ehara, Managing Director, Osaka Hydrant Co., Inter-
view, January 25, 1972. Mr. Ehara has been active in petroleum supply,




The manufacture of aircraft was a special strategic industry in
Japan during World War II. From modest beginnings in the early 1920's,
it began independent design work in 1932 and was completely independent
in all aspects of research and production by 1937. Before bombing took
its toll in 1944 and 1945, the industry employed over one million
employees and manufactured approximately 2,000 aircraft per month.
In the aftermath of defeat, the industry was dismantled completely. 1
Occupation policies ended all aircraft design and production, aerodynamic
studies, and aviaSion activities of any kind. In addition, the aircraft
factories suffered heavily in the massive bombing campaign against
Japan. There was little left, and the ensuing seven years left a large
technological gap when the aircraft industry began anew in 1952.
The vacuum was not complete, and while the plants, dies and tools of
the industry were destroyed, the skills of the technicians and adminis-
trators were available to be tapped when the revival began. One respected
defense industry author contended that the void of the early Occupation
was a benefit to the industry; outmoded processes and methods were
2
stripped away, making adoption of new production methods simpler.
The major aircraft factories did take steps to preserve their
personnel immediately after the Occupation began. Jobs were provided,
even living facilities in bombed-out factories were made available.
Anything that could be produced was, and wherever possible, private
See Chapter 4 for the details of demobilization policies as they
affected the aircraft industry.




studies and individual research continued. 3 The Japanese government was
favorably disposed towards resumption of aircraft manufacture, as
demonstrated by their rapid promulgation of the enabling law less than
three months after the Peace Treaty became effective.
The impetus for resumption of aircraft production came earlier, and
it came from the United States. United States policy towards Japanese
defense posture first shifted in the National Security Council (NSC)
decision of November 1948, which "recognized the importance of the
security of Japan."* The United States began to place contracts with
Japanese firms for supplies and for the repair and rehabilitation of U.S.
aircraft in 1949. 5
The outbreak ^of war in Korea increased the U.S. demand for supplies
and accelerated the offshore procurement program in Japan. Shortly
after the war broke out, the U.S. National Security Council called for
the "development and utilization of Japanese industrial capacity as a
source of current and wartime requirements for the acquisition of supplies
and equipment for the United States Forces and in support of the United
States Assistance Program." The new NSC program was justified by
3
Mr. Shimomura Makoto, Manager, Business Sector, Aircraft Division
Shin Meiwa, Interview, February 16, 1972, told of making pots and pans
at Shin Meiwa (formerly Kawanishi Aircraft) during the early Occupation
years. Interviews with Mr. Ogawa, December 27, 1971, Mr. Mabuchi,
November 27, 1971, and Captain Kimoto, December 4, 1971, amplified the
story of the aircraft industry's efforts to remain capable of starting
anew. Also see Chapter 3.
Emmerson, Arms
, p. 66.
Garret, U.S.A.F. Industrial Planning with the Japanese Air Self-
Defense Force
, p. 1. A Shin Meiwa brochure reports that they began
repair of U.S. Army vehicles in 1946, along with kerosene motors, motor-
cycles and threshing machines. The Garret study is probably the most










(a) to provide logistical support to the United States and
its allies in the Pacific Area.
(b) to reduce the need for dollar aid to Japan.
(c) to conserve U.S. resources.
On March 28, 1951, the Department of Defense recognized this new policy
and issued a directive which formally recognized Japan as a supply
source for military requirements.
Pursuant to the U.S. policy shift, the Far East Air Force (FEAF)
established a Division of Industrial Planning early in 1952. In June
1952, a Contract Conciliation Panel and Procurement Coordination Sub-
s'
Committee were established within the United States-Japan Joint Committee.**
The National Security Council further refined U.S. policy on
August 7, 1952:
(a) to develop with Japan a program for Japanese assistance
to defense and defense-supporting industries by U.S. offshore
procurement with Defense and Mutual Security funds.
(b) to encourage Japan to expand and stabilize its economy.
(c) to encourage the development of cooperative relations
between Japan and other free nations.
9
This policy was reaffirmed with minor changes in June 1953, and again
in April 1955.






, pp. 1, 7. The Joint Committee had been established pursuant







An advisory team from the USAF Air Materiel Command visited Japan
in January 1953, and primarily dealt with the Aircraft and Ordnance
Section of MITI and the Aircraft Production Council, also within MITI.
The Aircraft Industry Promotion Law of July 1952, gave the government
great power over the industry, and the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry
Law of June 3, 1954, further increased their control. MITI has licensed
and controlled all aircraft companies, parts manufacturers and related
firms. It can control, limit or distribute contracts to benefit the
industry, and it can curtail the number of companies. Japanese
government control meant that most industrial planning became a government-
to-government function, including licensing agreements and private funding
measures.
The United States also affected the aircraft industry through
another channel. The U.S. Forces began to manufacture military hardware
items in Japan early in the Occupation, and by 1948, the ordnance section
of the U.S. Eighth Army was producing fully manufactured vehicles. *
Japanese nationals were involved in the construction projects, and a
management course began at Tachikawa Air Base in 1947. It graduated
approximately 4000 Japanese over the ensuing 16 years. In 1971, over
75 percent of those graduates were in leadership positions in the aircraft
industry, the airlines, the electronic industry and the JASDF. As the
industry began to revive, these young managers, trained and experienced
in U.S. defense production techniques, were quite important in
Garret, op . cit .
, pp. 3-4; Spencer, Military Transfer of Technology ,
p. 92; also based on a briefing from Major Torino, JASDF, on the contents
of the two laws in question, February 25, 1972.






By 1953, U.S. military commanders had been specifically charged with
implementing the U.S. policy to support the establishment of the defense
industry. Prime Minister Yoshida was unfamiliar with the details of
industrial planning and relied on advice from business and two particular
government advisors: Mr. Kiraura Tokutaro, Director of the Safety Agency,
14
and Mr. Masuhara. Aircraft industrial support became one subject of
the 1953 negotiations between Safety Agency officials and FEAF
representatives
.
The United States believed that early Japanese force estimates were
overly optimistic, and was quick to caution that the force structure
should be streamlined wherever possible. Industrial support was an
area which USAF planners felt could be included in the private sector,
reducing the size of the air force. In the words of General LeBailly
:
Based on recommendations from numerous senior USAF officers
involved in logistics we came to the conclusion that in
order to save military dollars and manpower, it would be
better to try and develop aviation industry along with the
Air Force and use it in lieu of a logistics command . Lb
This proposal coincided with the Japanese political desire to restrict
the military budget and the industrial desire to advance as rapidly as
Spencer, op_. cit., pp. 43-47, Spencer explained in detail the
progress of this inner circle of Japanese students and instructors who
became important in the aircraft industry.
13Garret, op_. cit .
, p. 4.
General Tatsumi, Interview, February 22, 1972; Mr. Masuhara,
February 19, 1972.
15Ibid., also General LeBailly, letter to author, December 9, 1971,
and General Weyland, letter to author, April 30, 1972.
^-"Letter to the author, December 9, 1971, my emphasis.
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possible. Therefore, the decision was made to actively support and
develop the industry through the assistance of both governments.
In July 1954, Prime Minister Yoshida stressed Japan's dependence on
U.S. financial assistance and offshore procurement for the development
of its industry. The United States already had contributed heavily to
the aircraft industry in programs which began in 1951. The earliest
assistance was in the form of parts procurement which helped the Japanese
to improve the quality of their steel and aluminum. United States
purchases totalled 9.5 million dollars from 1951 to 1956. Contracts
for aircraft overhaul and repair were let in 1952 and were particularly
helpful in updating Japanese aircraft engineering standards. The first
five years of that program brought 13.6 million dollars to the industry. °
The aid continued; U.S. offshore procurement totalled 507 million dollars
19
from 1952 to 1967. The aircraft industry alone has received over 134
20
million dollars through U.S. procurement.
U.S. contributions through the military assistance program exceeded
the procurement program. Military aid to Japan totalled approximately
1,600 million dollars by the end of the Military Assistance Program (MAP)
program which was phased out in 1967 and 1968. Part of this aid was
in the form of equipment transfers and did not directly benefit the
private sector. Licensed production of aircraft was the major benefit
to the aircraft industry. Negotiation for the eventual production of









The Society of Japanese Aircraft Constructors, Directory of The
Aerospace Industry in Japan , September 1, 1971, p. 3.
21Nihon no Anzen Hosho
, 1969, p. 354.
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jet aircraft in Japan began early in 1954, before the establishment of
22
the JASDF. The T-33, F-86, F-104 and P-2V-7 (for the MSDF) were among
the major aircraft produced in Japan through license. The United States
bore 67 percent of the cost of the initial F-86 and T-22 program, and its
contribution to major aircraft manufacture totalled approximately 200
23
million dollars.
Program Cos t U.S. Share Japan Share % U.S.
(million of U.S. Dollars)
F-86/T-33 172.0 80.8 91.2 47
P-2V-7 86.2 44.5 41.7 52
F-104 275.0 75.0 200.0 27
The assistance program was terminated in 1967 and the F-4, although
produced under license, has not been financed with American assistance.
However, the U.S. contribution has been extremely important; offshore
procurement and military aid accounted for more than 25 percent of the
0/
total aircraft industry production through 1967.
The Japanese government also has provided significant support to
the aircraft industry. It began direct subsidies to aerospace engineering
within the industry and among scholars in 1952. Those subsidies have
continued and had totalled 19.8 million dollars through 1971. The
government has assisted the industry in machinery purchases with
financing totaling 16.15 million dollars. In addition, 11.67 million
dollars was invested in the Nihon Aeroplane Manufacturing Company (NAMC)
,
22Garret, op_. cit . , p. 8.
23Compiled from Garret, op_. cit .
, pp. 77-78, and Mr. Arimori,
Interview, February 23, 1972 (from SJAC records).
24
U.S. MAP aid to aircraft manufacture, $200 million plus; U.S.
offshore procurement, $134 million; total value of Japanese aircraft






a semi-governmental organization established in 1957 to coordinate
production of Japan's first turbo-prop transport. The government has
underwritten another 115 million dollars of NAMC debts. 25
Government purchases have dominated industrial production, and more
than 75 percent of all aircraft production through 1970 was generated
by the government. Defense demand was particularly important in the
early stages of the industry, and the combined American and Defense
Agency purchases accounted for approximately 90 percent of the total
26industrial production through 1960. Civilian sector production grew
steadily until 1968 when it reached 44 percent of total aircraft sales.
The industry has declared a target of 80 percent civilian demand and 20
percent military demand, but has acknowledged that it cannot hope for
27more than a 50-50 division before 1985. Other estimates have foreseen
an even greater dependency on military demands in the future, back up
to 70 to 80 percent of all production.
It would appear likely that the aircraft industry, revived by
government policies, will remain under the government's firm control
and heavily dependent on its purchases. Dependence on government budgets
can be an uncertain business and dangerously unstable. This was one of
the primary reasons that the industry has advocated the five-year plans




26SJAC, 1968 Annual Report (Tokyo, Japan: SJAC, 1969).
27Nippon No Anzen Hosho
, pp. 130-131.
28Nihon Keizai
, January 7, 1971. The present ratio is 60 percent
military - 40 percent civil and the delay of a follow on civil transport
project (YX) would suggest that this forecast may be fairly accurate.
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now prefer that the plan be revised on a rolling basis, every one to
29
two years.
Another aspect of the Japanese aircraft industry has tended to
provide stability against variable government budgets. Japan does not
have independent companies; instead, manufacturing is conducted by
aircraft divisions of large corporations. Mitsubishi Aircraft, by far
the largest aerospace manufacturer, accounted for 5.1 percent of the
total sales of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry in 1970. Twenty-six large
aircraft divisions averaged 5.4 percent of assets and 4.5 percent of
30
sales of their parent corporations. These large corporations have
been more capable of absorbing budgetary fluctuations and accepting
temporary deficits.
The industry has strived to become more stable and independent, but
it has recognized the difficulty of achieving that goal considering the
current level of domestic demand. JDA budgets during the Fourth DBP
apparently will not increase to the extent initially hoped for by the
industry. No aircraft production program was scrapped but budget
retrenchments may continue to lower production totals within individual
31programs. Civilian demand, though on the increase, has appeared
unlikely to produce large dividends or significant growth potential.
Without a major technological breakthrough which could support a major
new transport or similar venture, large increases in civilian export
seems improbable. An alternative potential in the export of military
29
Arimori, Interview, February 23, 1972. This would provide the





31The aircraft industry produced 84% of all Japan's military air-
craft in 1971 so pure domestic production will not produce momentous changes.
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hardware has become apparent and the aircraft industry has become quite
interested in this field.
Exports of the aerospace industry have shot upward in recent years.
Exports totalled 3.6 million dollars and 2.1 percent of sales in 1963;
by 1968, those figures had increased to 61 million dollars and 23.8 percent
32
of sales. *~ However, this has been achieved primarily in the civil
market, and it will be difficult to maintain the current export level
without another major transport.
The one untapped source has been arms sales and the industry has
openly campaigned to change the government's policies concerning the
33
export of arms. They have realized that such sales may be delicate to
negotiate, but they have anticipated weapons systems exports in the
future. Although there remain significant pressures against arms sales,
it has become possible that the government policy will shift. One
reason for such a change has been the concept of jishu boei as it
relates to independent production. Domestic production will require
large increases in research and development expenditures, and will
increase the pressure for mass production. Mass production will require
increased domestic purchases or arms exports. As Japan's technological
level increases pressure also will come from abroad in the form of
3Spurchase offers.
32




Shimoraura, Interview; Ariraori, Interview; also see discussion
Chapter 6, the section on aircraft industry defense policy.
This view is expressed in "Domestic Arms Production a Rodcy Road
For Japan," Asahi Evening Mews , February 1, 1972, p. 6.
3 5Mainichi , April 4, 1972, reported that Boeing Co., of the United
States, had expressed interest in the Kawasaki developed C-l transport.
The aircraft is described in Chapter 10.
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Aerospace exports of all types, including arms exports, will depend
in large part on the industry's capability to maintain pace with world-
wide development in a more autonomous role. There are indications that
such a role is evolving. The United States has discontinued aid, and
has displayed some hesitancy in granting licensing agreements. Japan's
own desire for an independent industry has led to increased self-reliance.
The aircraft industry experienced tremendous development in all
areas of production over the past twenty years. It produced one aircraft
in 1952 and 215 in 1969. The personnel base has been quite solid; in
fact by 1972 it appeared to be overstaffed with a total industrial
employment of approximately 25,600. The income of those employees
averaged the equivalent of 3,238 dollars per year in 1970, about double
the national average. Experienced technicians could be drawn from
other divisions of the company in the event of expansion, and aerospace
enrollment in the universities has continued to increase. The industry
has been able to absorb only one-third of the aeronautical engineering
students graduating each year. Therefore, they have had the opportunity
to select the top of each year's class, insuring high, industry-wide
personnel standards.
The industry has relied heavily on licensing agreements, particularly
in the production of modern military aircraft. As a result of this
practice, they have advanced dramatically in production techniques.
Mitsubishi Aircraft has begun assembly line production of the F-4E(J)
and it represented the most sophisticated advances in aerodynamic and
weapons systems engineering incorporated into an operational aircraft by
0£
SJAC, Directory
, pp. 2-3, also see Cecil Brownlow, "Direction of
Aerospace Industry Studied by Japan," Aviation Week , January 19, 1970,
p. 69.
37Brownlow, "Direction of Aerospace," loc . cit . , p. 70,
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1971. The Japanese capacity to produce the aircraft represented superior
production techniques by world standards.
Licensing has not generated the same expertise in all areas of
aircraft production and the industry has enjoyed less success in design
and development. Airframe design has been an exception and significant
progress has been achieved in this area. The PS-1 seaplane, designed
by Shin Meiwa, was revolutionary in its design concept and capable of
landing and taking-off in seas much higher than previously thought
possible. Kawasaki's C-l, although not unique, is a well-designed,
short haul cargo aircraft capable of advanced, short-field operations.
Mitsubishi has designed, developed and flown the XT-2, supersonic jet
trainer. While tbe aircraft is similar to the British Jaguar and
American F-5, it has placed Japan in an elite group of nations capable
of designing and producing supersonic aircraft.
The industry is not without some significant weaknesses, however,
and one of those is related to parts design and manufacture. For example,
the C-l has relied on Dunlop of Britain for tires because Japan did
not have the facilities to develop them. Both the C-l and the XT-2
10
have relied on imports for 40 to 50 percent of their parts.
One of the weakest points of parts construction has been in the
area of detailed casting and forging. The industry has had the capability
of making some aluminum and titanium alloys, but it has been deficient
39in high heat and chemical welding techniques. Japan has had no large
38
Nippon No Anzen Hosho
, pp. 54-55.
39 Ibid., p. 56, also Mr. Shimomura, Interview, February 16, 1972
and Mr. Ogawa, Interviews, December 27, 1971, and January 21, 1972,
Colonel Richard G. Leech, USAF, former Air Attache to Japan. The




forging press and has not been capable of large panel work. The wing of
40
the C-l relied on U.S. imports.
Material construction has also constituted an industrial weak point.
Japan has lagged far behind other advanced nations in the development
of low-weight and heat-resistant alloys including those using boron,
nickel, carbon and aluminum. The high-thrust engines in modern jet
aircraft require carbon fibre manufacture and hollow turbine blades which
have not been produced in Japan.
Jet engine design and production also has lagged behind air frame
capacity. Japan designed one jet engine in 1959 which was capable of
approximately 3100 pounds of thrust. There were no further developments
until 1971 when MITI sponsored a project to develop a turbofan engine
with 10,000 pounds of thrust.
This project was not aimed at a practical model, illustrating how
far behind Japan has been in engine production capabilities. Another
follow-on project to produce a 20 to 30,000 pound engine has been
planned, and would take an additional four years. The resultant engine,
which was planned for production in the 1980's, would be comparable in
many respects to the engines operating in the Boeing 747 and USAF C-5.
The electronics industry has become more interested in aircraft and
aerospace related equipment. New guidance devices, fire-control radars,
data-link receivers , sonars and navigation equipment are among the
devices required by aircraft weapons systems. In some of these areas







, pp. 61-62. The thrust on the Japanese engine would be
less than the JF-90 on the 747 (43,500 lb. thrust), but perhaps superior
in some other technical aspects.
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there has been a reverse spin-off phenomena where Japanese sophistication
in solid-state electronics has benefitted defense projects. For
example, Japan's technological capacity in the design and production of
small, solid-state radar equipment has been very advanced.
In other, weapons-related areas, the aviation electronics industry
has had a much lower capacity. Sonar development has been sloxtf, lagging
behind front-line development in this area. Missile guidance systems
have also been behind. The AAM-1, developed in Japan, is an air-to-air,
heat-seeking missile comparable to the U.S. Sidewinder, which was
developed in 1966. The U.S. missile was operational ten years before
and the Japanese model cost four times as much when it was produced.
The Japanese aircraft industry has made great strides forward in
the past twenty years and has exhibited an impressive capacity for
production of sophisticated aerospace vehicles and weaponry. However,
to some extent the appearance of modernity has been misleading, and
estimates that Japan's industry was two to three years behind must be
considered optimistic. Others view the industry very critically; for
example, in 1970 General Okumiya estimated the aircraft industry to be
ten to fifteen years behind that of Great Britain and twenty years
46behind that of the United States.
The industry has appeared to be financially sound and the nature of
its corporate structure has provided it with a good deal of flexibility.
Sankei , June 17, 1970 discussed the rising interest in defense
among the big electronics firms.
44
See Chapter 12 for a discussion of research and development in
space vehicles and guidance.
Nippon no Anzen Hosho
, pp. 66-67.
46





Personnel standards have been rather high and also provided the industry
with room for expansion. Production techniques have compared with the
highest world standards. In view of these strengths, General Okumiya's
estimate was pessimistic, but not unrealistic. Engine manufacture,
parts construction and material compounds have been production
technology areas which have been behind world standards. Based on
assessment of these areas, it would appear that the industry was at
least seven to nine years behind world technological levels in 1971.
The industry will continue to require government support and rely
heavily on government purchases. Although autonomous production has
been an oft-quoted goal of the Japanese aircraft companies, the current
technological level of the Air Self-Defense Force could not be maintained
in the absence of licensing agreements. Although it has now produced
front-line aircraft, certain parts of those aircraft and the accessory
equipment necessary to make them complete weapons systems could not be
produced in Japan.
Therefore, despite governmental support, the industry, at its
technical level of 1971, was not self-sufficient; partly because of the
industrial goals which had been set so high. The effort to produce
major front-line equipment had succeeded but only at the expense of




Aerospace research and development cannot be isolated from the
aircraft industry; advancing technology continuously contributes to
industrial posture. The government's policies toward research and
development therefore represent to some degree its general attitude toward
the potential side of the force structure.
The industrial weaknesses mentioned in the previous chapter emphasize
the need for research and development. Home production can only continue
with the support of basic and applied research in aerospace and weapons
development. Only' research can upgrade the aircraft industry and bring
its technology to a level consistent with its production techniques.
The value of all science-related research in Japan was estimated in
excess of two billion dollars per year during 1971. The United States,
whose economy was four times the size of Japan's, invested ten times
that amount in similar research. Only 18 percent of Japanese research
and development dealt with projects not developed abroad, 32 percent of
the projects were under development outside Japan and 30 percent of the
2
work was on techniques already established outside Japan. Perhaps the
best gauge of Japan's overall research and development effort has been
the Japanese balance of payments in technical knowledge. Japan payed
368 million dollars for imports of data in 1969 and received 46 million
3dollars for its exports. In comparison, the United States exported
Nippon no Anzen Hosho










ten times their technical data imports and Britain exported slightly
more than they imported.
The disparities between official government expenditures for research
was even more startling. In Japan, only 30 percent of all science-
related research was government sponsored in 1970; in the United States,
64 percent; and in Britain 54 percent of science research was government
4
financed. The United States government spent more than twenty times
the Japanese budget for scientific research.
One reason for the limited Japanese government investment in research
may be related to the high level of economic motivation to Japanese
research. Economics-related research accounted for 75.4 percent of all
research and development in Japan in 1969 while the comparable figure in
Britain was 24 percent, 12.4 percent in France and 3.2 percent in the
United States. Additionally, 86 percent of space and nuclear research in
the United States related to defense. The figure was only slightly lower
in West Germany, France and Britain, where defense related projects
accounted for approximately 65 percent of space and nuclear budgets.
Japan's proportion of defense-related space and nuclear research amounted
to 16.5 percent.
Money actually funded for defense research in Japan comprised a tiny
portion of research investment, approximately 2 percent in 1968. The
JDA research and development budget was 4.1 percent of government directed
science research in 1969. This compared to 46.6 percent in the United
4Nippon no Anzen Hbsho
,
p. 18. In West Germany the ratio is
government - 44%, civil - 56%.
Ibid . These figures were based on 1969 data and Japan's space
and nuclear efforts have increased dramatically in the two succeeding






States and over 40 percent in Britain. The United States was spending
300 tines the amount Japan did on research and development for defense.
Even within the Defense Agency, research and development has
received little priority. Its percentage of the defense budget has
hovered at 2 percent after 1968 as Figure 12-1 indicates. Figure 12-1
also reveals that Japan has spent less than 130 million dollars on
defense over the past 18 years. The 1972 budget included a 12 percent
increase, and optimistic estimates forecasted that the research portion
o
of the defense budget would increase to 3.5 percent of the Fourth DBP.
The monies allotted by government have financed approximately one-
half the defense research conducted. Figures available for 1967-1968
indicated that the JDA contributed 51 percent to defense research, the
aircraft companies contributed 48 percent and other public sources
9financed 1 percent. Nearly 70 percent of the research in aerospace was
financed by the JDA, but only 31 percent of missile research and 26 percent
of research in defense electronics was similarly financed. The total
amount budgeted for defense research in Japan each year was still less
than 100 million dollars, and only a portion of the money applied
directly to research.
The isolation of the Technical Research and Development Institute
(TRDI) has exacerbated the scarcity of funds. Other research institutions
in Japan, particularly educational institutions, have shunned any




Colonel Yamawake Hisashi, JASDF, Development Division, ASO,
Interview, February 14, 1972. The Development Division is the Chief of
Staff's advisor on technical development and maintains liaison with the
TRDI. Original drafts postulated 3.5%, but the revision of the 4 DBP
could alter that figure.
9
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relationship, or even contact, with the TRDI. The isolation also has
extended to government agencies . The JDA obviously has had no contact
with the various atomic energy projects underway, but it has shared
common interests in space research, particularly with regard to propellants
and guidance. Yet space research in Japan "completely excludes" the
military. The only exchange of information has occured within private
companies which might be conducting projects for both agencies. Even
this has been discouraged by the Science and Technology Agency, and such
an exchange must be ad hoc without any effective integration of functions
or goals.
Within these rather restrictive budgetary and operational limits
,
the TRDI has born the responsibility of directing all Defense Agency
research. The Institute is divided into five research centers and five
test centers where research actually performed by the TRDI is conducted.
Four Deputy Directors actually have a more important role, for in their
capacity as advisors to the Director, they "plan, design and conduct the
in
experiments" which are related to specific functional areas. The four
divisions include ground, naval, air and guided missiles. The divisions
are purely functional; all aircraft, whatever branch of service, are
developed through the Deputy Director for Air Development.
Major General Tanaka Kanji, JASDF, Deputy Director for Air
Development, TRDI, Interview February 14, 1972. General Tanaka felt this
situation was critical, particularly in space and missile technology.
"Tlr. Ichinose Teruo, Space Development Counsellor, Space and
Technology Agency, February 25, 1972, Interview. Mr. Ichinose confirmed
that no intra governmental contacts were made, either through the
respective agencies or through individual research facilities.
12Japan Defense Agency, The Technical Research and Development
Institute
, undated (1972), provided by General Tanaka, Deputy Director
for Air Development, TRDI, p. 11.
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The Deputy Director's most important function has been the guidance
of and liaison with the private companies conducting research because
all major projects have been conducted by those companies. Over 65
percent of the 1970 TRDI budget was expended through contracts, and
approximately 80 percent of all monies expended directly for research
13
were used by private companies. In 1970 only 70 percent of its staff
was dedicated to research activities compared to nearly 90 percent in
private research organizations.
Official JDA policy has recognized the primacy of private military
research. The Equipment Bureau promulgated a "Basic Policy of Production
and Research for Military Equipment" in July 1970 which said in part:
Defense power.... is based on the industrial power of the
nation and independent development, promotion of domestic
production, and the utilization of private companies are
necessary. ...Independent research ....should be promoted
and private companies should be utilized.
"
The Technical Institute has become primarily a bureaucratic apparatus
by which defense research is administered. The actual research structure
has been a series of decentralized research bureaus of private firms.
The lack of centralization obviously results in some areas of duplication
and uncertain responsibility.
The TRDI does not have the facilities or equipment to undertake
major research projects. This is another reason for the reliance on
civil research, because the JDA has emphasized major item research.
1 ^
JDA, The Technical Research and Development Institute , inside
cover (budgetary breakdown)
.
Nippon no Anzen Hosho
,
p. 26.
1 5Koho Antenna , #121, August 1970, p. 17.




After 1965, 60 to 80 percent of research funds have been allotted to
major aircraft and missile systems such as the PS-1, the XC-1, the XT-2
and a short range surface-to-surface missile. Major systems will continue
to be stressed in the forthcoming defense program which includes such
items as a multi-purpose, high-speed helicopter and a land-based patrol
airplane for anti-submarine warfare. One report indicated that those
two projects alone will be funded at 40 billion yen, approaching the
total amount allotted to research in the last DBP. '
The emphasis on major projects has limited the number which can be
attempted and escalated the risk involved in a failure. One major program
which proved unsuccessful would be a serious blow to the overall
development effort. As a result, the TRDI has been very cautious and
hesitated to apply funds to high risk projects. The two major aircraft
projects already mentioned have illustrated this caution. The
helicopter program envisioned a medium-size helicopter with winged,
high-speed capability. Its performance parameters are similar to
helicopters which have been developed in the United States. The large
ASW aircraft project envisioned a central computer system already being
18
utilized in similar U.S. aircraft. These two aircraft may have some
unique performance characteristics, but the initial design parameters
were within the scope of performance characteristics achieved elsewhere.
One source cited several target items in the Japanese research and
development proposals that have been built elsewhere and concluded that
Nippon no Anzen Hosho
,
p. 27. 47 billion yen was spent on research
in the 3rd DBP and a maximum of 150-170 billion yen would be spent in
the next plan based on 3.5% of the draft DBP now under revision.
18
See JPE Aviation Report
, February 15, 1971, p. 4, for a general
discussion of the two projects.
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19there was very little worthy of the name research.
The TRDl's caution has produced domestic equipment obsolescent
before they could be mass produced, or at best, time lags in acquiring
modern equipment. The caution the JDA has revealed has been reinforced
by the companies which would prefer to conduct research on a project
which will be produced, thereby insuring additional profits for their
efforts.
The bureaucratic process by which the decision is made to begin a
project has constituted another risk-discouraging factor. Viewpoints
from other government bureaucracies are considered before the JDA
authorizes a research project. In some cases, the decision is controlled
20
outside the JDA. J
The TRDI receives an open requirement for a system from the eventual
user service. It works with the service to develop a set of performance
requirements. These are then reviewed by the internal bureau before
the Director-General issues a Fundamental Design Order.
The Equipment Council within the JDA is the reviewing body which
must approve the TRDl's requirements package. The Fundamental Design
Order entails selection of a company to do the basic research, and the
Equipment Council chaired by the director of the Equipment Bureau is
21directly influenced by MITI. Furthermore, formal consultations with
MITI are required before a major project is approved.
19Nippon no Anzen Hosho
, pp. 22-23.
20
The bureaucratic procedures discussed herein are based on
interviews with Colonel Yamawake and Colonel Samejima, February 14, 1972.




The company which will conduct the research is normally chosen
according to three major criteria. The technical capability of the firm
receives first consideration. Political considerations come next:
MITI is interested in an even distribution of projects among various
companies. The same considerations which apply to production contracts
are utilized in the field of research. Finally, the companies have
specific types of equipment in which they are expert. For example, Shin
Meiwa has been the foremost seaplane producer while Kawasaki has
produced land-based patrol aircraft, and Mitsubishi has dominated fighter
manufacture. Therefore, they would be more likely to be chosen to do
research in their particular area of specialization.
The problem of testing exacerbates the delays in aerospace research.
The basic geography of a mountainous, island nation is hostile to
aircraft testing. The United States test area at Edwards Air Force
Base in California is as large as the entire Kanto Plain. Japan's test
areas are either in the middle of urban areas, or in mountainous regions
as in the case of the major flight test center at Gifu. Weather provides
an additional handicap, causing serious delays in testing. Gifu is near
the major air routes along Japan, and near the Nagoya urban area where
public opposition can delay testing. A similar aircraft, completed on
the same day will clear testing much more rapidly where adequate testing
facilities are available. Japan's test program may require three to
four times the period needed in the United States. ^
22Okumiya, The Sky is Full of Danger
, pp. 74-79, discussed these
test difficulties in detail. General Okumiya emphasized the delay factor
in an interview, November 18, 1971. He also noted that the decentralization
of research is important in this area. He pointed out that the JASDF
had no direct responsibility in the initial testing of the XT-2; it was
handled through the Development Division and the TRDI without assigning
a specific military project officer.
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The funding, the objectives, the procedures and problems of defense-
related aerospace research and development combine to limit its
effectiveness severely. The defense establishment's lack of experience
in current combat experience has further hampered efficient weapon
development. No serious research has been conducted on the aircraft
weapons systems which would follow production models, let alone second
generation systems. It would appear improbable that defense-related
research is capable of keeping the aircraft industry and the resulting
air power structure abreast of technological developments in the 1970' s.
Furthermore, the emphasis on major systems has made it unlikely that
autonomous research can contribute significantly to those production
areas where industry has lagged behind.
There are two other areas of research and development which directly
bear on defense technology although they are conducted independently.
Space program vehicles and nuclear energy have obvious applications to
military use. Although neither has been espoused by Japan, technical
capabilities in those fields have significance in terms of future options.
Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law sets forth the Japanese
basic policy on nuclear energy:
The research, development and utilization of atomic energy
shall be limited to peaceful purposes and performed
independently under democratic management, the results
therefrom shall be made public to contribute to inter-
national cooperation. ^3
That basic policy would have to be revised before military applications
of nuclear research could be undertaken; however, other factors exist
which limit technical advance in this area.





A Japanese nuclear option would require a core of nuclear scientists
and engineers. Perhaps 400 to 500 key personnel with training and
experience could provide the nucleus for an effective nuclear weapons
24
program. In the prevailing atmosphere in 1971 in Japan, few nuclear
scientists and engineers in Japan would cooperate with a military
project, and time would be required to establish such a nucleus of
personnel.
An effective program would require a stockpile of Plutonium or
Uranium 235. Japan almost certainly would opt for the more sophisticated
uranium weapon, and it could take several years to stockpile the reserve
necessary. The alternative methods of obtaining adequate material are the
fast breeder reactor or a uranium enrichment program. These also would
take years to complete; however, a fast breeder reactor is under
development in Japan.
Japan also faces the problem of geography again. A suitable
location for bomb assembly and nuclear enrichment would require industrial
and power support, yet demand safety separation and pollution control
provisions. Even if such a site could be established, Japan would face
the additional problem of testing. Japan has no remote islands or
desert hinterland, and underground or other controlled testing would
meet stiff opposition. The dangers from pollution, earthquakes or other
phenomena would deter homeland tests of any kind.
Geography also affects the ultimate strategy for the weapon's use. z ->
A large, anti-city system would be easier to construct, but unreasonable
0/
Y. Suenaga, "Nixon Shocks, Muckrackings Preempt Japan's Manuever,"
part of 8-part series "U.S. -Japan Relations" in The Daily Yomiuri
,
January 29, 1972, provided a critical view of Japanese nuclear capacity
which I have utilized as a basis of this viewpoint.
25
The options of nuclear strategy are discussed in Chapter 2.
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for Japan. Large land-based missiles would be vulnerable on the islands
of Japan and increase the probability that the population would be struck.
Sophisticated anti-force strategic weapons or defensive weapons would
require even more advanced technology.
While these technical vulnerabilities have militated against any
decision to 'go nuclear,' there have been significant advancements in
Japanese nuclear research. Japan's first atomic energy budget was
appropriated in 1954 and the basic law was enacted two years later. That
first budget of 250 million yen grew to nearly 50 billion yen in 1971. "
Private funding has more than doubled this investment, putting the
annual funding in nuclear-related areas in excess of 100 billion yen.
There are nine different ministries which have some function related
to nuclear energy, but three major operative bodies and one advisory
27body dominate the governmental organization. The advisory body is the
Atomic Energy Commission which is attached to the Prime Minister's
Office. It is directly concerned with the promotion of research,
development and utilization of nuclear energy. The Atomic Energy Bureau
within the Space and Technology Agency is an administrative center where
basic policy has been formulated. The Japan Atomic Energy Research
Institute was founded in 1956 through joint investments of government
and industry, and is the central research organ in Japan. An independent
offshoot, the Nuclear Ship Development Agency, has been concerned with
Atomic Energy Bureau, Atomic Energy in Japan , undated (1971),
provided by Atomic Energy Bureau.
27
Detailed organizational description may be found in Gensi Ryoku
Nenkan-1971 (Atomic Energy Yearbook-1971) (Tokyo: Nihon Gensi Ryoku
Sangyo Kaigi (Atomic Energy Industrial ossociation) , March 1, 1971),
pp. 281-283; also see Atomic Energy Commission, Fourteenth Annual Report
1969-1970 (english translation)
,




nuclear ship construction. The last major institution is the Power
Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation.
This reactor and fuel corporation is particularly relevant to
Japan's future military nuclear options. It has been concerned with
power generation, and has experimented with advanced nuclear fuels and
fast breeder reactors. The fast breeder reactor will produce more
Uranium 235 than it consumes and would provide Japan with unlimited
amounts of weapon-grade fuel. Japan's development program has progressed
to the stage that a prototype fast breeder reactor was under construction
28
and due for experimental operation by 1973-1974. Japan also began to
produce enriched uranium in a centrifugal reactor in April 1972.
Japan has been quite active internationally where several agreements
29guaranteeing outside uranium sources have been negotiated. Japan
recently signed an agreement with Australia which gave it access to the
rich uranium sources there; thus, Japan has come to have access to all
30the major non-communist uranium sources.
Education in the nuclear field expanded rapidly in Japan. Nine
universities had nuclear science and engineering programs in 1970, of
31
which seven began in the 1960's. There were more than 10,000 people
engaged in nuclear related projects in 1969. This number was expected
to increase to more than 15,000 by 1973, including approximately
28





, p. 313, discusses the many agreements in this area
which Japan has signed.
30
Asahi Evening News , February 22, 1972 reports the signing.
Australia has the 4th largest uranium deposits in the non-communist world.






Japan faces many technical liabilities in any attempt to add nuclear
weapons to its arsenal. However, it has pursued the use of nuclear
energy through large and varied fields of research and has added to its
general body of knowledge on the subject. A great deal of experience
will have been compiled by 1980, and an unlimited supply of uranium will
be available when fast breeder reactors become operational. At that time,
the decision to attain nuclear weapons will be a relatively minor one
in technical terms. The time period between a decision to obtain nuclear
weapons and achievement of the goal will have become minimal.
If nuclear weapons do become a relatively simple technical challenge
to Japan, they alone do not constitute a weapons system. A warhead
must have a delivery system. Japan has license produced the NIKE missile
which has been equipped with nuclear warheads in the United States. The
F-4, produced at Mitsubishi, is capable of carrying nuclear weapons on
combat missions in excess of 800 NM and could provide a tactical delivery
system.
Japan has not developed either a strategic delivery system nor an
anti-missile defense system. The effort to attain either capability
would utilize missiles as the delivery vehicle. Japan could depend on
aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, however, such an option would appear
to be quite unattractive. Base dispersal has been a problem in Japan
and any attempt to build an effective strategic force would require
greatly expanded dispersal capacity, among other measures. Such a force
would increase the probability of direct attack in the event of hostilities.






The majority of space vehicle and related research has been conducted
by the Science and Technology Agency. Space research in Japan began in
February 1955, when the Institute of Industrial Science at Tokyo
University began the development of sounding rockets. 3 By June 30, 1958,
two stage rockets were being launched, and two years later a National
Space Activities Council was organized to advise the Prime Minister on
space-related matters. The existing development agencies were reorganized
into the National Space Development Center in 1964. That center has
become the major focus of space-related activity in Japan, although six
separate ministries received appropriations for space research in the
1972 budget. 34 *
Japanese industry also has participated actively in space endeavors.
Keidanren, the Federation of Economic Organizations, dated its space-
related activities back to 1961. It established the permanent Space
Activities Promotion Council on June 10, 1968, which has promoted "the
35
study, development and utilization of space technology." The Council,
which consists of 53 firms and professional organizations engaged in
space activities, has maintained close relations with the government
in the formulation of space projects.
This formidable infrastructure has made significant strides; fifteen
years after the first decision was made to pursue space research, Japan
successfully launched its first satellite. As KokuJoho proudly noted:
33See Science and Technology Agency and Keidanren, Space in Japan
,
1971 (Tokyo: Asahi Evening News , December 1971), pp. 18-20 for a brief
chronological history of space activities in Japan.
34Japan Times , January 21, 1972. Those included the Education,
Transport, Posts and Telecommunication, MITI, and Construction as well






Japan thus became the 4th Nation in the world to succeed
in launching satellites of her indigenous design and
make with her indigenous rocket, after the Soviet Union,
the U.S.A., and France. 36
Japan launched two satellites in 1971 and has planned an ambitious
37
launch schedule including nine launches in the next five years. It
also has anticipated expending approximately 220 billion yen in govern-
ment funds over the ensuing five years. The 1972 space budget climbed
to 24 billion yen, more than a 50 percent increase over 1971. Perhaps
more important, space research was in the enviable and unusual position
of receiving all the government funds necessary to pursue its proposed
38projects.
Some aspects of the space vehicle program have developed at an
excellent rate. Japanese metallurgy technology has been quite advanced,
and Japan has enjoyed significant progress in rocket motors. Solid
propellants have been used extensively in Japan, in fact, almost
exclusively. They are much easier to store and handle which makes them
desirable for use in military missiles. Liquid fuels' are more commonly
used in large thrust engines, and lack of experience in handling and
utilizing liquid fuels was one of the factors which prompted a recent
39
licensing agreement to produce the U.S. Thor-Delta in Japan.
36




See JPE Aviation Report , October 26, 1970, pp. 10-11, for a
schedule of the launches planned through 1976.
38
Mr. Ichinose, Interview, February 25, 1972. Mr. Ichinose said




, also see "Drastic Changes in Japan's Space Development
Program," KokuJoho , February 1971. The license agreement to produce the
Thor-Delta was made and one satellite booster program was terminated and
another begun using the new vehicle as stage 1. This shift in a major
space program decision one year after its inception (the expense involved)
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Despite these indications of technological strength in space vehicle
research, there are two vulnerable areas which directly affect the possible
military application of the space program. The first of those is reentry.
Japan has never attempted reentry and has done little research on heat
dispersal, ablative materials or other aspects of the reentry problem.
A strategic ballistic missile must be able to reenter the atmosphere.
Equally important is accuracy, and guidance has been an 'Achilles
heel' in the Japanese space vehicle program. The Japanese guidance
effort has been most rudimentary; they have yet to launch a fully guided
ballistic missile. Their satellites have been launched with unguided
rockets and the orbits later established by observation and calculation.
The decision to license the Thor-Delta also was prompted by this
lack of guidance sophistication. The license agreement will not bring
Japan up to the Thor-Delta level of guidance because portions of the
system have been sold as 'black-box' components, not subject to Japanese
production. Japan had not planned to launch a practical satellite
until fiscal year 1978 though they hope that this schedule will be
accelerated by three years through Thor-Delta licensing. Therefore,
the first large Japanese guided missile will be launched in 1975 or
1976. Even at that time, Japan may be unable to launch such a guided
vehicle independently.
Japan will remain a novice in the field of inertial guidance and
ballistic vehicle guidance for some time after its first satellite is
again indicates the priority of this aspect of Japanese scientific
research.





launched into a predetermined orbit. Its lack of sophistication in
guidance would limit strategic application of the current Japanese space
program in the 1970' s.
There are potential military applications in the fields of space
vehicle and nuclear energy research, but the body of knowledge and
experience necessary for effective development has been lacking. Japan
generally has deemphasized research and development in the post-war era.
Japanese industry might be capable of the procedures and standards
necessary to produce sophisticated aerospace weaponry, but it remains
doubtful that the general level of Japanese technical capacity in
aerospace science would be capable of designing and engineering equally
modern weapons systems.
The neglect of defense research has left it incapable of supporting
technological standards in 1972; it was even less qualified to design or
adapt second generation aerospace weaponry. While the broad, long-range
potential of Japan and its industry is significant, the weaknesses
which have been mentioned have seriously restricted Japan's capacity




POLICY OPTIONS AND THE FUTURE

In the post-war era, the Japanese government has assigned air power
a primary role of providing for Japan's autonomous military defense.
Yet, the development of the air force structure has not optimized
operational capability. Governmental concern with aircraft industry
growth, allocations within the Air Self-Defense Force and training and
operating procedures have stressed future development. This emphasis
provided the air force with a nucleus of highly skilled pilots and
technicians who are capable of effecting a mobilization or change in
missions utilizing high performance weapons systems. Deemphasis of
research and development has limited the independence of the force
structure, but industrial priority increased mobilization capacity if
technical assistance was available.
The deemphasis of operational readiness in the air force structure
has been reflected in the other two branches of the Self-Defense Forces.
The priorities of Japanese military policy have raised further questions
about its relationship to and compatibility with national security policy.
National security policy may include ideological, economic, political
or military measures. Policies may directly respond to infringements
on the state or they may develop internal cohesiveness , increasing the
state's resistance to disruptions. Such policies are in part developed
in response to the international milieu perceived by a state; they also
are affected by the relevant societal and institutional factors internal
to the state.
Security policy may be examined from various aspects. One alternative
is to view the policy from an international viewpoint, thereby treating
See Kaihara, "We Should Know Ourselves as Well as Knowing Them,"
loc . cit
.
, where the lack of war reserves and operational incompatibilities




the reaction of national policy to the milieu as a unitary response.
The policy may also be perused from a national perspective, emphasizing
the social and historical factors which condition a state's response
to its environment.
The national perspective has been particularly important in the
Japanese case as historical and social factors have had increased
significance due to the relatively low level of perceived threat and the
drastic experience of defeat and occupation. Examination of the internal
elements impinging on all aspects of security policy is a large task
which defies definitive assessment of the relationship between the
elements and a particular aspect of policy.
This study has focused on one functional partition of the military
aspect of national security policy. This is the finite rather than the
comprehensive approach. It is a fragmentary view of national security
policy rather than a broad view. While there are risks in such an
approach, there are also advantages. The finite view assesses the nature
of the elements relevant to the particular policy aspect, air power in
this case; it examines the process by which the policy evolves; finally,
it definitively assesses the nature of the policy response. Because
of this closer perusal, the findings may either buttress or alter the
common presumptions about the particular policy response. That, in turn,
may give new insight to conventional views of overall Japanese security
policy.
The introduction to this study described some of the common
theories concerning the basis for Japanese security policy. Both Weinstein
and those who emphasize U.S. influence make the assumption that Japanese
policy has been responsive to the situations which it has faced. A
rather comprehensive, and non-theoretical exposition of these views
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edited by James Morley. This volume dealt with Japanese security policy
primarily through emphasis on the various elements which pertain to it.
Morley, after discussing the Japanese milieu in the concluding chapter,
recognized that Japan perceived no imminent or serious threats. Based
upon that conclusion and drawing from the remarks of the various
contributors, he hypothesized that Japanese security policy can be
characterized by four distinguishable elements.
The first element is "the balanced development of Japan's total
power," emphasizing economic growth.-3 All governmental needs are
evaluated and answered with primary reference to their affect on the
economic base. In addition, the government has relied on "peace
diplomacy," or diplomacy designed to ameliorate tensions and ease
confrontations in Asia. Japanese Asian diplomacy has included a growing
aid program. The final two elements of Japanese security policy more
directly pertain to the response to physical threat. Morley identified
those as reliance on the American alliance and the "systematic build-up"
4
of the defense forces.
The last two policies have often been considered complementary.
The alliance was designed to provide for those threats which Japan could
not defend against and the defense establishment was designed to supple-
ment the treaty. In Weinstein's words:
Their role in defending against external attack was... to
hold off an attacker until powerful American units could
^(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); contributors
include Helmann, Langdon, Thayer, Weinstein and Young.
3
Ibid., p. 210.
4lb id ., p. 212.
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enter the battle. In effect... the function of the Self-
Defense Forces became the strengthening of the American
guarantee. The Self-Defense Forces perform this mission
by being able to defend against low-level, probing attacks,
thus assuring that if and when a Soviet initiative is taken,
it will have to be on a large enough scale to call for
a strong, quick American response. That is still their
function today.
5
Based on this type of assumption, Morley concluded that future Japanese
defense build-up would continue to emphasize a complementary role:
Such a build-up (Fourth DBF) should enable Japan to play
a much greater role in its own defense and to exercise a
greater degree of surveillance over its own and contiguous
air space and over the surrounding waters, particularly
between the home islands, the Bonins, and Okinawa and to
a certain extent possibly as far as Guam and Taiwan. Its
defense industry can be expected to expand, so that by 1975
Japan will! probably have stockpiled sufficiently for a
reasonably prolonged war."
The policy described by these theoreoticians is rational, balanced
and based primarily on the lack of immediate military threat to Japan.
They assumed that the various aspects of policy were integrated in order
to provide security through a balance of economic, diplomatic and
military measures.
Such a theory depends on specific assumptions about the nature of
the defense forces and specifically the Air Self-Defense Force. Is air
power designed to meet low-level attacks, to operate with the U.S.
Forces, to control the contiguous air space, and to fight a prolonged
war? If it is not, and the evidence presented in this study suggests
that air power goals have been different, then the general conclusions
regarding national security policy are suspect. In fact, the air power







perspective has provided a somewhat different interpretation of the four
aspects of national security policy. It is not as rational, flexible
and responsive to external influence as the general analysis would suggest.
Economic growth has been a primary Japanese concern and has at
various times been legitimized in terms of national security. Balanced
growth was a part of the basic defense policy promulgated in 1957.
This policy has been interpreted and executed by the bureaucracy which
rules Japan and in this process it has grown to more than a security
guideline. Economic growth has become more than a basis for national
security. It has been translated into a series of ratios by which money
is distributed to the sectors of government. Relative needs or changing
priorities seem to have limited affect on disbursements. Morley noted
that the proportion of public money distributed to various governmental
functions remains remarkably constant from year to year.
The point is that the government assigned an extremely low priority
to defense spending in an era of bipolarity during the late 1950 's.
This principle has been institutionalized in the bureaucracy at less
than one percent of GNP for the military and significant changes in the
international environment have not altered this percentage. The lack of
flexibility suggests that the process is somewhat insulated from external
pressures.
Japan has continued to emphasize peaceful diplomacy, and has
attempted to broaden and consolidate economic and official relations
throughout Asia. The primary thrust of this effort has been to conciliate
or in some way accommodate different views. There has been little or no
Japanese attempt to impose Japanese views through anything outside




diplomatic measures. Force in support of diplomacy has been absolutely
prohibited outside the territory. Japan has even refused to consider
participating in a United Nations peace-keeping mission.
The final aspects of Japanese security policy mentioned by Morley
deal with active defense against the use of force. This study has
demonstrated a tenuous relationship between the Security Treaty and the
Air Self-Defense Force. The force structure has not been designed to
defeat low-level, probing attacks. It has not allocated resources to
raise the threshhold of war, or to prolong it in order to benefit from
U.S. support. Training procedures and programs have not emphasized the
limited force concept. Command procedures have not been designed to
facilitate a joint U.S. -Japanese effort. Equipment selection has not
reflected concern with limited, local war. The aircraft industry has
not developed in order to support a small, autonomous force.
There are elements which do explain the manner in which the force
structure has evolved. The Security Treaty cannot be considered in terms
of its response to a direct threat. The Japanese assessment that no
threat exists has not depended on the Security Treaty. Therefore the
autonomous force structure has not been built to complement the treaty
or respond to any existing threat.
The bureaucratic process in post-war Japan has left the defense
forces in a vacuum. They have been dominated completely by civilian
control but have received little or no guidance. The government, satis-
fied with maintaining low priorities for military funding, has not
effectively directed the development of the Self-Defense Forces.
Opposition political forces, fearful of legitimizing the defense forces




The limits which have circumscribed the development of the Air
Self-Defense Force have not been related primarily to the threat or to
strategy. The historical experience of World War II, a close relationship
with the USAF and the broad objectives of the military air power planners
have had an unnaturally large effect due to the vacuum surrounding the
JASDF. The planners have not faced assigned or self-imposed goals, but
have planned in terms of directions.
Outside the uniformed services, the nature of defense structure
evolution has also been significantly affected by the defense industry.
While it has not advocated an independent force structure, pressures
for an autonomous and technologically advanced industry have supported
the military preference for a greater degree of autonomy.
What has emerged is an air defense force which is supposedly the
front line of Japanese autonomous defense, but is instead a highly
professional nucleus. It would require a great deal more money to realize
its potential, and it has not been funded nor equipped primarily as an
operational force structure.
The bureaucratic insularity of the defense establishment has made it
relatively unresponsive to changing government perceptions or inter-
national pressures. Therefore, a shifting international environment
has not caused significant changes in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan.
The step-by-step development of the Air Self-Defense Force has not been
made with any fixed goal of limited capability in mind, but an unlimited
direction, independent air power.
The Nor ley assessment provided a picture of a cohesive, balanced
national security policy capable of responding to a broad range of
threats. It did not fully consider the importance of process and internal
variables that are particularly significant in the Japanese bureaucratic
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environment. Two aspects of this environment have had particular
relevance to national security policy.
The bureaucratic process has inhibited flexibility and made the
policy rather insensitive to change. The number of participants in
defense policy formulation has exacerbated this problem. Secondly,
military aspects of Japanese security policy have been demeaned and
deemphasized for historical and social reasons. The resulting isolation
of military planners has tended to increase the policy's unresponsiveness.
A somewhat different, more fragmented picture of Japanese security
policy emerges from this analysis. The one point of agreement in Japan
is that there is little threat. The threat has been assessed primarily
in terms of indirect aggression or social disruption. Therefore, economic
emphasis has not only been a principle but the primary tool of national
security. Possible controversies have been resolved where possible or
avoided. Physical response to threat outside the territory has received
no consideration, and direct threat to the territory has been considered
minimal. In those circumstances, the Air Self-Defense Force has become
part of the core of a military force which primarily provides a
capability to exercise future military options.
The airpover choices in the post-war era have been characterized by
a willingness to sacrifice operational capability in order to maintain
an infrastructure capable of a more rapid development pace. The disregard
for war reserves, the choice of high performance weapons system's units,
and the concern with industrial development have illustrated this preference.
The options available are not without limitation: the development of
air power has not been a comprehensive, government-wide evolution, and
there remain problems of technology and operations which would be
difficult to overcome. This does not negate the basic proposition that
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a capability for expansion or mission modification are the basic results
of post-war air power policies. Such a capability is particularly
important in the 1970's in view of an increasing probability that some
shift could occur in Japanese national security policy which would
increase the emphasis on military measures.
There are many different possibilities concerning the evolution of
o
the international system in Asia. Whatever the forecast, it invariably
has included the prediction that political and strategic diversification
of the bipolar system will continue. Many disagreements exist over the
extent of this evolution, for example, the affect of latent nuclear
bipolarity has often been argued.
Although these questions of degree will continue, there can be little
doubt that the evolution of a multi-centric regional system is underway
in Asia. The Nixon Doctrine has recognized the growing influence of
national centers in Asia, in particular China and Japan. Diversification
of power has been accompanied by a relaxation of tensions and growing
intercourse between the four major powers.
These international momentums have exacerbated domestic instability
in Japan and have led toward reexamination of the Japanese concept of
national security. Although 1975 has been suggested as a proper time to
reevaluate the Security Treaty, no firm date or program of security
policy revision has been established. However, it seems likely that
momentum will continue to build, and that future revision of Japanese
security policy is almost certain.
See Chapter 1 for discussion of possible political-military sub-
systems, also see Alastair Buchanan, "Power-Relationships in the Far
East: A European View," Survival , May-June 1972, pp. 106-113 for several
different alignments in East Asia which are at least theoretically
possible. Also Morley, ed., Forecast
,
Chapter VI and VII included
possible systematic developments in Asia.
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It would be very difficult to forecast the extent or direction of
change in the various aspects of security policy, nor would it be
possible to conclude that all policy assumptions will be altered. Japan
has recognized the evolution of the international system, the possible
implications of the Nixon Doctrine, the existence of Chinese nuclear
capability and the presence of the Soviet fleet. Internally, the
lessening aversion to military affairs and acceptance of the force
structure have contributed to the momentum. If these trends continue,
it seems likely that some additional emphasis in Japanese security policy
will be accorded to military capabilities.
Acceptance of this reordering of priorities and support for it would
be in the interest of all states in Asia. If Japan's strength is the
stability of its government, its weakness is bureaucratic inflexibility.
There is great resistance to any policy revision, particularly in
security affairs. Reinforcement of this inertia would be counter-
productive because a realignment of policy which was delayed until an
emergency could result in a drastic shift of priorities. The effort
to compensate for previous unpreparedness could result in overemphasis
of military alternatives as opposed to the current disinterest in
military oriented security measures. Technological weaknesses which
would emerge in the event Japan exercised an independent rearmament
option could exacerbate such a shift.
This does not mean that major Japanese rearmament is inevitable or
that other states cannot affect Japanese decisions. The United States,
for example, would remain in Asia in its own self-interest. Massive
disengagement would almost inevitably cause the Japanese to rearm. At
the same time, the U.S. presence will not deter all rearmament nor should
that be a U.S. goal. Selective rearmament in non-provocative fields

391
which support the Japanese defensive posture should be encouraged.
Japan's air power, like other military alternatives, will play a
larger role in Japan's future security policy. Non-recognition or
non-acceptance of this transition could eventually cause an irrational
shift in Japanese security priorities emphasizing the use of force.
External support for policies which reflect the reality of the power
balance are most likely to assist the Japanese in adapting to the power
balance. Such attitudes on the part of Japan's allies and neighbors
would provide the highest probability that Japan will continue to pursue
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